BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7736@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/events/department-calendar/icalrepea t.detail/2022/05/13/637/-/workshop-on-michael-moore-s-mechanical-choices DESCRIPTION:Contact TBA\nTBA\nLocation Rutgers University Inn & Conference Center DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220513 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220515 GEO:+40.496976;-74.446506 LOCATION:Zoom\, possibly in person @ 111 Somerset St\, New Brunswick\, NJ 0 8901\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Workshop on Michael Moore’s Mechanical Choices URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/workshop-on-michael-moor es-mechanical-choices/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nContact TBA p>\n
TBA
\nLocation Rutgers University Inn & Conference Center
The rich phil osophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton a nd Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philos ophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent bu t neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely the mutual claim that th eir opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional\, and were the produc t both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual s tructures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in vari ous prominent places\, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John K eill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibn iz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke \, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile\, vulgar\, and profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent in tellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codi cil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy\, but instead lay at th e heart of it. This famous debate\, while of course somewhat sui generis\, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate .
\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the History of Science at the Unive rsity of Oxford
\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Registration r equired. Please contact sc ienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lectu re Series.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7663@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/ DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws o f nature is between Humeans who think that laws merely describe the distri bution of matter and non-Humeans who think that laws govern it. The metaph ysics can place demands on the proper formulations of physical theories. I t is sometimes assumed that the governing view requires a fundamental / in trinsic direction of time: to govern\, laws must be dynamical\, producing later states of the world from earlier ones\, in accord with the fundament al direction of time in the universe. In this paper\, we propose a minimal primitivism about laws of nature (MinP) according to which there is no su ch requirement. On our view\, laws govern by constraining the physical pos sibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without ta king on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic prod uction. Moreover\, as a version of primitivism\, our view requires no redu ction / analysis of laws in terms of universals\, powers\, or dispositions . Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws\ , including the principle of least action\, the Past Hypothesis\, the Eins tein equation of general relativity\, and even controversial examples foun d in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retro-causal theori es of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining\, non- Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variet y of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do.\nThe talk will take place o ver Zoom. I will send out the Zoom link closer to the meeting. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211006T170000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211006T190000 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Eddy Keming Chen (UCSD) and Sheldon Goldstein (Rutgers)\, “Governin g Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature” URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/eddy-keming-chen-ucsd-an d-sheldon-goldstein-rutgers-governing-without-a-fundamental-direction-of-t ime-minimal-primitivism-about-laws-of-nature/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nAbstract: The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws of nature is between Hume ans who think that laws merely describe the distribution of matter and non -Humeans who think that laws govern it. The metaphysics can place demands on the proper formulations of physical theories. It is sometimes assumed t hat the governing view requires a fundamental / intrinsic direction of tim e: to govern\, laws must be dynamical\, producing later states of the worl d from earlier ones\, in accord with the fundamental direction of time in the universe. In this paper\, we propose a minimal primitivism about laws of nature (MinP) according to which there is no such requirement. On our v iew\, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view cap tures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commi tments about the direction of time or dynamic production. Moreover\, as a version of primitivism\, our view requires no reduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals\, powers\, or dispositions. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws\, including the principl e of least action\, the Past Hypothesis\, the Einstein equation of general relativity\, and even controversial examples found in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retro-causal theories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining\, non-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variety of candidate fundament al laws as Humeans do.
\nThe talk will take place over Zoom. I will send out the Zoom link closer to the meeting.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7709@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/art-brain-beholder DESCRIPTION:What can science teach us about how we perceive and understand art? How can art help us understand ourselves and each other? In this even t\, the Zuckerman Institute explores the interactions between our brains a nd the artistic world\, finding connections and parallels between art and science.\nEvent Speakers\nPlease visit the event webpage to view the speak er list.\nEvent Information\nFree and open to the public\, registration is required by January 28\, 2022. This event will also be live-streamed. Ple ase email zuckermaninstitute@columbia.edu with any questions.\nThis talk i s part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Brain Insight Lecture series hos ted by Columbia’s Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.\n\n\n\n\n\nRegister\nTickets : https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-TjKsoLFSuOXr1-x3 rGT5g. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220202T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220202T190000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Art in the Brain of the Beholder URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/art-in-the-brain-of-the- beholder/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat can science teach us about how we perceive and understand art? H ow can art help us understand ourselves and each other? In this event\, th e Zuckerman Institute explores the interactions between our brains and the artistic world\, finding connections and parallels between art and scienc e.
\nPlease visit the event webpage to view the spe aker list.
\nFree and open to the public \, registrat ion is required by January 28\, 2022. This event will also be live-str eamed. Please email zuckermaninstitute@columbia.edu< /a> with any questions.
\nThis talk is part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Brain Insight Lecture series hosted by Columbia’s Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and su pported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.
\nTickets: h ttps://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-TjKsoLFSuOXr1-x3rGT 5g.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:art\,mind\,neuroscience\,science X-TICKETS-URL:https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-TjKso LFSuOXr1-x3rGT5g END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7740@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/elly-truitt-structure -scientific-progress-case-roger-bacon DESCRIPTION:This talk explores the importance of the medieval period and ni neteenth-century medievalism to the invention of modern science by placing the work of thirteenth-century Franciscan\, polymath\, and scholastic nat ural philosopher Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292) into conversation with later scholars\, especially William Whewell (1794-1866). Elly Truitt argues that Bacon’s work and reputation became central to a narrative about the devel opment of science that insisted on Europe as the only possible place of or igin. Furthermore\, Truitt argues that this narrative was constructed\, in part\, by ignoring large parts of Bacon’s corpus and erasing his deep eng agement with medieval scholars working in the Arabic tradition\, and by re lying instead on a narrative structure that emerged in the context of late antique and medieval Christianity.\nEvent Speaker\nElly Truitt\, Associat e Professor of History and Sociology of Science at the University of Penns ylvania\nEvent Information\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Re gistration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with an y questions.\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lectur e Series.\nSponsoring Organizations:\n\nThe University Seminars at Columbi a University\nColumbia University in the City of New York\nNYU Gallatin Sc hool of Individualized Study\nThe Graduate Center\, City University of New York\nThe New York Academy of Medicine\nThe New York Academy of Sciences \n\nThe Center for Science and Society makes every reasonable effort to ac commodate individuals with disabilities. If you require disability accommo dations to attend a Center for Science and Society event\, please contact us at scienceandsociety@columbia.edu or (212) 853-1612 at least 10 days in advance of the event. For more information\, please visit the campus acce ssibility webpage.\n\n\n\n\n\nregister DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220223T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220223T193000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Elly Truitt – The Structure of Scientific Progress: The Case of Rog er Bacon URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/elly-truitt-the-structur e-of-scientific-progress-the-case-of-roger-bacon/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThis talk explores the importance of the medieval period and nineteen th-century medievalism to the invention of modern science by placing the w ork of thirteenth-century Franciscan\, polymath\, and scholastic natural p hilosopher Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292) into conversation with later schola rs\, especially William Whewell (1794-1866). Elly Truitt argues that Bacon ’s work and reputation became central to a narrative about the development of science that insisted on Europe as the only possible place of origin. Furthermore\, Truitt argues that this narrative was constructed\, in part\ , by ignoring large parts of Bacon’s corpus and erasing his deep engagemen t with medieval scholars working in the Arabic tradition\, and by relying instead on a narrative structure that emerged in the context of late antiq ue and medieval Christianity.
\nElly Truitt\, Associate Professor of History and So ciology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania
\nThis event is free and open to the public\; Registration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is part of the New York History of Science Lecture Series.
\nSp onsoring Organizations:
\nThe C enter for Science and Society makes every reasonable effort to accommodate individuals with disabilities. If you require disability accommodations t o attend a Center for Science and Society event\, please contact us at scienceandsociety@columbia.ed u or (212) 853-1612 at least 10 days in advance of the event. For more information\, please visit the campus acc essibility webpage.
\nThe current p andemic has focused attention on the techniques used by epidemiologists an d other non-experimental scientists to infer causal hypotheses from correl ational data. I have previously argued* that we need to explain these tech niques by reducing causal relationships to dependencies in systems of stru ctural equations with probabilistically independent exogenous variables. I n this talk I shall aim to use this account to cast light on (a) single-ca se counterfactual dependence and actual causation\, (b) the content and pr actical relevance of generic causal claims like “smoking causes cancer”\, (c) the temporal asymmetry of causation\, and (d) the proper understanding of rational action under risk.
\n*In particular\, I’ve argued this in http://weebly-file/1/8/5/5/185517 40/stat_nat_csn_monist.pdf. I will also be giving a talk on it at the CUNY Logic and Metaphysics workshop on Monday 7 March 1615-1815.
\nT he talk will be on Zoom. All are welcome to attend!
\nThe zoom link will be distributed through the MAPS mailing list. If you are not on the M APS mailing list and would like to receive the Zoom link for the talk\, pl ease email nyphilsci@gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:causality\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7759@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://philosophy.columbia.edu/content/department-calendar DESCRIPTION:LTF Event: Olivia Branscum\,“Fairness\, Objectivity\, and Gradi ngMultimodal Assessments.” DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220324T161000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220324T180000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:716 Philosophy Hall @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Olivia Branscum\, “Fairness\, Objectivity\, and Grading Multimodal Assessments.” URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/olivia-branscum-fairness -objectivity-and-grading-multimodal-assessments/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nLTF Event: Olivia Branscum\,
“Fairness\, Objectivity\, an
d Grading
Multimodal Assessments.”
Brooklyn Publ ic Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area t o discuss their work with a general audience\, hosted by the Brooklyn Publ ic Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophic al questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space wh ere Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions tha t matter to them.
\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and las t name at gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:biology\,mind\,psychology\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7712@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://bkpp.tumblr.com/ DESCRIPTION:Brooklyn Public Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area to discuss their work with a general audience\, hos ted by the Brooklyn Public Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophical questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space where Brooklynites can reason together about the phi losophical questions that matter to them.\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and last name at gmail.com. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220527T193000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220527T204500 GEO:+40.672511;-73.9682 LOCATION:Info Commons Lab\, Brookly Public Library @ 10 Grand Army Plaza\, Brooklyn\, NY 11238\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Olufemi Taiwo: On climate colonialism URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/olufemi-taiwo-on-climate -colonialism/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nBrooklyn Publ ic Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area t o discuss their work with a general audience\, hosted by the Brooklyn Publ ic Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophic al questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space wh ere Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions tha t matter to them.
\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and las t name at gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:climate\,political\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7818@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:http://bit.ly/cs-talks DESCRIPTION:ALL TALKS ARE ON ZOOM\, 1-3\, NYC TIMEAll are hosted by Rebecca Keller and Ryan McElhaneyZoom links are all announced on the Cognitive Sc ience email listTo subscribe to that list\, email davidrosenthal1@gmail.co mSome sessions—not all—are recorded for later access\n9/16: Michael A. Coh enPsychology and Neuroscience\, Amherst College9/23: Alon ZivonyPsychologi cal Sciences\, Birkbeck College London9/30: Steven GrossPhilosophy\, Johns Hopkins University10/7: Steven FlemingExperimental Psychology and Neuroim aging\, University College London10/14: John MorrisonPhilosophy\, Barnard College and Columbia University10/21: Michael SnodgrassCognition & Cogniti ve Neuroscience\, University of Michigan10/28: Jamal WilliamsPsychology\, University of California San Diego11/4: Ian PhillipsPhilosophy and Psychol ogical and Brain Sciences\, Johns Hopkins11/11: Paweł ZiębaInstitute of Ph ilosophy\, Jagiellonian University11/18: Nicholas SheaPhilosophy\, Univers ity of Oxford and University of LondonThe CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker S eries meets weekly at the CUNY Graduate Center\,Fridays\, 1-3 pm\, NYC tim e—currently on Zoom. This file is at: http://bit.ly/cs-talksFor additional information e-mail David Rosenthal DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220916T130000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220916T150000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220923T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221007T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221014T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221021T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221028T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221104T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221111T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221118T130000 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Cognitive Science Speaker Series URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/cognitive-science-speake r-series-18/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nProfessor Wil liamson will give 3 lectures: September 19\, 21\, and 23. All will take pl ace in AB-2400 [East Wing] from 4:30-6:30pm.
\nThe lectures will dis cuss problems in the methodology of contemporary philosophy. Although phil osophy without use of counterexamples would be a disaster\, the way they a re currently handled is naïve. In particular\, it is too vulnerable to fak e counterexamples generated by more or less universal human heuristics.
\nHuman cognition\, from sens e perception to abstract reflection\, frequently employs heuristics\, quic k\, easy\, efficient\, and imperfectly reliable ways of solving problems. To a neglected extent\, philosophical problems and paradoxes from reliance on the outputs of fallible heuristics. This will be illustrated with exam ples involving vagueness\, conditionals\, belief ascription\, truth and fa lsity\, and reasons aggregation. Potential lessons for philosophical metho d will be discussed.
\nOve rfitting is a well-recognized methodological problem in natural science\, where use of models with too many degrees of freedom leads to unstable the orizing and failure to detect errors in the data. Overfitting is also a ma jor but ill-recognized methodological problem in philosophy\, exacerbated by its reliance on heuristics. General intellectual tendencies conducive t o overfitting in philosophy will be discussed.
\nThe ‘hyperintensional revolution’ proclai ms that central metaphysical distinctions cannot be captured in modal term s since they are sensitive to differences between necessary equivalents. S uch hyperintensionalism fits the profile of overfitting. It is motivated b y case judgments that are explicable as results of a fallible heuristic an d it leads to models with too many degrees of freedom.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:rationality\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7878@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/2022/10/08/upcoming-maps-talks-fall -2022/ DESCRIPTION:Presented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221018T163000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221018T183000 GEO:+40.770718;-73.98539 LOCATION:Plaza View Room\, 12th Flr @ Leon Lowenstein Center\, 113 W 60th S t\, New York\, NY 10023\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Indefinite Causal Ordering. Elise Crull (CUNY) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/indefinite-causal-orderi ng-elise-crull-cuny/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nPresented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:causality\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7903@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham CONTACT: DESCRIPTION:Seen from a distance\, competing views of laws of nature attend to different aspects of their target concept. The Best System Analysis (‘ BSA’) focuses on the role of laws in systematizing our thoughts about part icular facts\, while non-Humean (‘realist’) views focus on whatever it is – N-relations among universals\, powers – that pushes the universe from on e state to another. Nothing stops us from combining these views: with the BSA\, we can restrict the laws of science to summarizing particulars\, whi le at the same time\, with our preferred realism\, positing a ‘driver’ tha t makes those particulars as they are.\nSo far\, there have been only a fe w attempts to hybridize the BSA with some form of realism\, and then only with the powers view. I argue that there is a deep assumption woven into t he fabric of realism from Descartes’s time on: that the laws of a science report on facts\, which in turn either are or involve the realist’s chosen driver. I argue that the best-known attempt to hybridize the BSA with a p ower’s view – Heather Demarest’s potency-BSA – still makes this Cartesian assumption\, and faces significant objections as a result. The lesson is t hat anyone attempting to create hybrids should abandon that assumption ent irely. After formulating what I take to be a more defensible powers-BSA hy brid\, I go on to show how one might cross-breed the BSA with primitivism and with the universals view. By abandoning the Cartesian assumption\, we can create hybrids that are considerably more defensible than their realis t parents.\nLocation: Plaza View Room\, 12th Floor\, Lowenstein Building o f Fordham Lincoln Center (113 W 60th St).\nDirections: Enter at the corner of 60th and Columbus\, and have a university ID ready. Please tell the se curity that you are attending an event hosted by the philosophy department . To get the Plaza View Room\, take the escalators one floor up to find th e elevators. Only some elevators go up to the 12th floor\; for those that only go to the 11th floor\, go to 11 and turn to the center of the main ha llway to see a stairway to 12. Upon arriving at the 12th floor\, take a ri ght and walk all the way to the end through the doors. Please email Peter Tan (ptan8@fordham.edu) for any issues.\nDue to technical limitations\, th e talk will be in-person only. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221206T163000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221206T183000 GEO:+40.770718;-73.98539 LOCATION:Plaza View Room\, 12th Floor\, @ Leon Lowenstein Center\, 113 W 60 th St\, New York\, NY 10023\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:How to Breed Hybrid Accounts of Laws of Nature. Walter Ott (UVA) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/how-to-breed-hybrid-acco unts-of-laws-of-nature-walter-ott-uva/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nSeen from a d
istance\, competing views of laws of nature attend to different aspects of
their target concept. The Best System Analysis (‘BSA’) focuses on the rol
e of laws in systematizing our thoughts about particular facts\, while non
-Humean (‘realist’) views focus on whatever it is – N-relations among univ
ersals\, powers – that pushes the universe from one state to another. Noth
ing stops us from combining these views: with the BSA\, we can restrict th
e laws of science to summarizing particulars\, while at the same time\, wi
th our preferred realism\, positing a ‘driver’ that makes those particular
s as they are.
\nSo far\, there have been only a few attempts to hybr
idize the BSA with some form of realism\, and then only with the powers vi
ew. I argue that there is a deep assumption woven into the fabric of reali
sm from Descartes’s time on: that the laws of a science report on facts\,
which in turn either are or involve the realist’s chosen driver. I argue t
hat the best-known attempt to hybridize the BSA with a power’s view – Heat
her Demarest’s potency-BSA – still makes this Cartesian assumption\, and f
aces significant objections as a result. The lesson is that anyone attempt
ing to create hybrids should abandon that assumption entirely. After formu
lating what I take to be a more defensible powers-BSA hybrid\, I go on to
show how one might cross-breed the BSA with primitivism and with the unive
rsals view. By abandoning the Cartesian assumption\, we can create hybrids
that are considerably more defensible than their realist parents.
Location: Plaza View Room\, 12th Floor\, Lowenstein Buil ding of Fordham Lincoln Center (113 W 60th St).
\nDirections : Enter at the corner of 60th and Columbus\, and have a universit y ID ready. Please tell the security that you are attending an event hoste d by the philosophy department. To get the Plaza View Room\, take the esca lators one floor up to find the elevators. Only some elevators go up to th e 12th floor\; for those that only go to the 11th floor\, go to 11 and tur n to the center of the main hallway to see a stairway to 12. Upon arriving at the 12th floor\, take a right and walk all the way to the end through the doors. Please email Peter Tan (ptan8@fordham.edu) for any issues.
\nDue to technical limitations\, the talk will be in-person only.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7943@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/2022/11/21/maps-schedule-fall-2022- and-spring-2023/ DESCRIPTION:For those interested\, here is the schedule for the rest of the Fall 2022 semester and Spring 2023 semester. All the talks will happen be tween 4:30pm and 6:30pm EST unless stated otherwise.\nArmin Schulz (Univer sity of Kansas)\nTuesday Jan 24 2023\nTBA\nGlenn Shafer (Rutgers Universit y)\nTuesday Feb 14 2023 RESCHEDULE\nTBA\nSean Carroll (Johns Hopkins)\nTue sday Feb 28 2023\nTBA\nKareem Khalifa (Middlebury College)\nTuesday Mar 21 2023\nTBA\nAny updates on the schedule\, as well as information about the talks will be announced through the MAPS mailing list. To be added to the mailing list please message Diego Arana (da689@rutgers.edu) and Barry Loe wer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu). DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230124T163000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230124T183000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:tba @ New York\, NY\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230228T163000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230321T163000 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Metro Area Philosophy of Science URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metro-area-philosophy-of -science/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nFor those int erested\, here is the schedule for the rest of the Fall 2022 semester and Spring 2023 semester. All the talks will happen between 4:30pm and 6:30pm EST unless stated otherwise.
\nArmin Schulz (University of Kansas)
\nTuesday Jan 24 2023
\nTBA
Glenn Shafer (Rutgers University)\nTuesday Feb 14 2023 RESCHEDULE
\nTBA
Sean Carroll (Johns Hopkins)
\nTuesday Feb
28 2023
\nTBA
Kareem Khalifa (Middl
ebury College)
\nTuesday Mar 21 2023
\nTBA
Any updates on the schedule\, as well as information about the talks will be a nnounced through the MAPS mailing list. To be added to the mailing list pl ease message Diego Arana (da689@rutgers.edu) and Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu).
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7983@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://www.cruzdavis.com/method-theory-reality/upcoming-events DESCRIPTION:The representational theory of measurement provides a collectio n of results that specify the conditions under which an attribute admits o f numerical representation. The original architects of the theory interpre ted the formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspe cts of their representations are conventional. There have been a number of recent efforts to reinterpret the formalism to arrive at a more metaphysi cally robust account of physical quantities. In this paper we argue that t he conventional elements of the representations afforded by the representa tional theory of measurement require careful scrutiny as one moves toward such an interpretation. To illustrate why\, we show that there is a sense in which the very number system in which one represents a physical quantit y such as mass or length is conventional. We argue that this result does n ot undermine the project of reinterpreting the representational theory of measurement for metaphysical purposes in general\, but it does undermine a certain class of inferences about the nature of physical quantities that some have been tempted to draw.\n\n\nTALK LINK — Email for the passcode cr uzdavis umass.edu or jrc2266 columbia.edu DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230323T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230323T180000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Columbia [ZOOM] @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:The Conventionality of Real-Valued Quantities. Marissa Bennett (Tor onto) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/the-conventionality-of-r eal-valued-quantities-marissa-bennett-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe represent ational theory of measurement provides a collection of results that specif y the conditions under which an attribute admits of numerical representati on. The original architects of the theory interpreted the formalism operat ionally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representat ions are conventional. There have been a number of recent efforts to reint erpret the formalism to arrive at a more metaphysically robust account of physical quantities. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the representational theory of measure ment require careful scrutiny as one moves toward such an interpretation. To illustrate why\, we show that there is a sense in which the very number system in which one represents a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. We argue that this result does not undermine the project of reinterpreting the representational theory of measurement for metaphys ical purposes in general\, but it does undermine a certain class of infere nces about the nature of physical quantities that some have been tempted t o draw.
\nTALK
LINK — Email for the passcode cruzdavis <
at> umass.edu or jrc2266
We are excite d to announce the upcoming MAPS Symposium on the Philosophy of Quantum Mec hanics\, taking place at NYU on April 25th from 3pm-7pm. The event will fe ature talks from Eddy Chen\, Emily Adlam\, and Tim Maudlin. Further detail s can be found below.
\nTalks:
\nPlease note that while all ar e welcome to attend\, non-NYU attendees must RSVP by emailing Diego Arana (da689@rutgers.edu) and Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu) to en sure their names are added to the entry list for the NYU building. For any further information\, please contact us through the emails just provided.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:physics\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8005@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:NYU CONTACT: DESCRIPTION:Presented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science\nDirections: En ter the Philosophy building at 5 Washington Place\, and have a university ID and vaccination card ready. For any questions\, please contact Diego Ar ana (da689@rutgers.edu)\, Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu) and Jack Mikuszewski (jhm378@nyu.edu).\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230509T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230509T183000 GEO:+40.729457;-73.994348 LOCATION:202 NYU Philosophy Dept. @ 5 Washington Pl\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Why de Broglie-Bohm and only de Broglie-Bohm? Or\, Towards a Nosolo gy of Quantum Interpretations. Jean Bricmont (UCLouvain) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/why-de-broglie-bohm-and- only-de-broglie-bohm-or-towards-a-nosology-of-quantum-interpretations-jean -bricmont-uclouvain/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nPresented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science
\nDirections: Enter the Philosoph y building at 5 Washington Place\, and have a university ID and vaccinatio n card ready. For any questions\, please contact Diego Arana (da689@rutger s.edu)\, Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu) and Jack Mikuszewski (jhm378@nyu.edu).
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:physics\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8042@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:NYU CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/ DESCRIPTION:Metro Area Philosophers of Science is pleased to announce the f ollowing confirmed talks this semester:\nHeinrich Päs (TU Dortmund Univers ity)\n4:00 p.m. EST\, Sept 6th\nLocation: 6th-floor lounge\, Philosophy De partment\, NYU\, 5 Washington Place\nTitle: TBA\nEric Y Ling (University o f Copenhagen)\n4:00 p.m. EST\, Sept 26th *\nLocation: TBA\nTitle: Spacetim e extensions of the big bang\nLev Vaidman (Tel Aviv University)\nTitle: TB A\nFurther details to be announced.\nIsaac Willhelm (National University o f Singapore)\nTitle: TBA\nFurther details to be announced. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230906T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230906T180000 GEO:+40.729457;-73.994348 LOCATION:NYU room 6th floor lounge @ 5 Washington Pl\, New York\, NY 10003\ , USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Heinrich Päs (TU Dortmund University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/heinrich-pas-tu-dortmund -university/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
Metro Area Ph ilosophers of Science is pleased to announce the following confirmed talks this semester:
\nHeinrich Päs (TU Dortmund University)
\n4:00 p.m. EST\, Sept 6th
\nLocation: 6th-floor lounge\, P
hilosophy Department\, NYU\, 5 Washington Place
\nTitle: TBA
Eric Y Ling (University of Copenhagen)
\n4:00 p.m. E
ST\, Sept 26th *
\nLocation: TBA
\nTitle: Spacetime extensions o
f the big bang
Lev Vaidman (Tel Aviv University)<
br />\nTitle: TBA
\nFurther details to be announced.
Isaac Willhelm (National University of Singapore)
\nTitle: T
BA
\nFurther details to be announced.
In this paper \, I explore the role that metaphor plays in the development of new scient ific models. My goal is to illustrate metaphor’s fecundity in this regard\ , the way in which it extends our understanding in surprisingly diverse wa ys. As Mary Hesse put this point\, “it is precisely in its extension that the fruitfulness of the model may lie” (1980\, 114).
\n\n
The particular focus of my paper is on the history of what John Haugeland cal led mind design: the use of mechanical models to reverse-engineer how mind s work (1997\, 1). My history focuses on two such models: the clockwork mo del and the computer model. In each case\, I show how a metaphorical under standing of the model led to conceptual innovation in two distinct ways. F irst\, it provided an interpretive frame that guided new research by offer ing an abstract\, hypothesized structure to be later filled in by empirica l research (Camp 2020). Second\, it provided a concrete exemplar to contra st with human minds (Daston 1994). For instance\, while on the one hand De scartes invoked the clockwork model to explain how color vision works (Ada ms 2015)\, he also invoked it as a vivid illustration of how human reasoni ng does not work (Riskin 2016).
\n\n
It is this second source of conceptual innovation that is the real core of the paper\; it reveals what I call the dialectic of mind design. This dialectic is especially evi dent in our tendency to redefine what it is to be human in response to new technological developments. For instance\, it is evident when we take som ething that was previously assumed to be paradigmatic of mental acuity\, s uch as the ability to play chess\, and redefine it as something merely mec hanical (Ensmenger 2012). But it is equally well evident when we take some thing that was previously taken to be mechanical—such as color vision—and redefine it as paradigmatically mental (Chalmers 1997\; cf. Adams and Brow ning 2020). The concept of mindedness is\, in this sense\, a constantly mo ving goalpost that is perennially being redefined in response to new techn ological developments.
\nTickets: https: //event.newschool.edu/thedialecticofminddesign#rsvp.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:mind\,science X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/thedialecticofminddesign#rsvp END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8022@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T101051Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY CONTACT:http://bit.ly/cs-talks DESCRIPTION:ALL TALKS ON ZOOM\nSOME ALSO IN PERSON (SEE ROOMS BELOW)\nTalks organized andhosted by Ryan McElhaney\nTo get Zoom links\, email davidros enthal1@gmail.com\nSome—but not all—sessions are recorded for later access \n9/8: Martina Helina\nHistory and Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Cognitive Science\,\nUniversity of CambridgePhilosophy\n9/15: No talk—one -week break\n9/22: Janis Karan Hesse\nNeuroscience\, University of Califor nia at Berkeley\n9/29: Justin Halberda\nPsychological and Brain Sciences\, Johns Hopkins University\n10/6: Jakub Mihalik\nDepartment of Analytic Phi losophy\, Institute of Philosophy of the\nCzech Academy of Sciences in Pra gue\n10/13: Gregg Caruso\nPhilosophy\, SUNY Corning\, Northeastern Univers ity London\, and\nMacquarie University\n** HYBRID: Graduate Center Room 71 02 **\n10/20: Edouard Machery\nHistory and Philosophy of Science\, Univers ity of Pittsburgh\n** HYBRID: Graduate Center Room 7102 **\n10/27: Heather Browning\nPhilosophy\, University of Southampton\n11/3: Panagiota Theodon i\nPhilosophy\, University of Athens\n11/10: François Kammerer\nInstitute for Philosophy II of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum\n11/17: Jonathan Phillips \nCognitive Science\, Psychological and Brain Sciences\, and\nPhilosophy\, Dartmouth College\n11/124: No talk—Thanksgiving break\n12/1: Lua Koenig\n Neuroscience Institute\, NYU Langone Medical Center\n** HYBRID: Graduate C enter Room 7102 **\n\nThe CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker Series meets week ly at the CUNY Graduate Center\,\nFridays\, 1-3 pm—all on Zoom\, some hybr id. This file is at: http://bit.ly/cs-talks\nFor additional information e- mail David Rosenthal DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230908T130000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230908T150000 GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092 LOCATION:Zoom & CUNY Grad Center 7102 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230922T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230929T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231006T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231013T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231020T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231027T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231103T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231110T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231117T130000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231201T130000 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Cognitive Science Speaker Series URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/cognitive-science-speake r-series-20/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nThe controver sial issue of information transfer in quantum teleportation procedure is a nalyzed in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mech anics. In contrast to the claims of Deutsch & Hayden 2000\, it is argued t hat quantum information\, considered as a measurable property for an obser ver in a particular world\, is transferred in a nonlocal way in the telepo rtation process. This\, however\, does not lead to action at a distance on the level of the universe which includes all parallel worlds. Preprint: < a href='https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21447/'>https://philsci-archive.p itt.edu/21447/
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:physics\,science END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR