BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7907@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T190251Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/105989 DESCRIPTION:
Keynote: Naomi Zack (Lehman College\, CUNY)
\nOne of ph
ilosophy’s original questions still plagues us: to what extent are beings
the same and to what extent do they differ? Arising in thinkers as diverse
as Parmenides\, Aquinas\, and De Beauvoir and in arenas from social and p
olitical philosophy to phenomenology and metaphysics. This conference aims
to gather graduate student scholars from a variety of specializations to
discuss their work on identity and difference. Some of the many questions
we may pursue together are the following:
What constitutes identit y and difference? What makes someone who they are? How do we understand ou rselves to be alike enough to communicate\, yet different enough that we m ust work to understand another’s point of view? How do identity and differ ence shape belonging–within a community\, within a social institution\, wi thin a political structure? Similarly\, how do differences among the membe rs of a group enrich the identity of that collective? How might overlappin g identities of an individual give rise to one’s sense of self? How does i dentity inform a given group’s philosophical thought? How might one form t heir identity and sense of self when\, as in the case of many marginalized groups/ minorities\, the “self” is oppressed?
\nThese questions add itionally motivate ontological considerations. To what extent can we descr ibe two objects that are in fact identical? What grants an object’s or a p erson’s identity over time: metaphysical characteristics\, temporal contin uity\, or certain brain states? Upon what aspects of an entity do we predi cate differences? When are two things metaphysically or logically identica l? Are mereological composites more than the sum of their parts? Are they identical to matter? To what extent do beings differ from Being? How might experiences or acts of reason help ground an identity claim such as A=A?< /p>\n
Other questions broadly related to “Identity and Difference” are a lso welcome.
\nPlease submit a 300-500 word abstract prepared for bl ind review to fordhamgradconference@gmail.com in PDF format. In the body o f the email\, please include:
\nSubmissi ons are due by Friday\, December 30\, 2022. After anonymo us review\, applicants will be notified by Tuesday\, January 17\, 2023. Pr esentations will be limited to 20 minutes.
\nThe conference will tak e place in person on March 3-4\, 2023 on Fordham University’s Rose Hill ca mpus located at 441 East Fordham Road\, Bronx\, NY 10458.
\nFor ques tions\, please contact the conference organizers at fordhamgradconference@ gmail.com
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230305 GEO:+40.859497;-73.882651 LOCATION:Philosophy dept @ 441 E Fordham Rd\, The Bronx\, NY 10458\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Identity and Difference. 2023 Fordham Graduate Student Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/identity-and-difference- 2023-fordham-graduate-student-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7955@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T190251Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/curiosity-creativity- and-complexity DESCRIPTION:How does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make deci sions when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?
\nThe conference showcases cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscience and Psychology (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exp loration\, decision-making\, information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artificial intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic moti vation) and Economics (decision making and information demand). Alongside formal presentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions am ong faculty\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poste r presentations.
\nSubmissions for poster presentations and travel a wards are due February 15\, 2023. Please visit the call for submissions for complete requirements.
\nFree and open to the public. Registratio n is required and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow C olumbia’s COVID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to p rovide proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email events@zi.colu mbia.edu with any questions.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230523 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230526 GEO:+40.816847;-73.957958 LOCATION:Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th Floor Lecture Hall) @ 3227 Br oadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Curiosity\, Creativity and Complexity Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/curiosity-creativity-and -complexity-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:artificial intelligence\,decision theory\,mind\,psych ology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8006@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T190251Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/111406 DESCRIPTION:Ideas about “identity” and “difference” proliferate in the n ews media\, in higher education\, in political disputations\, and in criti cal theories of society. Claims about “identity” and “difference” can rea dily be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of race\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, political affiliation\, ability and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc. But what exactly do we mean when we speak of “identity” or “differen ce”? And if we achieve greater clarity about the metaphysical presupposit ions and implications of “identity” and “difference\,” what difference wou ld that make?
\nA serious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expectedly generate a wide variety of questions. Is di scourse about what is “identical” reducible to discourse about what is “th e same”? Is discourse about what is “different” reducible to discourse ab out what is “other”? Can something be “the same” without being “identical \,” and can something be “other” without being “different”? When we speak about “being\,” does our speaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically)\, or instead does our speaking about being alw ays have the same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly on the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the thing’s membership in a general kind? Does an u nderstanding of identity depend on some reference to what is different? O r does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity ? What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or di fference\, or some combination of both? Is it possible for a knower to di scern real differences between things without discerning intelligible diff erences\, or does the indiscernibility of intelligible differences imply t hat there are no real differences at all but rather an identity? Does dif ference depend on negation\, or can one assert that there is difference wi thout having to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to spe ak of an ontological difference\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and be ings\, or is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences to exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a difference between “being” and “nothing”)?
\nIn spite of the virtual ubiquity of discourses about identity and differen ce\, there is a dearth of discourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity and difference.” With its choice of confer ence theme for 2024 (“Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Meta physics Makes”)\, the Metaphysical Society of America wishes to provoke de eper thinking about the metaphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such deeper thinking will make a meaningful difference in both t heory and practice.
\nProposals for papers on the conference theme a re especially encouraged\, but papers on other metaphysical topics are als o welcome. Please note: when selecting which submissions to accept for th is conference\, the Program Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion among others.
\n**************************** ************
\nGuidelines for the Submission of Abstracts\, and for Aristotle and Plato Prize Candidates
\nAbstracts of approximately 500 words should be submitted electronically by September 3 0\, 2023\, to: secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nAristotle Pri ze: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Meta physical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. El igibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D.. Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize s hould express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their s ubmission. Papers submitted for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,7 50 word limit\; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To b e considered for the Aristotle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be s ubmitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nPlato Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Priz e of the Metaphysical Society should submit full papers along with their a bstracts. Eligibility for the Plato Prize extends only to persons who rec eived a Ph.D. degree within six years of the conference submission date (i .e.\, persons who hold a Ph.D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize should exp ress this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their submission . Papers submitted for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit \; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeti ng\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize c arries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance wi th the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nTravel Grants< /u>: Thanks to the generous support of past presidents of the MSA and a gr ant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysic al Society is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expens es up to $350 to graduate students whose papers are selected for the confe rence program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide t he Metaphysical Society with all relevant expense-receipts).
\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts fo r the Aristotle Prize or Plato Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on their submission no later than December 1\, 2023.< /p>\n
\n< p>Tickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org /2024/2024_meeting.htm. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240311 GEO:+40.77103;-73.985096 LOCATION:Lowenstein Building\, Fordham University\, Lincoln Center @ 113 W 60th St\, New York\, NY 10023\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Metaphysical Society of America Conference: Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-society-of- america-conference-identity-difference-and-the-difference-that-metaphysics -makes/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity\,metaphysics X-COST:$70-120 X-TICKETS-URL:https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7679@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T190251Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://poprocksworkshop.wixsite.com/nycphilosophy DESCRIPTION:A number of authors have pointed out that the standard argum ents for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about t he content of a state per se\, but only instead about the sorts of capacit ies a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the s ubject need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two s tates to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precise ly because they have different sorts of contents\, and so there is no subs tantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I p resent evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but differ in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\ , and endogenous\, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that th is functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitut es the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilitie s for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship be tween cognition and perception.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T180000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rebecca Keller – (Endogenous) Perceptual States are Conceptual @ Po PRocks URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rebecca-keller-endogenou s-perceptual-states-are-conceptual-poprocks/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:psychology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7751@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T190251Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://www.bklynlibrary.org/calendar/philosophy-library-virtual-20 220322 DESCRIPTION:How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Cl assical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’ s not just a form of entertainment\, but a source of knowledge of other mi nds. In this talk\, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuk a (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can se e why by turning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowl edge and luck.
\nJonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. M atilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work draws on a variety of philosophical tradit ions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind\, metaphysics an d epistemology. His books include Attention\, Not Self (2017)\, a study of early Buddhist theories of attention\; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012)\, an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self\; Virtual Subjects\, Fugitive Selves (2020)\, an analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self\; and Inwardness: An Outsiders’ Guide (2021)\, a review of the concept of inwardness in literature\, film\, poetry\, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowship o f the British Academy in 2015\, and won the Infosys Prize in the Humanitie s the same year\, the only philosopher to do so.
\nThis series is cur ated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov.
\nBrooklyn Public Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area to discuss their work with a general audience\, hosted by the Brooklyn Public Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of t he best work on philosophical questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space where Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions that matter to them.
\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and last name at gmail.com.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220422T193000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220422T204500 GEO:+40.672511;-73.9682 LOCATION:Info Commons Lab\, Brookly Public Library @ 10 Grand Army Plaza\, Brooklyn\, NY 11238\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Justin Garson: On biological function and mental illness URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/justin-garson-on-biologi cal-function-and-mental-illness/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:biology\,mind\,psychology\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7891@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T190251Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b0c618/ websitePage:2d4463fc-e326-4269-9b07-c57fae3d4cb6 DESCRIPTION:The first section of the talk will give an account of the Hi ndu-Buddhist debate about the existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition concentrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used t o refer specifically to Dharmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of moment ariness. The second section looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a s atisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmaka ṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as more difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. Th e fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and considers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rā makaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Ru tgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: b>The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you ca n ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.ed u. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, dona tions are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Di nner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@colum bia.edu for further information.
\nComparative Philosophy Semina r:
\n