BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//208.94.116.123//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7955@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/curiosity-creativity- and-complexity DESCRIPTION:How does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisio ns when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?\nThe conference showcases cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscie nce and Psychology (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exploration\, decision-making\, information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artificial intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) an d Economics (decision making and information demand). Alongside formal pre sentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions among facult y\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presenta tions.\nSubmissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due Feb ruary 15\, 2023. Please visit the call for submissions for complete requir ements.\nEvent Information\nFree and open to the public. Registration is r equired and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbi a’s COVID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email even ts@zi.columbia.edu with any questions. DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230523 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230526 GEO:+40.816847;-73.957958 LOCATION:Jerome L. Greene Science Center (9th Floor Lecture Hall) @ 3227 Br oadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Curiosity\, Creativity and Complexity Conference URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/curiosity-creativity-and -complexity-conference/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nHow does the brain cope with Complexity? How do we make decisions when confronted with practically infinite streams of information?
\nThe conference showca ses cutting edge research on these questions in Neuroscience and Psycholog y (neural mechanisms of cognitive control\, exploration\, decision-making\ , information demand\, memory and creativity)\, Computer Science (artifici al intelligence of curiosity and intrinsic motivation) and Economics (deci sion making and information demand). Alongside formal presentations\, the conference will encourage ample interactions among faculty\, students and postdocs through informal discussions and poster presentations.
\nSu bmissions for poster presentations and travel awards are due February 15\, 2023. Please visit the call fo r submissions for complete requirements.
\nFree and open to the public. Registration is required and will open shortly. All in-person attendees must follow Columbia’s COV ID-19 policies. Visitors will be asked to provide proof of COVID-19 va ccination. Online attendees will receive a Zoom link. Please email events@zi.columbia.edu with any quest ions.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:artificial intelligence\,decision theory\,mind\,psych ology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7679@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://poprocksworkshop.wixsite.com/nycphilosophy DESCRIPTION:A number of authors have pointed out that the standard argument s for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se\, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the subj ect need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in som e state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two stat es to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents\, and so there is no substan tive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I pres ent evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but dif fer in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\, a nd endogenous\, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities f or how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship betwe en cognition and perception. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T160000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T180000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Rebecca Keller – (Endogenous) Perceptual States are Conceptual @ Po PRocks URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/rebecca-keller-endogenou s-perceptual-states-are-conceptual-poprocks/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nA number of a uthors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s havin g nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per s e\, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e.\, whether the subject need or need not pos sess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have ar gued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have differ ent sorts of contents\, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here\, I present evidence for states that do\, in fact\, share the same content but differ in the required conc eptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states\, and endogenous\, voluntar ily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—vo luntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concep t-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and percept ion.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:psychology END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7682@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Da o (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Ha n Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an app earance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, laws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an at tempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments s ee for the fa\, how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments \, in classical Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are incl uded here as a PDF attachment.\n \nDATE: October 22\, 2021\nTIME: 7:00-8:3 0 pm\n \nThis seminar will take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. The a ttached file is an instruction manual to help you familiarize yourself wit h the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with the program’s ba sic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting c an start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your name in the chat . Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeti ng. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virt ual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find ste p-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.\nLead Pre senter: Eirik Lang Harris\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State U niversity)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysb urg College)\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are on ly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Givi ng to Columbia. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20211022T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Discussion of Fa (法) in the Shenzi: Eirik Lang Harris URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-discussion-of-fa-%e6%b 3%95-in-the-shenzi-eirik-lang-harris/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nABS TRACT: The Shenzi Fragments\, numbering a mere 3\,000 or so characters in length\, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi)\, he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models\, standards\, la ws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments see for the fa\ , how they are to be determined\, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong\, stable\, and flourishing state. The fragments\, in classica l Chinese with English translations (Harris 2016)\, are included here as a PDF attachment.
\n\n
DATE: October 22\, 2021
\nTIME: 7:00-8:30 pm
\n\n
This seminar w ill take place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Belo w you will find the link to join the meeting. The attached file is an inst ruction manual to help you familiarize yourself with the program. In addit ion to familiarizing yourself with the program’s basic functions\, there a re two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you w ill need to sign in by typing your name in the chat. Subsequently\, we wil l have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University Seminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will raise your virtual Zoom hand in the Pa rticipants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your hand.
\nLead Presenter : Ei rik Lang Harris
\nDiscussants: Alejandro Bárcenas (Texas State University)\, Yutang Jin (Princeton University)\, Mercedes Valmisa (Gettysburg College)
\nNote Regarding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are o nly accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7751@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://www.bklynlibrary.org/calendar/philosophy-library-virtual-20 220322 DESCRIPTION:How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical In dian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entertainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In th is talk\, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition . I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by t urning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowledge and l uck.\nJonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work dr aws on a variety of philosophical traditions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind\, metaphysics and epistemology. His books include Attention\, Not Self (2017)\, a study of early Buddhist theories of attent ion\; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012)\, an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self\; Virtual Subjects\, Fugitive Selves (2020)\, a n analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self\; and Inwardness: An Ou tsiders’ Guide (2021)\, a review of the concept of inwardness in literatur e\, film\, poetry\, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowsh ip of the British Academy in 2015\, and won the Infosys Prize in the Human ities the same year\, the only philosopher to do so.\n\n\nThis series is c urated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220322T203000 GEO:+40.712775;-74.005973 LOCATION:Zoom @ New York\, NY\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto) Can theater teach us about what it’s lik e to be someone else? URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/jonardon-ganeri-toronto- can-theater-teach-us-about-what-its-like-to-be-someone-else/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nHow ca n we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater\, arguing that it’s not just a form of entert ainment\, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In this talk\, I’ll ex plore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine t he reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound\, and that we can see why by turning to contemp orary studies of the relationship between knowledge and luck.
\nThis series is curated and co-presented by Br ooklyn Public Philosophers\, aka Ian Olasov.
\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\n\n
Presents:
Lead Presenter : Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nDiscussants: Robert A. Carleo III (East China Normal University)\, Emma Buchtel (Hong Kong Education Uni versity)
\nABSTRAC
T: Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou’s cross-cultural methodo
logy blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and M
arx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its role in Li’s t
hought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition
influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence o
f ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism\, as outlined
DATE: March 25\, 2022
\n< p class='gmail-p1'>TIME: 6:30 – 8:00 pm EST< /span>\nThis seminar will t ake place via Zoom (please scroll down for the full invitation). Below you will find the link to join the meeting. Here is an instruction manual to help you familiariz e yourself with the program. In addition to familiarizing yourself with th e program’s basic functions\, there are two things we ask you to do before the meeting can start. First\, you will need to sign in by typing your na me in the chat. Subsequently\, we will have to agree on the privacy policy for the meeting. The privacy policy provided by the Columbia University S eminars Office will be read aloud. To indicate your agreement\, you will r aise your virtual Zoom hand in the Participants panel. In the manual\, you will find step-by-step instructions of how to sign in and to raise your h and.
\nNote Regar ding Donations: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Co lumbia.
\n\n
Accessibility Statement: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The University Seminars parti cipants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing accommodations or who h ave questions about physical access may contact the Office of Disability S ervices at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, includi ng sign-language interpreters\, are available on request. Requests for acc ommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar partici pants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: http s://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,Confucianism END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7711@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent CONTACT:https://bkpp.tumblr.com/ DESCRIPTION:Brooklyn Public Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area to discuss their work with a general audience\, hos ted by the Brooklyn Public Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophical questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space where Brooklynites can reason together about the phi losophical questions that matter to them.\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and last name at gmail.com. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220422T193000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220422T204500 GEO:+40.672511;-73.9682 LOCATION:Info Commons Lab\, Brookly Public Library @ 10 Grand Army Plaza\, Brooklyn\, NY 11238\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Justin Garson: On biological function and mental illness URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/justin-garson-on-biologi cal-function-and-mental-illness/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nBrooklyn Publ ic Philosophers is a forum for philosophers in the greater Brooklyn area t o discuss their work with a general audience\, hosted by the Brooklyn Publ ic Library. Its goal is to raise awareness of the best work on philosophic al questions of interest to Brooklynites\, and to provide a civil space wh ere Brooklynites can reason together about the philosophical questions tha t matter to them.
\nIf you’re interested in finding out more\, or if you’d like to give a talk\, please e-mail Ian Olasov at his first and las t name at gmail.com.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:biology\,mind\,psychology\,science END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7774@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nWelcomes you t o an IN-PERSON meeting:\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)\n« A Case ag ainst Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »\nWith responses fr om Alexander Englert (Princeton University)\nABSTRACT: There’s a common li ne of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious expe rience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhya mika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century ) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysical ly impossible. Lacking any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of co nscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I wil l present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” agains t mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between conscious ness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda f or centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also que stions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220513T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. All ison Aitken\, Columbia URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/a-case-against-simple-mi ndedness-srigupta-on-mental-mereology-allison-aitken-columbia/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nTHE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSO PHY
\nWelcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:
\nAllison Aitken (Columbia University)
\n« A Case against Simple-mindedn ess: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »
\nWith responses from Alexander Englert (Princet
on University)
ABST RACT: There’s a common line of reasoning whi ch supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary\, Mādhyamika Buddhist philo sophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any ki nd of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lack ing any unifying principle\, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk\, I will present an analys is of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” against mental simples an d show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intent ional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of int ra-Buddhist debate on the topic\, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience argua bly owes responses.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7963@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:The COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us.\nWith re sponses from Karsten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY) \nPresented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is re quired for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230303T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Philosophy of Crisis and a Question of Solidarity. Jin Y. Park (Ame rican) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/philosophy-of-crisis-and -a-question-of-solidarity-jin-y-park-american/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is said to be a once-in-a-century inciden t\, and it brought to us a sense of crisis at various levels. What is a cr isis\, though? Can any unnerving moment or period be called a crisis\, or are there different dimensions of a crisis to which we need to be attentiv e? Is solidarity possible after experiencing a crisis like Covid-19? Can B uddhism make any contribution to facilitating solidarity? This presentatio n explores the meaning and nature of a crisis and our responses to it by d rawing on modern Korean political thinker Pak Ch’iu’s (1909–1949) analysis of crisis and feminist-Buddhist thinker Kim Iryŏp’s (1896–1971) Buddhist philosophy. By doing so\, this presentation considers what social\, politi cal\, existential\, and even religious meaning we can draw from our experi ence of crises\, and what questions these insights present to us. p>\n
With responses from Kars ten Struhl (John Jay College of Criminal Justice\, CUNY)
\n< p class='gmail-p2'>Presented by THE COLUMBIA SOC IETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY\nRSVP is required for dinner. If you would like to participate in our dinner\, a $30 fee is required. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@colu mbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,existentialism\,Korean\,politi cal\,religion\,social END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7977@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studie s of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However \, conceptual misalignment is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contempora ry discussions. Specifically\, conceptual misalignment refers to the follo wing: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordi nation of concepts is formed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophicall y meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterp art misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to dete ct when it comes to emotion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phen omenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept of e motion in Chinese philosophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misali gnment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philosophy . Moreover\, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230317T193000 GEO:+40.807527;-73.960864 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Columbia @ 1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:From Conceptual Misalignment to Conceptual Engineering: A Case Stud y on Emotion from Chinese Philosophy. Wenqing Zhao (Whitman) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/from-conceptual-misalign ment-to-conceptual-engineering-a-case-study-on-emotion-from-chinese-philos ophy-wenqing-zhao-whitman/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nConceptual mi salignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studies of Non-Western philoso phy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However\, conceptual misalignme nt is often undetected\, unsuspected\, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP mate rials need to overcome to contribute to contemporary discussions. Specific ally\, conceptual misalignment refers to the following: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials\, a linguistic coordination of concepts is fo rmed between the speaker\, i.e.\, NW&HP\, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However\, in philosophically meaningful ways\, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterpart misalign. This misal ignment is particularly intricate and hard to detect when it comes to emot ion concepts\, as they are thought to involve phenomenal and/or intentiona l features. Through investigating the concept of emotion in Chinese philos ophy\, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misalignment as a method of cr oss-cultural comparative and history of philosophy. Moreover\, I argue tha t conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary concep tual engineering and amelioration projects.
\nWith responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island\, CUNY)
\nRSVP is r equired for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Ple ase contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Chinese\,comparative\,emotion END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-7978@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epist emology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions o f knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological kin d. In this talk\, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.\nWith responses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@ columbia.edu for further information.\n DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230324T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 10027 \, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Knowledge. Nilanjan Das (U Toront o) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/srihar%e1%b9%a3a-on-the- indefinability-of-knowledge-nilanjan-das-u-toronto/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
In Sanskrit epistemology\, philosophers are preoccupied with th e notion of pramā. A pramā\, roughly\, is a mental event of learning or kn owledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Co nfection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya)\, the 12th century philosoph er and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any sat isfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the no tion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such ant i-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is mo tivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epist emology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other n on-factive mental states and events. On this view\, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event\, we don’t init ially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event\, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) n ecessary for it to count as a knowledge-event\; rather\, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly\, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epistemology should give us re ason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are re liably tracking any sui generis psychological kind. In this talk\, I recon struct Śrīharṣa’s position.
\nWith res ponses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby resta urant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information .
\n\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,epistemology\,Indian END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8003@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:When someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of th at state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to an swering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a con straint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusion s it might be used to establish. Here I examine different candidate direc tions of explanation between consciousness and inner awareness. I interpr et the metaphor of consciousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use th e metaphor to distinguish between his view and contemporary higher-order t heories of consciousness. I then turn to explain why the memory argument fails. The first main problem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contemporar y defenders\, there is no good way to use the argument to reach a conclusi on about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the propos ed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology.\nWith responses fro m Lu Teng (NYU Shanghai) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T193000 GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136 LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100 27\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Speak\, Memory: Dignāga\, Consciousness\, and Awareness. Nicholas S ilins (Cornell) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/speak-memory-dignaga-con sciousness-and-awareness-nicholas-silins-cornell/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n
When someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of that state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I be gin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to es tablish. Here I examine different candidate directions of explanation bet ween consciousness and inner awareness. I interpret the metaphor of consc iousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use the metaphor to distinguis h between his view and contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness . I then turn to explain why the memory argument fails. The first main p roblem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contemporary defenders\, there is n o good way to use the argument to reach a conclusion about all conscious s tates. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology.
\nWith responses from Lu Teng (NYU Sh anghai)
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,consciousness\,mind END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8044@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:http://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philoso phy/ DESCRIPTION:What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but ha s also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. T he Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of sha me can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confuci an texts. Meanwhile\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoi st\, legalist\, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely th e focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debat e of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and res tores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of what constit utes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as insults. Mo re importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate \, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the C onfucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual ’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimu li while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s mora l cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the funct ion of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an imp ortant philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.\n\n\n\n \nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)\n\n\n\n\n\nWe hope you’ve had restful and productive summers\, and we look forward to seeing you at our upcoming meetings. Below is the list of our scheduled speakers. Please save these dates!\n\nSeptember 15 – Jing Hu (Concordia)\nOctober 1 3 – Bill Waldron (Middlebury)\nOctober 27 – David Wong (Duke)\nDecember 1 – Stephen Angle (Wesleyan)\n\nFurther details will be circulated in due co urse. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230915T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716 @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10 027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:War and Shame –A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults betw een the Confucians and their Interlocutors. Jing Hu (Concordia University) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/war-and-shame-a-debate-o n-the-appropriate-response-to-insults-between-the-confucians-and-their-int erlocutors-jing-hu-concordia-university/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nWhat i s an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently prese nted as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confucian texts. Meanwhi le\, the views of their rival thinkers\, such as the Daoist\, legalist\, o r much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE)\, are rarely the focus of attent ion. This paper brings Songzi\, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers\, into the picture and restores the histori cal intellectual discourse over the topic of what constitutes an appropria te response to humiliating situations such as insults. More importantly\, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate\, namely how Son gzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the Confucian doctrine : The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtu es can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimuli while also mai ntaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move\, I argue\, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external s timuli in inducing negative emotions\, thus making an important philosophi cal concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Nalei Chen (New York University)
\n
ABSTRACT: Yogācāra Bud dhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we co llectively\, yet mostly unconsciously\, construct our shared social realit ies\, our cultures. These “worlds” are supported by cognitive processes in formed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness\, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna). Through development an d socialization\, we come to identify with these cultural norms\, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover\, and in agreement with cognitiv e scientists\, Yogācārins argue that humans have developed to be “innate e ssentialists\,” so that we imagine that our constructed social and cultura l identities have their own essential\, intrinsic characteristics\, set ap art from all others\, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie c onflicts between groups. We can counteract these harmful patterns\, Yogācā rins say\, by analyzing how our social and cultural “realities” are collec tively constructed\, and by showing how—through logical\, psychological\, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our unreflective\, knee-jerk rea ction to different peoples and cultures\, and thereby foster more toleranc e\, empathy and understanding for all beings. In sum\, Yogācāra Buddhism o ffers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the origins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them\, rooted in ancient traditions yet rele vant to contemporary issues.
\nWith responses from Jonathan Go ld (Princeton University)
\nDATE: October 13th\, 2023
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall \, Room 716\, Columbia University
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Katja Vogt (Columbia University)
\n
< b>SPECIAL NOTE FOR DINNER ON 12/1: For this event\, the Neo-Confucian Seminar and our Comparative Philosophy Seminar will be going to dinner tog ether. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information. R SVPs are limited for this event.
\nNeo Confucian Studies seminar: I hope this email finds you well! Our next session of the seminar will conve ne on Friday 12/1 from 3:30-5:30 pm in the Heyman Center on Campus. The He yman Center is also a dormitory. The guards at its entrance will have a li st of all our attendees and will let you in based on that list\, no Green Pass required. (Green Passes are Columbia’s system for proving that you’re up-to-date on your vaccinations and boosters.) Our guest speaker will be Professor Dongxian Jiang of Fordham University. Professor Jiang will prese nt his draft “Political Thinking in a Classless Society” attached. Please ask Dongxian Jiang directly before you cite or share his draft. To be on t he list\, please RSVP to me at wk2363@columbia.edu before 11/27.
\nThe first sec tion of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about t he existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition conc entrated on is Nyāya\, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dha rmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second sectio n looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as mor e difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson\, relates it to the Buddhist view\, and consid ers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments.
\nWith responses from Martin Lin (Rutgers University)
\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Ha ll will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have t his card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearb y to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONATIONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted thr ough Columbia University’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a n earby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further inf ormation.
\nComparative Philosophy Seminar:
\nHow does the imagination change us ? Why should picturing ourselves a certain way have any real effect on wha t we are? These questions are central to debates in Buddhist tantric liter ature regarding the generation stage (utpattikrama)\, wherein pract itioners visualize themselves as buddhas ensconsed in magnificent mandala- palaces. For some\, this practice is what sets Buddhist tantra apart: thro ugh this “yoga of the imagination\,” as David Shulman puts it\, a practiti oner can achieve buddhahood in a single lifetime. And yet\, as the Buddhis t tantric author Indrabhūti (8th century) argues\, a pauper who imagines h imself to be a king does not thereby become one—so\, in the same way\, pra ctitioners who visualize themselves as buddhas will not thereby become bud dhas. The mental imagery (ākāra) involved in this practice is just so much unreal fabrication. Why should it have real transformative effects ? I’ll consider here how these debates played out in Sanskrit Buddhist tan tric texts from the 10th–11th centuries. I’ll focus on early authors in th e Kālacakra tradition\, who upheld Indrabhūti’s critique of the generation stage\, and authors like Ratnākaraśānti\, Vāgīśvarakīrti\, and Advayavajr a (aka Maitrīpa)\, who each in their own way critiqued mental imagery yet defended the importance and effectiveness of generation-stage practice. In the first part of the paper\, I’ll consider arguments against mental imag ery as these appear in generation-stage practice texts and the early Kālac akra tradition. In the second part\, I’ll turn to why we might think unrea l mental imagery can nevertheless have real transformative effects\, payin g special attention to the ways Buddhist tantric authors writing in Sanskr it take up ideas from the tradition of dramatic theory (nāṭyaśastra ) and Sanskrit culture more broadly.
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nWith responses from Thoma s Yarnall (Columbia University)
\nDATE: February 2nd\, 2024
\nTIME: 5:30 pm EST
\nLOCATION: Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, Columbia Univer sity
\n1150 Amsterdam Ave\, New York\, NY 10027
\nNOTE ON E NTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only op en with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting beg ins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nNOTE REGARDING DONAT IONS: Due to COVID-19\, donations are only accepted through Columbia U niversity’s secure online giving form\, Giving to Columbia.
\nRSV P is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restauran t. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information.
\nACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT: Columbia University encourages persons with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities. The Unive rsity Seminars’ participants with dis- abilities who anticipate needing ac commodations or who have questions about physical access may contact the O ffice of Disability Services at 212.854.2388 or disability@columbia.edu. Disability accommodations\, including sign-language interpreters\, are av ailable on request. Requests for accommodations must be made two weeks in advance. On campus\, seminar participants with disabilities should alert a Public Safety Officer if they need assistance accessing campus.
\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE: h ttps://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philosophy/
\n(Please do not reply to this announcement. You may contact th e Co-Chairs using the link above.)
\nComparative Philosophy Sem inar:
\n\n
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,comparative\,imagination END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8156@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Comparative philosophy is gaining traction in professional acad emic philosophy\, with specialist journals\, organizations\, books\, and p ublic campaigns. These inroads have been made in canonical areas of philos ophy\, including epistemology\, metaphysics\, logic\, and value theory. Ye t comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethi cs\, an interdisciplinary research area in which work with practice and po licy implications are dominated by the anglophone world. In this article\, I explain why comparative work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics\, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might over come these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues.\nWith responses from Wenqing Zhao (CUNY Baruch)\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please a rrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begin s. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in o r contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk. \nRSVP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER:. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2 798@columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited.\n\n \nCompara tive Philosophy Seminar:\n\nJanuary 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)\n February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\nApril 5 – Laura Speck er (Fordham University)\nMay 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Comparative Philosophy and Practical Applied Ethics. Laura Specker Sullivan (Fordham) URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/comparative-philosophy-a nd-practical-applied-ethics-laura-specker-sullivan-fordham/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\nFebruary 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\n - April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (Univ ersity at Buffalo)
\n\\n\\n Comparative p hilosophy is gaining traction in professional academic philosophy\, with s pecialist journals\, organizations\, books\, and public campaigns. These i nroads have been made in canonical areas of philosophy\, including epistem ology\, metaphysics\, logic\, and value theory. Yet comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethics\, an interdisciplinar y research area in which work with practice and policy implications are do minated by the anglophone world. In this article\, I explain why comparati ve work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics\, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might overcome these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues.
\n< p>With responses from Wenqing Zhao (CUNY Baruch)\nNOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late\, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or cont act Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resourc e so as not to interrupt the talk.
\nRSVP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER: b>. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798 @columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited.
\n
\n\n
Comparative Philosophy Seminar:
\n\n
- Januar y 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
\n- February 2 – Davey Tomlin son (Villanova University)
\n- April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham Univ ersity)
\n- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo)
\n ul>\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:applied\,comparative\,ethics END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-8106@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress DTSTAMP:20240329T141800Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos ophy/ DESCRIPTION:Comparative Philosophy Seminar:\n\nJanuary 19 – Alex Watson (As hoka University)\nFebruary 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)\nApr il 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)\nMay 3 – Daniel Stephens (Univer sity at Buffalo) DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240503T173000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240503T193000 GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573 LOCATION:Philosophy Hall\, Room 716\, @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, USA RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T173000 RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240503T173000 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Comparative Philosophy Seminar URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/comparative-philosophy-s eminar-11/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Comparative P hilosophy Seminar:
\n\n
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka Univers ity)
\n- February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)
\n< li>April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)\n- May 3 – Daniel S tephens (University at Buffalo)
\n