BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7907@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T220002Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/105989 DESCRIPTION:Keynote: Naomi Zack (Lehman College\, CUNY)\nOne of philosophy’ s original questions still plagues us: to what extent are beings the same and to what extent do they differ? Arising in thinkers as diverse as Parme nides\, Aquinas\, and De Beauvoir and in arenas from social and political philosophy to phenomenology and metaphysics. This conference aims to gathe r graduate student scholars from a variety of specializations to discuss t heir work on identity and difference. Some of the many questions we may pu rsue together are the following:\nWhat constitutes identity and difference ? What makes someone who they are? How do we understand ourselves to be al ike enough to communicate\, yet different enough that we must work to unde rstand another’s point of view? How do identity and difference shape belon ging–within a community\, within a social institution\, within a political structure? Similarly\, how do differences among the members of a group en rich the identity of that collective? How might overlapping identities of an individual give rise to one’s sense of self? How does identity inform a given group’s philosophical thought? How might one form their identity an d sense of self when\, as in the case of many marginalized groups/ minorit ies\, the “self” is oppressed?\nThese questions additionally motivate onto logical considerations. To what extent can we describe two objects that ar e in fact identical? What grants an object’s or a person’s identity over t ime: metaphysical characteristics\, temporal continuity\, or certain brain states? Upon what aspects of an entity do we predicate differences? When are two things metaphysically or logically identical? Are mereological com posites more than the sum of their parts? Are they identical to matter? To what extent do beings differ from Being? How might experiences or acts of reason help ground an identity claim such as A=A?\nOther questions broadl y related to “Identity and Difference” are also welcome.\nPlease submit a 300-500 word abstract prepared for blind review to fordhamgradconference@g mail.com in PDF format. In the body of the email\, please include:\n\nName \nEmail\nPaper title\nInstitutional Affiliation\n\nSubmissions are due by Friday\, December 30\, 2022. After anonymous review\, applicants will be n otified by Tuesday\, January 17\, 2023. Presentations will be limited to 2 0 minutes.\nThe conference will take place in person on March 3-4\, 2023 o n Fordham University’s Rose Hill campus located at 441 East Fordham Road\, Bronx\, NY 10458.\nFor questions\, please contact the conference organize rs at fordhamgradconference@gmail.com DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230303 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230305 GEO:+40.859497;-73.882651 LOCATION:Philosophy dept @ 441 E Fordham Rd\, The Bronx\, NY 10458\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Identity and Difference. 2023 Fordham Graduate Student Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/identity-and-difference- 2023-fordham-graduate-student-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nKeynote: Naom
i Zack (Lehman College\, CUNY)
\nOne of philosophy’s original questio
ns still plagues us: to what extent are beings the same and to what extent
do they differ? Arising in thinkers as diverse as Parmenides\, Aquinas\,
and De Beauvoir and in arenas from social and political philosophy to phen
omenology and metaphysics. This conference aims to gather graduate student
scholars from a variety of specializations to discuss their work on ident
ity and difference. Some of the many questions we may pursue together are
the following:
What constitutes identity and difference? What make s someone who they are? How do we understand ourselves to be alike enough to communicate\, yet different enough that we must work to understand anot her’s point of view? How do identity and difference shape belonging–within a community\, within a social institution\, within a political structure? Similarly\, how do differences among the members of a group enrich the id entity of that collective? How might overlapping identities of an individu al give rise to one’s sense of self? How does identity inform a given grou p’s philosophical thought? How might one form their identity and sense of self when\, as in the case of many marginalized groups/ minorities\, the “ self” is oppressed?
\nThese questions additionally motivate ontologi cal considerations. To what extent can we describe two objects that are in fact identical? What grants an object’s or a person’s identity over time: metaphysical characteristics\, temporal continuity\, or certain brain sta tes? Upon what aspects of an entity do we predicate differences? When are two things metaphysically or logically identical? Are mereological composi tes more than the sum of their parts? Are they identical to matter? To wha t extent do beings differ from Being? How might experiences or acts of rea son help ground an identity claim such as A=A?
\nOther questions bro adly related to “Identity and Difference” are also welcome.
\nPlease submit a 300-500 word abstract prepared for blind review to fordhamgradco nference@gmail.com in PDF format. In the body of the email\, please includ e:
\nSubmissions are due by Frid ay\, December 30\, 2022. After anonymous review\, applicants will be notified by Tuesday\, January 17\, 2023. Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes.
\nThe conference will take place in person on March 3-4\, 2023 on Fordham University’s Rose Hill campus located at 441 East Fo rdham Road\, Bronx\, NY 10458.
\nFor questions\, please contact the conference organizers at fordhamgradconference@gmail.com
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7955@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T220002Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/curiosity-creativity- and-complexity DESCRIPTION:How does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisio ns when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?\nThe conference showcases cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscie nce and Psychology (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exploration\, decision-making\, information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artificial intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) an d Economics (decision making and information demand). Alongside formal pre sentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions among facult y\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presenta tions.\nSubmissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due Feb ruary 15\, 2023. Please visit the call for submissions for complete requir ements.\nEvent Information\nFree and open to the public. Registration is r equired and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbi a’s COVID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email even ts@zi.columbia.edu with any questions. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230523 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230526 GEO:+40.816847;-73.957958 LOCATION:Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th Floor Lecture Hall) @ 3227 Br oadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Curiosity\, Creativity and Complexity Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/curiosity-creativity-and -complexity-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nHow does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisions when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?
\nThe conference showca ses cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscience and Psycholog y (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exploration\, decision-making\ , information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artifici al intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) and Economics (deci sion making and information demand). Alongside formal presentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions among faculty\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presentations.
\nSu bmissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due February 15\, 2023. Please visit the call fo r submissions for complete requirements.
\nFree and open to the public. Registration is required and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbia’s COV ID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 va ccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email events@zi.columbia.edu with any quest ions.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:artificial intelligence\,decision theory\,mind\,psych ology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8006@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T220002Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/111406 DESCRIPTION:Ideas about “identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media\, in higher education\, in political disputations\, and in critical theories of society. Claims about “identity” and “difference” can readil y be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of ra ce\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, pol itical affiliation\, ability and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc . But what exactly do we mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference” ? And if we achieve greater clarity about the metaphysical presupposition s and implications of “identity” and “difference\,” what difference would that make?\nA serious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “differen ce” will expectedly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse ab out what is “identical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”? Is discourse about what is “different” reducible to discourse about what i s “other”? Can something be “the same” without being “identical\,” and ca n something be “other” without being “different”? When we speak about “be ing\,” does our speaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically)\, or instead does our speaking about being always have t he same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thin g depend mainly on the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the thing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understandi ng of identity depend on some reference to what is different? Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity? What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\, or some combination of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences between things without discerning intelligible differences\, or does the indiscernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real differences at all but rather an identity? Does difference de pend on negation\, or can one assert that there is difference without havi ng to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an o ntological difference\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between B eing and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences to exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a difference between “being” and “nothing”)?\nIn spite of the v irtual ubiquity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a d earth of discourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 20 24 (“Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\, the Metaphysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking abo ut the metaphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such de eper thinking will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practic e.\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged \, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note: when selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Prog ram Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion among others.\n****************************************\nGuidelines for th e Submission of Abstracts\, and for Aristotle and Plato Prize Candidates\n Abstracts of approximately 500 words should be submitted electronically by September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nAristotle P rize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaph ysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Elig ibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet e arned a Ph.D.. Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize sho uld express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their sub mission. Papers submitted for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read a t the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Ar istotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, an d assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Aristotle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be sub mitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nPlato Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphys ical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligib ility for the Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. deg ree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who hold a Ph.D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Thos e wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish cl early in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitt ed for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limi t applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to f ootnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash awa rd of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs asso ciated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:sec retary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous sup port of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be abl e to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate stude nts whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with al l relevant expense-receipts).\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Plato Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on their submissi on no later than December 1\, 2023.\nhttps://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2 024/2024_meeting.htm\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/20 24_meeting.htm. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240307 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240311 GEO:+40.77103;-73.985096 LOCATION:Lowenstein Building\, Fordham University\, Lincoln Center @ 113 W 60th St\, New York\, NY 10023\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Metaphysical Society of America Conference: Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-society-of- america-conference-identity-difference-and-the-difference-that-metaphysics -makes/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nIdeas about “ identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media\, in higher educa tion\, in political disputations\, and in critical theories of society. C laims about “identity” and “difference” can readily be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of race\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, political affiliation\, abi lity and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc. But what exactly do w e mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”? And if we achieve gre ater clarity about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “i dentity” and “difference\,” what difference would that make?
\nA ser ious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expected ly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse about what is “iden tical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”? Is discourse abou t what is “different” reducible to discourse about what is “other”? Can s omething be “the same” without being “identical\,” and can something be “o ther” without being “different”? When we speak about “being\,” does our s peaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically) \, or instead does our speaking about being always have the same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly o n the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the t hing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understanding of identity de pend on some reference to what is different? Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity? What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\, or some combinat ion of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences betw een things without discerning intelligible differences\, or does the indis cernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real diffe rences at all but rather an identity? Does difference depend on negation\ , or can one assert that there is difference without having to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an ontological differ ence\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences t o exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a diff erence between “being” and “nothing”)?
\nIn spite of the virtual ubi quity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a dearth of d iscourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “ident ity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 2024 (“Ident ity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\, the Metap hysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking about the met aphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such deeper think ing will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practice.
\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged\, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note: wh en selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Program Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion amo ng others.
\n****************************************
\nAbstracts of approximately 500 words sh ould be submitted electronically by September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@me taphysicalsociety.org.
\nAristotle Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaphysical Society should sub mit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D.. Those wis hing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize should express this wish cle arly in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitte d for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word l imit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not t o footnotes or other supporting material. The Aristotle Prize carries a c ash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the cos ts associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Aristo tle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nPlato Prize: Tho se wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphysical Societ y should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for t he Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. degree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who hold a Ph. D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Those wishing t o be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish clearly in th e email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitted for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limit applies t o the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\ , inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full paper s and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@meta physicalsociety.org.
\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous support of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot F und for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate st udents whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with all relevant expense-receipts).
\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Pla to Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on thei r submission no later than December 1\, 2023.
\n\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm.< /p> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity\,metaphysics X-COST:$70-120 X-TICKETS-URL:https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7679@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T220002Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://poprocksworkshop.wixsite.com/nycphilosophy DESCRIPTION:A number of authors have pointed out that the standard argument s for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se\, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the subj ect need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in som e state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two stat es to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents\, and so there is no substan tive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I pres ent evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but dif fer in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\, a nd endogenous\, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities f or how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship betwe en cognition and perception. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T180000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rebecca Keller – (Endogenous) Perceptual States are Conceptual @ Po PRocks URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rebecca-keller-endogenou s-perceptual-states-are-conceptual-poprocks/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nA number of a uthors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s havin g nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per s e\, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the subject need or need not pos sess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have ar gued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have differ ent sorts of contents\, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I present evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but differ in the required conc eptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\, and endogenous\, voluntar ily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—vo luntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concep t-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and percept ion.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:psychology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7751@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T220002Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://www.bklynlibrary.org/calendar/philosophy-library-virtual-20 220322 DESCRIPTION:How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical In dian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entertainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In th is talk\, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition . I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by t urning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowledge and l uck.\nJonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work dr aws on a variety of philosophical traditions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind\, metaphysics and epistemology. His books include Attention\, Not Self (2017)\, a study of early Buddhist theories of attent ion\; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012)\, an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self\; Virtual Subjects\, Fugitive Selves (2020)\, a n analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self\; and Inwardness: An Ou tsiders’ Guide (2021)\, a review of the concept of inwardness in literatur e\, film\, poetry\, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowsh ip of the British Academy in 2015\, and won the Infosys Prize in the Human ities the same year\, the only philosopher to do so.\n\n\nThis series is c urated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto) Can theater teach us about what it’s lik e to be someone else? URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/jonardon-ganeri-toronto- can-theater-teach-us-about-what-its-like-to-be-someone-else/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nHow ca n we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entert ainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In this talk\, I’ll ex plore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine t he reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by turning to contemp orary studies of the relationship between knowledge and luck.
\nThis series is curated and co-presented by Br ooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov.
\nBrooklyn Publ ic Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area t o discuss their work with a general audience\, hosted by the Brooklyn Publ ic Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophic al questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space wh ere Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions tha t matter to them.
\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and las t name at gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:biology\,mind\,psychology\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7891@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T220002Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b0c618/ websitePage:2d4463fc-e326-4269-9b07-c57fae3d4cb6 DESCRIPTION:Recent research in animal behavior and culture shows that the m ental capacities of animals have been largely undervalued. And yet it is h ard to resist the impression of a gap—a difference in nature rather than d egree—between humans and non-humans when it comes to certain tasks involvi ng abstraction\, planning\, sustained attention\, or the transmission of c ulture over generations. How different is the human mind from the minds of non-human animals? The key to these issues may lie in the capacity of the mind to relate to itself as a “self” that bears desires and intentions\, along with agency and purpose. But how is this compatible with the recogni tion that much of our mental activity occurs at an unconscious or subconsc ious level\, below the threshold of awareness and reflection? Is our perce ived unity of self or mind an illusion we entertain for practical purposes ?\nPsychologist and philosopher Alison Gopnik\, ecologist Carl Safina\, an d biologist Kenneth R. Miller explore what separates humans from other ani mals in relation to the construct of “self.”\nReception to follow.\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTickets: https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22 abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b0c618/websitePage:2d4463fc-e326-4269-9b07-c57fae 3d4cb6. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230117T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230117T203000 GEO:+40.791947;-73.952101 LOCATION:New York Academy of Medicine @ 1216 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10029\ , USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Fathoming the Mind: A Closer Look at the Formation of Self URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/fathoming-the-mind-a-clo ser-look-at-the-formation-of-self/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe first sec tion of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about t he existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition conc entrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dha rmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second sectio n looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as mor e difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and consid ers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Rutgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Ha ll will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have t his card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearb y to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted thr ough Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a n earby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further inf ormation.
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\n