BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7739@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://rccs.rutgers.edu/component/jevents/icalrepeat.detail/2022/0 4/22/2230/54/fifth-rutgers-workshop-on-chinese-philosophy-in-person-live-s treaming-rsvp-required?Itemid=147 DESCRIPTION:Contact Nancy Rosario (nr531@religion.rutgers.edu)\n\nRSVP is r equired for both in-person and remote attendance. Click here to RSVP.\nRut gers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) was launched in 2012. It is des igned to build a bridge between Chinese philosophy and Western analytic ph ilosophy and to promote critical engagement and constructive dialogue betw een the two sides\, with the hope of bringing the study of Chinese philoso phy into the mainstream of philosophical discourse within the Western acad emy. It is run every other year\, usually in late spring. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220422 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220423 GEO:+40.496976;-74.446506 LOCATION:Zoom\, possibly in person @ 111 Somerset St\, New Brunswick\, NJ 0 8901\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rutgers-workshop-on-chin ese-philosophy/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nRSVP is requir ed for both in-person and remote attendance. Click here to RSVP.
\nRutgers Wo rkshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) was launched in 2012. It is d esigned to build a bridge between Chinese philosophy and Western analytic philosophy and to promote critical engagement and constructive dialogue be tween the two sides\, with the hope of bringing the study of Chinese philo sophy into the mainstream of philosophical discourse within the Western ac ademy. It is run every other year\, usually in late spring.
\nKeynote: Naom
i Zack (Lehman College\, CUNY)
\nOne of philosophy’s original questio
ns still plagues us: to what extent are beings the same and to what extent
do they differ? Arising in thinkers as diverse as Parmenides\, Aquinas\,
and De Beauvoir and in arenas from social and political philosophy to phen
omenology and metaphysics. This conference aims to gather graduate student
scholars from a variety of specializations to discuss their work on ident
ity and difference. Some of the many questions we may pursue together are
the following:
What constitutes identity and difference? What make s someone who they are? How do we understand ourselves to be alike enough to communicate\, yet different enough that we must work to understand anot her’s point of view? How do identity and difference shape belonging–within a community\, within a social institution\, within a political structure? Similarly\, how do differences among the members of a group enrich the id entity of that collective? How might overlapping identities of an individu al give rise to one’s sense of self? How does identity inform a given grou p’s philosophical thought? How might one form their identity and sense of self when\, as in the case of many marginalized groups/ minorities\, the “ self” is oppressed?
\nThese questions additionally motivate ontologi cal considerations. To what extent can we describe two objects that are in fact identical? What grants an object’s or a person’s identity over time: metaphysical characteristics\, temporal continuity\, or certain brain sta tes? Upon what aspects of an entity do we predicate differences? When are two things metaphysically or logically identical? Are mereological composi tes more than the sum of their parts? Are they identical to matter? To wha t extent do beings differ from Being? How might experiences or acts of rea son help ground an identity claim such as A=A?
\nOther questions bro adly related to “Identity and Difference” are also welcome.
\nPlease submit a 300-500 word abstract prepared for blind review to fordhamgradco nference@gmail.com in PDF format. In the body of the email\, please includ e:
\nSubmissions are due by Frid ay\, December 30\, 2022. After anonymous review\, applicants will be notified by Tuesday\, January 17\, 2023. Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes.
\nThe conference will take place in person on March 3-4\, 2023 on Fordham University’s Rose Hill campus located at 441 East Fo rdham Road\, Bronx\, NY 10458.
\nFor questions\, please contact the conference organizers at fordhamgradconference@gmail.com
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8001@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers CONTACT:https://rccs.rutgers.edu/component/jevents/icalrepeat.detail/2023/0 4/28/2376/54/sixth-rutgers-workshop-on-chinese-philosophy?Itemid=147 DESCRIPTION:Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) was launched in 2 012. It is designed to build a bridge between Chinese philosophy and Weste rn analytic philosophy and to promote critical engagement and constructive dialogue between the two sides\, with the hope to diversify the practice of philosophy by bringing the study of Chinese philosophy into the mainstr eam of philosophical discourse within the Western academy. It is run every other year\, usually in late spring.\nSixth RWCP\, “New Voices in Chinese Philosophy\,” will be held in person\, with live streaming through Zoom\, on Friday\, April 28\, 2023. Six junior scholars of Chinese philosophy\, representing new voices in the field\, will engage six more senior scholar s. This year’s workshop is co-sponsored by Rutgers Global\, Religion Depar tment\, Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion\, and Philosophy Dep artment. RSVP is required for attendance\, either in-person (limited to th e room capacity) or online. Click here to register.\nProgram\n\n\n\n8:20a. m. Breakfast\n8:50a.m. – 9:00a.m. Welcoming Remarks\nKaren Bennett\, Chair of Philosophy Department\, Rutgers University\n9:00a.m. – 10:00a.m. “Rela tional Normativity: Williams’s Thick Ethical Concepts in Confucian Ethical Communities”\nPresenter: Sai-Ying Ng (CUNY Graduate Center)\nCommentator: Alex Guerrero (Rutgers University)\nModerator: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan Un iversity)\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)\n10:00a.m. – 10:15a .m. tea break\n10:15a.m. – 11:15a.m. “Paradoxes in the Zhuangzi”\nPresente r: Chun-Man Kwong (University of Oxford)\nCommentator: Graham Priest (CUNY Graduate Center)\nModerator: Karen Bennett (Rutgers University)\nRapporte ur: Adrian Liu (Rutgers University)\n11:15a.m. – 11:30a.m. tea break\n11:3 0a.m. – 12:30p.m. “A Mohist Theory of Reference”\nPresenter: Susan Blake ( Skidmore College)\nCommentator: Jane Geaney (University of Richmond)\nMode rator: Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University)\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutger s University)\n\n\n\n12:30p.m. – 1:30p.m. Lunch (onsite)\n1:30p.m. – 2:30p .m. “Wealth\, Poverty\, and Living a Moral Life: Confucius and Mencius”\nP resenter: Frederick Choo (Rutgers University)\nCommentator: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)\nModerator: Tanja Sargent (Rutgers University)\nRapp orteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)\n2:30p.m. – 2:45p.m. tea break\n2: 45p.m. – 3:45p.m. “Gratitude and Debt in Western and Confucian Ethics”\nPr esenter: Choo Lok-Chui (Nanyang Technological University)\nCommentator: Fr ances Kamm (Rutgers University)\nModerator: Hagop Sarkissian (CUNY Baruch College)\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)\n3:45p.m. – 4:00p.m. tea break\n4:00p.m. – 5:00p.m. “‘Flying by Not Having Wings’ — in and bey ond the Zhuangzi”\nPresenter: L. K. Gustin Law (University of Chicago)\nCo mmentator: Lincoln Rathnam (Duke Kunshan University)\nModerator: George Ts ai (University of Hawaii at Manoa)\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers Univer sity)\n\n\n\nTickets: https://rutgers.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_yyYQkq3M RfClXZVmGF8Crg?_x_zm_rtaid=QuxN4SzER_KWi_wNN1yMvw.1682175640487.e3662c4136 09a827351ca808d375a53e&_x_zm_rhtaid=274#/registration. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230428 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230429 GEO:+40.501353;-74.449403 LOCATION:Hageman Hall Conference Room @ 35 Seminary Pl\, New Brunswick\, NJ 08901\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Sixth Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/sixth-rutgers-workshop-o n-chinese-philosophy/ X-COST-TYPE:external X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nRutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) was la unched in 2012. It is designed to build a bridge between Chinese philosoph y and Western analytic philosophy and to promote critical engagement and c onstructive dialogue between the two sides\, with the hope to diversify th e practice of philosophy by bringing the study of Chinese philosophy into the mainstream of philosophical discourse within the Western academy. It i s run every other year\, usually in late spring.
\nSixth RWCP\, “
8:20a.m. Breakfast
\n8:50a.m. – 9:00a.
m. Welcoming Remarks
\nKaren Bennett\, Chair of Phil
osophy Department\, Rutgers University
9:00a.m. – 10:00a.m.
\nPresenter: Sai-Ying Ng (CUNY Graduate
Center)
\nCommentator: Alex Guerrero (Rutgers University)
\nMod
erator: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh
(Rutgers University)
10:00a.m. – 10:15a.m. tea break
\n10:15
a.m. – 11:15a.m. “Paradoxes in the Zhuangzi”
\nPresenter: Chun-Man Kwong (University of Oxford)
\nCommentator: G
raham Priest (CUNY Graduate Center)
\nModerator: Karen Bennett (Rutge
rs University)
\nRapporteur: Adrian Liu (Rutgers University)
11:15a.m. – 11:30a.m. tea break
\n11:30a.m. – 12:30p.m. “A M
ohist Theory of Reference”
\nPresenter: Susan Blake (Skidmor
e College)
\nCommentator: Jane Geaney (University of Richmond)
\nModerator: Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University)
\nRapporteur: Esther
Goh (Rutgers University)
12:30p.m. – 1:30p.m. Lunch (onsite)
\n1:30p.m. – 2:30p.m. “Wealth\, Poverty\, and Li
ving a Moral Life: Confucius and Mencius”
\nPresenter: Frede
rick Choo (Rutgers University)
\nCommentator: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan
University)
\nModerator: Tanja Sargent (Rutgers University)
\nR
apporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
2:30p.m. – 2:45p.m. tea break
\n2:45p.m. – 3:45p.m. “Gratitude and Debt in Western
and Confucian Ethics”
\nPresenter: Choo Lok-Chui (Nanyang Te
chnological University)
\nCommentator: Frances Kamm (Rutgers Universi
ty)
\nModerator: Hagop Sarkissian (CUNY Baruch College)
\nRappor
teur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
3:45p.m. – 4:00p.m. tea brea k
\n4:00p.m. – 5:00p.m. “‘Flying by Not Having Wings’ — in a
nd beyond the Zhuangzi”
\nPresenter: L. K. Gustin L
aw (University of Chicago)
\nCommentator: Lincoln Rathnam (Duke Kunsh
an University)
\nModerator: George Tsai (University of Hawaii at Mano
a)
\nRapporteur: Esther Goh (Rutgers University)
riday\, No vember 10
\n9:30–9:55 Check–in and Coffee
\n9:55 Welcome
\n10:00–12:00 Adam Smith
\nSpeaker: R yan Patrick Hanley (Boston College)
\nCommentator: Samuel Fleischack er (University of Illinois Chicago)
\n12:00–2:00 Lunch Break
\n2:00–4:00 Immanuel Kant
\nSpeaker: Marcia Baron (Indian a University Bloomington)
\nCommentator: Kyla Ebels–Duggan (Northwes tern University)
\n4:00–4:30 Coffee Break
\n4:30–6:30 German Romanticism
\nSpeaker: Frederick Beiser (Syracuse Unive rsity)
\nCommentator: Owen Ware (University of Toronto)
\n6:30 –7:30 Reception
\nSaturday\, November 11
\n9:30– 10:00 Check–in and Coffee
\n10:00–12:00 Friedrich Nietzsche< /p>\n
Speaker: Andrew Huddleston (University of Warwick)
\nComment ator: Claire Kirwin (Northwestern University)
\n12:00–2:00 Lunc h Break
\n2:00–4:00 Simone De Beauvoir
\nSpeaker: Michelle Kosch (Cornell University)
\nCommentator: Susan J. Brison (Dartmouth University)
\n4:00–4:30 Coffee Break
\n4:30–6:30 Co ntemporary
\nSpeaker: Simon May (King’s College London)
\nComm entator: Alecxander Nehamas (Princeton University)
\n6:30–7:30 Reception
\nIdeas about “ identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media\, in higher educa tion\, in political disputations\, and in critical theories of society. C laims about “identity” and “difference” can readily be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of race\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, political affiliation\, abi lity and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc. But what exactly do w e mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”? And if we achieve gre ater clarity about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “i dentity” and “difference\,” what difference would that make?
\nA ser ious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expected ly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse about what is “iden tical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”? Is discourse abou t what is “different” reducible to discourse about what is “other”? Can s omething be “the same” without being “identical\,” and can something be “o ther” without being “different”? When we speak about “being\,” does our s peaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically) \, or instead does our speaking about being always have the same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly o n the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the t hing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understanding of identity de pend on some reference to what is different? Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity? What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\, or some combinat ion of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences betw een things without discerning intelligible differences\, or does the indis cernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real diffe rences at all but rather an identity? Does difference depend on negation\ , or can one assert that there is difference without having to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an ontological differ ence\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences t o exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a diff erence between “being” and “nothing”)?
\nIn spite of the virtual ubi quity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a dearth of d iscourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “ident ity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 2024 (“Ident ity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\, the Metap hysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking about the met aphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such deeper think ing will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practice.
\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged\, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note: wh en selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Program Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion amo ng others.
\n****************************************
\nAbstracts of approximately 500 words sh ould be submitted electronically by September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@me taphysicalsociety.org.
\nAristotle Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaphysical Society should sub mit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D.. Those wis hing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize should express this wish cle arly in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitte d for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word l imit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not t o footnotes or other supporting material. The Aristotle Prize carries a c ash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the cos ts associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Aristo tle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nPlato Prize: Tho se wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphysical Societ y should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for t he Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. degree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who hold a Ph. D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Those wishing t o be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish clearly in th e email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitted for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limit applies t o the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\ , inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full paper s and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@meta physicalsociety.org.
\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous support of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot F und for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate st udents whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with all relevant expense-receipts).
\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Pla to Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on thei r submission no later than December 1\, 2023.
\n\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm.< /p> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity\,metaphysics X-COST:$70-120 X-TICKETS-URL:https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7682@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Da o (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Ha n Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an app earance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, laws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an at tempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments s ee for the fa\, how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments \, in classical Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are incl uded here as a PDF attachment.\n \nDATE: October 22\, 2021\nTIME: 7:00-8:3 0 pm\n \nThis seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. The a ttached file is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself wit h the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with the program’s ba sic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting c an start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your name in the chat . Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeti ng. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virt ual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find ste p-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.\nLead Pre senter: Eirik Lang Harris\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State U niversity)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysb urg College)\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are on ly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Givi ng to Columbia. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Discussion of Fa (法) in the Shenzi: Eirik Lang Harris URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-discussion-of-fa-%e6%b 3%95-in-the-shenzi-eirik-lang-harris/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nABS TRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, la ws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments see for the fa\ , how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments\, in classica l Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are included here as a PDF attachment.
\n\n
DATE: October 22\, 2021
\nTIME: 7:00-8:30 pm
\n\n
This seminar w ill take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Belo w you will find the link to join the meeting. The attached file is an inst ruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addit ion to familiarizing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there a re two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you w ill need to sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we wil l have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Pa rticipants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nLead Presenter : Ei rik Lang Harris
\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State University)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysburg College)
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are o nly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7751@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://www.bklynlibrary.org/calendar/philosophy-library-virtual-20 220322 DESCRIPTION:How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical In dian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entertainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In th is talk\, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition . I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by t urning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowledge and l uck.\nJonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work dr aws on a variety of philosophical traditions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind\, metaphysics and epistemology. His books include Attention\, Not Self (2017)\, a study of early Buddhist theories of attent ion\; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012)\, an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self\; Virtual Subjects\, Fugitive Selves (2020)\, a n analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self\; and Inwardness: An Ou tsiders’ Guide (2021)\, a review of the concept of inwardness in literatur e\, film\, poetry\, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowsh ip of the British Academy in 2015\, and won the Infosys Prize in the Human ities the same year\, the only philosopher to do so.\n\n\nThis series is c urated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto) Can theater teach us about what it’s lik e to be someone else? URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/jonardon-ganeri-toronto- can-theater-teach-us-about-what-its-like-to-be-someone-else/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nHow ca n we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entert ainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In this talk\, I’ll ex plore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine t he reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by turning to contemp orary studies of the relationship between knowledge and luck.
\nThis series is curated and co-presented by Br ooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov.
\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\n\n
Presents:
Lead Presenter : Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Uni versity)
\nABSTRAC
T: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cultural methodo
logy blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and M
arx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its role in Li’s t
hought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition
influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence o
f ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined
DATE: March 25\, 2022
\n< p class='gmail-p1'>TIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST< /span>\nThis seminar will t ake place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiariz e yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with th e program’s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your na me in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University S eminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will r aise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your h and.
\nNote Regar ding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Co lumbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars parti cipants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing accommodations or who h ave questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability S ervices at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, includi ng sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for acc ommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar partici pants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: http s://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7863@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://philosophy.columbia.edu/content/colloquium-lectures-2022-20 23 DESCRIPTION:Thursday\, September 29th\, 2022\nChristina Van Dyke (Barnard C ollege)\nTitle “I feel it in my fingers\, I feel it in my toes: Imaginativ e Meditation and Experience of Love in Medieval Contemplative Philosophy” \n4:10-6:00 PM\n716 Philosophy Hall DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220929T161000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220929T180000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:716 Philosophy Hall @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:I feel it in my fingers\, I feel it in my toes: Imaginative Meditat ion and Experience of Love in Medieval Contemplative Philosophy. Christina Van Dyke\, Barnard URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/i-feel-it-in-my-fingers- i-feel-it-in-my-toes-imaginative-meditation-and-experience-of-love-in-medi eval-contemplative-philosophy-christina-van-dyke-barnard/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nThursday\, Se
ptember 29th\, 2022
\nChristina Van Dyke (Barnard College)
\nTit
le “I feel it in my fingers\, I feel it in my toes: Imaginative Meditation
and Experience of Love in Medieval Contemplative Philosophy”
\n4:10-
6:00 PM
\n716 Philosophy Hall
Tuesday\, Feb. 14 of course! 4pm\, McShane Center 311
\n
A fun student-faculty roundtable disc ussion on topics related to love in all of its fabulous variety: erotic lo ve\, unrequited love\, love and justice\, love of friends\, love of the D ivine\, sanctioned and unsanctioned love\, personal and political love\, a nd so much more! What insights can we\, along with some of our favorite ar tists and thinkers\, offer on love? Come for a roundtable where a small group of faculty and students will jump off with brief prepared remarks\, followed by a discussion\, food\, and fun!
\nRSVP here a>
\nTickets: http://www.fordhamphilosophy.org/events/2023/ 2/14/what-is-love-thinking-across-the-humanities-on-valentiness-day. p> X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:love X-TICKETS-URL:http://www.fordhamphilosophy.org/events/2023/2/14/what-is-lov e-thinking-across-the-humanities-on-valentiness-day END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7977@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studie s of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However \, conceptual misalignment is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contempora ry discussions. Specifically\, conceptual misalignment refers to the follo wing: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordi nation of concepts is formed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophicall y meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterp art misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to dete ct when it comes to emotion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phen omenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept of e motion in Chinese philosophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misali gnment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philosophy . Moreover\, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T193000 GEO:+40.807527;-73.960864 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Columbia @ 1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Conceptual Misalignment to Conceptual Engineering: A Case Stud y on Emotion from Chinese Philosophy. Wenqing Zhao (Whitman) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/from-conceptual-misalign ment-to-conceptual-engineering-a-case-study-on-emotion-from-chinese-philos ophy-wenqing-zhao-whitman/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nConceptual mi salignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studies of Non-Western philoso phy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However\, conceptual misalignme nt is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP mate rials need to overcome to contribute to contemporary discussions. Specific ally\, conceptual misalignment refers to the following: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordination of concepts is fo rmed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophically meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterpart misalign. This misal ignment is particularly intricate and hard to detect when it comes to emot ion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phenomenal and/or intentiona l features. Through investigating the concept of emotion in Chinese philos ophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misalignment as a method of cr oss-cultural comparative and history of philosophy. Moreover\, I argue tha t conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary concep tual engineering and amelioration projects.
\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Ple ase contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,emotion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7931@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://philosophy.columbia.edu/content/colloquium-lectures-2022-20 23 DESCRIPTION:The Avoidance of Intimacy: A Reorientation in the Moral Philoso phy of Love\nPresented by Columbia University Dept. of Philosophy DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230413T161000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230413T180000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Columbia U\, Philosophy 716 @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:The Avoidance of Intimacy: A Reorientation in the Moral Philosophy of Love. Vida Yao (Rice University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/vida-yao-rice-university / X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
The Avoidance of Intimacy: A Reorientation in the Moral Philosophy of Love
\nPres ented by Columbia University Dept. of Philosophy
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:love END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240319T054150Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but ha s also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. T he Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of sha me can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confuci an texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoi st\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely th e focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debat e of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and res tores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of what constit utes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as insults. Mo re importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate \, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the C onfucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual ’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimu li while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s mora l cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the funct ion of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an imp ortant philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.\n\n\n\n \nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n\n\n\n\nWe hope you’ve had restful and productive summers\, and we look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meetings. Below is the list of our scheduled speakers. Please save these dates!\n\nSeptember 15 – Jing Hu (Concordia)\nOctober 1 3 – Bill Waldron (Middlebury)\nOctober 27 – David Wong (Duke)\nDecember 1 – Stephen Angle (Wesleyan)\n\nFurther details will be circulated in due co urse. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716 @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:War and Shame –A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults betw een the Confucians and their Interlocutors. Jing Hu (Concordia University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/war-and-shame-a-debate-o n-the-appropriate-response-to-insults-between-the-confucians-and-their-int erlocutors-jing-hu-concordia-university/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat i s an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently prese nted as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confucian texts. Meanwhi le\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoist\, legalist\, o r much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attent ion. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and restores the histori cal intellectual discourse over the topic of what constitutes an appropria te response to humiliating situations such as insults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate\, namely how Son gzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the Confucian doctrine : The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtu es can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimuli while also mai ntaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external s timuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an important philosophi cal concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)
\n
The first sec tion of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about t he existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition conc entrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dha rmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second sectio n looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as mor e difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and consid ers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Rutgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Ha ll will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have t his card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearb y to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted thr ough Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a n earby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further inf ormation.
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\n