BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7653@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T071740Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/robert-iliffe-thousan d-fictions-cultism-and-delusional-metaphysics-newton-leibniz-disputes DESCRIPTION:The rich philosophical and mathematical disputes that took plac e between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteent h century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent but neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely the mutual claim that their opponents’ conceptual foundations were fiction al\, and were the product both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual structures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly deb ased metaphysics in various prominent places\, and mobilized allies such a s Roger Cotes and John Keill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the mos t sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibniz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In th e Fifth letter to Clarke\, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile\, vulgar\, and profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than t he rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent intellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\ , Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton ’s work was no mere codicil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy \, but instead lay at the heart of it. This famous debate\, while of cours e somewhat sui generis\, is indicative of more general and dynamic feature s of intellectual debate.\nEvent Speaker\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the History of Science at the University of Oxford\nEvent Information\nThis e vent is free and open to the public\; Registration required. Please contac t scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.\nThis event is part o f the New York History of Science Lecture Series. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210927T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210927T193000 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Robert Iliffe – ‘A Thousand Fictions’: Cultism and Delusional Metap hysics in the Newton-Leibniz Disputes URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/robert-iliffe-a-thousand -fictions-cultism-anrobert-iliffe-a-thousand-fictions-cultism-and-delusion al-metaphysics-in-the-newton-leibniz-disputesd-delusional-me/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nThe rich phil osophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton a nd Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philos ophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent bu t neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely the mutual claim that th eir opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional\, and were the produc t both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual s tructures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in vari ous prominent places\, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John K eill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibn iz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke \, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile\, vulgar\, and profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent in tellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codi cil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy\, but instead lay at th e heart of it. This famous debate\, while of course somewhat sui generis\, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate .
\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the History of Science at the Unive rsity of Oxford
\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Registration r equired. Please contact sc ienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lectu re Series.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7709@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T071740Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/art-brain-beholder DESCRIPTION:What can science teach us about how we perceive and understand art? How can art help us understand ourselves and each other? In this even t\, the Zuckerman Institute explores the interactions between our brains a nd the artistic world\, finding connections and parallels between art and science.\nEvent Speakers\nPlease visit the event webpage to view the speak er list.\nEvent Information\nFree and open to the public\, registration is required by January 28\, 2022. This event will also be live-streamed. Ple ase email zuckermaninstitute@columbia.edu with any questions.\nThis talk i s part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Brain Insight Lecture series hos ted by Columbia’s Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.\n\n\n\n\n\nRegister\nTickets : https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-TjKsoLFSuOXr1-x3 rGT5g. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220202T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220202T190000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Art in the Brain of the Beholder URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/art-in-the-brain-of-the- beholder/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat can science teach us about how we perceive and understand art? H ow can art help us understand ourselves and each other? In this event\, th e Zuckerman Institute explores the interactions between our brains and the artistic world\, finding connections and parallels between art and scienc e.
\nPlease visit the event webpage to view the spe aker list.
\nFree and open to the public \, registrat ion is required by January 28\, 2022. This event will also be live-str eamed. Please email zuckermaninstitute@columbia.edu< /a> with any questions.
\nThis talk is part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Brain Insight Lecture series hosted by Columbia’s Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and su pported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.
\nTickets: h ttps://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-TjKsoLFSuOXr1-x3rGT 5g.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:art\,mind\,neuroscience\,science X-TICKETS-URL:https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-TjKso LFSuOXr1-x3rGT5g END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7740@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T071740Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/elly-truitt-structure -scientific-progress-case-roger-bacon DESCRIPTION:This talk explores the importance of the medieval period and ni neteenth-century medievalism to the invention of modern science by placing the work of thirteenth-century Franciscan\, polymath\, and scholastic nat ural philosopher Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292) into conversation with later scholars\, especially William Whewell (1794-1866). Elly Truitt argues that Bacon’s work and reputation became central to a narrative about the devel opment of science that insisted on Europe as the only possible place of or igin. Furthermore\, Truitt argues that this narrative was constructed\, in part\, by ignoring large parts of Bacon’s corpus and erasing his deep eng agement with medieval scholars working in the Arabic tradition\, and by re lying instead on a narrative structure that emerged in the context of late antique and medieval Christianity.\nEvent Speaker\nElly Truitt\, Associat e Professor of History and Sociology of Science at the University of Penns ylvania\nEvent Information\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Re gistration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with an y questions.\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lectur e Series.\nSponsoring Organizations:\n\nThe University Seminars at Columbi a University\nColumbia University in the City of New York\nNYU Gallatin Sc hool of Individualized Study\nThe Graduate Center\, City University of New York\nThe New York Academy of Medicine\nThe New York Academy of Sciences \n\nThe Center for Science and Society makes every reasonable effort to ac commodate individuals with disabilities. If you require disability accommo dations to attend a Center for Science and Society event\, please contact us at scienceandsociety@columbia.edu or (212) 853-1612 at least 10 days in advance of the event. For more information\, please visit the campus acce ssibility webpage.\n\n\n\n\n\nregister DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220223T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220223T193000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Elly Truitt – The Structure of Scientific Progress: The Case of Rog er Bacon URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/elly-truitt-the-structur e-of-scientific-progress-the-case-of-roger-bacon/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis talk explores the importance of the medieval period and nineteen th-century medievalism to the invention of modern science by placing the w ork of thirteenth-century Franciscan\, polymath\, and scholastic natural p hilosopher Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292) into conversation with later schola rs\, especially William Whewell (1794-1866). Elly Truitt argues that Bacon ’s work and reputation became central to a narrative about the development of science that insisted on Europe as the only possible place of origin. Furthermore\, Truitt argues that this narrative was constructed\, in part\ , by ignoring large parts of Bacon’s corpus and erasing his deep engagemen t with medieval scholars working in the Arabic tradition\, and by relying instead on a narrative structure that emerged in the context of late antiq ue and medieval Christianity.
\nElly Truitt\, Associate Professor of History and So ciology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania
\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Registration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lecture Series.
\nSp onsoring Organizations:
\nThe C enter for Science and Society makes every reasonable effort to accommodate individuals with disabilities. If you require disability accommodations t o attend a Center for Science and Society event\, please contact us at scienceandsociety@columbia.ed u or (212) 853-1612 at least 10 days in advance of the event. For more information\, please visit the campus acc essibility webpage.
\nThe current p andemic has focused attention on the techniques used by epidemiologists an d other non-experimental scientists to infer causal hypotheses from correl ational data. I have previously argued* that we need to explain these tech niques by reducing causal relationships to dependencies in systems of stru ctural equations with probabilistically independent exogenous variables. I n this talk I shall aim to use this account to cast light on (a) single-ca se counterfactual dependence and actual causation\, (b) the content and pr actical relevance of generic causal claims like “smoking causes cancer”\, (c) the temporal asymmetry of causation\, and (d) the proper understanding of rational action under risk.
\n*In particular\, I’ve argued this in http://weebly-file/1/8/5/5/185517 40/stat_nat_csn_monist.pdf. I will also be giving a talk on it at the CUNY Logic and Metaphysics workshop on Monday 7 March 1615-1815.
\nT he talk will be on Zoom. All are welcome to attend!
\nThe zoom link will be distributed through the MAPS mailing list. If you are not on the M APS mailing list and would like to receive the Zoom link for the talk\, pl ease email nyphilsci@gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:causality\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7759@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T071740Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://philosophy.columbia.edu/content/department-calendar DESCRIPTION:LTF Event: Olivia Branscum\,“Fairness\, Objectivity\, and Gradi ngMultimodal Assessments.” DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220324T161000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220324T180000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:716 Philosophy Hall @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Olivia Branscum\, “Fairness\, Objectivity\, and Grading Multimodal Assessments.” URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/olivia-branscum-fairness -objectivity-and-grading-multimodal-assessments/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nLTF Event: Olivia Branscum\,
“Fairness\, Objectivity\, an
d Grading
Multimodal Assessments.”
The represent ational theory of measurement provides a collection of results that specif y the conditions under which an attribute admits of numerical representati on. The original architects of the theory interpreted the formalism operat ionally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representat ions are conventional. There have been a number of recent efforts to reint erpret the formalism to arrive at a more metaphysically robust account of physical quantities. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the representational theory of measure ment require careful scrutiny as one moves toward such an interpretation. To illustrate why\, we show that there is a sense in which the very number system in which one represents a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. We argue that this result does not undermine the project of reinterpreting the representational theory of measurement for metaphys ical purposes in general\, but it does undermine a certain class of infere nces about the nature of physical quantities that some have been tempted t o draw.
\nTALK
LINK — Email for the passcode cruzdavis <
at> umass.edu or jrc2266