BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7707@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://nygiw.tumblr.com/2021-2022 DESCRIPTION:Eva Bockenheimer. Frederica Gregoratto. Thimo Heisenberg. Axel Honneth. Rahel Jaeggi. Gal Katz. Frederick Neuhouser. Andreja Novakovic. A ngelica Nuzzo. Johannes-Georg Schülein. Italo Testa.\nApril 22-23 Time TBA \n*In-person event DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220422 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220424 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Columbia University @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Hegel’s Heritage: First Nature in Social Philosophy Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/hegels-heritage-first-na ture-in-social-philosophy-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nEva Bockenhei
mer. Frederica Gregoratto. Thimo Heisenberg. Axel Honneth. Rahel Jaeggi. G
al Katz. Frederick Neuhouser. Andreja Novakovic. Angelica Nuzzo. Johannes-
Georg Schülein. Italo Testa.
\nApril 22-23 Time TBA
\n
ABS TRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, la ws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments see for the fa\ , how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments\, in classica l Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are included here as a PDF attachment.
\n\n
DATE: October 22\, 2021
\nTIME: 7:00-8:30 pm
\n\n
This seminar w ill take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Belo w you will find the link to join the meeting. The attached file is an inst ruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addit ion to familiarizing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there a re two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you w ill need to sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we wil l have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Pa rticipants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nLead Presenter : Ei rik Lang Harris
\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State University)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysburg College)
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are o nly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7745@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/2022/02/15/upcoming-maps-talks-spri ng-2022/ DESCRIPTION:The current pandemic has focused attention on the techniques us ed by epidemiologists and other non-experimental scientists to infer causa l hypotheses from correlational data. I have previously argued* that we ne ed to explain these techniques by reducing causal relationships to depende ncies in systems of structural equations with probabilistically independen t exogenous variables. In this talk I shall aim to use this account to cas t light on (a) single-case counterfactual dependence and actual causation\ , (b) the content and practical relevance of generic causal claims like “s moking causes cancer”\, (c) the temporal asymmetry of causation\, and (d) the proper understanding of rational action under risk.\n*In particular\, I’ve argued this in http://weebly-file/1/8/5/5/18551740/stat_nat_csn_monis t.pdf. I will also be giving a talk on it at the CUNY Logic and Metaphysic s workshop on Monday 7 March 1615-1815.\nThe talk will be on Zoom. All are welcome to attend!\nThe zoom link will be distributed through the MAPS ma iling list. If you are not on the MAPS mailing list and would like to rece ive the Zoom link for the talk\, please email nyphilsci@gmail.com. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220309T163000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220309T183000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:The Causal Structure of Reality\, David Papineau (KCL) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/the-causal-structure-of- reality-david-papineau-kcl/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe current p andemic has focused attention on the techniques used by epidemiologists an d other non-experimental scientists to infer causal hypotheses from correl ational data. I have previously argued* that we need to explain these tech niques by reducing causal relationships to dependencies in systems of stru ctural equations with probabilistically independent exogenous variables. I n this talk I shall aim to use this account to cast light on (a) single-ca se counterfactual dependence and actual causation\, (b) the content and pr actical relevance of generic causal claims like “smoking causes cancer”\, (c) the temporal asymmetry of causation\, and (d) the proper understanding of rational action under risk.
\n*In particular\, I’ve argued this in http://weebly-file/1/8/5/5/185517 40/stat_nat_csn_monist.pdf. I will also be giving a talk on it at the CUNY Logic and Metaphysics workshop on Monday 7 March 1615-1815.
\nT he talk will be on Zoom. All are welcome to attend!
\nThe zoom link will be distributed through the MAPS mailing list. If you are not on the M APS mailing list and would like to receive the Zoom link for the talk\, pl ease email nyphilsci@gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:causality\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7750@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\n \nPresents: L i Zehou on the ‘Deep Structures of Confucianism’\nLead Presenter: Andrew L ambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo I II (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Univ ersity)\nABSTRACT: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cult ural methodology blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such a s Kant and Marx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its ro le in Li’s thought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultura l tradition influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence of ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined in this prep aratory reading. The idea is that culture\, history\, and social practice (collectively\, a tradition) shape human psychology (including the formati on of concepts\, emotions\, and values) in ways not always apparent to the subject. Within the Chinese tradition\, Confucianism constitutes such a d eep structure\, and its effects cannot be captured by textual studies alon e\, nor studies of material culture. Rather\, the deep structure is articu lated in terms of an emergent shared subjectivity. Such traditions can evo lve and ultimately dissolve\; nevertheless\, their effects are deep-rooted . This seminar meeting will aim to identify the parameters of Li’s ambitio us theoretical framework and its plausibility\, and to explore connections with current work in related fields\, such as cultural and empirical psyc hology.\nDATE: March 25\, 2022\nTIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST\nThis seminar wil l take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addition to familiar izing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there are two things w e ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sig n in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants pane l. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand. \nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, d onations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giv ing form\, Giving to Columbia.\n \nAccessibility Statement: Columbia Unive rsity encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars participants with dis- abilities w ho anticipate needing accommodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 or di sability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disab ilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance acce ssing campus. \nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: https://universityseminars.colum bia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/ DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T183000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220325T200000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Li Zehou. Deep Structures of Confucianism URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/li-zehou-deep-structures -of-confucianism/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\n\n
Presents:
Lead Presenter : Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Uni versity)
\nABSTRAC
T: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cultural methodo
logy blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and M
arx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its role in Li’s t
hought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition
influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence o
f ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined
DATE: March 25\, 2022
\n< p class='gmail-p1'>TIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST< /span>\nThis seminar will t ake place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiariz e yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with th e program’s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your na me in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University S eminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will r aise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your h and.
\nNote Regar ding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Co lumbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars parti cipants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing accommodations or who h ave questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability S ervices at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, includi ng sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for acc ommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar partici pants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: http s://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7774@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nWelcomes you t o an IN-PERSON meeting:\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)\n« A Case ag ainst Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »\nWith responses fr om Alexander Englert (Princeton University)\nABSTRACT: There’s a common li ne of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious expe rience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhya mika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century ) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysical ly impossible. Lacking any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of co nscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I wil l present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” agains t mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between conscious ness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda f or centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also que stions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. All ison Aitken\, Columbia URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-case-against-simple-mi ndedness-srigupta-on-mental-mereology-allison-aitken-columbia/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\nWelcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:
\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)
\n« A Case against Simple-mindedn ess: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »
\nWith responses from Alexander Englert (Princet
on University)
ABST RACT: There’s a common line of reasoning whi ch supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhyamika Buddhist philo sophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any ki nd of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lack ing any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I will present an analys is of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” against mental simples an d show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intent ional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of int ra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience argua bly owes responses.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7870@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)\n ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two diffe rent kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two diffe rent kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conv entionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophi cal discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2021\, 2022) has influentially arg ued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that in terprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. How ever\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidha rma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an e ntity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of con ventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from t he models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s a ccount of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits an d McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventio nally true.\n \nDinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University S eminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating r equirements at lm3335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Gue rrero (William & Mary) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-conventional-tr uth-and-ontological-pluralism-laura-p-guerrero-william-mary/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nWith responses from Mark Siderits (Illin ois State University)
\nABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often dra w a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth ( saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontologi cal distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real e ntities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). S imilar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entiti es and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2 021\, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he call s “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one t hat denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involvin g apparent reference to them. However\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that v iew by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventi onal truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinctio n between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultima tely. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional re ality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will a lso argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offeri ng a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is deri ved from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the vi ews suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultima te truths about what is conventionally true.
\n\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the C olumbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is req uired for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,metaphysics\,truth END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7872@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Timothy Connolly (East Stroudsburg Universi ty)\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discussions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an emotion. Ancient Asian philosoph ical traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism\, however\, emphasize co mpassion as a character trait that should be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a necessary tool? What is the role o f love and care? Does self-reflection contribute to the process?\n\n \nDi nner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3 335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:How to nurture compassion? Some lessons from Asian philosophical tr aditions. Sin Yee Chan (U Vermont) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/how-to-nurture-compassio n-some-lessons-from-asian-philosophical-traditions-sin-yee-chan-u-vermont/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWith responses from Timothy Connolly (Ea st Stroudsburg University)
\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discu
ssions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an
emotion. Ancient Asian philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and
Buddhism\, however\, emphasize compassion as a character trait that should
be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions
to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a ne
cessary tool? What is the role of love and care? Does self-reflection co
ntribute to the process?
\n
\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia Univ ersity Seminars. < /p>\n
RSVP is required for di nner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7861@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://nygiw.tumblr.com/post/694621478841450496 DESCRIPTION:Please join us for a talk by Eric-John Russell (Universität Pot sdam)\, who will present chapters from his recently published book\, Why E verything is as it Seems: Hegel and Debord. Jacob McNulty (University Coll ege London) will provide a response followed by a Q&A with our audience.\n Guy Debord has been called many things: pseudo-philosopher\, nihilist\, fi lmmaker\, megalomaniac\, strategist\, third-rate Mephistopheles. His book The Society of the Spectacle (1967) has fallen into a similarly motley rec eption\, frequently enveloped within the discourses of postmodernism\, med ia and cultural studies\, and avant-garde art history. My research however \, dispenses with such narratives and instead offers a sustained examinati on of the concept of the society of the spectacle through the two pillars upon which Debord understood his own work as a critical theory of society: Marx’s critique of political economy and Hegel’s speculative philosophy. It is the latter that will be the focus of my paper\, first by offering so me introductory remarks on Debord’s theory of the spectacle but then argui ng that it precisely the speculative dimension of Hegel’s dialectic that remains central for Debord’s diagnosis of twentieth century capitalism\, w ith emphasis placed on the importance of Hegel’s Wesenslogik. I will concl ude with the historical significance of Debord’s “heretical Hegelianism\,” specifically as an intervention within the atmosphere of the French Hegel ianism of the interwar and postwar period.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221216T170000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221216T190000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, rm 716 @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Why Everything is as it Seems: Hegel & Debord. Eric-John Russell URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/why-everything-is-as-it- seems-hegel-debord-eric-john-russell/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nPlease join u s for a talk by Eric-John Russell (Universität Potsdam)\, who will present chapters from his recently published book\, Why Everything i s as it Seems: Hegel and Debord. Jacob McNulty (University College London) will provide a response followed by a Q&A with our audience.
\nGuy Debord has been called many things: pseudo-philosopher\, nihilist \, filmmaker\, megalomaniac\, strategist\, third-rate Mephistopheles. His book The Society of the Spectacle (1967) has fallen into a similarl y motley reception\, frequently enveloped within the discourses of postmod ernism\, media and cultural studies\, and avant-garde art history. My rese arch however\, dispenses with such narratives and instead offers a sustain ed examination of the concept of the society of the spectacle through the two pillars upon which Debord understood his own work as a critical theory of society: Marx’s critique of political economy and Hegel’s speculative philosophy. It is the latter that will be the focus of my paper\, first by offering some introductory remarks on Debord’s theory of the spectacle bu t then arguing that it precisely the speculative dimension of Hege l’s dialectic that remains central for Debord’s diagnosis of twentieth cen tury capitalism\, with emphasis placed on the importance of Hegel’s Wes enslogik. I will conclude with the historical significance of Debord’s “heretical Hegelianism\,” specifically as an intervention within the atmo sphere of the French Hegelianism of the interwar and postwar period.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:German\,Hegel\,idealism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7964@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U\,New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://nygiw.tumblr.com/post/708636328395472896/21523-james-kreine s DESCRIPTION:15 Feb\, 4pm:\nJames Kreines (Claremont McKenna)\nFrom Shapeles s Abyss Towards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously \n@ The New School\, Room L502\, at 2 W 13th Street\nGuests and visitors p olicies at the New School can be accessed via this website. You will have to download CLEAR and upload proof of vaccination or the results of a rapi d test. Please try to arrive 15 minutes earlier so we can help you in case of complications.\n\nFeb 24:\nGeorg Spoo (Freiburg)\nGrounds and Limits o f Immanent Critique: Kant\, Hegel\, Marx\n@ Columbia\n\nMar 3:\nHeikki Ika heimo\nHegel\, Humanity\, and Social Critique\n@ Zoom\n\nMar 24:\nStephen Howard (KU Leuven)\nKant’s Late Philosophy of Nature: The Opus Postumum\n@ Columbia\n\nApr 11:\nKarin de Boer\nDoes Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason A mount to an A Priori History of Rational Cosmology?\n@ Columbia\n\nApr 15\ , 4pm:\nEva von Redecker\nCo-sponsored by the New School Graduate Student Conference\n@ The New School\n\nApr 21:\nGiulia Battistoni\nNAture\, Life\ , Organizm: The Legacy of Romanticism and Classical German Philosophy in J onas’ Philosophical Biology\n@ The New School\n \n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T180000 GEO:+40.735225;-73.994325 LOCATION:The New School L502 @ 2 W 13th St\, New York\, NY 10011\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Shapeless Abyss Towards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously. James Kreines (Claremont McKenna) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/german-idealism-workshop -3/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
15 Feb\, 4pm:
\nJames Kreines (Claremont McKenna)
\nFrom Shapeless Abyss To wards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously
\n@ The New School\, Room L502\, at 2 W 13th Street
\nGuests and visito rs policies at the New School can be accessed via this w ebsite. You will have to download CLEAR and upload proof of vaccinatio n or the results of a rapid test. Please try to arrive 15 minutes earlier so we can help you in case of complications.
\nFeb 24:
\nGeorg Spoo (Freiburg)
\nGrounds and Limits of Immanent Critique: Kant\, Hegel\, Marx
\n@ Columbia
\nMar 3:
\nHeik ki Ikaheimo
\nHegel\, Humanity\, and Social Critique
\n@ Zoom< /p>\n
Mar 24:
\nStephen Howard (KU Leuven)
\nKant’s Late Philosophy of Nature: The Opus Postumum
\n@ Columbia
\nApr 11:
\nKarin de Boer
\nDoes Kant’s Antinomy of Pure R eason Amount to an A Priori History of Rational Cosmology?
\n@ Colum bia
\nApr 15\, 4pm:
\nEva von Redecker
\nCo-spon sored by the New School Graduate Student Conference
\n@ The New Scho ol
\nApr 21:
\nGiulia Battistoni
\nNAture\, Life \, Organizm: The Legacy of Romanticism and Classical German Philosophy in Jonas’ Philosophical Biology
\n@ The New School
\n\n
< /p>\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:German\,Hegel\,idealism\,Spinoza END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7963@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:The COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us.\nWith re sponses from Karsten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY) \nPresented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is re quired for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Philosophy of Crisis and a Question of Solidarity. Jin Y. Park (Ame rican) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/philosophy-of-crisis-and -a-question-of-solidarity-jin-y-park-american/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us. p>\n
With responses from Kars ten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY)
\n< p class='gmail-p2'>Presented by THE COLUMBIA SOC IETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is required for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@colu mbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,existentialism\,Korean\,politi cal\,religion\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7977@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studie s of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However \, conceptual misalignment is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contempora ry discussions. Specifically\, conceptual misalignment refers to the follo wing: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordi nation of concepts is formed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophicall y meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterp art misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to dete ct when it comes to emotion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phen omenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept of e motion in Chinese philosophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misali gnment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philosophy . Moreover\, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T193000 GEO:+40.807527;-73.960864 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Columbia @ 1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Conceptual Misalignment to Conceptual Engineering: A Case Stud y on Emotion from Chinese Philosophy. Wenqing Zhao (Whitman) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/from-conceptual-misalign ment-to-conceptual-engineering-a-case-study-on-emotion-from-chinese-philos ophy-wenqing-zhao-whitman/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nConceptual mi salignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studies of Non-Western philoso phy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However\, conceptual misalignme nt is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP mate rials need to overcome to contribute to contemporary discussions. Specific ally\, conceptual misalignment refers to the following: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordination of concepts is fo rmed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophically meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterpart misalign. This misal ignment is particularly intricate and hard to detect when it comes to emot ion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phenomenal and/or intentiona l features. Through investigating the concept of emotion in Chinese philos ophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misalignment as a method of cr oss-cultural comparative and history of philosophy. Moreover\, I argue tha t conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary concep tual engineering and amelioration projects.
\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Ple ase contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,emotion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T065842Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but ha s also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. T he Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of sha me can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confuci an texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoi st\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely th e focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debat e of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and res tores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of what constit utes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as insults. Mo re importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate \, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the C onfucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual ’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimu li while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s mora l cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the funct ion of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an imp ortant philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.\n\n\n\n \nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n\n\n\n\nWe hope you’ve had restful and productive summers\, and we look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meetings. Below is the list of our scheduled speakers. Please save these dates!\n\nSeptember 15 – Jing Hu (Concordia)\nOctober 1 3 – Bill Waldron (Middlebury)\nOctober 27 – David Wong (Duke)\nDecember 1 – Stephen Angle (Wesleyan)\n\nFurther details will be circulated in due co urse. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716 @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:War and Shame –A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults betw een the Confucians and their Interlocutors. Jing Hu (Concordia University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/war-and-shame-a-debate-o n-the-appropriate-response-to-insults-between-the-confucians-and-their-int erlocutors-jing-hu-concordia-university/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
What i s an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently prese nted as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confucian texts. Meanwhi le\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoist\, legalist\, o r much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attent ion. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and restores the histori cal intellectual discourse over the topic of what constitutes an appropria te response to humiliating situations such as insults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate\, namely how Son gzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the Confucian doctrine : The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtu es can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimuli while also mai ntaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external s timuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an important philosophi cal concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)
\n
ABSTRACT: Yogācāra Bud dhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we co llectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, construct our shared social realit ies\, our cultures. These “worlds” are supported by cognitive processes in formed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna). Through development an d socialization\, we come to identify with these cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover\, and in agreement with cognitiv e scientists\, Yogācārins argue that humans have developed to be “innate e ssentialists\,” so that we imagine that our constructed social and cultura l identities have their own essential\, intrinsic characteristics\, set ap art from all others\, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie c onflicts between groups. We can counteract these harmful patterns\, Yogācā rins say\, by analyzing how our social and cultural “realities” are collec tively constructed\, and by showing how—through logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our unreflective\, knee-jerk rea ction to different peoples and cultures\, and thereby foster more toleranc e\, empathy and understanding for all beings. In sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism o ffers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the origins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, rooted in ancient traditions yet rele vant to contemporary issues.
\nWith responses from Jonathan Go ld (Princeton University)
\nDATE: October 13th\, 2023
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall \, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nThe first sec tion of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about t he existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition conc entrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dha rmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second sectio n looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as mor e difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and consid ers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Rutgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Ha ll will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have t his card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearb y to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted thr ough Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a n earby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further inf ormation.
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\nHow does the imagination change us ? Why should picturing ourselves a certain way have any real effect on wha t we are? These questions are central to debates in Buddhist tantric liter ature regarding the generation stage (utpattikrama)\, wherein pract itioners visualize themselves as buddhas ensconsed in magnificent mandala- palaces. For some\, this practice is what sets Buddhist tantra apart: thro ugh this “yoga of the imagination\,” as David Shulman puts it\, a practiti oner can achieve buddhahood in a single lifetime. And yet\, as the Buddhis t tantric author Indrabhūti (8th century) argues\, a pauper who imagines h imself to be a king does not thereby become one—so\, in the same way\, pra ctitioners who visualize themselves as buddhas will not thereby become bud dhas. The mental imagery (ākāra) involved in this practice is just so much unreal fabrication. Why should it have real transformative effects ? I’ll consider here how these debates played out in Sanskrit Buddhist tan tric texts from the 10th–11th centuries. I’ll focus on early authors in th e Kālacakra tradition\, who upheld Indrabhūti’s critique of the generation stage\, and authors like Ratnākaraśānti\, Vāgīśvarakīrti\, and Advayavajr a (aka Maitrīpa)\, who each in their own way critiqued mental imagery yet defended the importance and effectiveness of generation-stage practice. In the first part of the paper\, I’ll consider arguments against mental imag ery as these appear in generation-stage practice texts and the early Kālac akra tradition. In the second part\, I’ll turn to why we might think unrea l mental imagery can nevertheless have real transformative effects\, payin g special attention to the ways Buddhist tantric authors writing in Sanskr it take up ideas from the tradition of dramatic theory (nāṭyaśastra ) and Sanskrit culture more broadly.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Thoma s Yarnall (Columbia University)
\nDATE: February 2nd\, 2024
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia Univer sity
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON E NTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only op en with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting beg ins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONAT IONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia U niversity’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSV P is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restauran t. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information.
\nACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The Unive rsity Seminars’ participants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing ac commodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the O ffice of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are av ailable on request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: h ttps://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n(Please do not reply to this announcement. You may contact th e Co-Chairs using the link above.)
\nComparative Philosophy Sem inar:
\n\n
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,imagination END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\nFebruary 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\n - April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (Univ ersity at Buffalo)
\n