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UID:ai1ec-7947@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240328T135207Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:NYU
CONTACT:https://theassc.org/assc-26/
DESCRIPTION:
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We are pleased to announce that the 26th annual meeting
of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness will be held
at New York University on June 22-25\, 2023.
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Submissions for talks and poste
rs are now open with a deadline of February 15\, 2023. Conference registration will open
in early 2023.
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Ke
ynote speakers\, sympo
sia\, tutorials\,
and housing have now b
een arranged\, as specified below.
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Please direct any inquiries to
ASSC26@nyu.
edu.
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We hope to see you soon in New York!
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Ned Bloc
k and David Chalmers\, Conference Directors
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Tickets: https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b0c6
18/websitePage:9772d97b-6260-4e47-bbfb-cbb109517975.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221117T190000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221117T203000
GEO:+40.791947;-73.952101
LOCATION:New York Academy of Medicine @ 1216 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10029\
, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Unraveling the Mind: The Mystery of Consciousness
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/unraveling-the-mind-the-
mystery-of-consciousness/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:consciousness\,mind
X-COST:$5-40
X-TICKETS-URL:https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b
0c618/websitePage:9772d97b-6260-4e47-bbfb-cbb109517975
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7921@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240328T135207Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:NYU
CONTACT:https://as.nyu.edu/departments/philosophy/events/spring-2023/depart
ment-colloquium-katharina-kraus.html
DESCRIPTION:
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This talk explores the reflexive nature of
consciousness\, which consists primarily in the fact that a state of consc
iousness has a reflexive relation to the subject who has that state\, so t
hat the subject can typically be aware of itself as having that state. Com
paring Kant’s\, Fichte’s\, and selected contemporary analytic theories of
this reflexivity shows that there is a crucial difference in the way the r
elation between form (or mode) and content of a state of consciousness is
conceived. The first part examines Kant’s formal theory of consciousness:
reflexivity is understood not in terms of a self-referential content resul
ting from a reflection on the state of the subject\, but as the universal
transcendental form that any content must have in order to be representati
onally significant and potentially conscious to the subject. The second pa
rt examines Fichte’s departure from Kant in his theory of a self-positing
consciousness: in the original act of self-positing\, the mere form of ref
lexivity is turned into a self-referential content that determines the sub
ject as an object from the absolute standpoint of consciousness. The third
part examines analytic theories that explain the reflexivity (or what is
often called the subjective character) of consciousness on a model of ment
al indexicality. These theories tend to reduce reflexivity to an objective
constituent of content that\, although often implicit\, can be read off f
rom the subject’s contextual situatedness in nature. In conclusion\, Kant’
s theory can be understood as a moderate\, human-centered kind of perspect
ivism that navigates between Fichtean absolute subjectivity and a naturali
st absolute objectivity.
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Regis
tration is free but required. A registration link will be shared via e
mail with our department mailing lists a few weeks before the event. Pleas
e contact Jack Mikuszewski at jhm378@nyu.edu if you did not receive a regi
stration link.
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The Phi
losophy Department provides reasonable accommodations to people with disab
ilities. Requests for accommodations should be submitted to philosophy@nyu
.edu at least two weeks before the event.
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Tickets: https://as.nyu.edu/departments/philosophy/events/spr
ing-2023/department-colloquium-katharina-kraus.html.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230217T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230217T173000
GEO:+40.729457;-73.994348
LOCATION:NYU Philosophy Dept. @ 5 Washington Pl\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:The Reflexivity of Consciousness in Kant\, Fichte and Beyond. Katha
rina Kraus (Johns Hopkins)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/the-reflexivity-of-consc
iousness-in-kant-fichte-and-beyond-katharina-kraus-johns-hopkins/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:consciousness\,German\,Kant\,mind\,modern
X-TICKETS-URL:https://as.nyu.edu/departments/philosophy/events/spring-2023/
department-colloquium-katharina-kraus.html
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8003@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240328T135207Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U
CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos
ophy/
DESCRIPTION:
When someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of
that state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to
answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a
constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclus
ions it might be used to establish. Here I examine different candidate di
rections of explanation between consciousness and inner awareness. I inte
rpret the metaphor of consciousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use
the metaphor to distinguish between his view and contemporary higher-orde
r theories of consciousness. I then turn to explain why the memory argume
nt fails. The first main problem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contempo
rary defenders\, there is no good way to use the argument to reach a concl
usion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the pro
posed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension bo
th with ancient objections as well as current psychology.
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With res
ponses from Lu Teng (NYU Shanghai)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T173000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T193000
GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136
LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100
27\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Speak\, Memory: Dignāga\, Consciousness\, and Awareness. Nicholas S
ilins (Cornell)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/speak-memory-dignaga-con
sciousness-and-awareness-nicholas-silins-cornell/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,consciousness\,mind
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