BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7736@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T053408Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/events/department-calendar/icalrepea t.detail/2022/05/13/637/-/workshop-on-michael-moore-s-mechanical-choices DESCRIPTION:
Contact TBA
\nTBA
\nLocation Rutgers University I
nn & Conference Center
Abstract: The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about law s of nature is between Humeans who think that laws merely describe the dis tribution of matter and non-Humeans who think that laws govern it. The met aphysics can place demands on the proper formulations of physical theories . It is sometimes assumed that the governing view requires a fundamental / intrinsic direction of time: to govern\, laws must be dynamical\, produci ng later states of the world from earlier ones\, in accord with the fundam ental direction of time in the universe. In this paper\, we propose a mini mal primitivism about laws of nature (MinP) according to which there is no such requirement. On our view\, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic p roduction. Moreover\, as a version of primitivism\, our view requires no r eduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals\, powers\, or dispositi ons. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental la ws\, including the principle of least action\, the Past Hypothesis\, the E instein equation of general relativity\, and even controversial examples f ound in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retro-causal the ories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining\, n on-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide var iety of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do.
\nThe talk will ta ke place over Zoom. I will send out the Zoom link closer to the meeting. p> DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211006T170000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211006T190000 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Eddy Keming Chen (UCSD) and Sheldon Goldstein (Rutgers)\, “Governin g Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature” URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/eddy-keming-chen-ucsd-an d-sheldon-goldstein-rutgers-governing-without-a-fundamental-direction-of-t ime-minimal-primitivism-about-laws-of-nature/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7838@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T053408Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/events/rutgers-lectures-in-philosoph y/217-general/rutgers-lectures-in-philosophy/1346-timothy-williamson DESCRIPTION:
Professor Williamson will give 3 lectures: September 19\, 21 \, and 23. All will take place in AB-2400 [East Wing] from 4:30-6:30pm.
\nThe lectures will discuss problems in the methodology of contemporar y philosophy. Although philosophy without use of counterexamples would be a disaster\, the way they are currently handled is naïve. In particular\, it is too vulnerable to fake counterexamples generated by more or less uni versal human heuristics.
\nHuman cognition\, from sense perception to abstract reflection\, frequentl y employs heuristics\, quick\, easy\, efficient\, and imperfectly reliable ways of solving problems. To a neglected extent\, philosophical problems and paradoxes from reliance on the outputs of fallible heuristics. This wi ll be illustrated with examples involving vagueness\, conditionals\, belie f ascription\, truth and falsity\, and reasons aggregation. Potential less ons for philosophical method will be discussed.
\nOverfitting is a well-recognized methodological pr oblem in natural science\, where use of models with too many degrees of fr eedom leads to unstable theorizing and failure to detect errors in the dat a. Overfitting is also a major but ill-recognized methodological problem i n philosophy\, exacerbated by its reliance on heuristics. General intellec tual tendencies conducive to overfitting in philosophy will be discussed.< /p>\n
The ‘hyperinte nsional revolution’ proclaims that central metaphysical distinctions canno t be captured in modal terms since they are sensitive to differences betwe en necessary equivalents. Such hyperintensionalism fits the profile of ove rfitting. It is motivated by case judgments that are explicable as results of a fallible heuristic and it leads to models with too many degrees of f reedom.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220919T163000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220919T183000 GEO:+40.502036;-74.448441 LOCATION:AB-2400 [East Wing] CAC Rutgers U @ 15 Seminary Pl\, New Brunswick \, NJ 08901\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220921T163000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220923T163000 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy: Timothy Williamson URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rutgers-lectures-in-phil osophy-timothy-williamson/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:rationality\,science END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR