BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7739@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://rccs.rutgers.edu/component/jevents/icalrepeat.detail/2022/0 4/22/2230/54/fifth-rutgers-workshop-on-chinese-philosophy-in-person-live-s treaming-rsvp-required?Itemid=147 DESCRIPTION:
RSVP is required for both in-person and remote attendance. Click here to RSVP.
\nRutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) wa s launched in 2012. It is designed to build a bridge between Chinese philo sophy and Western analytic philosophy and to promote critical engagement a nd constructive dialogue between the two sides\, with the hope of bringing the study of Chinese philosophy into the mainstream of philosophical disc ourse within the Western academy. It is run every other year\, usually in late spring.
\nThe REC is a pre-read conference. The papers will be made availab le on this website on April 15.
\nFriday\, April 29\, 2022
\n\n
Satur day\, April 30\, 2022
\nDiscussants
\n\n
Participants (to be updated soon)
\n
Chris Copan\, Andy Egan\, Megan Feeney\, Peter Klein\, Matthew McGra th\, Susanna Schellenberg\, Ernie Sosa
\n\n
The REC is a pre- read conference\, so papers are to be read in advance. There is no registr ation fee for the conference\, but please notify Chris Copan\, the confere nce manager\, if you plan to attend by sending an email to rutgersepistemologyconference@gm ail.com. If you wish to participate in the meals\, please send a check made out to “Rutgers University” to the conference manager by April 15 ($ 80 if you are a faculty member or a postdoc\; $60 if you are a graduate st udent or an undergraduate): Chris Copan\; REC\; 106 Somerset St\, 5th Floo r\; New Brunswick\, NJ 08901.
\n\n
Contact Toby Bollig
\nTBA
\nLocation TBD
This conference celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first publication of Saul Kripke’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by show casing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influen ce. These topics include\, but are not limited to: the nature of names and natural kind terms\; the failure of the description or cluster/descriptio n theories\; the distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apriority\; empty names\; the metaphysics of essence and origin\; the natu re of modality and possible worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology o f modality\; the role of philosophical intuition\; and the mind-body probl em.
\nDates: 12th and 13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.
\nVenue : The CUNY Graduate Center\, 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.
\nFormat: hybrid
\nRegistration: for both online and in person attend ance\, please register by the 28th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
\n\n\n\n
Tickets: https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20221212 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20221214 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:Philosophy Dept.\, CUNY Graduate Center @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:50 Years of Naming and Necessity URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/50-years-of-naming-and-n ecessity/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:conference\,epistemology\,language\,metaphysics X-TICKETS-URL:https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7 END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7887@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT: DESCRIPTION:One of the most challenging as pects of the war in Ukraine is the way in which the conflict has been cons tantly shifting in its form. In the first place\, there is a conventional ground war between Russia and Ukraine\, in which the identity and will of the two peoples is at stake. Yet Russia has used weapons supplied by Iran\ , and Ukraine depends on NATO for its own supplies\, indicating that this war depends on the maintenance and expansion of alliances. The stability o f these alliances in turn depends on a combination of Realpolitik and shared values as the glue that holds them together. This logic of all iances motivates the energy war that Russia is waging with Europe\, reveal ing that\, unbeknownst to Europe\, Russian energy policy over the last dec ade was an early form of the war. Similarly\, the threat of nuclear war al so tests the resolve of NATO\, forcing it to consider the values at stake in the conflict. Is the war about Ukraine’s sovereignty or the principle o f nation-state sovereignty itself? Is it about human rights for Ukrainians or the entire human rights project? For Russia\, is it about self-defense or a pan-Slavic identity? Is it about the protection of Russian minoritie s in Ukraine or the threat of Western secularization?
\nThe material form of the war—economic\, conventional\, n uclear—will depend on the way in which the participants on all sides and i n all parts of the world come to an understanding about these questions co ncerning the moral and spiritual stakes in the war. If it is just a matter of giving up Ukraine\, then the economic costs for Europe may not be wort h the fight\, and Russia’s victory in the energy war could lead to a gener al NATO capitulation. But if the freedom and security of central and weste rn Europe are also at stake\, then even a severe economic recession would be a small price to pay for the reestablishment of a NATO-dominated securi ty order. Is freedom worth the risk of annihilation? Is peace worth the in dignities and repression of authoritarianism? As the most serious global c onflict since World War II\, the war in Ukraine risks going beyond the bou nds of all other forms of war before it. What are the resources that are n ecessary for meeting its challenges? How can the shifting forms of the war be contained and channeled toward a future lasting peace?
\nThese types of questions are not specific to the wa r in Ukraine but arise in any situation of war. Every war forces us to rec onsider the character of war and the forms that it can take. In the first place\, the insight that leads to a war is one about the nature of a confl ict. War only begins once the parties determine that there is an otherwise irresolvable conflict about the basis of order. The course of a war also results in a practical insight into the form of a postwar order. Peace and stability cannot arrive until all come to an agreement about the new unde rstanding of order. This intertwining of practical and theoretical gains m eans that the time of war is also a time of shifting manifestations of the forms by which war is fought\, as well as the forms of order to be establ ished by the outcome of the war. The course of a war will be decided by ou r understanding of the kind of world we want to live in\, the risks we are willing to take to establish such a world\, and our belief in its practic al possibility. A war will necessarily change in form depending upon where we are in the movement from the conflict of competing ideas to the victor y of a particular conception of order. Since the result of the conflict wo uld be an establishment of sovereignty based on some understanding of orde r\, the conflict is not just a material one but also a theoretical and spi ritual one about the metaphysical basis of order. In the process of war\, insight leads to conflict\, and conflict leads to insight.
\nAt the 2023 Telos-Paul Piccone Institute conference on forms of war\, we will consider different ways of understanding the re lationship between conflict and insight in war as well as examples of how the conceptualization of conflict affects the outbreak\, progress\, and ou tcome of wars. On the one hand\, we will consider the way in which the exp erience of war\, both on the battlefield and on the home front\, affects t he outcome of the war. On the other hand\, we will look at how this import ance of the experience of war in turn affects the strategy of war. Such st rategizing begins already at the nascent stages of conflict\, before any a ctual fighting begins\, but in which the possibility of conflict can alrea dy lead to concessions by one side or the other that lead to a transformat ion of the basis of order. Similarly\, fears and hopes for the future also determine the course of a war\, helping the participants to end a war by offering them a mutually acceptable vision of the terms of peace.
\nQuestions include:
\nThe conference will take place at the John D. Calandra Italian Ame rican Institute in New York City from Thursday\, March 30\, to Saturda y\, April 1\, 2023.
\nPlease note: Abstracts for this conference will only be accepted from current Telos-Paul Piccone Inst itute members. In order to become a member\, please visit our membership enrollment page. Telos-Paul Piccone Institute memberships are valid until the end of the an nual New York City conference.
\nIf yo u are interested in making a presentation\, please submit a 200-word abstr act and 50-word bio by December 15\, 2022\, to t elosnyc2023@telosinstitute.net. Please place “The 2023 Telos Conferenc e” in the email’s subject line.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230330 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230402 GEO:+40.736746;-73.820319 LOCATION:John D. Calandra Italian American Institute @ 65-30 Kissena Blvd\, Queens\, NY 11367\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:2023 Telos Conference: Forms of War URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/2023-telos-conference-fo rms-of-war/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,war END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7913@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/106913 DESCRIPTION:The Center for Philosophy of Religion at Rutgers University is pleased to host an in-person\, working-papers conference on the Psychol ogy and Epistemology of Religious Experience. We are seeking abstracts (15 0-350 words) from those interested in participating. The tentative date is 15-16 April 2023. And the deadline for submission is 28 February 2023. Pa rticipants with accepted submissions will be given hotel accommodations an d a modest honorarium to help defray travel costs.
\nTheme
\nThe overall theme of the workshop is the Psychology and Epistemology of Religious Experiences. Philosophers of religion frequently assign reli gious experiences important epistemic roles\, such as justifying religious beliefs. But religious experiences of the kind philosophers are intereste d in are also studied in other fields as well\, such as psychology and rel igious studies. However\, the psychology and epistemology of religious exp eriences are presumably not independent\; studying them together is likely to be insightful in various ways. To that end\, we are interested in brin ging together scholars working on the psychology and epistemology of relig ious experiences. Potential topics include:
\n· The nature of religious experiences
\n· Taxonomies of religious experiences< /p>\n
· Potential psychological mechanisms and accounts of religio us experience
\n· The relation between perception and religiou s experiences
\n· The epistemology of religious experience
\n· The interactions between the psychology and epistemology of r eligious experience
\n· The relation of cognitive science of r eligion to religious experience
\nAny proposed papers on these topic s\, or similar ones\, are welcome. Papers exploring interdisciplinary appr oaches are also welcome.
\nInstructions
\nPlease submit an abstract (150-350 words)\, long abstract (350-650 words)\, or full pap er to Timothy Perrine at tp654@scarletmail.rutgers.edu. Submission should be prepa red for blind review. In a separate document please provide your name\, in stitutional affiliation (if applicable)\, and contact information. Submiss ion deadline is 28 February\; acceptances will be decided by 5 March\; and the workshop will be held 15-16 April.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230415 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230417 GEO:+40.49747;-74.44717 LOCATION:Center for Philosophy of Religions\, Rutgers @ The Gateway\, 106 S omerset St\, New Brunswick\, NJ 08901\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Psychology and Epistemology of Religious Experiences Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/psychology-and-epistemol ogy-of-religious-experiences-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,epistemology\,mind\,religion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8001@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://rccs.rutgers.edu/component/jevents/icalrepeat.detail/2023/0 4/28/2376/54/sixth-rutgers-workshop-on-chinese-philosophy?Itemid=147 DESCRIPTION:Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philos ophy (RWCP) was launched in 2012. It is designed to build a bridg e between Chinese philosophy and Western analytic philosophy and to promot e critical engagement and constructive dialogue between the two sides\, wi th the hope to diversify the practice of philosophy by bringing the study of Chinese philosophy into the mainstream of philosophical discourse withi n the Western academy. It is run every other year\, usually in late spring .
\nSixth RWCP\, “New Voices in Chinese Philosophy\,” will be held in person\, with live streaming throu gh Zoom\, on Friday\, April 28\, 2023. Six junior scholars of Chinese phil osophy\, representing new voices in the field\, will engage six more senio r scholars. This year’s workshop is co-sponsored by Rutgers Global\, Relig ion Department\, Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion\, and Philo sophy Department. RSVP is required for attendance\, either in-person (limi ted to the room capacity) or online. Click here to register.
\n8:20a.m. Breakfast
\n8:50a.m. – 9:00a.m. Welcoming Remarks
\nKa
ren Bennett\, Chair of Philosophy Department\, Rutgers University
9:00a.m. – 10:00a.m. “Relational Normativity: Williams’s Thick Eth
ical Concepts in Confucian Ethical Communities”
\nPresenter:
Sai-Ying Ng (CUNY Graduate Center)
\nCommentator: Alex Guerrero (Rut
gers University)
\nModerator: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
10:00a.m. – 10:15a .m. tea break
\n10:15a.m. – 11:15a.m. “Paradoxes in the
Zhuangzi”
\nPresenter: Chun-Man Kwong (University of Ox
ford)
\nCommentator: Graham Priest (CUNY Graduate Center)
\nMode
rator: Karen Bennett (Rutgers University)
\nRapporteur: Adrian Liu (R
utgers University)
11:15a.m. – 11:30a.m. tea break
\n11:30a.
m. – 12:30p.m. “A Mohist Theory of Reference”
\nPres
enter: Susan Blake (Skidmore College)
\nCommentator: Jane Geaney (Uni
versity of Richmond)
\nModerator: Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
12:30p.m. – 1:3 0p.m. Lunch (onsite)
\n1:30p.m. – 2:30p.m.
“Wealth\, Poverty\, and Living a Moral Life: Confucius and Mencius”
\nPresenter: Frederick Choo (Rutgers University)
\nCommentato
r: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)
\nModerator: Tanja Sargent (Ru
tgers University)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
2:30p.m. – 2:45p.m. tea break
\n2:45p.m. – 3:45p.m. “Grat
itude and Debt in Western and Confucian Ethics”
\nPresenter:
Choo Lok-Chui (Nanyang Technological University)
\nCommentator: Fran
ces Kamm (Rutgers University)
\nModerator: Hagop Sarkissian (CUNY Bar
uch College)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
3: 45p.m. – 4:00p.m. tea break
\n4:00p.m. – 5:00p.m. “‘Flying b
y Not Having Wings’ — in and beyond the Zhuangzi”
\nPresenter: L. K. Gustin Law (University of Chicago)
\nCommentator:
Lincoln Rathnam (Duke Kunshan University)
\nModerator: George Tsai (U
niversity of Hawaii at Manoa)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers Unive
rsity)
Keynote: Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin-Madison) p>\n
Pedagogy Workshop Leader: TBA
\nLocation: The Graduate Center \, CUNY—New York\, New York
\nAbstracts & Workshop Applications due: July 31st 2023
\nResponses: August 31st 2023
\nOrganizers: Mi chael Greer (CUNY)\, Maria Salazar (CUNY)
\nContact email: gscope.co mmittee@gmail.com
\nThe committee for the Graduate Student Conferenc e on Philosophy of Education (GSCOPE) invites abstracts for papers on the topic of Higher Education\, Democracy\, and Controversy. The theme of the conference & post-conference pedagogy workshop reflects the difficulty in creating and maintaining respectful discourse in higher-education classroo ms\, especially surrounding controversial empirical\, moral\, and politica l issues. Some argue that this is an equity issue. Undergraduate students who come from rural and/or underprivileged areas are more likely to experi ence alienation on campus\, sometimes because they have never been exposed to certain “politically correct” language or ideas\, and sometimes simply because they lack the financial and social capital that their peers have. It seems crucial (and follows from democratic and civic values) to foster safe learning environments for all students\, especially those students w ho are more likely to feel alienated on college campuses and in elite spac es. At the same time\, some argue that the aim of higher education is pure ly epistemological\, and not civic or democratic. Proponents of this view might hold that free speech and academic freedom must be properly protecte d for higher education to perform its proper social function: education. W hat is the appropriate relationship between higher education\, knowledge-p roduction\, teaching\, free speech\, and democracy? How can higher educati on instructors and professors be effective teachers in the light of these relationships?
\nPapers must pertain to higher educationbut maybe ab out anything from interpersonal classroom dynamicstoinstitutional policies to campus controversy. We are particularly interested in papers that expl ore the following topics:
\nWe especially welcome contributions that:
\nAbstracts should:
\n– Outline the paper’s principal
argument(s).
\n– Give a good sense of the paper’s philosophical and/o
r empirical contributions and methods.
\n– Be anonymized.
Pro posal Guidelines:
\nPlease submit abstracts of up to 500 words by mi dnight EST on Monday\, July 31\, 2023.
\nPDF or DOC.X by email to gs cope.committee@gmail.com
\nPost-Conference Pedagogy Workshop
\nThe theme of our conference Higher Education\, Democracy\, and Contro versy is relevant to graduate student educators\, who are routinely u nder-trained and under-equipped to engage with real-life problems they may encounter in the classroom. The lack of training for higher education tea chers is a growing iue in philosophy of education.
\nThis workshop a ttends to this issue by facilitating a space for graduate student educator s to reflect on how to foster good teaching environments for controversial issues\, and be good interlocutors with each other on controversial issue s. The workshop will also touch on promoting equity in classrooms. We will provide workshop participants with a certificate of completion.
\nh ttps://philevents.org/event/show/112546
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20231012 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20231015 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:GSCOPE 2023: Higher Education\, Democracy\, and Controversy URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/gscope-2023-higher-educa tion-democracy-and-controversy/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfp\,conference\,epistemology\,ethics\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8024@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://sofheyman.org/events/beyond-polarization-epistemic-distorti on-and-criticism DESCRIPTION:Individuals support forms of domination with varying levels of understanding that they are doing so. In many cases\, those very struct ures of domination distort our conceptions of them through mechanisms such as motivated reasoning\, implicit bias\, affected ignorance\, false consc iousness\, and belief polarization. These various epistemic distortions\, in turn\, cause social conflict\, notably by promoting political polarizat ion. Those worried by social conflict have spent a great deal of energy de crying the increasingly polarized contexts in which we live. However\, epi stemic distortions in our sociopolitical beliefs also misrepresent\, maint ain systems of domination and prevent human needs from being met.
\nThis workshop aims to go beyond pronouncements such as ‘we are polarized’ or that ‘partisanship is on the rise\,’ and begin to think through epistem ic distortions at the individual and intersubjective levels\, the role of criticism and critique in facilitating belief and social change\, and the idea of reconciliation\, by asking questions such as:
\nConvenors
\nEge Yumuşak is a philosopher\, specializing in epistemolo gy\, the philosophy of mind\, and social & political philosophy. She recei ved a PhD in Philosophy from Harvard University in 2022. Her research exam ines political disagreement—its material foundations\, psychological and s ocial manifestations\, and epistemic properties. She is currently writing a series of articles on the nature and significance of clashes of perspect ive in social life.
\nNicolas Côté is a postdoctoral res earcher at the University of Toronto. His research is mainly in normative ethics and social choice theory\, but they also dabble in applied ethics a nd issues of practical rationality. Côté’s doctoral dissertation work focu ses on the measurement of freedom\, especially on axiomatic approaches to the measurement question\, and on how deontic concerns for protecting indi vidual rights interact with welfarist concerns for improving the general w elfare. Côté’s current research focuses on the ethics of decision-making u nder radical uncertainty.
\nInvited speakers:
\nSabina Vaccarino Bremner\; Daniela Dover\; Cain Shelley
\nInvited commentators
\nTBA
The Rutgers Epistemology Conference is a pre-read conference. The papers\, the finalized schedule\, and further i nformation about the conference will be posted soon.
\nThere is no registration fee for the confer ence\, but please notify Caroline von Klemperer\, the conference manager\, if you plan to attend by sending an email to rutgersepistem ologyconference@gmail.com. If you wish to participate in the meals\, p lease send a check made out to “Rutgers University” to Caroline von Klempe rer by April 15 ($80 if you are a faculty member or a postdoc\; $60 if you are a graduate student or an undergraduate). Checks should be sent to Car oline von Klemperer\; Rutgers Epistemology Conference\; 106 Somerset St\, 5th Floor\; New Brunswick\, NJ 08901. Everyone signed up for conference me als by April 15 will be listed as a participant on the conference website.
\n\n
https://philevents.org/event/show/112086
\nAll sessions will be held at the Hyatt Regenc y in New Brunswick\, NJ. A limited number of reduced-priced rooms are available to those attending the conference. The reduced rate is $170 per night for a single or double room. You can reserve a room here: https://ww w.hyatt.com/en-US/group-booking/EWRRN/G-RE01.
\nIf you are a graduate student or a postdoc and would like to attend the c onference and stay with a Rutgers graduate student\, please contact the co nference manager at rutgersepistemologyconference@gmail.com< /a>. We will try to provide all graduate students and postdocs a place to stay\, but we cannot make any promises.
\nInformation about accessibility of the conference venue can be found here.
\nPlane & Train: If you are flying\, it is best t o fly into Newark Airport. It is about 25 miles from the Hyatt Regency in New Brunswick. The best way to get from the airport to New Brunswick is vi a NJ Transit. The train stops at the airport and it is a 25 min train ride from the airport to New Brunswick. When you arrive at Newark Airport\, fo llow the signs to the monorail “airtrain”. The airtrain will take you to t he NJ transit train stop. Trains run from Newark Airport to New Brunswick about every half hour. A oneway ticket Newark Airport – New Brunswick is a bout $14. You can buy tickets at the vending machines at the Newark Airpor t train station or on the mobile app MyTix. The Hyatt is a 5 min walk from the New Brunswick train station.
\nTra in: The best way to get to New Brunswick from New York or Philade lphia is via NJ Transit. The Hyatt is a 5 min walk from the New Brunswick train station.
\nABSTRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attribut ed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appeara nce in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, laws). We will examine the fragments that discus s fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that thes e fragments see for the fa\, how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments\, in classical Chinese with English translations (Harris 201 6)\, are included here as a PDF attachment.
\n\n
DA TE: October 22\, 2021
\nTIME: 7:00-8:30 pm
\n\n
This seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. T he attached file is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with the program’ s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeti ng can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the m eeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Of fice will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nLead Presenter: Eirik Lang Harris
\nDiscussan ts: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State University)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa < /a>(Gettysburg College)
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secu re online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Discussion of Fa (法) in the Shenzi: Eirik Lang Harris URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-discussion-of-fa-%e6%b 3%95-in-the-shenzi-eirik-lang-harris/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7750@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCI ETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
\n\n
< b>Presents: Li Zehou on the ‘Deep Str uctures of Confucianism’
\nLead Presenter: Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\ , CUNY)
\nDiscussa nts: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Bucht el (Hong Kong Education University)
\nABSTRACT: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zeh ou’s cross-cultural methodology blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and Marx. This seminar addresses the question of cul ture and its role in Li’s thought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition influences the subjects within it. One such cla im concerns the existence of ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlin ed in this preparatory reading . The idea is that culture\, history\, and social practice (col lectively\, a tradition) shape human psychology (including the formation o f concepts\, emotions\, and values) in ways not always apparent to the sub ject. Within the Chinese tradition\, Confucianism constitutes such a deep structure\, and its effects cannot be captured by textual studies alone\, nor studies of material culture. Rather\, the deep structure is articulate d in terms of an emergent shared subjectivity. Such traditions can evolve and ultimately dissolve\; nevertheless\, their effects are deep-rooted. Th is seminar meeting will aim to identify the parameters of Li’s ambitious t heoretical framework and its plausibility\, and to explore connections wit h current work in related fields\, such as cultural and empirical psycholo gy.
\nDATE: Ma rch 25\, 2022
\nTI ME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST
\nThis seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addition to fam iliarizing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there are two thi ngs we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need t o sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided b y the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form \, Giving to Columbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages p ersons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. Th e University Seminars participants with dis- abilities who anticipate need ing accommodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability Services at 212.85 4.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disabili ty accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are available o n request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public S afety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/co mparative-philosophy/
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T183000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T200000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Li Zehou. Deep Structures of Confucianism URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/li-zehou-deep-structures -of-confucianism/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7774@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
THE COLUMBIA SOCI ETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
\nWelcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:
\n< p class='gmail-p2'>Allison Aitken (Columbia University)\n« A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »< /p>\n
With responses from Ale xander Englert (Princeton University)
\nABSTRACT: There’s a c ommon line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of consci ous experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\ , Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus meta physically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle\, the phenomenal uni ty of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk \, I will present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument ” against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between c onsciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. All ison Aitken\, Columbia URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-case-against-simple-mi ndedness-srigupta-on-mental-mereology-allison-aitken-columbia/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7870@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)
\nABSTRACT: Budd hist philosophers often draw a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-sa tya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinct ion in terms of an ontological distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally rea l entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophical discussion s about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological st atus of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning th em. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2021\, 2022) has influentially argued for an eli minitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the A bhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. However\, in a re cent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pl uralism\, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist d istinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” f rom a more basic distinction between two different ways an entity can exis t: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDan iel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he o ffers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s account of conv entional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. Tha t view will\, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel\, a llow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventionally true.
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Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columb ia.edu.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Gue rrero (William & Mary) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-conventional-tr uth-and-ontological-pluralism-laura-p-guerrero-william-mary/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,metaphysics\,truth END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7872@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Timothy Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)
\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discussions on compassion focus on the value and the
nature of compassion as an emotion. Ancient Asian philosophical tradition
s such as Confucianism and Buddhism\, however\, emphasize compassion as a
character trait that should be nurtured. This paper examines the insights
drawn from these traditions to help inform the nurturing of compassion. Fo
r example\, is empathy a necessary tool? What is the role of love and car
e? Does self-reflection contribute to the process?
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Dinner will be kindly o ffered by the Columbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requ irements at lm3335@columbia.edu.< span class='gmail-Apple-converted-space'>
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:How to nurture compassion? Some lessons from Asian philosophical tr aditions. Sin Yee Chan (U Vermont) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/how-to-nurture-compassio n-some-lessons-from-asian-philosophical-traditions-sin-yee-chan-u-vermont/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7963@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:The COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century incident\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at v arious levels. What is a crisis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or peri od be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to w hich we need to be attentive? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can Buddhism make any contribution to facilitating s olidarity? This presentation explores the meaning and nature of a crisis a nd our responses to it by drawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak C h’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Ir yŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation con siders what social\, political\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experience of crises\, and what questions these insig hts present to us.
\nWith responses from Karsten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Ju stice\, CUNY)
\nPresented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
\nRSVP is required for dinne r. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is requi red. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Philosophy of Crisis and a Question of Solidarity. Jin Y. Park (Ame rican) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/philosophy-of-crisis-and -a-question-of-solidarity-jin-y-park-american/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,existentialism\,Korean\,politi cal\,religion\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7977@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the stu dies of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). Howe ver\, conceptual misalignment is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contemp orary discussions. Specifically\, conceptual misalignment refers to the fo llowing: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coo rdination of concepts is formed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and i ts context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophic ally meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone count erpart misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to d etect when it comes to emotion concepts\, as they are thought to involve p henomenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept o f emotion in Chinese philosophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual mis alignment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philoso phy. Moreover\, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resou rce for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.
\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for fu rther information.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T193000 GEO:+40.807527;-73.960864 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Columbia @ 1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Conceptual Misalignment to Conceptual Engineering: A Case Stud y on Emotion from Chinese Philosophy. Wenqing Zhao (Whitman) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/from-conceptual-misalign ment-to-conceptual-engineering-a-case-study-on-emotion-from-chinese-philos ophy-wenqing-zhao-whitman/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,emotion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7978@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosoph ers are preoccupied with the notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a men tal event of learning or knowledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosopher and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-even ts are indefinable. Any satisfactory (and therefore non-circular) definiti on of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that do esn’t appeal back to the notion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itsel f. But there is no such anti-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’ s argument is that it is motivated by his commitment to a certain “knowled ge first” approach to epistemology: the view that knowledge-events are epi stemically prior to other non-factive mental states and events. On this vi ew\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a know ledge-event\, we don’t initially ascribe to them some other non-factive me ntal event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (l ike truth or reliability) necessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events un til a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epi stemology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological k ind. In this talk\, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will t ake place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu< /a> for further information.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 10027 \, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toront o) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/srihar%e1%b9%a3a-on-the- indefinability-of-knowledge-nilanjan-das-u-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,epistemology\,Indian END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T165411Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:
What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatm ents such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discou rse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese phi losophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner se nse of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencin g shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on t he Confucian texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such a s the Daoist\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the pictu re and restores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of wh at constitutes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as i nsults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of t his debate\, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity wi thin the Confucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile exte rnal stimuli while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strate gic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus mak ing an important philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Menciu s.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< p>With responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n
ABSTRACT: Yogācāra Buddhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we collectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, constru ct our shared social realities\, our cultures. These “worlds” are supporte d by cognitive processes informed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñā na). Through development and socialization\, we come to identify with thes e cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover\, and in agreement with cognitive scientists\, Yogācārins argue that humans hav e developed to be “innate essentialists\,” so that we imagine that our con structed social and cultural identities have their own essential\, intrins ic characteristics\, set apart from all others\, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie conflicts between groups. We can counteract thes e harmful patterns\, Yogācārins say\, by analyzing how our social and cult ural “realities” are collectively constructed\, and by showing how—through logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our u nreflective\, knee-jerk reaction to different peoples and cultures\, and t hereby foster more tolerance\, empathy and understanding for all beings. I n sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism offers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the or igins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, rooted in ancient traditions yet relevant to contemporary issues.
\nWith re sponses from Jonathan Gold (Princeton University)
\nDA TE: October 13th\, 2023
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLO CATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUM BIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early wher e someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole a t cf27 98@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as no t to interrupt the talk.
\nThe first section of the talk will give an account of the Hi ndu-Buddhist debate about the existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition concentrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used t o refer specifically to Dharmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of moment ariness. The second section looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a s atisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmaka ṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as more difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. Th e fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and considers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rā makaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Ru tgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: b>The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you ca n ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.ed u. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, dona tions are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Di nner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@colum bia.edu for further information.
\nComparative Philosophy Semina r:
\nHow doe s the imagination change us? Why should picturing ourselves a certain way have any real effect on what we are? These questions are central to debate s in Buddhist tantric literature regarding the generation stage (utpatt ikrama)\, wherein practitioners visualize themselves as buddhas enscon sed in magnificent mandala-palaces. For some\, this practice is what sets Buddhist tantra apart: through this “yoga of the imagination\,” as David S hulman puts it\, a practitioner can achieve buddhahood in a single lifetim e. And yet\, as the Buddhist tantric author Indrabhūti (8th century) argue s\, a pauper who imagines himself to be a king does not thereby become one —so\, in the same way\, practitioners who visualize themselves as buddhas will not thereby become buddhas. The mental imagery (ākāra) involve d in this practice is just so much unreal fabrication. Why should it have real transformative effects? I’ll consider here how these debates played o ut in Sanskrit Buddhist tantric texts from the 10th–11th centuries. I’ll f ocus on early authors in the Kālacakra tradition\, who upheld Indrabhūti’s critique of the generation stage\, and authors like Ratnākaraśānti\, Vāgī śvarakīrti\, and Advayavajra (aka Maitrīpa)\, who each in their own way cr itiqued mental imagery yet defended the importance and effectiveness of ge neration-stage practice. In the first part of the paper\, I’ll consider ar guments against mental imagery as these appear in generation-stage practic e texts and the early Kālacakra tradition. In the second part\, I’ll turn to why we might think unreal mental imagery can nevertheless have real tra nsformative effects\, paying special attention to the ways Buddhist tantri c authors writing in Sanskrit take up ideas from the tradition of dramatic theory (nāṭyaśastra) and Sanskrit culture more broadly.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW ith responses from Thomas Yarnall (Columbia University)
\n div>\nDATE: February 2nd\, 2024 p>\n
TIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to P hilosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you d o not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing ou tside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone w alking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please o nly contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu fo r further information.
\nACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT: Columbia Un iversity encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its progra ms and activities. The University Seminars’ participants with dis- abiliti es who anticipate needing accommodations or who have questions about physi cal access may contact the Office of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 o r disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-la nguage interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for accommodation s must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistanc e accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminar s/comparative-philosophy/
\n(Please do not reply to this anno uncement. You may contact the Co-Chairs using the link above.)
\n< p>Comparative Philosophy Seminar:\n\n
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240202T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240202T193000 GEO:+40.811099;-73.962729 LOCATION:Columbia Religion @ 80 Claremont Ave\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Mental Imagery\, Tantric Practice\, and the Drama of the Imaginatio n. Davey K. Tomlinson (Villanova) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/mental-imagery-tantric-p ractice-and-the-drama-of-the-imagination-davey-k-tomlinson-villanova/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,imagination END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\n- February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova Univ ersity)
\n- April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- M ay 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo)
\n