BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7679@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T191640Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://poprocksworkshop.wixsite.com/nycphilosophy DESCRIPTION:A number of authors have pointed out that the standard argument s for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se\, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the subj ect need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in som e state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two stat es to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents\, and so there is no substan tive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I pres ent evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but dif fer in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\, a nd endogenous\, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities f or how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship betwe en cognition and perception. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T180000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rebecca Keller – (Endogenous) Perceptual States are Conceptual @ Po PRocks URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rebecca-keller-endogenou s-perceptual-states-are-conceptual-poprocks/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nA number of a uthors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s havin g nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per s e\, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the subject need or need not pos sess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have ar gued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have differ ent sorts of contents\, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I present evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but differ in the required conc eptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\, and endogenous\, voluntar ily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—vo luntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concep t-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and percept ion.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:psychology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7711@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T191640Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://bkpp.tumblr.com/ DESCRIPTION:Brooklyn Public Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area to discuss their work with a general audience\, hos ted by the Brooklyn Public Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophical questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space where Brooklynites can reason together about the phi losophical questions that matter to them.\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and last name at gmail.com. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220422T193000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220422T204500 GEO:+40.672511;-73.9682 LOCATION:Info Commons Lab\, Brookly Public Library @ 10 Grand Army Plaza\, Brooklyn\, NY 11238\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Justin Garson: On biological function and mental illness URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/justin-garson-on-biologi cal-function-and-mental-illness/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nBrooklyn Publ ic Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area t o discuss their work with a general audience\, hosted by the Brooklyn Publ ic Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophic al questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space wh ere Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions tha t matter to them.
\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and las t name at gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:biology\,mind\,psychology\,science END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR