BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7879@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/103858 DESCRIPTION:This conference celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first pu blication of Saul Kripke’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by showcas ing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influence. These topics include\, but are not limited to: the nature of names and na tural kind terms\; the failure of the description or cluster/description t heories\; the distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apr iority\; empty names\; the metaphysics of essence and origin\; the nature of modality and possible worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology of m odality\; the role of philosophical intuition\; and the mind-body problem. \nDates: 12th and 13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.\nVenue: The CUNY Gradua te Center\, 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.\nFormat: hybrid\nRegistr ation: for both online and in person attendance\, please register by the 2 8th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.\n https://s aulkripkecenter.org/ \nSpeakers:\n\n\n Katalin Balog \nRutgers University – Newark\n\n\n Anandi Hattiangadi \nStockholm University\n\n\n Carl Hoefer \nUniversitat Autonoma de Barcelona\n\n\n Janet Levin \nUniversity of Sou thern California\n\n\n Antonella Mallozzi \nProvidence College\n\n\n Genov eva Martí \nICREA And University Of Barcelona\n\n\n Alexander Moran \nTrin ity College\, Dublin\n\n\n Brian Rabern \nUniversity of Edinburgh\n\n\n Te resa Robertson Ishii \nUniversity of California at Santa Barbara\n\n\n Nat han Salmon \nUniversity of California at Santa Barbara\n\n\n Sarah Sawyer \nUniversity of Sussex\n\n\n Anders Schoubye \nStockholm University\n\n\n Jennifer Wang \nSimon Fraser University\n\n\n Stephen Yablo \nMassachusett s Institute of Technology\n\n\nOrganisers:\n\n\n Corine Besson \nUniversit y of Sussex\n\n\n Anandi Hattiangadi \nStockholm University\n\n\n Antonell a Mallozzi \nProvidence College\n\n\n Yale Weiss \nCUNY Graduate Center\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nTickets: https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20221212 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20221214 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:Philosophy Dept.\, CUNY Graduate Center @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:50 Years of Naming and Necessity URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/50-years-of-naming-and-n ecessity/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nThis conferen ce celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first publication of Saul Kripke ’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by showcasing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influence. These topics include\, but are not limited to: the nature of names and natural kind terms\; the f ailure of the description or cluster/description theories\; the distinctio n between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apriority\; empty names\; t he metaphysics of essence and origin\; the nature of modality and possible worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology of modality\; the role of ph ilosophical intuition\; and the mind-body problem.
\nDates: 12th and 13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.
\nVenue: The CUNY Graduate Center\ , 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.
\nFormat: hybrid
\nReg istration: for both online and in person attendance\, please register by t he 28th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
\n\n\n\n
Tickets: https: //forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:conference\,epistemology\,language\,metaphysics X-TICKETS-URL:https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7 END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7660@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Abstract: It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion t hat grounding can be\, indeed is\, overdetermined. Further to this\, it s eems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it\, either conceptually or m etaphysically\, that we ought to find concerning. But from a small sampli ng of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. This pa per aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obvious or straightforward a bout grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much m ore serious philosophical attention.\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop w ill be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, un less otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:\nSep 13. Ric ki Bliss (Lehigh University)\nSep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion Un iversity)\nSep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)\nOct 4. Yale W eiss (CUNY GC)\nOct 11. NO MEETING\nOct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)\nOct 25 . Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)\nNov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)\nNov 15 . Sara Uckelman (Durham University)\nNov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)\nNov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of G hent)\nDec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210913T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210913T181500 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Metaphysical Overdetermination (Ricki Bliss) @ Logic & Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-overdetermi nation-ricki-bliss-logic-metaphysics-workshop/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nAbstract: It is widely recognized by prop onents of the notion that grounding can be\, indeed is\, overdetermined. Further to this\, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus h as emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it\, ei ther conceptually or metaphysically\, that we ought to find concerning. B ut from a small sampling of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsi bly be drawn. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obviou s or straightforward about grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much more serious philosophical attention.
\nThe Log ic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 ( NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedul e is as follows:
\nSep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
\nS ep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
\nSep 27. Rashe d Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
\nOct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
\nOct 11. NO MEETING
\nOct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
\nOc t 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
\nNov 1. Thom as Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
\nNov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
\nNov 2 2. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
\nNov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münste r)
\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
\nDec 13. Dolf R ami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mond ays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
\nSep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehig h University)
\nSep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University )
\nSep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
\nOct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
\nOct 11. NO MEETING
\nOct 18. Rohit Pari kh (CUNY GC)
\nOct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State Universi ty)
\nNov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
\nNov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham U niversity)
\nNov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
\nNov 2 9. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent )
\nDec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
\nThe rich phil osophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton a nd Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philos ophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent bu t neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely the mutual claim that th eir opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional\, and were the produc t both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual s tructures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in vari ous prominent places\, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John K eill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibn iz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke \, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile\, vulgar\, and profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent in tellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codi cil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy\, but instead lay at th e heart of it. This famous debate\, while of course somewhat sui generis\, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate .
\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the History of Science at the Unive rsity of Oxford
\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Registration r equired. Please contact sc ienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lectu re Series.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7682@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Da o (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Ha n Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an app earance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, laws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an at tempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments s ee for the fa\, how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments \, in classical Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are incl uded here as a PDF attachment.\n \nDATE: October 22\, 2021\nTIME: 7:00-8:3 0 pm\n \nThis seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. The a ttached file is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself wit h the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with the program’s ba sic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting c an start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your name in the chat . Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeti ng. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virt ual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find ste p-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.\nLead Pre senter: Eirik Lang Harris\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State U niversity)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysb urg College)\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are on ly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Givi ng to Columbia. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Discussion of Fa (法) in the Shenzi: Eirik Lang Harris URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-discussion-of-fa-%e6%b 3%95-in-the-shenzi-eirik-lang-harris/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nABS TRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, la ws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments see for the fa\ , how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments\, in classica l Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are included here as a PDF attachment.
\n\n
DATE: October 22\, 2021
\nTIME: 7:00-8:30 pm
\n\n
This seminar w ill take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Belo w you will find the link to join the meeting. The attached file is an inst ruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addit ion to familiarizing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there a re two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you w ill need to sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we wil l have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Pa rticipants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nLead Presenter : Ei rik Lang Harris
\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State University)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysburg College)
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are o nly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7713@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2022/01/18/spring-2022-schedule/ DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Speakers may present either virtually or in-pe rson\; the details will be announced for each talk individually. Meetings will convene at the Graduate Center\, Room 5382. You may attend any talk f rom that location (even if the speaker is not physically present). At leas t for any talk for which the speaker is not physically present\, you will also be able to attend virtually from anywhere via Zoom. The provisional s chedule is as follows:\nFeb 7. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)\nFeb 14. Ekate rina Kubyshkina (Campinas)\nFeb 21. NO MEETING\nFeb 28. Michael Burton (Ya le)\nMar 7. David Papineau (King’s)\nMar 14. Wilfrid Hodges (King’s)\nMar 21. Noson Yanofsky (CUNY)\nMar 28. Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)\nApr 4. Jenn McDonal d (Columbia)\nApr 11. Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins)\nApr 18. NO MEETING\nA pr 25. Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen)\nMay 2. Elia Zardini (Madrid)\nMay 9. Friederike Moltmann (CNRS Nice)\nMay 16. Mircea Dumitru (Bucharest)\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220207T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220207T181500 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:Zoom & CUNY rm 5382 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220214T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220221T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220228T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220307T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220314T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220321T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220328T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220404T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220411T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220425T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220502T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220509T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220516T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-16/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY tim e). Speakers may present either virtually or in-person\; the details will be announced for each talk individually. Meetings will convene at the Grad uate Center\, Room 5382. You may attend any talk from that location (even if the speaker is not physically present). At least for any talk fo r which the speaker is not physically present\, you will also be able to a ttend virtually from anywhere via Zoom. The provisional schedule is as fol lows:
\nFeb 7. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)
\nFeb 14. Ekaterin a Kubyshkina (Campinas)
\nFeb 21. NO MEETING
\nFeb 28. Michael Burton (Yale)
\nMar 7. David Papineau (King’s)
\nMar 14. Wilf rid Hodges (King’s)
\nMar 21. Noson Yanofsky (CUNY)
\nMar 28. Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)
\nApr 4. Jenn McDonald (Columbia)
\nApr 11. Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins)
\nApr 18. NO MEETING
\nApr 25. Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen)
\nMay 2. Elia Zardini (Madrid)
\nMay 9. Friederike Moltmann (CNRS Nice)
\nMay 16. Mircea Dumitru (Bu charest)
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7750@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\n \nPresents: L i Zehou on the ‘Deep Structures of Confucianism’\nLead Presenter: Andrew L ambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo I II (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Univ ersity)\nABSTRACT: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cult ural methodology blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such a s Kant and Marx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its ro le in Li’s thought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultura l tradition influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence of ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined in this prep aratory reading. The idea is that culture\, history\, and social practice (collectively\, a tradition) shape human psychology (including the formati on of concepts\, emotions\, and values) in ways not always apparent to the subject. Within the Chinese tradition\, Confucianism constitutes such a d eep structure\, and its effects cannot be captured by textual studies alon e\, nor studies of material culture. Rather\, the deep structure is articu lated in terms of an emergent shared subjectivity. Such traditions can evo lve and ultimately dissolve\; nevertheless\, their effects are deep-rooted . This seminar meeting will aim to identify the parameters of Li’s ambitio us theoretical framework and its plausibility\, and to explore connections with current work in related fields\, such as cultural and empirical psyc hology.\nDATE: March 25\, 2022\nTIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST\nThis seminar wil l take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addition to familiar izing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there are two things w e ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sig n in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants pane l. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand. \nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, d onations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giv ing form\, Giving to Columbia.\n \nAccessibility Statement: Columbia Unive rsity encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars participants with dis- abilities w ho anticipate needing accommodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 or di sability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disab ilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance acce ssing campus. \nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: https://universityseminars.colum bia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/ DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T183000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T200000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Li Zehou. Deep Structures of Confucianism URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/li-zehou-deep-structures -of-confucianism/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\n\n
Presents:
Lead Presenter : Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Uni versity)
\nABSTRAC
T: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cultural methodo
logy blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and M
arx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its role in Li’s t
hought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition
influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence o
f ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined
DATE: March 25\, 2022
\n< p class='gmail-p1'>TIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST< /span>\nThis seminar will t ake place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiariz e yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with th e program’s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your na me in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University S eminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will r aise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your h and.
\nNote Regar ding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Co lumbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars parti cipants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing accommodations or who h ave questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability S ervices at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, includi ng sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for acc ommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar partici pants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: http s://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7774@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nWelcomes you t o an IN-PERSON meeting:\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)\n« A Case ag ainst Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »\nWith responses fr om Alexander Englert (Princeton University)\nABSTRACT: There’s a common li ne of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious expe rience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhya mika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century ) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysical ly impossible. Lacking any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of co nscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I wil l present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” agains t mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between conscious ness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda f or centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also que stions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. All ison Aitken\, Columbia URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-case-against-simple-mi ndedness-srigupta-on-mental-mereology-allison-aitken-columbia/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\nWelcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:
\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)
\n« A Case against Simple-mindedn ess: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »
\nWith responses from Alexander Englert (Princet
on University)
ABST RACT: There’s a common line of reasoning whi ch supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhyamika Buddhist philo sophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any ki nd of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lack ing any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I will present an analys is of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” against mental simples an d show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intent ional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of int ra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience argua bly owes responses.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7816@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2022/08/19/fall-2022-schedule/ DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-p erson (at the Graduate Center\, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as follows:\nSept 5. NO MEETING\nSep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)\nSep 19. Boka i Yao (Notre Dame)\nSep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine)\, Louise Du puis (Paris Dauphine)\, and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)\nOct 3. Yale Weis s (CUNY)\nOct 10. NO MEETING\nOct 17. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)\nOct 24 . Friederika Moltmann (CNRS\, Côte d’Azur)\nOct 31. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)\nN ov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)\nNov 14. Tommy Kivatinos (Auburn)\nNov 21. Ma rko Malink (NYU)\nNov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)\nDec 5. Martin Pleit z (Muenster)\nDec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220912T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220912T181500 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 7314 & Zoom @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220919T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220926T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221003T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221017T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221024T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221031T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221107T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221114T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221121T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221128T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221205T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-17/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY tim e). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-person (at the Graduate C enter\, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as follows:
\nSept 5 . NO MEETING
\nSep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)
\nSep 19. Bokai Y ao (Notre Dame)
\nSep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine)\, Louis e Dupuis (Paris Dauphine)\, and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)
\nOct 3 . Yale Weiss (CUNY)
\nOct 10. NO MEETING
\nOct 17. Guillermo B adia (Queensland)
\nOct 24. Friederika Moltmann (CNRS\, Côte d’Azur)
\nOct 31. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)
\nNov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)
\nNov 14. Tommy Kivatinos (Auburn)
\nNov 21. Marko Malink (NY U)
\nNov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)
\nDec 5. Martin Pleit z (Muenster)
\nDec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State)
\n HTML> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7870@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)\n ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two diffe rent kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two diffe rent kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conv entionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophi cal discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2021\, 2022) has influentially arg ued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that in terprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. How ever\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidha rma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an e ntity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of con ventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from t he models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s a ccount of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits an d McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventio nally true.\n \nDinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University S eminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating r equirements at lm3335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Gue rrero (William & Mary) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-conventional-tr uth-and-ontological-pluralism-laura-p-guerrero-william-mary/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWith responses from Mark Siderits (Illin ois State University)
\nABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often dra w a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth ( saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontologi cal distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real e ntities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). S imilar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entiti es and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2 021\, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he call s “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one t hat denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involvin g apparent reference to them. However\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that v iew by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventi onal truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinctio n between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultima tely. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional re ality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will a lso argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offeri ng a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is deri ved from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the vi ews suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultima te truths about what is conventionally true.
\n\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the C olumbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is req uired for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,metaphysics\,truth END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7872@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Timothy Connolly (East Stroudsburg Universi ty)\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discussions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an emotion. Ancient Asian philosoph ical traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism\, however\, emphasize co mpassion as a character trait that should be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a necessary tool? What is the role o f love and care? Does self-reflection contribute to the process?\n\n \nDi nner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3 335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:How to nurture compassion? Some lessons from Asian philosophical tr aditions. Sin Yee Chan (U Vermont) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/how-to-nurture-compassio n-some-lessons-from-asian-philosophical-traditions-sin-yee-chan-u-vermont/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWith responses from Timothy Connolly (Ea st Stroudsburg University)
\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discu
ssions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an
emotion. Ancient Asian philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and
Buddhism\, however\, emphasize compassion as a character trait that should
be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions
to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a ne
cessary tool? What is the role of love and care? Does self-reflection co
ntribute to the process?
\n
\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia Univ ersity Seminars. < /p>\n
RSVP is required for di nner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7972@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Neopragmatists seek to sidestep metaphysical puzzles by shiftin g the target of philosophical explanation from the objects we think and ta lk about to the functions of expressions and concepts in our cognitive eco nomy. Logical vocabulary can serve as a target for neopragmatist inquiry\, and it has also posed obstacles to neopragmatist accounts of other vocabu lary. I will argue that the obstacles can be addressed by adopting a neopr agmatist perspective toward logical relations\, such as logical consequenc e\, and toward propositional content. Doing so calls into question two pur ported constraints on explanations of the functions of logical connectives . I will sketch an account made possible by rejecting those constraints\, one according to which logical connectives serve to express dialectical at titudes. The proposal is deflationary in two ways: it rests on an extensio n of deflationism from truth to logical relations\, and it aims to deflate some of neopragmatists’ theoretical ambitions.\nHi\, All. Below is the pr ovisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to f ace to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nM ar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event . Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\n Marc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum )\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230227T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230227T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 9205 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Neopragmatism and logic: A deflationary proposal. Lionel Shapiro (U Conn) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/neopragmatism-and-logic- a-deflationary-proposal-lionel-shapiro-uconn/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nNeopragmatist s seek to sidestep metaphysical puzzles by shifting the target of philosop hical explanation from the objects we think and talk about to the function s of expressions and concepts in our cognitive economy. Logical vocabulary can serve as a target for neopragmatist inquiry\, and it has also posed o bstacles to neopragmatist accounts of other vocabulary. I will argue that the obstacles can be addressed by adopting a neopragmatist perspective tow ard logical relations\, such as logical consequence\, and toward propositi onal content. Doing so calls into question two purported constraints on ex planations of the functions of logical connectives. I will sketch an accou nt made possible by rejecting those constraints\, one according to which l ogical connectives serve to express dialectical attitudes. The proposal is deflationary in two ways: it rests on an extension of deflationism from t ruth to logical relations\, and it aims to deflate some of neopragmatists’ theoretical ambitions.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Monday s 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meeti ngs. (No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 S hawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 T homas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting< /p>\n
Apr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacon a\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Spe cial event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all af ternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Boch um)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n BODY> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7963@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:The COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us.\nWith re sponses from Karsten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY) \nPresented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is re quired for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Philosophy of Crisis and a Question of Solidarity. Jin Y. Park (Ame rican) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/philosophy-of-crisis-and -a-question-of-solidarity-jin-y-park-american/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us. p>\n
With responses from Kars ten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY)
\n< p class='gmail-p2'>Presented by THE COLUMBIA SOC IETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is required for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@colu mbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,existentialism\,Korean\,politi cal\,religion\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7920@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Hi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop thi s coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.) \n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel F itting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nAp r 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Bra nden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara B urns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and t he session will run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wa nsing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T181500 EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500 EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500 EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230403T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230417T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230424T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230501T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230510T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230515T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-18/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nHi\, All. Bel ow is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meet ings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are re verting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Me l Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\ , SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Sp ring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeaster n
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columb ia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydne y) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Ma ciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7980@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Saul Kripke announced his possible world semantics in 1959\, an d published his proof of axiomatic completeness for the standard modal log ics of the time in 1963. It is very unlike the standard completeness proo f used today\, which involves a Lindenbaum/Henkin construction and produce s canonical models. Kripke’s proof involved tableaus\, in a format that i s difficult to follow\, and uses tableau construction algorithms that are complex and somewhat error prone to describe. I will first discuss Kripke’ s proof\, then the historical origins of the modern version. Then I will show that completeness\, proved Kripke style\, could actually have been do ne in the Lindenbaum/Henkin way\, thus simplifying things considerably. N one of this is new but\, with the parts collected together it is an intere sting story. “In my end is my beginning”.\nHi\, All. Below is the provisio nal program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as us ual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 G ary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Bra d Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\nMarc C olyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:On Kripke’s proof of Kripke completeness. Melvin Fitting (CUNY) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/on-kripkes-proof-of-krip ke-completeness-melvin-fitting-cuny/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nSaul Kripke a nnounced his possible world semantics in 1959\, and published his proof of axiomatic completeness for the standard modal logics of the time in 1963. It is very unlike the standard completeness proof used today\, which inv olves a Lindenbaum/Henkin construction and produces canonical models. Kri pke’s proof involved tableaus\, in a format that is difficult to follow\, and uses tableau construction algorithms that are complex and somewhat err or prone to describe. I will first discuss Kripke’s proof\, then the histo rical origins of the modern version. Then I will show that completeness\, proved Kripke style\, could actually have been done in the Lindenbaum/Hen kin way\, thus simplifying things considerably. None of this is new but\, with the parts collected together it is an interesting story. “In my end is my beginning”.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for t he Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.1 5-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. ( No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn S impson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\n< p>Apr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Tu rin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special e vent. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoo n:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n< /HTML> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7977@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studie s of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However \, conceptual misalignment is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contempora ry discussions. Specifically\, conceptual misalignment refers to the follo wing: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordi nation of concepts is formed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophicall y meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterp art misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to dete ct when it comes to emotion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phen omenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept of e motion in Chinese philosophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misali gnment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philosophy . Moreover\, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T193000 GEO:+40.807527;-73.960864 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Columbia @ 1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Conceptual Misalignment to Conceptual Engineering: A Case Stud y on Emotion from Chinese Philosophy. Wenqing Zhao (Whitman) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/from-conceptual-misalign ment-to-conceptual-engineering-a-case-study-on-emotion-from-chinese-philos ophy-wenqing-zhao-whitman/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nConceptual mi salignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studies of Non-Western philoso phy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However\, conceptual misalignme nt is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP mate rials need to overcome to contribute to contemporary discussions. Specific ally\, conceptual misalignment refers to the following: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordination of concepts is fo rmed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophically meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterpart misalign. This misal ignment is particularly intricate and hard to detect when it comes to emot ion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phenomenal and/or intentiona l features. Through investigating the concept of emotion in Chinese philos ophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misalignment as a method of cr oss-cultural comparative and history of philosophy. Moreover\, I argue tha t conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary concep tual engineering and amelioration projects.
\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Ple ase contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,emotion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7987@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:The sender-receiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackl e the question of the conventionality of meaning. But many people who care d about the conventionality of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work\, only a few attempts have been made to say anything about the nature of lo gic and inference from the perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the what’s been said in that regard\, by Skyrms and othe rs\, and suggest a few general lessons.\n—\nHi\, All. Below is the provisi onal program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as u sual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face t o face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Br ad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Sprin g recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andre a Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Not e that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMa y 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and inference in the sender-receiver model. Shawn Simpson (Pi tt) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-inference-in-t he-sender-receiver-model-shawn-simpson-pitt/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
The sender-re ceiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackle the question of the co nventionality of meaning. But many people who cared about the conventional ity of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work\, only a few attempts hav e been made to say anything about the nature of logic and inference from t he perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the wh at’s been said in that regard\, by Skyrms and others\, and suggest a few g eneral lessons.
\n—
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional progr am for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mond ays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face mee tings. (No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iac ona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 S pecial event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bo chum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7990@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:What we call first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated\ , in a certain guise\, by Peirce around 1885 and championed\, albeit in id iosyncratic form\, by Zermelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterize s uch logics model- and proof-theoretically and argue that they constitute e xploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain-dependent gener ality. Whereas a logic\, or family of such\, can be of interest for any o f a variety of reasons\, we suggest that one of those reasons might be tha t said logic fosters some clarification regarding just what qualifies as a logical concept\, a logical operation\, or a logical law.\n \nNote: The p ublished paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.\nHi\ , All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semes ter. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lio nel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferg uson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia \nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session wil l run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\ , Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:First-order logics over fixed domain. Gregory Taylor (CUNY) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/first-order-logics-over- fixed-domain-gregory-taylor-cuny/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat we call first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated\, in a certain guise\, b y Peirce around 1885 and championed\, albeit in idiosyncratic form\, by Ze rmelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterize such logics model- and pr oof-theoretically and argue that they constitute exploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain-dependent generality. Whereas a logic\ , or family of such\, can be of interest for any of a variety of reasons\, we suggest that one of those reasons might be that said logic fosters som e clarification regarding just what qualifies as a logical concept\, a log ical operation\, or a logical law.
\n\n
Note: Th e published paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this comi ng semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Ro om 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n< p> \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fite lson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Sam ara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nM arc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8019@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:This semester\, we will meet as usual on Mondays\, 4.15-6.15\, followed by a trip to the pub for all those who would like to go. The roo m is yet to be determined. Meetings will be face to face only. Below is th e provisional program for the semester. Details of each meeting will be an nounced on a weekly basis\, as usual.\nNote that the first meeting will be on September 11. Unfortunately we lose several Mondays towards the start of the semester because of CUNY holidays. There is nothing currently sche duled for Nov 20 or Dec 11. Whether we fill those slots is a decision yet to be made\; but if you would like one of them\, let us know.\n \nSept 4. GC closed. No meeting\nSept 11 Francesco Paoli\, Cagliari\nSept 18 Will Na va\, NYU\nSept 25 GC closed. No meeting\nOct 2 Brett Topey\, Saltzburg\nOc t 9 GC closed. No meeting.\nOct 16 Yale Weiss\, GC\nOct 23 Melissa Fusco\, Columbia\nOct 30 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nNov 6 Alex Citkin\, Priv ate Researcher\nNov 13 Alex Skiles\, Rutgers\nNov 20 [GP in Germany]\nNov 27 Mircea Dumitru\, Bucharest\nDec 4 James Walsh\, NYU\nDec 11 DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230911T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230911T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 4419 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230918T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231002T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231016T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231023T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231030T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231106T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231113T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231127T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231204T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231211T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-19/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis semester \, we will meet as usual on Mondays\, 4.15-6.15\, followed by a trip to th e pub for all those who would like to go. The room is yet to be determine d. Meetings will be face to face only. Below is the provisional program fo r the semester. Details of each meeting will be announced on a weekly basi s\, as usual.
\nNote that the first meeting will be on September 11. Unfortunately we lose several Mondays towards the start of the semester b ecause of CUNY holidays. There is nothing currently scheduled for Nov 20 or Dec 11. Whether we fill those slots is a decision yet to be made\; but if you would like one of them\, let us know.
\n\n
Sept 4. GC closed. No meeting
\nSept 11 Francesco Paoli\, Cagliari
\nSept 18 Will Nava\, NYU
\nSept 25 GC closed. No meeting
\nOct 2 Brett Topey\, Saltzburg
\nOct 9 GC closed. No me eting.
\nOct 16 Yale Weiss\, GC
\nOct 23 Melissa Fusco\, Columbia
\nOct 30 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nNov 6 Alex Citkin\, Private Researcher
\nNov 13 Alex Skiles\, Rutgers
\nN ov 20 [GP in Germany]
\nNov 27 Mircea Dumitru\, Bucharest p>\n
Dec 4 James Walsh\, NYU
\nDec 11
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but ha s also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. T he Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of sha me can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confuci an texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoi st\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely th e focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debat e of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and res tores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of what constit utes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as insults. Mo re importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate \, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the C onfucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual ’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimu li while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s mora l cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the funct ion of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an imp ortant philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.\n\n\n\n \nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n\n\n\n\nWe hope you’ve had restful and productive summers\, and we look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meetings. Below is the list of our scheduled speakers. Please save these dates!\n\nSeptember 15 – Jing Hu (Concordia)\nOctober 1 3 – Bill Waldron (Middlebury)\nOctober 27 – David Wong (Duke)\nDecember 1 – Stephen Angle (Wesleyan)\n\nFurther details will be circulated in due co urse. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716 @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:War and Shame –A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults betw een the Confucians and their Interlocutors. Jing Hu (Concordia University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/war-and-shame-a-debate-o n-the-appropriate-response-to-insults-between-the-confucians-and-their-int erlocutors-jing-hu-concordia-university/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat i s an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently prese nted as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confucian texts. Meanwhi le\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoist\, legalist\, o r much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attent ion. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and restores the histori cal intellectual discourse over the topic of what constitutes an appropria te response to humiliating situations such as insults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate\, namely how Son gzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the Confucian doctrine : The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtu es can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimuli while also mai ntaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external s timuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an important philosophi cal concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)
\n
ABSTRACT: Yogācāra Bud dhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we co llectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, construct our shared social realit ies\, our cultures. These “worlds” are supported by cognitive processes in formed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna). Through development an d socialization\, we come to identify with these cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover\, and in agreement with cognitiv e scientists\, Yogācārins argue that humans have developed to be “innate e ssentialists\,” so that we imagine that our constructed social and cultura l identities have their own essential\, intrinsic characteristics\, set ap art from all others\, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie c onflicts between groups. We can counteract these harmful patterns\, Yogācā rins say\, by analyzing how our social and cultural “realities” are collec tively constructed\, and by showing how—through logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our unreflective\, knee-jerk rea ction to different peoples and cultures\, and thereby foster more toleranc e\, empathy and understanding for all beings. In sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism o ffers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the origins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, rooted in ancient traditions yet rele vant to contemporary issues.
\nWith responses from Jonathan Go ld (Princeton University)
\nDATE: October 13th\, 2023
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall \, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nThe first sec tion of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about t he existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition conc entrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dha rmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second sectio n looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as mor e difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and consid ers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Rutgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Ha ll will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have t his card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearb y to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted thr ough Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a n earby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further inf ormation.
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\nHow does the imagination change us ? Why should picturing ourselves a certain way have any real effect on wha t we are? These questions are central to debates in Buddhist tantric liter ature regarding the generation stage (utpattikrama)\, wherein pract itioners visualize themselves as buddhas ensconsed in magnificent mandala- palaces. For some\, this practice is what sets Buddhist tantra apart: thro ugh this “yoga of the imagination\,” as David Shulman puts it\, a practiti oner can achieve buddhahood in a single lifetime. And yet\, as the Buddhis t tantric author Indrabhūti (8th century) argues\, a pauper who imagines h imself to be a king does not thereby become one—so\, in the same way\, pra ctitioners who visualize themselves as buddhas will not thereby become bud dhas. The mental imagery (ākāra) involved in this practice is just so much unreal fabrication. Why should it have real transformative effects ? I’ll consider here how these debates played out in Sanskrit Buddhist tan tric texts from the 10th–11th centuries. I’ll focus on early authors in th e Kālacakra tradition\, who upheld Indrabhūti’s critique of the generation stage\, and authors like Ratnākaraśānti\, Vāgīśvarakīrti\, and Advayavajr a (aka Maitrīpa)\, who each in their own way critiqued mental imagery yet defended the importance and effectiveness of generation-stage practice. In the first part of the paper\, I’ll consider arguments against mental imag ery as these appear in generation-stage practice texts and the early Kālac akra tradition. In the second part\, I’ll turn to why we might think unrea l mental imagery can nevertheless have real transformative effects\, payin g special attention to the ways Buddhist tantric authors writing in Sanskr it take up ideas from the tradition of dramatic theory (nāṭyaśastra ) and Sanskrit culture more broadly.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Thoma s Yarnall (Columbia University)
\nDATE: February 2nd\, 2024
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia Univer sity
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON E NTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only op en with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting beg ins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONAT IONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia U niversity’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSV P is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restauran t. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information.
\nACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The Unive rsity Seminars’ participants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing ac commodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the O ffice of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are av ailable on request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: h ttps://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n(Please do not reply to this announcement. You may contact th e Co-Chairs using the link above.)
\nComparative Philosophy Sem inar:
\n\n
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,imagination END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8136@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f rom 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisional schedule is as fo llows:\nFeb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)\nFeb 12. NO MEETING\nFeb 19. NO MEETING \nFeb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)\nMar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)\nMar 11. Otávi o Bueno (Miami)\nMar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)\nMar 25. Dan Marshal l (Lingnan)\nApr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)\nApr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)\nA pr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)\nApr 22. NO MEETING\nApr 29. Anandi Hatt iangadi (Stockholm)\nMay 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240205T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240205T181500 GEO:+40.748815;-73.984102 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 7395 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240226T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240304T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240311T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240318T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240325T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240401T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240408T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240415T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240429T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240506T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic & Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-metaphysics-worksh op-4/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\nFebruary 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\n - April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (Univ ersity at Buffalo)
\n\\n\\n \n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8032@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T100239Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://philosophy.columbia.edu/content/colloquia-lectures-2023-202 4 DESCRIPTION:Verity Harte is a specialist in ancient philosophy\, with parti cular research interests in ancient metaphysics\, epistemology and psychol ogy\, especially of Plato and Aristotle. She is the author of Plato on Par ts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure\, and is the editor of several important books on ancient philosophy. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240215T161000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240215T180000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:716 Philosophy Hall @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, U SA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Verity Harte (Yale) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/verity-harte-yale/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mond ays from 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in -person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisi onal schedule is as follows:
\nFeb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)
\nFe b 12. NO MEETING
\nFeb 19. NO MEETING
\nFeb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)
\nMar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)
\nMar 11. Otávio Bueno (M iami)
\nMar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)
\nMar 25. Dan Mar shall (Lingnan)
\nApr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)
\nApr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)
\nApr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)
\nApr 22. NO MEETING
\nApr 29. Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm)
\nMay 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)
\n\\n\\n Verity Harte is a specialist in ancient philosophy\, with particular research interests in ancient metaphysics\, epistemology and psychology\, especially of Plat o and Aristotle. She is the author of Plato on Parts and Wholes: The M etaphysics of Structure\, and is the editor of several important book s on ancient philosophy.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:ancient\,metaphysics END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR