BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8003@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T131026Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:When someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of th at state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to an swering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a con straint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusion s it might be used to establish. Here I examine different candidate direc tions of explanation between consciousness and inner awareness. I interpr et the metaphor of consciousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use th e metaphor to distinguish between his view and contemporary higher-order t heories of consciousness. I then turn to explain why the memory argument fails. The first main problem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contemporar y defenders\, there is no good way to use the argument to reach a conclusi on about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the propos ed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology.\nWith responses fro m Lu Teng (NYU Shanghai) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Speak\, Memory: Dignāga\, Consciousness\, and Awareness. Nicholas S ilins (Cornell) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/speak-memory-dignaga-con sciousness-and-awareness-nicholas-silins-cornell/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nWhen someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of that state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I be gin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to es tablish. Here I examine different candidate directions of explanation bet ween consciousness and inner awareness. I interpret the metaphor of consc iousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use the metaphor to distinguis h between his view and contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness . I then turn to explain why the memory argument fails. The first main p roblem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contemporary defenders\, there is n o good way to use the argument to reach a conclusion about all conscious s tates. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology.
\nWith responses from Lu Teng (NYU Sh anghai)
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,consciousness\,mind END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR