BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7768@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/2022/04/20/free-will-implications-f rom-physics-and-metaphysics/ DESCRIPTION:Free WillImplications from Physics and Metaphysics\nThe worksho p will be hybrid\, and anyone interested can participate through Zoom\, al though there will be limited spots for in-person participants. If you are interested in attending in-person\, please reply to this email or write to loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu.\nBarry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.e du) Assistant: Diego Arana (diego.arana@rutgers.edu)Program (All times are EST)\nZoom Link: https://tinyurl.com/freewillzoom\niCal: https://tinyurl. com/freewillical\nMay 1110:00am Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame\, Duke)Ginet ’s Principle: Our freedom is the freedom to add to thegiven past.11:30am J ohn Perry (Stanford)Causation\, Entailment and Freedom3:00pm Barry Loewer (Rutgers)The Consequence Argument Meets the Mentaculus4:30pm Carlo Rovelli (Aix-Marseille\, UWO)Free will: Back to Reichenbach\nMay 1210:00am Kadri Vihvelin (USC)Why We can’t Change the Past11:30am Valia Allori (NIU)Freedo m from the Quantum?3:00pm Tim O’Connor (Indiana\, Baylor)Top-Down and Inde terministic Agency: Why?4:30pm Jessica Wilson (Toronto)Two Routes to the E mergence of Free Will DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220511 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220513 GEO:+40.500841;-74.447417 LOCATION:Rutgers & Zoom @ New Brunswick\, NJ\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Free Will Workshop: Implications from Physics and Metaphysics URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/free-will-workshop-impli cations-from-physics-and-metaphysics/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nFree Will
Implications from Physics and Metaphysics
The workshop will be hybrid\, and anyone interested can particip ate through Zoom\, although there will be limited spots for in-person part icipants. If you are interested in attending in-person\, please reply to t his email or write to loewe r@philosophy.rutgers.edu.
\n
Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu) Assistant: Diego Arana (diego.aran
a@rutgers.edu)
Program (All times are EST)
Zoom Link: https://tinyurl.com/freewillzoom
\n< span dir='ltr' role='presentation'>iCal: https://tinyurl.com/freewillical< /span>
\n
May 11
10:00am Peter van Inwagen (
Notre Dame\, Duke)
Ginet’s Principle: Our freedom is the freedom to add to the
span>
given p
ast.
1
1:30am John Perry (Stanford)
Causatio
n\, Entailment and Freedom
3:00pm Barry Loewer (Rutgers)
The Consequence Argument Meet
s the Mentaculus
4:30pm Carlo Rovelli (Aix-Marseille\, UWO)
Free will: Back to Reichen
bach
May 12
10:00am Kadri Vihvelin (USC)
11:30am Valia Allori (NIU)
Freedom from the Quantum?
3:00pm Ti
m O’Connor (Indiana\, Baylor)
Top-Down and Indeterministic Agency: Why?4:30pm Jessica
Wilson (Toronto)
Two Routes to the Emergence of Free Will
Susan Neiman develops in Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosop hy (2002\, Princeton: Princeton University Press) a watershed perspec tive on the longstanding problem of evil\, the perniciously difficult to s atisfy “need to find order within those appearances so unbearable that the y threaten reason’s ability to go on.” The book thereby also presents a ra dically new perspective on traditional debates within metaphysics. On the occasion of its twentieth anniversary\, we gather to celebrate her accompl ishment and to advance the research program it reflects. Participants will include\, in addition to Neiman herself: Annalise Acorn\, Frederick Beise r\, Jeremy Bendik-Keymer\, Omri Boehm\, Dan Brudney\, Caroline Bynum\, Lor raine Daston\, Michael Della Rocca\, Wendy Doniger\, Wolfram Ellenberger\, John Faithful Hamer\, Carey Harrison\, Patricia Kitcher\, Philip Kitcher\ , Christia Mercer\, Cornel West\, Allen Wood\, and James Wood.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:evil\,metaphysics\,religion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7879@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/103858 DESCRIPTION:This conference celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first pu blication of Saul Kripke’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by showcas ing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influence. These topics include\, but are not limited to: the nature of names and na tural kind terms\; the failure of the description or cluster/description t heories\; the distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apr iority\; empty names\; the metaphysics of essence and origin\; the nature of modality and possible worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology of m odality\; the role of philosophical intuition\; and the mind-body problem. \nDates: 12th and 13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.\nVenue: The CUNY Gradua te Center\, 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.\nFormat: hybrid\nRegistr ation: for both online and in person attendance\, please register by the 2 8th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.\n https://s aulkripkecenter.org/ \nSpeakers:\n\n\n Katalin Balog \nRutgers University – Newark\n\n\n Anandi Hattiangadi \nStockholm University\n\n\n Carl Hoefer \nUniversitat Autonoma de Barcelona\n\n\n Janet Levin \nUniversity of Sou thern California\n\n\n Antonella Mallozzi \nProvidence College\n\n\n Genov eva Martí \nICREA And University Of Barcelona\n\n\n Alexander Moran \nTrin ity College\, Dublin\n\n\n Brian Rabern \nUniversity of Edinburgh\n\n\n Te resa Robertson Ishii \nUniversity of California at Santa Barbara\n\n\n Nat han Salmon \nUniversity of California at Santa Barbara\n\n\n Sarah Sawyer \nUniversity of Sussex\n\n\n Anders Schoubye \nStockholm University\n\n\n Jennifer Wang \nSimon Fraser University\n\n\n Stephen Yablo \nMassachusett s Institute of Technology\n\n\nOrganisers:\n\n\n Corine Besson \nUniversit y of Sussex\n\n\n Anandi Hattiangadi \nStockholm University\n\n\n Antonell a Mallozzi \nProvidence College\n\n\n Yale Weiss \nCUNY Graduate Center\n \n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nTickets: https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20221212 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20221214 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:Philosophy Dept.\, CUNY Graduate Center @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:50 Years of Naming and Necessity URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/50-years-of-naming-and-n ecessity/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis conferen ce celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first publication of Saul Kripke ’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by showcasing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influence. These topics include\, but are not limited to: the nature of names and natural kind terms\; the f ailure of the description or cluster/description theories\; the distinctio n between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apriority\; empty names\; t he metaphysics of essence and origin\; the nature of modality and possible worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology of modality\; the role of ph ilosophical intuition\; and the mind-body problem.
