BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7707@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T103211Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://nygiw.tumblr.com/2021-2022 DESCRIPTION:Eva Bockenheimer. Frederica Gregoratto. Thimo Heisenberg. Axel Honneth. Rahel Jaeggi. Gal Katz. Frederick Neuhouser. Andreja Novakovic. A ngelica Nuzzo. Johannes-Georg Schülein. Italo Testa.\nApril 22-23 Time TBA \n*In-person event DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220422 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220424 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Columbia University @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Hegel’s Heritage: First Nature in Social Philosophy Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/hegels-heritage-first-na ture-in-social-philosophy-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nEva Bockenhei
mer. Frederica Gregoratto. Thimo Heisenberg. Axel Honneth. Rahel Jaeggi. G
al Katz. Frederick Neuhouser. Andreja Novakovic. Angelica Nuzzo. Johannes-
Georg Schülein. Italo Testa.
\nApril 22-23 Time TBA
\n
Individuals s upport forms of domination with varying levels of understanding that they are doing so. In many cases\, those very structures of domination distort our conceptions of them through mechanisms such as motivated reasoning\, i mplicit bias\, affected ignorance\, false consciousness\, and belief polar ization. These various epistemic distortions\, in turn\, cause social conf lict\, notably by promoting political polarization. Those worried by socia l conflict have spent a great deal of energy decrying the increasingly pol arized contexts in which we live. However\, epistemic distortions in our s ociopolitical beliefs also misrepresent\, maintain systems of domination a nd prevent human needs from being met.
\nThis workshop aims to go be yond pronouncements such as ‘we are polarized’ or that ‘partisanship is on the rise\,’ and begin to think through epistemic distortions at the indiv idual and intersubjective levels\, the role of criticism and critique in f acilitating belief and social change\, and the idea of reconciliation\, by asking questions such as:
\nConvenors
\nEge Yumuşak is a philosopher\, specializing in epistemology\, the philosophy of mind \, and social & political philosophy. She received a PhD in Philosophy fro m Harvard University in 2022. Her research examines political disagreement —its material foundations\, psychological and social manifestations\, and epistemic properties. She is currently writing a series of articles on the nature and significance of clashes of perspective in social life.
\nNicolas Côté is a postdoctoral researcher at the University o f Toronto. His research is mainly in normative ethics and social choice th eory\, but they also dabble in applied ethics and issues of practical rati onality. Côté’s doctoral dissertation work focuses on the measurement of f reedom\, especially on axiomatic approaches to the measurement question\, and on how deontic concerns for protecting individual rights interact with welfarist concerns for improving the general welfare. Côté’s current rese arch focuses on the ethics of decision-making under radical uncertainty. p>\n
Invited speakers:
\nSabina Vaccarino Bremner \; Daniela Dover\; Cain Shelley
\nInvited commentators
\nTBA
Please join u s for a talk by Eric-John Russell (Universität Potsdam)\, who will present chapters from his recently published book\, Why Everything i s as it Seems: Hegel and Debord. Jacob McNulty (University College London) will provide a response followed by a Q&A with our audience.
\nGuy Debord has been called many things: pseudo-philosopher\, nihilist \, filmmaker\, megalomaniac\, strategist\, third-rate Mephistopheles. His book The Society of the Spectacle (1967) has fallen into a similarl y motley reception\, frequently enveloped within the discourses of postmod ernism\, media and cultural studies\, and avant-garde art history. My rese arch however\, dispenses with such narratives and instead offers a sustain ed examination of the concept of the society of the spectacle through the two pillars upon which Debord understood his own work as a critical theory of society: Marx’s critique of political economy and Hegel’s speculative philosophy. It is the latter that will be the focus of my paper\, first by offering some introductory remarks on Debord’s theory of the spectacle bu t then arguing that it precisely the speculative dimension of Hege l’s dialectic that remains central for Debord’s diagnosis of twentieth cen tury capitalism\, with emphasis placed on the importance of Hegel’s Wes enslogik. I will conclude with the historical significance of Debord’s “heretical Hegelianism\,” specifically as an intervention within the atmo sphere of the French Hegelianism of the interwar and postwar period.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:German\,Hegel\,idealism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7954@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T103211Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/cynthia-bennett-disab ility-accessibility-and-fairness-artificial-intelligence DESCRIPTION:Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to automate and scale sol utions to perennial accessibility challenges (e.g.\, generating image desc riptions for blind users). However\, research shows that AI-bias dispropor tionately impacts people already marginalized based on their race\, gender \, or disabilities\, raising questions about potential impacts in addition to AI’s promise. In this talk\, Cynthia Bennett will overview broad conce rns at the intersection of AI\, disability\, and accessibility. She will t hen share details about one project in this research space that led to gui dance on human and AI-generated image descriptions that account for subjec tive and potentially sensitive descriptors around race\, gender\, and disa bility of people in images. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230206T130000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230206T140000 GEO:+40.841243;-73.940971 LOCATION:Presbyterian Hospital Building (Room PH20-200) @ 622 W 168th St\, New York\, NY 10032\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Cynthia Bennett – Disability Accessibility and Fairness in Artifici al Intelligence URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/cynthia-bennett-disabili ty-accessibility-and-fairness-in-artificial-intelligence/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
Artificial in telligence (AI) promises to automate and scale solutions to perennial acce ssibility challenges (e.g.\, generating image descriptions for blind users ). However\, research shows that AI-bias disproportionately impacts people already marginalized based on their race\, gender\, or disabilities\, rai sing questions about potential impacts in addition to AI’s promise. In thi s talk\, Cynthia Bennett will overview broad concerns at the intersection of AI\, disability\, and accessibility. She will then share details about one project in this research space that led to guidance on human and AI-ge nerated image descriptions that account for subjective and potentially sen sitive descriptors around race\, gender\, and disability of people in imag es.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:artificial intelligence\,ethics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7964@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T103211Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U\,New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://nygiw.tumblr.com/post/708636328395472896/21523-james-kreine s DESCRIPTION:15 Feb\, 4pm:\nJames Kreines (Claremont McKenna)\nFrom Shapeles s Abyss Towards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously \n@ The New School\, Room L502\, at 2 W 13th Street\nGuests and visitors p olicies at the New School can be accessed via this website. You will have to download CLEAR and upload proof of vaccination or the results of a rapi d test. Please try to arrive 15 minutes earlier so we can help you in case of complications.\n\nFeb 24:\nGeorg Spoo (Freiburg)\nGrounds and Limits o f Immanent Critique: Kant\, Hegel\, Marx\n@ Columbia\n\nMar 3:\nHeikki Ika heimo\nHegel\, Humanity\, and Social Critique\n@ Zoom\n\nMar 24:\nStephen Howard (KU Leuven)\nKant’s Late Philosophy of Nature: The Opus Postumum\n@ Columbia\n\nApr 11:\nKarin de Boer\nDoes Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason A mount to an A Priori History of Rational Cosmology?\n@ Columbia\n\nApr 15\ , 4pm:\nEva von Redecker\nCo-sponsored by the New School Graduate Student Conference\n@ The New School\n\nApr 21:\nGiulia Battistoni\nNAture\, Life\ , Organizm: The Legacy of Romanticism and Classical German Philosophy in J onas’ Philosophical Biology\n@ The New School\n \n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T180000 GEO:+40.735225;-73.994325 LOCATION:The New School L502 @ 2 W 13th St\, New York\, NY 10011\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Shapeless Abyss Towards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously. James Kreines (Claremont McKenna) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/german-idealism-workshop -3/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n15 Feb\, 4pm:
\nJames Kreines (Claremont McKenna)
\nFrom Shapeless Abyss To wards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously
\n@ The New School\, Room L502\, at 2 W 13th Street
\nGuests and visito rs policies at the New School can be accessed via this w ebsite. You will have to download CLEAR and upload proof of vaccinatio n or the results of a rapid test. Please try to arrive 15 minutes earlier so we can help you in case of complications.
\nFeb 24:
\nGeorg Spoo (Freiburg)
\nGrounds and Limits of Immanent Critique: Kant\, Hegel\, Marx
\n@ Columbia
\nMar 3:
\nHeik ki Ikaheimo
\nHegel\, Humanity\, and Social Critique
\n@ Zoom< /p>\n
Mar 24:
\nStephen Howard (KU Leuven)
\nKant’s Late Philosophy of Nature: The Opus Postumum
\n@ Columbia
\nApr 11:
\nKarin de Boer
\nDoes Kant’s Antinomy of Pure R eason Amount to an A Priori History of Rational Cosmology?
\n@ Colum bia
\nApr 15\, 4pm:
\nEva von Redecker
\nCo-spon sored by the New School Graduate Student Conference
\n@ The New Scho ol
\nApr 21:
\nGiulia Battistoni
\nNAture\, Life \, Organizm: The Legacy of Romanticism and Classical German Philosophy in Jonas’ Philosophical Biology
\n@ The New School
\n\n
< /p>\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:German\,Hegel\,idealism\,Spinoza END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7978@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T103211Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epist emology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions o f knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological kin d. In this talk\, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.\nWith responses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@ columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 10027 \, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toront o) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/srihar%e1%b9%a3a-on-the- indefinability-of-knowledge-nilanjan-das-u-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nIn Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epistemology should give us re ason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are re liably tracking any sui generis psychological kind. In this talk\, I recon struct Śrīharṣa’s position.
\nWith res ponses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby resta urant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information .
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,epistemology\,Indian END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8156@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T103211Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Comparative philosophy is gaining traction in professional acad emic philosophy\, with specialist journals\, organizations\, books\, and p ublic campaigns. These inroads have been made in canonical areas of philos ophy\, including epistemology\, metaphysics\, logic\, and value theory. Ye t comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethi cs\, an interdisciplinary research area in which work with practice and po licy implications are dominated by the anglophone world. In this article\, I explain why comparative work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics\, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might over come these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues.\nWith responses from Wenqing Zhao (CUNY Baruch)\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please a rrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begin s. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in o r contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk. \nRSVP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER:. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2 798@columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited.\n\n \nCompara tive Philosophy Seminar:\n\nJanuary 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)\n February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\nApril 5 – Laura Speck er (Fordham University)\nMay 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Comparative Philosophy and Practical Applied Ethics. Laura Specker Sullivan (Fordham) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/comparative-philosophy-a nd-practical-applied-ethics-laura-specker-sullivan-fordham/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
Comparative p hilosophy is gaining traction in professional academic philosophy\, with s pecialist journals\, organizations\, books\, and public campaigns. These i nroads have been made in canonical areas of philosophy\, including epistem ology\, metaphysics\, logic\, and value theory. Yet comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethics\, an interdisciplinar y research area in which work with practice and policy implications are do minated by the anglophone world. In this article\, I explain why comparati ve work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics\, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might overcome these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues.
\n< p>With responses from Wenqing Zhao (CUNY Baruch)\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or cont act Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resourc e so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nRSVP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER:
b>. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at
cf2798
@columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited.
\n
\n
Comparative Philosophy Seminar:
\n