BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8024@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T053222Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://sofheyman.org/events/beyond-polarization-epistemic-distorti on-and-criticism DESCRIPTION:Individuals support forms of domination with varying levels of understanding that they are doing so. In many cases\, those very structure s of domination distort our conceptions of them through mechanisms such as motivated reasoning\, implicit bias\, affected ignorance\, false consciou sness\, and belief polarization. These various epistemic distortions\, in turn\, cause social conflict\, notably by promoting political polarization . Those worried by social conflict have spent a great deal of energy decry ing the increasingly polarized contexts in which we live. However\, episte mic distortions in our sociopolitical beliefs also misrepresent\, maintain systems of domination and prevent human needs from being met.\nThis works hop aims to go beyond pronouncements such as ‘we are polarized’ or that ‘p artisanship is on the rise\,’ and begin to think through epistemic distort ions at the individual and intersubjective levels\, the role of criticism and critique in facilitating belief and social change\, and the idea of re conciliation\, by asking questions such as:\n\nIn what ways are individual beliefs about domination/social structures epistemically distorted?\nWhat explains why social beliefs are epistemically distorted?\nWhat are the no rmative upshots of epistemic distortion for social relationships like ally ship\, comradeship\, and friendship?\nOught polarization be remedied? Whic h epistemic resources and theoretical frameworks avail themselves of emanc ipatory potential?\n\nConvenors\nEge Yumuşak is a philosopher\, specializi ng in epistemology\, the philosophy of mind\, and social & political philo sophy. She received a PhD in Philosophy from Harvard University in 2022. H er research examines political disagreement—its material foundations\, psy chological and social manifestations\, and epistemic properties. She is cu rrently writing a series of articles on the nature and significance of cla shes of perspective in social life.\nNicolas Côté is a postdoctoral resear cher at the University of Toronto. His research is mainly in normative eth ics and social choice theory\, but they also dabble in applied ethics and issues of practical rationality. Côté’s doctoral dissertation work focuses on the measurement of freedom\, especially on axiomatic approaches to the measurement question\, and on how deontic concerns for protecting individ ual rights interact with welfarist concerns for improving the general welf are. Côté’s current research focuses on the ethics of decision-making unde r radical uncertainty.\nInvited speakers:\nSabina Vaccarino Bremner\; Dani ela Dover\; Cain Shelley\nInvited commentators\nTBA DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20231108 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20231109 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Heyman Center\, 2nd foor common room @ 116th and Broadway\, New Yo rk\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Beyond Polarization: Epistemic Distortion and Criticism URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/beyond-polarization-epis temic-distortion-and-criticism-2/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nIndividuals s upport forms of domination with varying levels of understanding that they are doing so. In many cases\, those very structures of domination distort our conceptions of them through mechanisms such as motivated reasoning\, i mplicit bias\, affected ignorance\, false consciousness\, and belief polar ization. These various epistemic distortions\, in turn\, cause social conf lict\, notably by promoting political polarization. Those worried by socia l conflict have spent a great deal of energy decrying the increasingly pol arized contexts in which we live. However\, epistemic distortions in our s ociopolitical beliefs also misrepresent\, maintain systems of domination a nd prevent human needs from being met.
\nThis workshop aims to go be yond pronouncements such as ‘we are polarized’ or that ‘partisanship is on the rise\,’ and begin to think through epistemic distortions at the indiv idual and intersubjective levels\, the role of criticism and critique in f acilitating belief and social change\, and the idea of reconciliation\, by asking questions such as:
\nConvenors
\nEge Yumuşak is a philosopher\, specializing in epistemology\, the philosophy of mind \, and social & political philosophy. She received a PhD in Philosophy fro m Harvard University in 2022. Her research examines political disagreement —its material foundations\, psychological and social manifestations\, and epistemic properties. She is currently writing a series of articles on the nature and significance of clashes of perspective in social life.
\nNicolas Côté is a postdoctoral researcher at the University o f Toronto. His research is mainly in normative ethics and social choice th eory\, but they also dabble in applied ethics and issues of practical rati onality. Côté’s doctoral dissertation work focuses on the measurement of f reedom\, especially on axiomatic approaches to the measurement question\, and on how deontic concerns for protecting individual rights interact with welfarist concerns for improving the general welfare. Côté’s current rese arch focuses on the ethics of decision-making under radical uncertainty. p>\n
Invited speakers:
\nSabina Vaccarino Bremner \; Daniela Dover\; Cain Shelley
\nInvited commentators
\nTBA
How does objectivity shape power\, and how does power shape ob jectivity?
\nWelcome to “Unmasking Objectivity: A Critical Examinati on of the Nexus between Universal Truth Claims and Emergent Power Structur es\,” a conference that plunges into the intricate relationship between kn owledge and power. In this conference\, we will uncover how epistemologica l standpoints intersect with systems of coercion\, marginalization\, and o ppression. Our topic extends to alternative visions of knowledge\, truth\, and learning\, offering the potential for shared beliefs while addressing the adverse impacts of entrenched power structures.
\nHow have clai ms to absolute\, objective\, or scientific truth driven oppression through ideologies like religious absolutism\, colonialism\, technocracy\, and sc ientific sexism and racism? Contemporary debates further emphasize the sig nificance of this intersection.
\nOur discourse will also scrutinize epistemic injustice\, examining whether universalist epistemologies privi lege specific knowledge systems while silencing valid alternatives. We aim to shed light on social and political issues overlooked by dominant knowl edge frameworks through inclusive dialogues. This conference fosters criti cal exploration and inclusive discourse\, drawing on interdisciplinary stu dies in philosophy\, sociology\, and political theory.
\nTogether\, we will assess the ethical implications of our epistemological practices a nd explore pathways to creating more equitable systems of knowledge and so cial learning. Join us at “Unmasking Objectivity” as we navigate the intri cate web of knowledge and power\, aiming for a just and inclusive future w here the notion of objectivity is both scrutinized and harnessed for socia l transformation.
\n\n\n\n\nThis event wi ll feature a thought-provoking panel discussion with sexual and reproducti ve justice experts on the value of the sexual and reproductive justice fra mework and how it can be applied to diverse stakeholders\, settings\, and contexts. Panelists will also highlight examples from around the world of momentum towards sexual and reproductive justice.
\nFree and open to the public\; registration is required for bot h in-person and onlin e attendance. For additional information\, please visit the event webpage. Please email Malia Maier at mm5352@cumc.columbia.edu with any qu estions. All in-person attendees must follow Columbia’s COVI D-19 policies.
\nHosted by the Global Health Justice and Governance Program at Columbia University.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:justice\,medical\,reproductive\,social X-TICKETS-URL:https://www.eventbrite.com/e/sexual-reproductive-justice-vehi cle-for-global-progress-in-person-tickets-523893077297 END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7978@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T053222Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epist emology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions o f knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological kin d. In this talk\, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.\nWith responses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@ columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 10027 \, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toront o) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/srihar%e1%b9%a3a-on-the- indefinability-of-knowledge-nilanjan-das-u-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nIn Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epistemology should give us re ason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are re liably tracking any sui generis psychological kind. In this talk\, I recon struct Śrīharṣa’s position.
\nWith res ponses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby resta urant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information .
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,epistemology\,Indian END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8082@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T053222Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:nycwittgensteinworkshop@gmail.com DESCRIPTION:The importance of incorporating value pluralism into a theory o f justice is recognized in many conceptualizations of justice. This plural ism is often seen as a reason to attend to a range of perspectives\, persp ectives which can function as a source of information in determining which principles should guide justice. However\, philosophy’s ability to proper ly attend to different perspectives has received extensive attention in th e criticisms of various non-ideal theorists\, who argue that ideal-theoret ical philosophy runs the risk of excluding important aspects of actual soc ial problems. Taking these criticisms on board\, this paper builds on non- ideal theory by arguing for a Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach to justice. I will explain how this linguistic practice-embedded understan ding of justice can be a helpful tool for non-ideal theory\, as it can giv e us insight into why\, in various similar but different cases\, the notio n of justice is seen as applicable. In light of this approach\, I will sug gest a reorientation of the pluralist demand towards an empirical starting point. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231103T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231103T180000 GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243 LOCATION:New School room 1101 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Non-Idea Justice: A Family Resemblance Approach. Nadia ben Hassine (Cambridge) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/non-idea-justice-a-famil y-resemblance-approach-nadia-ben-hassine-cambridge/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
The importanc e of incorporating value pluralism into a theory of justice is recognized in many conceptualizations of justice. This pluralism is often seen as a r eason to attend to a range of perspectives\, perspectives which can functi on as a source of information in determining which principles should guide justice. However\, philosophy’s ability to properly attend to different p erspectives has received extensive attention in the criticisms of various non-ideal theorists\, who argue that ideal-theoretical philosophy runs the risk of excluding important aspects of actual social problems. Taking the se criticisms on board\, this paper builds on non-ideal theory by arguing for a Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach to justice. I will expla in how this linguistic practice-embedded understanding of justice can be a helpful tool for non-ideal theory\, as it can give us insight into why\, in various similar but different cases\, the notion of justice is seen as applicable. In light of this approach\, I will suggest a reorientation of the pluralist demand towards an empirical starting point.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:justice\,social\,wittgenstein END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8140@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T053222Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/eyoewara DESCRIPTION:This talk reads contemporary debates about structural racism an d US history from the perspective of philosophical questions about identit y and difference. While many people have argued that America needs to come to terms with or “work through” the racism in its history that has shaped and continues to shape its present structures\, it remains difficult to e xplain what connects this past and the present. Are we talking about one r acism with many different past and present forms? Or are there multiple ra cisms that only share some similar features? In this talk\, I draw attenti on to how these divisions play out particularly in contemporary Black Stud ies and argue that the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze can offer us resources for thinking about these questions through his discussions of repetition. I argue that understanding our conversations about structural racism and history as conversations about a racism that repeats\, can help us to bett er understand why racism seems to reappear\, how to think its disparate fo rms together\, and what presuppositions operate in many attempts to “work through” the past.\nBio: Eyo Ewara is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. His teaching and research explores the relatio nships between 20th Century Continental Philosophy\, Critical Philosophy o f Race\, and Queer Theory. His work has appeared in Theory and Event\, Pu ncta\, Philosophy Today\, Critical Philosophy of Race\, Political Theology \, and other venues. His current research project is particularly interest ed in engaging work in Continental Philosophy\, Queer Theory\, and Black S tudies to address questions of identity and difference amongst concepts of race\, forms of racism\, and forms of anti-racism. How can we better acco unt for the relations between at times radically disparate concepts\, stru ctures\, and practices such that they can all specifically and recognizabl y be called racial? What might our account of these relations say about ou r ability to address racism’s harms?\nTickets: https://event.newschool.edu /eyoewara. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240328T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240328T200000 GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243 LOCATION:Wolff Conference Room/D1103 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Strange Returns: Racism\, Repetition and Working Through the Past presented by Eyo Ewara URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/strange-returns-racism-r epetition-and-working-through-the-past-presented-by-eyo-ewara/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis talk rea ds contemporary debates about structural racism and US history from the pe rspective of philosophical questions about identity and difference. While many people have argued that America needs to come to terms with or “work through” the racism in its history that has shaped and continues to shape its present structures\, it remains difficult to explain what connects thi s past and the present. Are we talking about one racism with many differen t past and present forms? Or are there multiple racisms that only share so me similar features? In this talk\, I draw attention to how these division s play out particularly in contemporary Black Studies and argue that the p hilosophy of Gilles Deleuze can offer us resources for thinking about thes e questions through his discussions of repetition. I argue that understand ing our conversations about structural racism and history as conversations about a racism that repeats\, can help us to better understand why racism seems to reappear\, how to think its disparate forms together\, and what presuppositions operate in many attempts to “work through” the past.
\nBio: Eyo Ewara is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. His teaching and research explores the relatio nships between 20th Century Continental Philosophy\, Critical Philosophy o f Race\, and Queer Theory. His work has appeared in Theory and Event\, Pu ncta\, Philosophy Today\, Critical Philosophy of Race\, Political Theology \, and other venues. His current research project is particularly interest ed in engaging work in Continental Philosophy\, Queer Theory\, and Black S tudies to address questions of identity and difference amongst concepts of race\, forms of racism\, and forms of anti-racism. How can we better acco unt for the relations between at times radically disparate concepts\, stru ctures\, and practices such that they can all specifically and recognizabl y be called racial? What might our account of these relations say about ou r ability to address racism’s harms?
\nTickets: https://event .newschool.edu/eyoewara.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:history\,race X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/eyoewara END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR