BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7751@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T132016Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://www.bklynlibrary.org/calendar/philosophy-library-virtual-20 220322 DESCRIPTION:How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical In dian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entertainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In th is talk\, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition . I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by t urning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowledge and l uck.\nJonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work dr aws on a variety of philosophical traditions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind\, metaphysics and epistemology. His books include Attention\, Not Self (2017)\, a study of early Buddhist theories of attent ion\; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012)\, an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self\; Virtual Subjects\, Fugitive Selves (2020)\, a n analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self\; and Inwardness: An Ou tsiders’ Guide (2021)\, a review of the concept of inwardness in literatur e\, film\, poetry\, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowsh ip of the British Academy in 2015\, and won the Infosys Prize in the Human ities the same year\, the only philosopher to do so.\n\n\nThis series is c urated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto) Can theater teach us about what it’s lik e to be someone else? URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/jonardon-ganeri-toronto- can-theater-teach-us-about-what-its-like-to-be-someone-else/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nHow ca n we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entert ainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In this talk\, I’ll ex plore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine t he reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by turning to contemp orary studies of the relationship between knowledge and luck.
\nThis series is curated and co-presented by Br ooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov.
\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\n\n
Presents:
Lead Presenter : Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Uni versity)
\nABSTRAC
T: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cultural methodo
logy blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and M
arx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its role in Li’s t
hought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition
influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence o
f ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined
DATE: March 25\, 2022
\n< p class='gmail-p1'>TIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST< /span>\nThis seminar will t ake place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiariz e yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with th e program’s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your na me in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University S eminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will r aise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your h and.
\nNote Regar ding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Co lumbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars parti cipants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing accommodations or who h ave questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability S ervices at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, includi ng sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for acc ommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar partici pants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: http s://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7872@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T132016Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:With responses from Timothy Connolly (East Stroudsburg Universi ty)\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discussions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an emotion. Ancient Asian philosoph ical traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism\, however\, emphasize co mpassion as a character trait that should be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a necessary tool? What is the role o f love and care? Does self-reflection contribute to the process?\n\n \nDi nner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3 335@columbia.edu. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:How to nurture compassion? Some lessons from Asian philosophical tr aditions. Sin Yee Chan (U Vermont) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/how-to-nurture-compassio n-some-lessons-from-asian-philosophical-traditions-sin-yee-chan-u-vermont/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nWith responses from Timothy Connolly (Ea st Stroudsburg University)
\nABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discu
ssions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an
emotion. Ancient Asian philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and
Buddhism\, however\, emphasize compassion as a character trait that should
be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions
to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example\, is empathy a ne
cessary tool? What is the role of love and care? Does self-reflection co
ntribute to the process?
\n
\n
Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia Univ ersity Seminars. < /p>\n
RSVP is required for di nner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7976@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T132016Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT: DESCRIPTION:This talk will develop the idea that racial identities are best understood as formed through large scale historical events\, and that thi s genesis can only be obscured by disavowals of racial categories as conce ptually mistaken and inevitably morally pernicious. In this sense\, races are formed not simply as ideas\, or ideologies and policies\, as many soc ial constructivists about race argue\, but as forms of life with associate d patterns of subjectivity including\, as a wealth of social psychology ha s shown\, presumptive attitudes and behavioral dispositions (Jeffers 2019\ ; Steele 2010\; Sullivan 2005). Because they are historical formations\, r acial identities are thoroughly social\, contextual\, variegated internall y\, and dynamic. It is history that will alter them\, not merely policy ch anges. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230316T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230316T180000 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 5318 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:The Historical Formation of Races. Linda Alcoff URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/the-historical-formation -of-races-linda-alcoff/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis talk wil l develop the idea that racial identities are best understood as formed th rough large scale historical events\, and that this genesis can only be ob scured by disavowals of racial categories as conceptually mistaken and ine vitably morally pernicious. In this sense\, races are formed not simply a s ideas\, or ideologies and policies\, as many social constructivists abou t race argue\, but as forms of life with associated patterns of subjectivi ty including\, as a wealth of social psychology has shown\, presumptive at titudes and behavioral dispositions (Jeffers 2019\; Steele 2010\; Sullivan 2005). Because they are historical formations\, racial identities are thoroughly social\, contextual\, variegated internally\, and dynamic. It is history that will alter them\, not merely policy changes.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:history\,race\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7978@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T132016Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epist emology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions o f knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological kin d. In this talk\, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.\nWith responses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@ columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 10027 \, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toront o) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/srihar%e1%b9%a3a-on-the- indefinability-of-knowledge-nilanjan-das-u-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nIn Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epistemology should give us re ason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are re liably tracking any sui generis psychological kind. In this talk\, I recon struct Śrīharṣa’s position.
\nWith res ponses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby resta urant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information .
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,epistemology\,Indian END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240328T132016Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but ha s also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. T he Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of sha me can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confuci an texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoi st\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely th e focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debat e of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and res tores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of what constit utes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as insults. Mo re importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate \, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the C onfucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual ’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimu li while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s mora l cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the funct ion of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an imp ortant philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.\n\n\n\n \nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n\n\n\n\nWe hope you’ve had restful and productive summers\, and we look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meetings. Below is the list of our scheduled speakers. Please save these dates!\n\nSeptember 15 – Jing Hu (Concordia)\nOctober 1 3 – Bill Waldron (Middlebury)\nOctober 27 – David Wong (Duke)\nDecember 1 – Stephen Angle (Wesleyan)\n\nFurther details will be circulated in due co urse. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716 @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:War and Shame –A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults betw een the Confucians and their Interlocutors. Jing Hu (Concordia University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/war-and-shame-a-debate-o n-the-appropriate-response-to-insults-between-the-confucians-and-their-int erlocutors-jing-hu-concordia-university/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
What i s an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently prese nted as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confucian texts. Meanwhi le\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoist\, legalist\, o r much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attent ion. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and restores the histori cal intellectual discourse over the topic of what constitutes an appropria te response to humiliating situations such as insults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate\, namely how Son gzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the Confucian doctrine : The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtu es can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimuli while also mai ntaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external s timuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an important philosophi cal concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)
\n
This talk rea ds contemporary debates about structural racism and US history from the pe rspective of philosophical questions about identity and difference. While many people have argued that America needs to come to terms with or “work through” the racism in its history that has shaped and continues to shape its present structures\, it remains difficult to explain what connects thi s past and the present. Are we talking about one racism with many differen t past and present forms? Or are there multiple racisms that only share so me similar features? In this talk\, I draw attention to how these division s play out particularly in contemporary Black Studies and argue that the p hilosophy of Gilles Deleuze can offer us resources for thinking about thes e questions through his discussions of repetition. I argue that understand ing our conversations about structural racism and history as conversations about a racism that repeats\, can help us to better understand why racism seems to reappear\, how to think its disparate forms together\, and what presuppositions operate in many attempts to “work through” the past.
\nBio: Eyo Ewara is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. His teaching and research explores the relatio nships between 20th Century Continental Philosophy\, Critical Philosophy o f Race\, and Queer Theory. His work has appeared in Theory and Event\, Pu ncta\, Philosophy Today\, Critical Philosophy of Race\, Political Theology \, and other venues. His current research project is particularly interest ed in engaging work in Continental Philosophy\, Queer Theory\, and Black S tudies to address questions of identity and difference amongst concepts of race\, forms of racism\, and forms of anti-racism. How can we better acco unt for the relations between at times radically disparate concepts\, stru ctures\, and practices such that they can all specifically and recognizabl y be called racial? What might our account of these relations say about ou r ability to address racism’s harms?
\nTickets: https://event .newschool.edu/eyoewara.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:history\,race X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/eyoewara END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR