BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7682@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
ABSTRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attribut ed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appeara nce in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, laws). We will examine the fragments that discus s fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that thes e fragments see for the fa\, how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments\, in classical Chinese with English translations (Harris 201 6)\, are included here as a PDF attachment.
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DA TE: October 22\, 2021
\nTIME: 7:00-8:30 pm
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This seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. T he attached file is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with the program’ s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeti ng can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the m eeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Of fice will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nLead Presenter: Eirik Lang Harris
\nDiscussan ts: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State University)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa < /a>(Gettysburg College)
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secu re online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Discussion of Fa (法) in the Shenzi: Eirik Lang Harris URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-discussion-of-fa-%e6%b 3%95-in-the-shenzi-eirik-lang-harris/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7751@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://www.bklynlibrary.org/calendar/philosophy-library-virtual-20 220322 DESCRIPTION:How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Cl assical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’ s not just a form of entertainment\, but a source of knowledge of other mi nds. In this talk\, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuk a (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can se e why by turning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowl edge and luck.
\nJonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. M atilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work draws on a variety of philosophical tradit ions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind\, metaphysics an d epistemology. His books include Attention\, Not Self (2017)\, a study of early Buddhist theories of attention\; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012)\, an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self\; Virtual Subjects\, Fugitive Selves (2020)\, an analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self\; and Inwardness: An Outsiders’ Guide (2021)\, a review of the concept of inwardness in literature\, film\, poetry\, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowship o f the British Academy in 2015\, and won the Infosys Prize in the Humanitie s the same year\, the only philosopher to do so.
\nThis series is cur ated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov.
\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCI ETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
\n\n
< b>Presents: Li Zehou on the ‘Deep Str uctures of Confucianism’
\nLead Presenter: Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\ , CUNY)
\nDiscussa nts: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Bucht el (Hong Kong Education University)
\nABSTRACT: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zeh ou’s cross-cultural methodology blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and Marx. This seminar addresses the question of cul ture and its role in Li’s thought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition influences the subjects within it. One such cla im concerns the existence of ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlin ed in this preparatory reading . The idea is that culture\, history\, and social practice (col lectively\, a tradition) shape human psychology (including the formation o f concepts\, emotions\, and values) in ways not always apparent to the sub ject. Within the Chinese tradition\, Confucianism constitutes such a deep structure\, and its effects cannot be captured by textual studies alone\, nor studies of material culture. Rather\, the deep structure is articulate d in terms of an emergent shared subjectivity. Such traditions can evolve and ultimately dissolve\; nevertheless\, their effects are deep-rooted. Th is seminar meeting will aim to identify the parameters of Li’s ambitious t heoretical framework and its plausibility\, and to explore connections wit h current work in related fields\, such as cultural and empirical psycholo gy.
\nDATE: Ma rch 25\, 2022
\nTI ME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST
\nThis seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addition to fam iliarizing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there are two thi ngs we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need t o sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided b y the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form \, Giving to Columbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages p ersons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. Th e University Seminars participants with dis- abilities who anticipate need ing accommodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability Services at 212.85 4.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disabili ty accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are available o n request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public S afety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/co mparative-philosophy/
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T183000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T200000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Li Zehou. Deep Structures of Confucianism URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/li-zehou-deep-structures -of-confucianism/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7774@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
THE COLUMBIA SOCI ETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
\nWelcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:
\n< p class='gmail-p2'>Allison Aitken (Columbia University)\n« A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »< /p>\n
With responses from Ale xander Englert (Princeton University)
\nABSTRACT: There’s a c ommon line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of consci ous experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\ , Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus meta physically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle\, the phenomenal uni ty of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk \, I will present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument ” against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between c onsciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. All ison Aitken\, Columbia URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-case-against-simple-mi ndedness-srigupta-on-mental-mereology-allison-aitken-columbia/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7963@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
The COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century incident\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at v arious levels. What is a crisis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or peri od be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to w hich we need to be attentive? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can Buddhism make any contribution to facilitating s olidarity? This presentation explores the meaning and nature of a crisis a nd our responses to it by drawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak C h’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Ir yŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation con siders what social\, political\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experience of crises\, and what questions these insig hts present to us.
\nWith responses from Karsten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Ju stice\, CUNY)
\nPresented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
\nRSVP is required for dinne r. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is requi red. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Philosophy of Crisis and a Question of Solidarity. Jin Y. Park (Ame rican) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/philosophy-of-crisis-and -a-question-of-solidarity-jin-y-park-american/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,existentialism\,Korean\,politi cal\,religion\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7977@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the stu dies of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). Howe ver\, conceptual misalignment is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contemp orary discussions. Specifically\, conceptual misalignment refers to the fo llowing: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coo rdination of concepts is formed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and i ts context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophic ally meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone count erpart misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to d etect when it comes to emotion concepts\, as they are thought to involve p henomenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept o f emotion in Chinese philosophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual mis alignment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philoso phy. Moreover\, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resou rce for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.
\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for fu rther information.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T193000 GEO:+40.807527;-73.960864 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Columbia @ 1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Conceptual Misalignment to Conceptual Engineering: A Case Stud y on Emotion from Chinese Philosophy. Wenqing Zhao (Whitman) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/from-conceptual-misalign ment-to-conceptual-engineering-a-case-study-on-emotion-from-chinese-philos ophy-wenqing-zhao-whitman/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,emotion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7978@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosoph ers are preoccupied with the notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a men tal event of learning or knowledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosopher and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-even ts are indefinable. Any satisfactory (and therefore non-circular) definiti on of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that do esn’t appeal back to the notion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itsel f. But there is no such anti-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’ s argument is that it is motivated by his commitment to a certain “knowled ge first” approach to epistemology: the view that knowledge-events are epi stemically prior to other non-factive mental states and events. On this vi ew\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a know ledge-event\, we don’t initially ascribe to them some other non-factive me ntal event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (l ike truth or reliability) necessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events un til a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epi stemology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological k ind. In this talk\, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will t ake place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu< /a> for further information.
\nDTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 10027 \, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toront o) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/srihar%e1%b9%a3a-on-the- indefinability-of-knowledge-nilanjan-das-u-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,epistemology\,Indian END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8003@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:
When someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of that state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclus ions it might be used to establish. Here I examine different candidate di rections of explanation between consciousness and inner awareness. I inte rpret the metaphor of consciousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use the metaphor to distinguish between his view and contemporary higher-orde r theories of consciousness. I then turn to explain why the memory argume nt fails. The first main problem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contempo rary defenders\, there is no good way to use the argument to reach a concl usion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the pro posed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension bo th with ancient objections as well as current psychology.
\nWith res ponses from Lu Teng (NYU Shanghai)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Speak\, Memory: Dignāga\, Consciousness\, and Awareness. Nicholas S ilins (Cornell) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/speak-memory-dignaga-con sciousness-and-awareness-nicholas-silins-cornell/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,consciousness\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatm ents such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discou rse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese phi losophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner se nse of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencin g shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on t he Confucian texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such a s the Daoist\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the pictu re and restores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of wh at constitutes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as i nsults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of t his debate\, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity wi thin the Confucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile exte rnal stimuli while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strate gic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus mak ing an important philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Menciu s.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n< p>With responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n
ABSTRACT: Yogācāra Buddhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we collectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, constru ct our shared social realities\, our cultures. These “worlds” are supporte d by cognitive processes informed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñā na). Through development and socialization\, we come to identify with thes e cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover\, and in agreement with cognitive scientists\, Yogācārins argue that humans hav e developed to be “innate essentialists\,” so that we imagine that our con structed social and cultural identities have their own essential\, intrins ic characteristics\, set apart from all others\, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie conflicts between groups. We can counteract thes e harmful patterns\, Yogācārins say\, by analyzing how our social and cult ural “realities” are collectively constructed\, and by showing how—through logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our u nreflective\, knee-jerk reaction to different peoples and cultures\, and t hereby foster more tolerance\, empathy and understanding for all beings. I n sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism offers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the or igins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, rooted in ancient traditions yet relevant to contemporary issues.
\nWith re sponses from Jonathan Gold (Princeton University)
\nDA TE: October 13th\, 2023
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLO CATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUM BIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early wher e someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole a t cf27 98@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as no t to interrupt the talk.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Katja Vogt (C olumbia University)
\n
SPECIAL NOTE FOR DINNER ON 12/1: For this event\, the Neo-Confucian Seminar and our Comparative Philosophy Seminar w ill be going to dinner together. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited for this event.
\nNeo Con fucian Studies seminar: I hope this email finds you well! Our next session of the seminar will convene on Friday 12/1 from 3:30-5:30 pm in the Heyma n Center on Campus. The Heyman Center is also a dormitory. The guards at i ts entrance will have a list of all our attendees and will let you in base d on that list\, no Green Pass required. (Green Passes are Columbia’s syst em for proving that you’re up-to-date on your vaccinations and boosters.) Our guest speaker will be Professor Dongxian Jiang of Fordham University. Professor Jiang will present his draft “Political Thinking in a Classless Society” attached. Please ask Dongxian Jiang directly before you cite or s hare his draft. To be on the list\, please RSVP to me at wk2363@columbia.edu before 11/27 .
\nThe first section of the talk will give an account of the Hi ndu-Buddhist debate about the existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition concentrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used t o refer specifically to Dharmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of moment ariness. The second section looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a s atisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmaka ṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as more difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. Th e fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and considers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rā makaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Ru tgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: b>The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you ca n ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.ed u. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, dona tions are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Di nner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@colum bia.edu for further information.
\nComparative Philosophy Semina r:
\nHow doe s the imagination change us? Why should picturing ourselves a certain way have any real effect on what we are? These questions are central to debate s in Buddhist tantric literature regarding the generation stage (utpatt ikrama)\, wherein practitioners visualize themselves as buddhas enscon sed in magnificent mandala-palaces. For some\, this practice is what sets Buddhist tantra apart: through this “yoga of the imagination\,” as David S hulman puts it\, a practitioner can achieve buddhahood in a single lifetim e. And yet\, as the Buddhist tantric author Indrabhūti (8th century) argue s\, a pauper who imagines himself to be a king does not thereby become one —so\, in the same way\, practitioners who visualize themselves as buddhas will not thereby become buddhas. The mental imagery (ākāra) involve d in this practice is just so much unreal fabrication. Why should it have real transformative effects? I’ll consider here how these debates played o ut in Sanskrit Buddhist tantric texts from the 10th–11th centuries. I’ll f ocus on early authors in the Kālacakra tradition\, who upheld Indrabhūti’s critique of the generation stage\, and authors like Ratnākaraśānti\, Vāgī śvarakīrti\, and Advayavajra (aka Maitrīpa)\, who each in their own way cr itiqued mental imagery yet defended the importance and effectiveness of ge neration-stage practice. In the first part of the paper\, I’ll consider ar guments against mental imagery as these appear in generation-stage practic e texts and the early Kālacakra tradition. In the second part\, I’ll turn to why we might think unreal mental imagery can nevertheless have real tra nsformative effects\, paying special attention to the ways Buddhist tantri c authors writing in Sanskrit take up ideas from the tradition of dramatic theory (nāṭyaśastra) and Sanskrit culture more broadly.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nW ith responses from Thomas Yarnall (Columbia University)
\n div>\nDATE: February 2nd\, 2024 p>\n
TIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to P hilosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you d o not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing ou tside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone w alking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please o nly contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu fo r further information.
\nACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT: Columbia Un iversity encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its progra ms and activities. The University Seminars’ participants with dis- abiliti es who anticipate needing accommodations or who have questions about physi cal access may contact the Office of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 o r disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-la nguage interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for accommodation s must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistanc e accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminar s/comparative-philosophy/
\n(Please do not reply to this anno uncement. You may contact the Co-Chairs using the link above.)
\n< p>Comparative Philosophy Seminar:\n\n
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240202T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240202T193000 GEO:+40.811099;-73.962729 LOCATION:Columbia Religion @ 80 Claremont Ave\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Mental Imagery\, Tantric Practice\, and the Drama of the Imaginatio n. Davey K. Tomlinson (Villanova) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/mental-imagery-tantric-p ractice-and-the-drama-of-the-imagination-davey-k-tomlinson-villanova/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,imagination END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8156@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\n- February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova Univ ersity)
\n- April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- M ay 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo)
\nComparative philosophy is gaining traction in professional a cademic philosophy\, with specialist journals\, organizations\, books\, an d public campaigns. These inroads have been made in canonical areas of phi losophy\, including epistemology\, metaphysics\, logic\, and value theory. Yet comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied e thics\, an interdisciplinary research area in which work with practice and policy implications are dominated by the anglophone world. In this articl e\, I explain why comparative work might be especially difficult in this t ype of applied ethics\, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might o vercome these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contempora ry practical issues.
\nWith responses from Wenqing Zhao (CUNY Baruch)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosoph y Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not ha ve this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside un til the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking n earby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only cont act Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nRS VP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER:. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaur ant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information. RSV Ps are limited.
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Comparative Philosophy Se minar:
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Comparative Philosophy and Practical Applied Ethics. Laura Specker Sullivan (Fordham) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/comparative-philosophy-a nd-practical-applied-ethics-laura-specker-sullivan-fordham/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:applied\,comparative\,ethics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8106@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T102815Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\n< li>February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\n- April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (Uni versity at Buffalo)
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\n\n
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240503T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240503T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T173000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240503T173000 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Comparative Philosophy Seminar URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/comparative-philosophy-s eminar-11/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\n- February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Vi llanova University)
\n- April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo)
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