\nDates: 12th and 13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.
\nVenue: The CUNY Graduate Center\ , 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.
\nFormat: hybrid
\nReg istration: for both online and in person attendance\, please register by t he 28th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
\n\n\n\n
Tickets: https: //forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:conference\,epistemology\,language\,metaphysics X-TICKETS-URL:https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7 END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8048@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023 DESCRIPTION:Join us for a series of keynote presentations as part of the 20 23 Institute for Philosophy and New Humanities: Mind-Dependent Artifacts: Artifact-Dependent Minds.\nArtifacts are a primary object of study in the humanities. They are products and\, thus\, manifestations of human thought \, action\, and self-determination without which they cannot be understood . At the same time\, human mindedness depends on artifacts\, and as well a s other objects – a dependence that is manifest in the form of artifacts. Human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are therefore intertwined in complex ways.\nOur Fall institute meeting 2023 Institute will consider wa ys in which human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are dialecticall y intertwined. Of special interest will be automatically or mechanically p roduced artifacts\, and AI systems as artifacts that are neither inert cau sal models of human thinking nor independently minded entities. The ontolo gy of such products thus needs to be calibrated in light of their contribu tion to the deep diversity of the mutual dependence of mindedness and arti facts. Some questions our seminar will address include: How do AI-research and AI-systems structure and restructure the historical\, diverse articul ation of human mindedness? How does our understanding of these and other a rtifacts shape our self-conception at the most fundamental level?\n \nWe w ill explore these issues in the ontology\, epistemology\, and humanistic s tudy of AI and other artifacts together with distinguished keynote speaker s:\nMonday\, September 11\, 4pm\nHans Ulrich Gumbrecht: UNFOLDING A FUZZY FUTURE? Dimensions for Thinking about “Singularity”\n\nTuesday\, September 12\, 10am\nCameron Buckner: Understanding Progress in AI Using Empiricist Philosophy of Mind\n\nWednesday\, September 13\, 3pm\nKanta Dihal\nWednes day\, September 13\, 5pm\nDavid Chalmers: Forum Humanum Lecture\n\nThursda y\, September 14\, 4pm\nNandi Theunissen: Rethinking Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity\n\nFriday\, September 15\, 4pm\nKalindi Vora\nTicke ts: https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023#rsvp. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230911 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230916 GEO:+40.735498;-73.993501 LOCATION:Starr Foundation Hall (UL102) @ 63 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Mind-Dependent Artifacts: Artifact-Dependent Minds URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/mind-dependent-artifacts -artifact-dependent-minds/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nJoin us for a series of keynote presentations as part of the 2023 Institute for Philoso phy and New Humanities: Mind-Dependent Artifacts: Artifact-Dependent Minds .
\nArtifacts are a primary object of study in the humanities. They are products and\, thus\, manifestations of human thought\, action\, and s elf-determination without which they cannot be understood. At the same tim e\, human mindedness depends on artifacts\, and as well as other objects – a dependence that is manifest in the form of artifacts. Human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are therefore intertwined in complex ways.
\nOur Fall institute meeting 2023 Institute will consider ways in whic h human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are dialectically intertwi ned. Of special interest will be automatically or mechanically produced ar tifacts\, and AI systems as artifacts that are neither inert causal models of human thinking nor independently minded entities. The ontology of such products thus needs to be calibrated in light of their contribution to th e deep diversity of the mutual dependence of mindedness and artifacts. Som e questions our seminar will address include: How do AI-research and AI-sy stems structure and restructure the historical\, diverse articulation of h uman mindedness? How does our understanding of these and other artifacts s hape our self-conception at the most fundamental level?
\n\n
We will explore these issues in the ontology\, epistemology\, and humanist ic study of AI and other artifacts together with distinguished keynote spe akers:
\nMonday\, September 11\, 4pm
\nHans Ulrich Gumb
recht: UNFOLDING A FUZZY FUTURE? Dimensions for Thinking about “Singularit
y”
Tuesday\, September 12\, 10am
\n
Cameron Buckner: Understanding Progress in AI Using Empiricist Philosophy
of Mind
\n
Wednesday\, September 13\, 3pm
\n
Wednesday\, September 13\, 5pm
\nDavid Chalmers: Forum Humanum Lecture
\n
Thursday\, September 14\, 4pm
\nNandi Theunissen:
Rethinking Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity
< /p>\n
Friday\, September 15\, 4pm
\nKalindi Vora
p>\n
Tickets: https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023#rsvp.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,mind X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023#rsvp END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8006@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/111406 DESCRIPTION:Ideas about “identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media\, in higher education\, in political disputations\, and in critical theories of society. Claims about “identity” and “difference” can readil y be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of ra ce\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, pol itical affiliation\, ability and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc . But what exactly do we mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference” ? And if we achieve greater clarity about the metaphysical presupposition s and implications of “identity” and “difference\,” what difference would that make?\nA serious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “differen ce” will expectedly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse ab out what is “identical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”? Is discourse about what is “different” reducible to discourse about what i s “other”? Can something be “the same” without being “identical\,” and ca n something be “other” without being “different”? When we speak about “be ing\,” does our speaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically)\, or instead does our speaking about being always have t he same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thin g depend mainly on the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the thing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understandi ng of identity depend on some reference to what is different? Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity? What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\, or some combination of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences between things without discerning intelligible differences\, or does the indiscernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real differences at all but rather an identity? Does difference de pend on negation\, or can one assert that there is difference without havi ng to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an o ntological difference\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between B eing and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences to exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a difference between “being” and “nothing”)?\nIn spite of the v irtual ubiquity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a d earth of discourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 20 24 (“Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\, the Metaphysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking abo ut the metaphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such de eper thinking will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practic e.\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged \, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note: when selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Prog ram Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion among others.\n****************************************\nGuidelines for th e Submission of Abstracts\, and for Aristotle and Plato Prize Candidates\n Abstracts of approximately 500 words should be submitted electronically by September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nAristotle P rize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaph ysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Elig ibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet e arned a Ph.D.. Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize sho uld express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their sub mission. Papers submitted for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read a t the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Ar istotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, an d assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Aristotle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be sub mitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nPlato Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphys ical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligib ility for the Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. deg ree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who hold a Ph.D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Thos e wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish cl early in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitt ed for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limi t applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to f ootnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash awa rd of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs asso ciated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:sec retary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous sup port of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be abl e to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate stude nts whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with al l relevant expense-receipts).\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Plato Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on their submissi on no later than December 1\, 2023.\nhttps://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2 024/2024_meeting.htm\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/20 24_meeting.htm. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240311 GEO:+40.77103;-73.985096 LOCATION:Lowenstein Building\, Fordham University\, Lincoln Center @ 113 W 60th St\, New York\, NY 10023\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Metaphysical Society of America Conference: Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-society-of- america-conference-identity-difference-and-the-difference-that-metaphysics -makes/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nIdeas about “ identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media\, in higher educa tion\, in political disputations\, and in critical theories of society. C laims about “identity” and “difference” can readily be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of race\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, political affiliation\, abi lity and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc. But what exactly do w e mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”? And if we achieve gre ater clarity about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “i dentity” and “difference\,” what difference would that make?
\nA ser ious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expected ly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse about what is “iden tical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”? Is discourse abou t what is “different” reducible to discourse about what is “other”? Can s omething be “the same” without being “identical\,” and can something be “o ther” without being “different”? When we speak about “being\,” does our s peaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically) \, or instead does our speaking about being always have the same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly o n the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the t hing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understanding of identity de pend on some reference to what is different? Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity? What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\, or some combinat ion of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences betw een things without discerning intelligible differences\, or does the indis cernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real diffe rences at all but rather an identity? Does difference depend on negation\ , or can one assert that there is difference without having to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an ontological differ ence\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences t o exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a diff erence between “being” and “nothing”)?
\nIn spite of the virtual ubi quity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a dearth of d iscourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “ident ity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 2024 (“Ident ity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\, the Metap hysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking about the met aphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such deeper think ing will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practice.
\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged\, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note: wh en selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Program Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion amo ng others.
\n****************************************
\nAbstracts of approximately 500 words sh ould be submitted electronically by September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@me taphysicalsociety.org.
\nAristotle Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaphysical Society should sub mit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D.. Those wis hing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize should express this wish cle arly in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitte d for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word l imit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not t o footnotes or other supporting material. The Aristotle Prize carries a c ash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the cos ts associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Aristo tle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nPlato Prize: Tho se wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphysical Societ y should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for t he Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. degree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who hold a Ph. D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Those wishing t o be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish clearly in th e email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitted for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limit applies t o the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\ , inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full paper s and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@meta physicalsociety.org.
\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous support of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot F und for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate st udents whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with all relevant expense-receipts).
\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Pla to Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on thei r submission no later than December 1\, 2023.
\n\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm.< /p> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity\,metaphysics X-COST:$70-120 X-TICKETS-URL:https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8126@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/events/department-calendar/month.cal endar/2024/04/09/- DESCRIPTION:Social Metaphysics Workshop – location tbd DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240426 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240429 GEO:+40.49747;-74.44717 LOCATION:Rutgers Philosophy @ The Gateway\, 106 Somerset St\, New Brunswick \, NJ 08901\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Social Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/social-metaphysics-works hop/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nSocial Metaph ysics Workshop – location tbd
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7660@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Abstract: It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion t hat grounding can be\, indeed is\, overdetermined. Further to this\, it s eems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it\, either conceptually or m etaphysically\, that we ought to find concerning. But from a small sampli ng of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. This pa per aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obvious or straightforward a bout grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much m ore serious philosophical attention.\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop w ill be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, un less otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:\nSep 13. Ric ki Bliss (Lehigh University)\nSep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion Un iversity)\nSep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)\nOct 4. Yale W eiss (CUNY GC)\nOct 11. NO MEETING\nOct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)\nOct 25 . Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)\nNov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)\nNov 15 . Sara Uckelman (Durham University)\nNov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)\nNov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of G hent)\nDec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210913T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210913T181500 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Metaphysical Overdetermination (Ricki Bliss) @ Logic & Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-overdetermi nation-ricki-bliss-logic-metaphysics-workshop/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nAbstract: It is widely recognized by prop onents of the notion that grounding can be\, indeed is\, overdetermined. Further to this\, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus h as emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it\, ei ther conceptually or metaphysically\, that we ought to find concerning. B ut from a small sampling of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsi bly be drawn. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obviou s or straightforward about grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much more serious philosophical attention.
\nThe Log ic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 ( NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedul e is as follows:
\nSep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
\nS ep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
\nSep 27. Rashe d Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
\nOct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
\nOct 11. NO MEETING
\nOct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
\nOc t 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
\nNov 1. Thom as Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
\nNov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
\nNov 2 2. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
\nNov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münste r)
\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
\nDec 13. Dolf R ami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mond ays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
\nSep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehig h University)
\nSep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University )
\nSep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
\nOct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
\nOct 11. NO MEETING
\nOct 18. Rohit Pari kh (CUNY GC)
\nOct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State Universi ty)
\nNov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
\nNov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham U niversity)
\nNov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
\nNov 2 9. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent )
\nDec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
\nThe rich phil osophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton a nd Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philos ophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent bu t neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely the mutual claim that th eir opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional\, and were the produc t both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual s tructures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in vari ous prominent places\, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John K eill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibn iz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke \, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile\, vulgar\, and profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent in tellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codi cil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy\, but instead lay at th e heart of it. This famous debate\, while of course somewhat sui generis\, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate .
\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the History of Science at the Unive rsity of Oxford
\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Registration r equired. Please contact sc ienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lectu re Series.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7713@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2022/01/18/spring-2022-schedule/ DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Speakers may present either virtually or in-pe rson\; the details will be announced for each talk individually. Meetings will convene at the Graduate Center\, Room 5382. You may attend any talk f rom that location (even if the speaker is not physically present). At leas t for any talk for which the speaker is not physically present\, you will also be able to attend virtually from anywhere via Zoom. The provisional s chedule is as follows:\nFeb 7. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)\nFeb 14. Ekate rina Kubyshkina (Campinas)\nFeb 21. NO MEETING\nFeb 28. Michael Burton (Ya le)\nMar 7. David Papineau (King’s)\nMar 14. Wilfrid Hodges (King’s)\nMar 21. Noson Yanofsky (CUNY)\nMar 28. Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)\nApr 4. Jenn McDonal d (Columbia)\nApr 11. Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins)\nApr 18. NO MEETING\nA pr 25. Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen)\nMay 2. Elia Zardini (Madrid)\nMay 9. Friederike Moltmann (CNRS Nice)\nMay 16. Mircea Dumitru (Bucharest)\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220207T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220207T181500 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:Zoom & CUNY rm 5382 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220214T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220221T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220228T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220307T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220314T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220321T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220328T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220404T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220411T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220425T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220502T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220509T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220516T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-16/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY tim e). Speakers may present either virtually or in-person\; the details will be announced for each talk individually. Meetings will convene at the Grad uate Center\, Room 5382. You may attend any talk from that location (even if the speaker is not physically present). At least for any talk fo r which the speaker is not physically present\, you will also be able to a ttend virtually from anywhere via Zoom. The provisional schedule is as fol lows:
\nFeb 7. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)
\nFeb 14. Ekaterin a Kubyshkina (Campinas)
\nFeb 21. NO MEETING
\nFeb 28. Michael Burton (Yale)
\nMar 7. David Papineau (King’s)
\nMar 14. Wilf rid Hodges (King’s)
\nMar 21. Noson Yanofsky (CUNY)
\nMar 28. Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)
\nApr 4. Jenn McDonald (Columbia)
\nApr 11. Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins)
\nApr 18. NO MEETING
\nApr 25. Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen)
\nMay 2. Elia Zardini (Madrid)
\nMay 9. Friederike Moltmann (CNRS Nice)
\nMay 16. Mircea Dumitru (Bu charest)
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7816@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2022/08/19/fall-2022-schedule/ DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-p erson (at the Graduate Center\, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as follows:\nSept 5. NO MEETING\nSep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)\nSep 19. Boka i Yao (Notre Dame)\nSep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine)\, Louise Du puis (Paris Dauphine)\, and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)\nOct 3. Yale Weis s (CUNY)\nOct 10. NO MEETING\nOct 17. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)\nOct 24 . Friederika Moltmann (CNRS\, Côte d’Azur)\nOct 31. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)\nN ov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)\nNov 14. Tommy Kivatinos (Auburn)\nNov 21. Ma rko Malink (NYU)\nNov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)\nDec 5. Martin Pleit z (Muenster)\nDec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220912T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220912T181500 GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 7314 & Zoom @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220919T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220926T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221003T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221017T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221024T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221031T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221107T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221114T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221121T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221128T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221205T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-17/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY tim e). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-person (at the Graduate C enter\, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as follows:
\nSept 5 . NO MEETING
\nSep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)
\nSep 19. Bokai Y ao (Notre Dame)
\nSep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine)\, Louis e Dupuis (Paris Dauphine)\, and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)
\nOct 3 . Yale Weiss (CUNY)
\nOct 10. NO MEETING
\nOct 17. Guillermo B adia (Queensland)
\nOct 24. Friederika Moltmann (CNRS\, Côte d’Azur)
\nOct 31. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)
\nNov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)
\nNov 14. Tommy Kivatinos (Auburn)
\nNov 21. Marko Malink (NY U)
\nNov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)
\nDec 5. Martin Pleit z (Muenster)
\nDec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State)
\n HTML> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7870@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)\n ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two diffe rent kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two diffe rent kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conv entionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophi cal discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2021\, 2022) has influentially arg ued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that in terprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. How ever\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidha rma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an e ntity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of con ventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from t he models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s a ccount of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits an d McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventio nally true.\n \nDinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University S eminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating r equirements at lm3335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Gue rrero (William & Mary) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-conventional-tr uth-and-ontological-pluralism-laura-p-guerrero-william-mary/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWith responses from Mark Siderits (Illin ois State University)
\nABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often dra w a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth ( saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontologi cal distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real e ntities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). S imilar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entiti es and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2 021\, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he call s “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one t hat denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involvin g apparent reference to them. However\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that v iew by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventi onal truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinctio n between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultima tely. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional re ality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will a lso argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offeri ng a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is deri ved from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the vi ews suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultima te truths about what is conventionally true.
\n\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the C olumbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is req uired for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,metaphysics\,truth END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7972@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Neopragmatists seek to sidestep metaphysical puzzles by shiftin g the target of philosophical explanation from the objects we think and ta lk about to the functions of expressions and concepts in our cognitive eco nomy. Logical vocabulary can serve as a target for neopragmatist inquiry\, and it has also posed obstacles to neopragmatist accounts of other vocabu lary. I will argue that the obstacles can be addressed by adopting a neopr agmatist perspective toward logical relations\, such as logical consequenc e\, and toward propositional content. Doing so calls into question two pur ported constraints on explanations of the functions of logical connectives . I will sketch an account made possible by rejecting those constraints\, one according to which logical connectives serve to express dialectical at titudes. The proposal is deflationary in two ways: it rests on an extensio n of deflationism from truth to logical relations\, and it aims to deflate some of neopragmatists’ theoretical ambitions.\nHi\, All. Below is the pr ovisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to f ace to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nM ar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event . Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\n Marc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum )\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230227T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230227T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 9205 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Neopragmatism and logic: A deflationary proposal. Lionel Shapiro (U Conn) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/neopragmatism-and-logic- a-deflationary-proposal-lionel-shapiro-uconn/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nNeopragmatist s seek to sidestep metaphysical puzzles by shifting the target of philosop hical explanation from the objects we think and talk about to the function s of expressions and concepts in our cognitive economy. Logical vocabulary can serve as a target for neopragmatist inquiry\, and it has also posed o bstacles to neopragmatist accounts of other vocabulary. I will argue that the obstacles can be addressed by adopting a neopragmatist perspective tow ard logical relations\, such as logical consequence\, and toward propositi onal content. Doing so calls into question two purported constraints on ex planations of the functions of logical connectives. I will sketch an accou nt made possible by rejecting those constraints\, one according to which l ogical connectives serve to express dialectical attitudes. The proposal is deflationary in two ways: it rests on an extension of deflationism from t ruth to logical relations\, and it aims to deflate some of neopragmatists’ theoretical ambitions.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Monday s 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meeti ngs. (No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 S hawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 T homas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting< /p>\n
Apr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacon a\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Spe cial event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all af ternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Boch um)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n BODY> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7920@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Hi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop thi s coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.) \n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel F itting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nAp r 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Bra nden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara B urns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and t he session will run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wa nsing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T181500 EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500 EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500 EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230403T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230417T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230424T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230501T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230510T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230515T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-18/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nHi\, All. Bel ow is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meet ings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are re verting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Me l Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\ , SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Sp ring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeaster n
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columb ia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydne y) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Ma ciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7980@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:Saul Kripke announced his possible world semantics in 1959\, an d published his proof of axiomatic completeness for the standard modal log ics of the time in 1963. It is very unlike the standard completeness proo f used today\, which involves a Lindenbaum/Henkin construction and produce s canonical models. Kripke’s proof involved tableaus\, in a format that i s difficult to follow\, and uses tableau construction algorithms that are complex and somewhat error prone to describe. I will first discuss Kripke’ s proof\, then the historical origins of the modern version. Then I will show that completeness\, proved Kripke style\, could actually have been do ne in the Lindenbaum/Henkin way\, thus simplifying things considerably. N one of this is new but\, with the parts collected together it is an intere sting story. “In my end is my beginning”.\nHi\, All. Below is the provisio nal program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as us ual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 G ary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Bra d Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\nMarc C olyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:On Kripke’s proof of Kripke completeness. Melvin Fitting (CUNY) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/on-kripkes-proof-of-krip ke-completeness-melvin-fitting-cuny/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nSaul Kripke a nnounced his possible world semantics in 1959\, and published his proof of axiomatic completeness for the standard modal logics of the time in 1963. It is very unlike the standard completeness proof used today\, which inv olves a Lindenbaum/Henkin construction and produces canonical models. Kri pke’s proof involved tableaus\, in a format that is difficult to follow\, and uses tableau construction algorithms that are complex and somewhat err or prone to describe. I will first discuss Kripke’s proof\, then the histo rical origins of the modern version. Then I will show that completeness\, proved Kripke style\, could actually have been done in the Lindenbaum/Hen kin way\, thus simplifying things considerably. None of this is new but\, with the parts collected together it is an interesting story. “In my end is my beginning”.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for t he Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.1 5-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. ( No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn S impson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\n< p>Apr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Tu rin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special e vent. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoo n:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n< /HTML> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7987@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:The sender-receiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackl e the question of the conventionality of meaning. But many people who care d about the conventionality of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work\, only a few attempts have been made to say anything about the nature of lo gic and inference from the perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the what’s been said in that regard\, by Skyrms and othe rs\, and suggest a few general lessons.\n—\nHi\, All. Below is the provisi onal program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as u sual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face t o face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Br ad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Sprin g recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andre a Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Not e that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMa y 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and inference in the sender-receiver model. Shawn Simpson (Pi tt) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-inference-in-t he-sender-receiver-model-shawn-simpson-pitt/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe sender-re ceiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackle the question of the co nventionality of meaning. But many people who cared about the conventional ity of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work\, only a few attempts hav e been made to say anything about the nature of logic and inference from t he perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the wh at’s been said in that regard\, by Skyrms and others\, and suggest a few g eneral lessons.
\n—
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional progr am for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mond ays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face mee tings. (No more Zoom.)
\n\n
Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iac ona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 S pecial event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bo chum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7990@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:What we call first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated\ , in a certain guise\, by Peirce around 1885 and championed\, albeit in id iosyncratic form\, by Zermelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterize s uch logics model- and proof-theoretically and argue that they constitute e xploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain-dependent gener ality. Whereas a logic\, or family of such\, can be of interest for any o f a variety of reasons\, we suggest that one of those reasons might be tha t said logic fosters some clarification regarding just what qualifies as a logical concept\, a logical operation\, or a logical law.\n \nNote: The p ublished paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.\nHi\ , All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semes ter. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lio nel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferg uson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia \nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session wil l run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\ , Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001 6\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:First-order logics over fixed domain. Gregory Taylor (CUNY) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/first-order-logics-over- fixed-domain-gregory-taylor-cuny/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat we call first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated\, in a certain guise\, b y Peirce around 1885 and championed\, albeit in idiosyncratic form\, by Ze rmelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterize such logics model- and pr oof-theoretically and argue that they constitute exploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain-dependent generality. Whereas a logic\ , or family of such\, can be of interest for any of a variety of reasons\, we suggest that one of those reasons might be that said logic fosters som e clarification regarding just what qualifies as a logical concept\, a log ical operation\, or a logical law.
\n\n
Note: Th e published paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this comi ng semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Ro om 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n< p> \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fite lson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Sam ara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nM arc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7941@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/jocelynbenoist DESCRIPTION:Western metaphysics is based on the opposition between reality and appearance. This construction essentially rests on a visual model\, or more exactly on some staging of what visual experience is.\nI am going to question the basis of this metaphysics\, by taking into account the reali ty of appearances and reflecting on their various uses\, in particular art istic ones. This path will be taken in the first place by shifting the foc us of philosophical analysis from visual to acoustic models. Thus\, I will envisage a realism of echoes\, as opposed to the metaphysics of shadows. \nBiography:\nJocelyn Benoist\, born in 1968\, is Professor at the univers ity Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne\, where he teaches Contemporary Philosophy\, and currently a member of the ‘Institut Universitaire de France’. He has dedicated his early work to phenomenology and the bridges between phenomen ology and early Analytic philosophy. For some time he was the Director of the Husserl Archive of Paris at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Then\, he de veloped a personal investigation into the meaning of realism in philosophy . He has published many books\, including recently: Toward a Contextual Re alism\, H.U.P.\, 2021\, and Von der Phänomenologie zum Realismus\, Mohr Si ebeck\, 2022. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230330T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230330T200000 GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243 LOCATION:Wolff Conference Room/D1103 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Echoes. Beyond the opposition between appearance and reality. Jocel yn Benoist URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/echoes-beyond-the-opposi tion-between-appearance-and-reality-jocelyn-benoist/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWestern metap
hysics is based on the opposition between reality and appearance. This con
struction essentially rests on a visual model\, or more exactly on some st
aging of what visual experience is.
\nI am going to question the basi
s of this metaphysics\, by taking into account the reality of appearances
and reflecting on their various uses\, in particular artistic ones. This p
ath will be taken in the first place by shifting the focus of philosophica
l analysis from visual to acoustic models. Thus\, I will envisage a realis
m of echoes\, as opposed to the metaphysics of shadows.
Jocelyn Benoist\, born in 1968\, is Pro fessor at the university Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne\, where he teaches Cont emporary Philosophy\, and currently a member of the ‘Institut Universitair e de France’. He has dedicated his early work to phenomenology and the bri dges between phenomenology and early Analytic philosophy. For some time he was the Director of the Husserl Archive of Paris at the Ecole Normale Sup érieure. Then\, he developed a personal investigation into the meaning of realism in philosophy. He has published many books\, including recently: < em>Toward a Contextual Realism\, H.U.P.\, 2021\, and Von der Phänomen ologie zum Realismus\, Mohr Siebeck\, 2022.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8019@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:This semester\, we will meet as usual on Mondays\, 4.15-6.15\, followed by a trip to the pub for all those who would like to go. The roo m is yet to be determined. Meetings will be face to face only. Below is th e provisional program for the semester. Details of each meeting will be an nounced on a weekly basis\, as usual.\nNote that the first meeting will be on September 11. Unfortunately we lose several Mondays towards the start of the semester because of CUNY holidays. There is nothing currently sche duled for Nov 20 or Dec 11. Whether we fill those slots is a decision yet to be made\; but if you would like one of them\, let us know.\n \nSept 4. GC closed. No meeting\nSept 11 Francesco Paoli\, Cagliari\nSept 18 Will Na va\, NYU\nSept 25 GC closed. No meeting\nOct 2 Brett Topey\, Saltzburg\nOc t 9 GC closed. No meeting.\nOct 16 Yale Weiss\, GC\nOct 23 Melissa Fusco\, Columbia\nOct 30 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nNov 6 Alex Citkin\, Priv ate Researcher\nNov 13 Alex Skiles\, Rutgers\nNov 20 [GP in Germany]\nNov 27 Mircea Dumitru\, Bucharest\nDec 4 James Walsh\, NYU\nDec 11 DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230911T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230911T181500 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 4419 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230918T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231002T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231016T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231023T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231030T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231106T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231113T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231127T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231204T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231211T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo rkshop-19/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis semester \, we will meet as usual on Mondays\, 4.15-6.15\, followed by a trip to th e pub for all those who would like to go. The room is yet to be determine d. Meetings will be face to face only. Below is the provisional program fo r the semester. Details of each meeting will be announced on a weekly basi s\, as usual.
\nNote that the first meeting will be on September 11. Unfortunately we lose several Mondays towards the start of the semester b ecause of CUNY holidays. There is nothing currently scheduled for Nov 20 or Dec 11. Whether we fill those slots is a decision yet to be made\; but if you would like one of them\, let us know.
\n\n
Sept 4. GC closed. No meeting
\nSept 11 Francesco Paoli\, Cagliari
\nSept 18 Will Nava\, NYU
\nSept 25 GC closed. No meeting
\nOct 2 Brett Topey\, Saltzburg
\nOct 9 GC closed. No me eting.
\nOct 16 Yale Weiss\, GC
\nOct 23 Melissa Fusco\, Columbia
\nOct 30 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nNov 6 Alex Citkin\, Private Researcher
\nNov 13 Alex Skiles\, Rutgers
\nN ov 20 [GP in Germany]
\nNov 27 Mircea Dumitru\, Bucharest p>\n
Dec 4 James Walsh\, NYU
\nDec 11
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8145@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/nietzscheandmusic DESCRIPTION:Nietzsche (1844-1900) is one of the few philosophers who have a n intimate connection to music. This connection has much to do with his ea rly music education. His contemporaries testify that he was a good pianist . His musical ambition\, or his musical daimon\, urged him to compose musi c\, although he had no training in this area. Most of his compositions are from his late teens\; his earliest inspirations are Beethoven\, Mozart\, Haydn\, Schubert\, Schumann and Wagner. His compositions were gathered tog ether and published by Curt Paul Janz in Friedrich Nietzsche\, Der musikal ische Nachlass. Nietzsche’s music is available in several productions. How ever\, Nietzsche did not follow a musical path and decided to become a phi lologist and dedicated his life to writing and philosophy.\nNietzsche’s ba ckground in music\, on the other hand\, influenced his way of thinking and writing. All of these interesting areas between music\, literature\, and philosophy and Nietzsche’s relationship to music understood on a broad spe ctrum have been explored by many Nietzsche scholars including Georges Liéb ert\, Graham Parkes\, Francois Noudelmann\, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and othe rs and in the anthology\, An Anthology on Nietzsche and Music: Philosophic al Thoughts and Musical Experiments\, edited by the presenters of today’s event. This event is dedicated to the exploration of this relationship bet ween Nietzsche and music.\n\n\n\nTickets: https://event.newschool.edu/niet zscheandmusic. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240202T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240202T203000 GEO:+40.736551;-73.996616 LOCATION:Arnold Hall rm i400 @ Arnhold Hall\, 55 W 13th St\, New York\, NY 10011\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Nietzsche and Music URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/nietzsche-and-music/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nNietzsche (1844- 1900) is one of the few philosophers who have an intimate connection to mu sic. This connection has much to do with his early music education. His co ntemporaries testify that he was a good pianist. His musical ambition\, or his musical daimon\, urged him to compose music\, although he had no trai ning in this area. Most of his compositions are from his late teens\; his earliest inspirations are Beethoven\, Mozart\, Haydn\, Schubert\, Schumann and Wagner. His compositions were gathered together and published by Curt Paul Janz in Friedrich Nietzsche\, Der musikalische Nachlass. Nietzsche’s music is available in several productions. However\, Nietzsche did not fo llow a musical path and decided to become a philologist and dedicated his life to writing and philosophy.
\nNietzsche’s background in music\, on the other hand\, influenced his way of thinking and writing. All of the se interesting areas between music\, literature\, and philosophy and Nietz sche’s relationship to music understood on a broad spectrum have been expl ored by many Nietzsche scholars including Georges Liébert\, Graham Parkes\ , Francois Noudelmann\, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and others and in the anthol ogy\, An Anthology on Nietzsche and Music: Philosophical Thoughts and Musi cal Experiments\, edited by the presenters of today’s event. This event is dedicated to the exploration of this relationship between Nietzsche and m usic.
\nTickets: https://eve nt.newschool.edu/nietzscheandmusic.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:music\,Nietzsche X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/nietzscheandmusic END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8136@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T075052Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/ DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f rom 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisional schedule is as fo llows:\nFeb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)\nFeb 12. NO MEETING\nFeb 19. NO MEETING \nFeb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)\nMar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)\nMar 11. Otávi o Bueno (Miami)\nMar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)\nMar 25. Dan Marshal l (Lingnan)\nApr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)\nApr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)\nA pr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)\nApr 22. NO MEETING\nApr 29. Anandi Hatt iangadi (Stockholm)\nMay 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240205T161500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240205T181500 GEO:+40.748815;-73.984102 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 7395 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240226T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240304T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240311T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240318T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240325T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240401T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240408T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240415T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240429T161500 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240506T161500 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Logic & Metaphysics Workshop URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-metaphysics-worksh op-4/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mond ays from 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in -person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisi onal schedule is as follows:
\nFeb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)
\nFe b 12. NO MEETING
\nFeb 19. NO MEETING
\nFeb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)
\nMar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)
\nMar 11. Otávio Bueno (M iami)
\nMar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)
\nMar 25. Dan Mar shall (Lingnan)
\nApr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)
\nApr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)
\nApr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)
\nApr 22. NO MEETING
\nApr 29. Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm)
\nMay 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)
\nVerity Harte is a specialist in ancient philosophy\, with particular research interests in ancient metaphysics\, epistemology and psychology\, especially of Plat o and Aristotle. She is the author of Plato on Parts and Wholes: The M etaphysics of Structure\, and is the editor of several important book s on ancient philosophy.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:ancient\,metaphysics END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR