BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7955@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/curiosity-creativity- and-complexity DESCRIPTION:How does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisio ns when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?\nThe conference showcases cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscie nce and Psychology (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exploration\, decision-making\, information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artificial intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) an d Economics (decision making and information demand). Alongside formal pre sentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions among facult y\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presenta tions.\nSubmissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due Feb ruary 15\, 2023. Please visit the call for submissions for complete requir ements.\nEvent Information\nFree and open to the public. Registration is r equired and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbi a’s COVID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email even ts@zi.columbia.edu with any questions. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230523 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230526 GEO:+40.816847;-73.957958 LOCATION:Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th Floor Lecture Hall) @ 3227 Br oadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Curiosity\, Creativity and Complexity Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/curiosity-creativity-and -complexity-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nHow does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisions when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?
\nThe conference showca ses cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscience and Psycholog y (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exploration\, decision-making\ , information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artifici al intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) and Economics (deci sion making and information demand). Alongside formal presentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions among faculty\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presentations.
\nSu bmissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due February 15\, 2023. Please visit the call fo r submissions for complete requirements.
\nFree and open to the public. Registration is required and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbia’s COV ID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 va ccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email events@zi.columbia.edu with any quest ions.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:artificial intelligence\,decision theory\,mind\,psych ology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7774@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nWelcomes you t o an IN-PERSON meeting:\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)\n« A Case ag ainst Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »\nWith responses fr om Alexander Englert (Princeton University)\nABSTRACT: There’s a common li ne of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious expe rience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhya mika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century ) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysical ly impossible. Lacking any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of co nscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I wil l present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” agains t mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between conscious ness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda f or centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also que stions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. All ison Aitken\, Columbia URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-case-against-simple-mi ndedness-srigupta-on-mental-mereology-allison-aitken-columbia/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\nWelcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:
\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)
\n« A Case against Simple-mindedn ess: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »
\nWith responses from Alexander Englert (Princet
on University)
ABST RACT: There’s a common line of reasoning whi ch supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhyamika Buddhist philo sophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any ki nd of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lack ing any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I will present an analys is of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” against mental simples an d show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intent ional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of int ra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience argua bly owes responses.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7870@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)\n ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two diffe rent kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two diffe rent kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conv entionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophi cal discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2021\, 2022) has influentially arg ued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that in terprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. How ever\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidha rma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an e ntity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of con ventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from t he models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s a ccount of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits an d McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventio nally true.\n \nDinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University S eminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating r equirements at lm3335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Gue rrero (William & Mary) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-conventional-tr uth-and-ontological-pluralism-laura-p-guerrero-william-mary/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nWith responses from Mark Siderits (Illin ois State University)
\nABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often dra w a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth ( saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontologi cal distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real e ntities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). S imilar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entiti es and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2 021\, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he call s “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one t hat denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involvin g apparent reference to them. However\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that v iew by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventi onal truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinctio n between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultima tely. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional re ality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will a lso argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offeri ng a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is deri ved from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the vi ews suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultima te truths about what is conventionally true.
\n\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the C olumbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is req uired for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,metaphysics\,truth END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7872@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Timothy Connolly (East Stroudsburg Universi ty)\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discussions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an emotion. Ancient Asian philosoph ical traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism\, however\, emphasize co mpassion as a character trait that should be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a necessary tool? What is the role o f love and care? Does self-reflection contribute to the process?\n\n \nDi nner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3 335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:How to nurture compassion? Some lessons from Asian philosophical tr aditions. Sin Yee Chan (U Vermont) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/how-to-nurture-compassio n-some-lessons-from-asian-philosophical-traditions-sin-yee-chan-u-vermont/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWith responses from Timothy Connolly (Ea st Stroudsburg University)
\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discu
ssions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an
emotion. Ancient Asian philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and
Buddhism\, however\, emphasize compassion as a character trait that should
be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions
to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a ne
cessary tool? What is the role of love and care? Does self-reflection co
ntribute to the process?
\n
\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia Univ ersity Seminars. < /p>\n
RSVP is required for di nner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7954@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/cynthia-bennett-disab ility-accessibility-and-fairness-artificial-intelligence DESCRIPTION:Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to automate and scale sol utions to perennial accessibility challenges (e.g.\, generating image desc riptions for blind users). However\, research shows that AI-bias dispropor tionately impacts people already marginalized based on their race\, gender \, or disabilities\, raising questions about potential impacts in addition to AI’s promise. In this talk\, Cynthia Bennett will overview broad conce rns at the intersection of AI\, disability\, and accessibility. She will t hen share details about one project in this research space that led to gui dance on human and AI-generated image descriptions that account for subjec tive and potentially sensitive descriptors around race\, gender\, and disa bility of people in images. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230206T130000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230206T140000 GEO:+40.841243;-73.940971 LOCATION:Presbyterian Hospital Building (Room PH20-200) @ 622 W 168th St\, New York\, NY 10032\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Cynthia Bennett – Disability Accessibility and Fairness in Artifici al Intelligence URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/cynthia-bennett-disabili ty-accessibility-and-fairness-in-artificial-intelligence/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nArtificial in telligence (AI) promises to automate and scale solutions to perennial acce ssibility challenges (e.g.\, generating image descriptions for blind users ). However\, research shows that AI-bias disproportionately impacts people already marginalized based on their race\, gender\, or disabilities\, rai sing questions about potential impacts in addition to AI’s promise. In thi s talk\, Cynthia Bennett will overview broad concerns at the intersection of AI\, disability\, and accessibility. She will then share details about one project in this research space that led to guidance on human and AI-ge nerated image descriptions that account for subjective and potentially sen sitive descriptors around race\, gender\, and disability of people in imag es.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:artificial intelligence\,ethics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7963@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:The COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us.\nWith re sponses from Karsten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY) \nPresented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is re quired for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Philosophy of Crisis and a Question of Solidarity. Jin Y. Park (Ame rican) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/philosophy-of-crisis-and -a-question-of-solidarity-jin-y-park-american/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us. p>\n
With responses from Kars ten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY)
\n< p class='gmail-p2'>Presented by THE COLUMBIA SOC IETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is required for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@colu mbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,existentialism\,Korean\,politi cal\,religion\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8078@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T023421Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: Yogācāra Buddhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE Ind ia an explicit model of how we collectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, c onstruct our shared social realities\, our cultures. These “worlds” are su pported by cognitive processes informed by cultural influences occurring o utside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya -vijñāna). Through development and socialization\, we come to identify wit h these cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover \, and in agreement with cognitive scientists\, Yogācārins argue that huma ns have developed to be “innate essentialists\,” so that we imagine that o ur constructed social and cultural identities have their own essential\, i ntrinsic characteristics\, set apart from all others\, generating the “us/ them” dichotomies that underlie conflicts between groups. We can counterac t these harmful patterns\, Yogācārins say\, by analyzing how our social an d cultural “realities” are collectively constructed\, and by showing how—t hrough logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our unreflective\, knee-jerk reaction to different peoples and cultures\, and thereby foster more tolerance\, empathy and understanding for all bei ngs. In sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism offers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the origins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, root ed in ancient traditions yet relevant to contemporary issues.\nWith respon ses from Jonathan Gold (Princeton University)\nDATE: October 13th\, 2023\n TIME: 5:30 pm EST\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia Univers ity\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUM BIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia Uni versity ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where so meone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive lat e\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf 2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.\n\n\n\n\nWe hope you’ve had restful and productive summers\, and we look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meetings. Belo w is the list of our scheduled speakers. Please save these dates!\n\nSepte mber 15 – Jing Hu (Concordia)\nOctober 13 – Bill Waldron (Middlebury)\nOct ober 27 – David Wong (Duke)\nDecember 1 – Stephen Angle (Wesleyan)\n\nFurt her details will be circulated in due course. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231013T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231013T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716 @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Buddhist Analyses of the Unconscious Construction of our Collective ‘Life-Worlds. William Waldron (Middlebury) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-analyses-of-the -unconscious-construction-of-our-collective-life-worlds-william-waldron-mi ddlebury/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nABSTRACT: Yogācāra Bud dhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we co llectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, construct our shared social realit ies\, our cultures. These “worlds” are supported by cognitive processes in formed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna). Through development an d socialization\, we come to identify with these cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover\, and in agreement with cognitiv e scientists\, Yogācārins argue that humans have developed to be “innate e ssentialists\,” so that we imagine that our constructed social and cultura l identities have their own essential\, intrinsic characteristics\, set ap art from all others\, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie c onflicts between groups. We can counteract these harmful patterns\, Yogācā rins say\, by analyzing how our social and cultural “realities” are collec tively constructed\, and by showing how—through logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our unreflective\, knee-jerk rea ction to different peoples and cultures\, and thereby foster more toleranc e\, empathy and understanding for all beings. In sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism o ffers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the origins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, rooted in ancient traditions yet rele vant to contemporary issues.
\nWith responses from Jonathan Go ld (Princeton University)
\nDATE: October 13th\, 2023
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall \, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nThe first sec tion of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about t he existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition conc entrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dha rmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second sectio n looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as mor e difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and consid ers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Rutgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Ha ll will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have t his card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearb y to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted thr ough Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a n earby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further inf ormation.
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\nHow does the imagination change us ? Why should picturing ourselves a certain way have any real effect on wha t we are? These questions are central to debates in Buddhist tantric liter ature regarding the generation stage (utpattikrama)\, wherein pract itioners visualize themselves as buddhas ensconsed in magnificent mandala- palaces. For some\, this practice is what sets Buddhist tantra apart: thro ugh this “yoga of the imagination\,” as David Shulman puts it\, a practiti oner can achieve buddhahood in a single lifetime. And yet\, as the Buddhis t tantric author Indrabhūti (8th century) argues\, a pauper who imagines h imself to be a king does not thereby become one—so\, in the same way\, pra ctitioners who visualize themselves as buddhas will not thereby become bud dhas. The mental imagery (ākāra) involved in this practice is just so much unreal fabrication. Why should it have real transformative effects ? I’ll consider here how these debates played out in Sanskrit Buddhist tan tric texts from the 10th–11th centuries. I’ll focus on early authors in th e Kālacakra tradition\, who upheld Indrabhūti’s critique of the generation stage\, and authors like Ratnākaraśānti\, Vāgīśvarakīrti\, and Advayavajr a (aka Maitrīpa)\, who each in their own way critiqued mental imagery yet defended the importance and effectiveness of generation-stage practice. In the first part of the paper\, I’ll consider arguments against mental imag ery as these appear in generation-stage practice texts and the early Kālac akra tradition. In the second part\, I’ll turn to why we might think unrea l mental imagery can nevertheless have real transformative effects\, payin g special attention to the ways Buddhist tantric authors writing in Sanskr it take up ideas from the tradition of dramatic theory (nāṭyaśastra ) and Sanskrit culture more broadly.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Thoma s Yarnall (Columbia University)
\nDATE: February 2nd\, 2024
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia Univer sity
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON E NTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only op en with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting beg ins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONAT IONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia U niversity’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSV P is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restauran t. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information.
\nACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The Unive rsity Seminars’ participants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing ac commodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the O ffice of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are av ailable on request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: h ttps://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n(Please do not reply to this announcement. You may contact th e Co-Chairs using the link above.)
\nComparative Philosophy Sem inar:
\n\n
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,imagination END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\nFebruary 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\n - April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (Univ ersity at Buffalo)
\n