BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7897@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T130509Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/philosophycolloquiumkamtekar DESCRIPTION:What makes right acts right? A Stoic answer to Ross’s question. \nWhen W.D. Ross poses the question\, “what makes right acts right?” (The Right and the Good ch. 2)\, he is asking a question that is prior to the d eliberative question\, “how do I determine the right thing to do?” The Sto ics recognize this: in De Officiis 1.7\, Cicero says that every inquiry ab out duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned with the end of g oods and evils\, which addresses such matters as whether all duties are pe rfect\, whether some are more important than others\, and what are the kin ds of duties\, and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (praecepta) b y which our conduct can be made to conform with the end. This paper focus es on (1) and in particular asks Ross’s question about Stoic right actions (kathêkonta).\n \nThe endpoint of Stoic deliberation is determining what token action is the right action. The paper begins with the Stoic distin ction between a thing’s choiceworthiness\, its intrinsic disposition to el icit a choice response in a suitable subject\, and its possession being to -be-chosen. The determination of what is to-be-done is made by weighing ag ainst each other all the values of the relevant action types specified by their content (the so-called ‘intermediate actions’) that are in accordanc e with nature\, as Stoic value theory says that according with nature is a n objective reason to do an action. What constitutes the rightness of the token right action\, and is given in its reasonable defense\, is the same as what constitutes the rightness of a perfect (katorthôma) action. Th e Stoic distinction between right and perfect action depends on the action ’s moral goodness—not rightness—which is due to its causal origin.\nPresen ted by Professor Rachana Kamtekar (Cornell University)\nTickets: https://e vent.newschool.edu/philosophycolloquiumkamtekar. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221117T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221117T200000 GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243 LOCATION:Wolff Conference Room/D1103 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rachana Kamtekar: What makes right acts right? A Stoic answer to Ro ss’s question URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rachana-kamtekar-what-ma kes-right-acts-right-a-stoic-answer-to-rosss-question/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nW hat makes right acts right? A Stoic answer to Ross’s question.
\nWhen W.D. Ross poses the question\, “what makes right acts righ t?” (The Right and the Good ch. 2)\, he is asking a question that is prior to the deliberative question\, “how do I determine the right thing to do? ” The Stoics recognize this: in De Officiis 1.7\, Cicero says that every i nquiry about duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned with the end of goods and evils\, which addresses such matters as whether all duti es are perfect\, whether some are more important than others\, and what ar e the kinds of duties\, and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (pra ecepta) by which our conduct can be made to conform with the end. This pa per focuses on (1) and in particular asks Ross’s question about Stoic righ t actions (kathêkonta).
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The endpoint of Stoic deliberat ion is determining what token action is the right action. The paper begin s with the Stoic distinction between a thing’s choiceworthiness\, its intr insic disposition to elicit a choice response in a suitable subject\, and its possession being to-be-chosen. The determination of what is to-be-done is made by weighing against each other all the values of the relevant act ion types specified by their content (the so-called ‘intermediate actions’ ) that are in accordance with nature\, as Stoic value theory says that acc ording with nature is an objective reason to do an action. What constitut es the rightness of the token right action\, and is given in its reasonabl e defense\, is the same as what constitutes the rightness of a perfect (ka torthôma) action. The Stoic distinction between right and perfect actio n depends on the action’s moral goodness—not rightness—which is due to its causal origin.
\nPresented by Professor Rachana Kamtekar (Cornell University) p>\n
Tickets: https://event.newschool.edu/phi losophycolloquiumkamtekar.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:ancient\,ethics X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/philosophycolloquiumkamtekar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7938@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T130509Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/gwengrewal DESCRIPTION:Book discussion on Gwenda-lin Grewal’s\, Thinking About Death i n Plato’s Euthydemus. A Close Reading and New Translation (OUP 2022)\n \nS peakers:\nGwenda-lin Grewal (NSSR)\nCinzia Arruzza (NSSR)\nNicholas Pappas (CUNY)\n \nThinking of Death places Plato’s Euthydemus among the dialogue s that surround the trial and death of Socrates. A premonition of philosop hy’s fate arrives in the form of Socrates’ encounter with the two-headed s ophist pair\, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus\, who appear as if they are the ghost of the Socrates of Aristophanes’ Thinkery. The pair vacillate betwee n choral ode and rhapsody\, as Plato vacillates between referring to them in the dual and plural number in Greek. Gwenda-lin Grewal’s close reading explores how the structure of the dialogue and the pair’s back-and-forth a rguments bear a striking resemblance to thinking itself: in its immersive remove from reality\, thinking simulates death even as it cannot conceive of its possibility. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus take this to an extreme\, and so emerge as the philosophical dream and sophistic nightmare of being disembodied from substance. The Euthydemus is haunted by philosophy’s tenu ous relationship to political life. This is played out in the narration th rough Crito’s implied criticism of Socrates-the phantom image of the Athen ian laws-and in the drama itself\, which appears to take place in Hades. T hinking of death thus brings with it a lurid parody of the death of thinki ng: the farce of perfect philosophy that bears the gravity of the city’s s ophistry. Grewal also provides a new translation of the Euthydemus that pa ys careful attention to grammatical ambiguities\, nuances\, and wit in way s that substantially expand the reader’s access to the dialogue’s mysterie s. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230223T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230223T200000 GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243 LOCATION:Wolff Conference Room/D1103 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Thinking About Death in Plato’s Euthydemus. URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/thinking-about-death-in- platos-euthydemus/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nBook discussion on Gwenda-lin Grewal’s\, Thinking About Death in Plato’s Euthy demus. A Close Reading and New Translation (OUP 2022)
\n< p> \nSpeakers:
\nGwenda-lin
Grewal (NSSR)
\nCinzia Arruzza (NSSR)
\nNicholas Pappas (CUNY)
\n
Thinking of D eath places Plato’s Euthydemus among the dialogues that surround the trial and death of Socrates. A premonition of philosophy’s fate arrives in the form of Socrates’ encounter with the two-headed sophist pair\, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus\, who appear as if they are the ghost of the Socrates of Aristophanes’ Thinkery. The pair vacillate between choral ode and rhapsody \, as Plato vacillates between referring to them in the dual and plural nu mber in Greek. Gwenda-lin Grewal’s close reading explores how the structur e of the dialogue and the pair’s back-and-forth arguments bear a striking resemblance to thinking itself: in its immersive remove from reality\, thi nking simulates death even as it cannot conceive of its possibility. Euthy demus and Dionysodorus take this to an extreme\, and so emerge as the phil osophical dream and sophistic nightmare of being disembodied from substanc e. The Euthydemus is haunted by philosophy’s tenuous relationship to polit ical life. This is played out in the narration through Crito’s implied cri ticism of Socrates-the phantom image of the Athenian laws-and in the drama itself\, which appears to take place in Hades. Thinking of death thus bri ngs with it a lurid parody of the death of thinking: the farce of perfect philosophy that bears the gravity of the city’s sophistry. Grewal also pro vides a new translation of the Euthydemus that pays careful attention to g rammatical ambiguities\, nuances\, and wit in ways that substantially expa nd the reader’s access to the dialogue’s mysteries.
\nThe importanc e of incorporating value pluralism into a theory of justice is recognized in many conceptualizations of justice. This pluralism is often seen as a r eason to attend to a range of perspectives\, perspectives which can functi on as a source of information in determining which principles should guide justice. However\, philosophy’s ability to properly attend to different p erspectives has received extensive attention in the criticisms of various non-ideal theorists\, who argue that ideal-theoretical philosophy runs the risk of excluding important aspects of actual social problems. Taking the se criticisms on board\, this paper builds on non-ideal theory by arguing for a Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach to justice. I will expla in how this linguistic practice-embedded understanding of justice can be a helpful tool for non-ideal theory\, as it can give us insight into why\, in various similar but different cases\, the notion of justice is seen as applicable. In light of this approach\, I will suggest a reorientation of the pluralist demand towards an empirical starting point.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:justice\,social\,wittgenstein END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8051@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T130509Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/rachanakamtekar DESCRIPTION:When W.D. Ross poses the question “what makes right acts right? ” (The Right and the Good\, ch. 2)\, he is asking a question that is prior to\, and has a bearing on\, the practical question “how do I determine th e right thing to do?” The Stoics recognize this. Cicero (De Officio\, wher e he is referring to Panaetius’ work Peri Kathêkontos) tells us that ever y inquiry about duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned with the end of good and evil deeds\, which addresses such matters as whether a ll duties are perfect (omniane official perfecta sint)\, whether some are more important than others\, and what the kinds of duties are\, and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (praecepta) by which our conduct can b e made to conform with the end (De Officiis\, 1.7). While Cicero himself focuses on the second\, this paper seeks the answer to the first part.\n \nRachana Kamtekar is a Professor of Philosophy and Classics at Cornell Un iversity and has written on many topics in ancient philosophy and contempo rary moral psychology. Her monograph\, Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellect ualism\, the Divided Soul and the Desire for Good\, was published in 2017. She is currently working on the relationship between action and characte r in ancient Greek ethics.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231116T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231116T200000 GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243 LOCATION:Wolff Conference Room/D1103 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Chrysippus on What Makes Right Acts Right. Rachana Kamtekar (Cornel l) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/chrysippus-on-what-makes -right-acts-right-rachana-kamtekar-cornell/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhen W.D. Ros s poses the question “what makes right acts right?” (The Right and the Good\, ch. 2)\, he is asking a question that is prior to\, and has a bearing on\, the practical question “how do I determine the right thing t o do?” The Stoics recognize this. Cicero (De Officio\, where he i s referring to Panaetius’ work Peri Kathêkontos) tells us that e very inquiry about duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned wi th the end of good and evil deeds\, which addresses such matters as whethe r all duties are perfect (omniane official perfecta sint)\, wheth er some are more important than others\, and what the kinds of duties are\ , and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (praecepta) by wh ich our conduct can be made to conform with the end (De Officiis\, 1.7). While Cicero himself focuses on the second\, this paper seeks the answer to the first part.
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Rachana Kamtekar is a Profess or of Philosophy and Classics at Cornell University and has written on man y topics in ancient philosophy and contemporary moral psychology. Her mono graph\, Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism\, the Divided Soul a nd the Desire for Good\, was published in 2017. She is currently wor king on the relationship between action and character in ancient Greek eth ics.
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