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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7768@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers
CONTACT:https://nyphilsci.wordpress.com/2022/04/20/free-will-implications-f
rom-physics-and-metaphysics/
DESCRIPTION:Free WillImplications from Physics and Metaphysics\nThe worksho
p will be hybrid\, and anyone interested can participate through Zoom\, al
though there will be limited spots for in-person participants. If you are
interested in attending in-person\, please reply to this email or write to
loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu.\nBarry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.e
du) Assistant: Diego Arana (diego.arana@rutgers.edu)Program (All times are
EST)\nZoom Link: https://tinyurl.com/freewillzoom\niCal: https://tinyurl.
com/freewillical\nMay 1110:00am Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame\, Duke)Ginet
’s Principle: Our freedom is the freedom to add to thegiven past.11:30am J
ohn Perry (Stanford)Causation\, Entailment and Freedom3:00pm Barry Loewer
(Rutgers)The Consequence Argument Meets the Mentaculus4:30pm Carlo Rovelli
(Aix-Marseille\, UWO)Free will: Back to Reichenbach\nMay 1210:00am Kadri
Vihvelin (USC)Why We can’t Change the Past11:30am Valia Allori (NIU)Freedo
m from the Quantum?3:00pm Tim O’Connor (Indiana\, Baylor)Top-Down and Inde
terministic Agency: Why?4:30pm Jessica Wilson (Toronto)Two Routes to the E
mergence of Free Will
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220511
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220513
GEO:+40.500841;-74.447417
LOCATION:Rutgers & Zoom @ New Brunswick\, NJ\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Free Will Workshop: Implications from Physics and Metaphysics
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/free-will-workshop-impli
cations-from-physics-and-metaphysics/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\n\\n\\nFree Will
Implications from Physics and Metaphysics
\nThe workshop will be hybrid\, and anyone interested can particip
ate through Zoom\, although there will be limited spots for in-person part
icipants. If you are interested in attending in-person\, please reply to t
his email or write to loewe
r@philosophy.rutgers.edu.
\n
Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu) Assistant: Diego Arana (diego.aran
a@rutgers.edu)
Program (All times are EST)
\nZoom Link: https://tinyurl.com/freewillzoom
\n<
span dir='ltr' role='presentation'>iCal: https://tinyurl.com/freewillical<
/span>
\n
May 11
10:00am Peter van Inwagen (
Notre Dame\, Duke)
Ginet’s Principle: Our freedom is the freedom to add to the
span>
given p
ast.
1
1:30am John Perry (Stanford)
Causatio
n\, Entailment and Freedom
3:00pm Barry Loewer (Rutgers)
The Consequence Argument Meet
s the Mentaculus
4:30pm Carlo Rovelli (Aix-Marseille\, UWO)
Free will: Back to Reichen
bach
\n
May 12
10:00am Kadri Vihvelin (USC)
Why We can’t Change the Past
11:30am Valia Allori (NIU)
Freedom from the Quantum?
3:00pm Ti
m O’Connor (Indiana\, Baylor)
Top-Down and Indeterministic Agency: Why?4:30pm Jessica
Wilson (Toronto)
Two Routes to the Emergence of Free Will
\n
HTML>
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:free will\,metaphysics\,physics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7840@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers
CONTACT:trip@mccrossin.org\; https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/events/departme
nt-calendar/icalrepeat.detail/2022/09/30/698/-/evil-in-modern-thought-at-t
wenty-workshop
DESCRIPTION:Susan Neiman develops in Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative
History of Philosophy (2002\, Princeton: Princeton University Press) a wa
tershed perspective on the longstanding problem of evil\, the perniciously
difficult to satisfy “need to find order within those appearances so unbe
arable that they threaten reason’s ability to go on.” The book thereby als
o presents a radically new perspective on traditional debates within metap
hysics. On the occasion of its twentieth anniversary\, we gather to celebr
ate her accomplishment and to advance the research program it reflects. Pa
rticipants will include\, in addition to Neiman herself: Annalise Acorn\,
Frederick Beiser\, Jeremy Bendik-Keymer\, Omri Boehm\, Dan Brudney\, Carol
ine Bynum\, Lorraine Daston\, Michael Della Rocca\, Wendy Doniger\, Wolfra
m Ellenberger\, John Faithful Hamer\, Carey Harrison\, Patricia Kitcher\,
Philip Kitcher\, Christia Mercer\, Cornel West\, Allen Wood\, and James Wo
od.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220930
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20221003
GEO:+40.501353;-74.449403
LOCATION:Hageman Hall - New Brunswick Theological Seminary @ 35 Seminary Pl
\, New Brunswick\, NJ 08901\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Evil in Modern Thought at Twenty Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/evil-in-modern-thought-a
t-twenty-workshop/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nSusan Neiman
develops in Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosop
hy (2002\, Princeton: Princeton University Press) a watershed perspec
tive on the longstanding problem of evil\, the perniciously difficult to s
atisfy “need to find order within those appearances so unbearable that the
y threaten reason’s ability to go on.” The book thereby also presents a ra
dically new perspective on traditional debates within metaphysics. On the
occasion of its twentieth anniversary\, we gather to celebrate her accompl
ishment and to advance the research program it reflects. Participants will
include\, in addition to Neiman herself: Annalise Acorn\, Frederick Beise
r\, Jeremy Bendik-Keymer\, Omri Boehm\, Dan Brudney\, Caroline Bynum\, Lor
raine Daston\, Michael Della Rocca\, Wendy Doniger\, Wolfram Ellenberger\,
John Faithful Hamer\, Carey Harrison\, Patricia Kitcher\, Philip Kitcher\
, Christia Mercer\, Cornel West\, Allen Wood\, and James Wood.
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:evil\,metaphysics\,religion
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7879@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/103858
DESCRIPTION:This conference celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first pu
blication of Saul Kripke’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by showcas
ing new work on a range of topics on which it has had a lasting influence.
These topics include\, but are not limited to: the nature of names and na
tural kind terms\; the failure of the description or cluster/description t
heories\; the distinction between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apr
iority\; empty names\; the metaphysics of essence and origin\; the nature
of modality and possible worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology of m
odality\; the role of philosophical intuition\; and the mind-body problem.
\nDates: 12th and 13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.\nVenue: The CUNY Gradua
te Center\, 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.\nFormat: hybrid\nRegistr
ation: for both online and in person attendance\, please register by the 2
8th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.\n https://s
aulkripkecenter.org/ \nSpeakers:\n\n\n Katalin Balog \nRutgers University
– Newark\n\n\n Anandi Hattiangadi \nStockholm University\n\n\n Carl Hoefer
\nUniversitat Autonoma de Barcelona\n\n\n Janet Levin \nUniversity of Sou
thern California\n\n\n Antonella Mallozzi \nProvidence College\n\n\n Genov
eva Martí \nICREA And University Of Barcelona\n\n\n Alexander Moran \nTrin
ity College\, Dublin\n\n\n Brian Rabern \nUniversity of Edinburgh\n\n\n Te
resa Robertson Ishii \nUniversity of California at Santa Barbara\n\n\n Nat
han Salmon \nUniversity of California at Santa Barbara\n\n\n Sarah Sawyer
\nUniversity of Sussex\n\n\n Anders Schoubye \nStockholm University\n\n\n
Jennifer Wang \nSimon Fraser University\n\n\n Stephen Yablo \nMassachusett
s Institute of Technology\n\n\nOrganisers:\n\n\n Corine Besson \nUniversit
y of Sussex\n\n\n Anandi Hattiangadi \nStockholm University\n\n\n Antonell
a Mallozzi \nProvidence College\n\n\n Yale Weiss \nCUNY Graduate Center\n
\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nTickets: https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20221212
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20221214
GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098
LOCATION:Philosophy Dept.\, CUNY Graduate Center @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\,
NY 10016\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:50 Years of Naming and Necessity
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/50-years-of-naming-and-n
ecessity/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThis conferen
ce celebrates the 50th anniversary of the first publication of Saul Kripke
’s masterpiece\, Naming and Necessity\, by showcasing new work on a range
of topics on which it has had a lasting influence. These topics include\,
but are not limited to: the nature of names and natural kind terms\; the f
ailure of the description or cluster/description theories\; the distinctio
n between metaphysical necessity and epistemic apriority\; empty names\; t
he metaphysics of essence and origin\; the nature of modality and possible
worlds\; conceivability and the epistemology of modality\; the role of ph
ilosophical intuition\; and the mind-body problem.
\nDates: 12th and
13th December\, from 9am to 5pm.
\nVenue: The CUNY Graduate Center\
, 365 5th Avenue\, New York\, New York.
\nFormat: hybrid
\nReg
istration: for both online and in person attendance\, please register by t
he 28th of November\, 2022 at https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
\n\nSpeakers:
\n\n
\n
\n
Rutge
rs University – Newark
\n
\n
\n
\n
Stockholm University
\n
\n
\n
\n
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
\n
\n
\n
\n
University of Southern California
\n
\n
\n
\n
Providence College
\n\n
\n
\n
ICREA And University Of Barce
lona
\n
\n
\n
\n
Trinity C
ollege\, Dublin
\n
\n
\n
\n
Univer
sity of Edinburgh
\n
\n
\n
\n
University of California at Santa Barbara\n
\n<
div>\n
\n
University of California at Santa Ba
rbara
\n
\n\n
\n
University of Su
ssex
\n
\n\n
\n
Stock
holm University
\n
\n\n
\n
Simo
n Fraser University
\n
\n\n
\n
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
\n
\n\nOrganiser
s:
\n\n
\n
\n
University of Susse
x
\n
\n
\n
\n
Stockhol
m University
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
CUNY
Graduate Center
\n
\n
\n\n\nTickets: https:
//forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:conference\,epistemology\,language\,metaphysics
X-TICKETS-URL:https://forms.gle/Jbr3uaFx1ZwRxJpZ7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7947@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:NYU
CONTACT:https://theassc.org/assc-26/
DESCRIPTION:We are pleased to announce that the 26th annual meeting of the
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness will be held at New
York University on June 22-25\, 2023.\nSubmissions for talks and posters a
re now open with a deadline of February 15\, 2023. Conference registration
will open in early 2023.\nKeynote speakers\, symposia\, tutorials\, and h
ousing have now been arranged\, as specified below.\nPlease direct any inq
uiries to ASSC26@nyu.edu.\nWe hope to see you soon in New York!\nNed Block
and David Chalmers\, Conference Directors\n\n\nTickets: https://theassc.o
rg/assc-26/#registration.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230622
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230626
GEO:+40.730564;-73.999586
LOCATION:Vanderbilt Hall @ Vanderbilt Hall\, 40 Washington Square S\, New Y
ork\, NY 10012\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness Conference
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/association-for-the-scie
ntific-study-of-consciousness-conference/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\n
\n
We are p
leased to announce that the 26th annual meeting of the Association for the
Scientific Study of Consciousness will be held at New York University on
June 22-25\, 2023.
\n
Submissions for talks and posters are now open with a
deadline of February 15\, 2023. Conference registration will open in early 2023.
\n
Keynote speakers\, symposia\, tutorials\, and housing have now been arranged\, as specified
below.
\n
Please direct any inquiries to ASSC26@nyu.edu.
\n
We hope to
see you soon in New York!
\n
Ned Block and David Chalmers\, Conf
erence Directors
\n
\n
\nTickets: https:/
/theassc.org/assc-26/#registration.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfp\,conference\,consciousness
X-COST:$150-550
X-TICKETS-URL:https://theassc.org/assc-26/#registration
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8048@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research
CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023
DESCRIPTION:Join us for a series of keynote presentations as part of the 20
23 Institute for Philosophy and New Humanities: Mind-Dependent Artifacts:
Artifact-Dependent Minds.\nArtifacts are a primary object of study in the
humanities. They are products and\, thus\, manifestations of human thought
\, action\, and self-determination without which they cannot be understood
. At the same time\, human mindedness depends on artifacts\, and as well a
s other objects – a dependence that is manifest in the form of artifacts.
Human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are therefore intertwined in
complex ways.\nOur Fall institute meeting 2023 Institute will consider wa
ys in which human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are dialecticall
y intertwined. Of special interest will be automatically or mechanically p
roduced artifacts\, and AI systems as artifacts that are neither inert cau
sal models of human thinking nor independently minded entities. The ontolo
gy of such products thus needs to be calibrated in light of their contribu
tion to the deep diversity of the mutual dependence of mindedness and arti
facts. Some questions our seminar will address include: How do AI-research
and AI-systems structure and restructure the historical\, diverse articul
ation of human mindedness? How does our understanding of these and other a
rtifacts shape our self-conception at the most fundamental level?\n \nWe w
ill explore these issues in the ontology\, epistemology\, and humanistic s
tudy of AI and other artifacts together with distinguished keynote speaker
s:\nMonday\, September 11\, 4pm\nHans Ulrich Gumbrecht: UNFOLDING A FUZZY
FUTURE? Dimensions for Thinking about “Singularity”\n\nTuesday\, September
12\, 10am\nCameron Buckner: Understanding Progress in AI Using Empiricist
Philosophy of Mind\n\nWednesday\, September 13\, 3pm\nKanta Dihal\nWednes
day\, September 13\, 5pm\nDavid Chalmers: Forum Humanum Lecture\n\nThursda
y\, September 14\, 4pm\nNandi Theunissen: Rethinking Regress Arguments for
the Value of Humanity\n\nFriday\, September 15\, 4pm\nKalindi Vora\nTicke
ts: https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023#rsvp.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230911
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230916
GEO:+40.735498;-73.993501
LOCATION:Starr Foundation Hall (UL102) @ 63 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10003\,
USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Mind-Dependent Artifacts: Artifact-Dependent Minds
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/mind-dependent-artifacts
-artifact-dependent-minds/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nJoin us for a
series of keynote presentations as part of the 2023 Institute for Philoso
phy and New Humanities: Mind-Dependent Artifacts: Artifact-Dependent Minds
.
\nArtifacts are a primary object of study in the humanities. They
are products and\, thus\, manifestations of human thought\, action\, and s
elf-determination without which they cannot be understood. At the same tim
e\, human mindedness depends on artifacts\, and as well as other objects –
a dependence that is manifest in the form of artifacts. Human mindedness
and the reality of artifacts are therefore intertwined in complex ways.
\nOur Fall institute meeting 2023 Institute will consider ways in whic
h human mindedness and the reality of artifacts are dialectically intertwi
ned. Of special interest will be automatically or mechanically produced ar
tifacts\, and AI systems as artifacts that are neither inert causal models
of human thinking nor independently minded entities. The ontology of such
products thus needs to be calibrated in light of their contribution to th
e deep diversity of the mutual dependence of mindedness and artifacts. Som
e questions our seminar will address include: How do AI-research and AI-sy
stems structure and restructure the historical\, diverse articulation of h
uman mindedness? How does our understanding of these and other artifacts s
hape our self-conception at the most fundamental level?
\n
\n
We will explore these issues in the ontology\, epistemology\, and humanist
ic study of AI and other artifacts together with distinguished keynote spe
akers:
\nMonday\, September 11\, 4pm
\nHans Ulrich Gumb
recht: UNFOLDING A FUZZY FUTURE? Dimensions for Thinking about “Singularit
y”
\n\nTuesday\, September 12\, 10am
\n
Cameron Buckner: Understanding Progress in AI Using Empiricist Philosophy
of Mind
\n
\nWednesday\, September 13\, 3pm
\nKanta Dihal
\nWednesday\, September 13\, 5pm
\nDavid Chalmers: Forum Humanum Lecture
\n
\nThursday\, September 14\, 4pm
\nNandi Theunissen:
Rethinking Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity
\n<
/p>\n
Friday\, September 15\, 4pm
\nKalindi Vora
p>\n
Tickets: https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023#rsvp.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,mind
X-TICKETS-URL:https://event.newschool.edu/ipnh2023#rsvp
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8006@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Fordham
CONTACT:https://philevents.org/event/show/111406
DESCRIPTION:Ideas about “identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news
media\, in higher education\, in political disputations\, and in critical
theories of society. Claims about “identity” and “difference” can readil
y be found at work in a wide variety of typologies\, including those of ra
ce\, class\, ethnicity\, gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, pol
itical affiliation\, ability and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc
. But what exactly do we mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”
? And if we achieve greater clarity about the metaphysical presupposition
s and implications of “identity” and “difference\,” what difference would
that make?\nA serious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “differen
ce” will expectedly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse ab
out what is “identical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”?
Is discourse about what is “different” reducible to discourse about what i
s “other”? Can something be “the same” without being “identical\,” and ca
n something be “other” without being “different”? When we speak about “be
ing\,” does our speaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken
of analogically)\, or instead does our speaking about being always have t
he same sense (is it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thin
g depend mainly on the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend
instead on the thing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understandi
ng of identity depend on some reference to what is different? Or does an
understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity? What is
the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\,
or some combination of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real
differences between things without discerning intelligible differences\,
or does the indiscernibility of intelligible differences imply that there
are no real differences at all but rather an identity? Does difference de
pend on negation\, or can one assert that there is difference without havi
ng to assert that something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an o
ntological difference\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or
is it senseless – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between B
eing and beings? Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible
for differences to exist only among beings (in which case there apparently
cannot be a difference between “being” and “nothing”)?\nIn spite of the v
irtual ubiquity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a d
earth of discourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications
of “identity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 20
24 (“Identity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\,
the Metaphysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking abo
ut the metaphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such de
eper thinking will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practic
e.\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged
\, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note:
when selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Prog
ram Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion
among others.\n****************************************\nGuidelines for th
e Submission of Abstracts\, and for Aristotle and Plato Prize Candidates\n
Abstracts of approximately 500 words should be submitted electronically by
September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nAristotle P
rize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaph
ysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Elig
ibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet e
arned a Ph.D.. Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize sho
uld express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their sub
mission. Papers submitted for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750
word limit\; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read a
t the meeting\, and not to footnotes or other supporting material. The Ar
istotle Prize carries a cash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, an
d assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting. To be
considered for the Aristotle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be sub
mitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nPlato
Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphys
ical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligib
ility for the Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. deg
ree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who
hold a Ph.D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Thos
e wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish cl
early in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitt
ed for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limi
t applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to f
ootnotes or other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash awa
rd of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs asso
ciated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\,
full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:sec
retary@metaphysicalsociety.org.\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous sup
port of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund
for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be abl
e to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate stude
nts whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to
receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with al
l relevant expense-receipts).\nThose who submit abstracts\, and those who
submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Plato Prize\,
will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on their submissi
on no later than December 1\, 2023.\nhttps://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2
024/2024_meeting.htm\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/20
24_meeting.htm.
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240307
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240311
GEO:+40.77103;-73.985096
LOCATION:Lowenstein Building\, Fordham University\, Lincoln Center @ 113 W
60th St\, New York\, NY 10023\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Metaphysical Society of America Conference: Identity\, Difference\,
and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-society-of-
america-conference-identity-difference-and-the-difference-that-metaphysics
-makes/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nIdeas about “
identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media\, in higher educa
tion\, in political disputations\, and in critical theories of society. C
laims about “identity” and “difference” can readily be found at work in a
wide variety of typologies\, including those of race\, class\, ethnicity\,
gender\, sexuality\, religion\, nationality\, political affiliation\, abi
lity and disability\, animality and humanity\, etc. But what exactly do w
e mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”? And if we achieve gre
ater clarity about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “i
dentity” and “difference\,” what difference would that make?
\nA ser
ious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expected
ly generate a wide variety of questions. Is discourse about what is “iden
tical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”? Is discourse abou
t what is “different” reducible to discourse about what is “other”? Can s
omething be “the same” without being “identical\,” and can something be “o
ther” without being “different”? When we speak about “being\,” does our s
peaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically)
\, or instead does our speaking about being always have the same sense (is
it spoken of univocally)? Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly o
n the thing’s status as an individual\, or does it depend instead on the t
hing’s membership in a general kind? Does an understanding of identity de
pend on some reference to what is different? Or does an understanding of
difference depend on some reference to identity? What is the relation of
knowing to being: is it one of identity\, or difference\, or some combinat
ion of both? Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences betw
een things without discerning intelligible differences\, or does the indis
cernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real diffe
rences at all but rather an identity? Does difference depend on negation\
, or can one assert that there is difference without having to assert that
something is “not”? Does it make sense to speak of an ontological differ
ence\, i.e.\, a difference between Being and beings\, or is it senseless
– maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings?
Is “being” different from “nothing\,” or is it possible for differences t
o exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a diff
erence between “being” and “nothing”)?
\nIn spite of the virtual ubi
quity of discourses about identity and difference\, there is a dearth of d
iscourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “ident
ity and difference.” With its choice of conference theme for 2024 (“Ident
ity\, Difference\, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”)\, the Metap
hysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking about the met
aphysics of identity and difference\, with the hope that such deeper think
ing will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practice.
\nProposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged\,
but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome. Please note: wh
en selecting which submissions to accept for this conference\, the Program
Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion amo
ng others.
\n****************************************
\nGuidelines for the Submission of Abstracts\, and for Aristotle and Plato
Prize Candidates
\nAbstracts of approximately 500 words sh
ould be submitted electronically by September 30\, 2023\, to: secretary@me
taphysicalsociety.org.
\nAristotle Prize: Those wishing to be
considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaphysical Society should sub
mit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for the Aristotle
Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D.. Those wis
hing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize should express this wish cle
arly in the email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitte
d for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word l
imit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not t
o footnotes or other supporting material. The Aristotle Prize carries a c
ash award of $500\, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the cos
ts associated with attending the meeting. To be considered for the Aristo
tle Prize\, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\,
2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.
\nPlato Prize: Tho
se wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphysical Societ
y should submit full papers along with their abstracts. Eligibility for t
he Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. degree within
six years of the conference submission date (i.e.\, persons who hold a Ph.
D. degree which was conferred after September 30\, 2017). Those wishing t
o be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish clearly in th
e email note that accompanies their submission. Papers submitted for the
Plato Prize are subject to a 3\,750 word limit\; this word limit applies t
o the body of the text to be read at the meeting\, and not to footnotes or
other supporting material. The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500\
, inclusion in the program\, and assistance with the costs associated with
attending the meeting. To be considered for the Plato Prize\, full paper
s and abstracts must be submitted by September 30\, 2023 to:secretary@meta
physicalsociety.org.
\nTravel Grants: Thanks to the generous
support of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot F
und for Systematic Philosophy\, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be
able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate st
udents whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing
to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with
all relevant expense-receipts).
\nThose who submit abstracts\, and
those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Pla
to Prize\, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on thei
r submission no later than December 1\, 2023.
\n\nTickets: https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm.<
/p>
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:cfa\,conference\,identity\,metaphysics
X-COST:$70-120
X-TICKETS-URL:https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2024/2024_meeting.htm
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8126@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Rutgers
CONTACT:https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/events/department-calendar/month.cal
endar/2024/04/09/-
DESCRIPTION:Social Metaphysics Workshop – location tbd
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240426
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240429
GEO:+40.49747;-74.44717
LOCATION:Rutgers Philosophy @ The Gateway\, 106 Somerset St\, New Brunswick
\, NJ 08901\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Social Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/social-metaphysics-works
hop/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\n\\n\\nSocial Metaph
ysics Workshop – location tbd
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,social
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7660@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion t
hat grounding can be\, indeed is\, overdetermined. Further to this\, it s
eems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding
is overdetermined and there is nothing about it\, either conceptually or m
etaphysically\, that we ought to find concerning. But from a small sampli
ng of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. This pa
per aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obvious or straightforward a
bout grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much m
ore serious philosophical attention.\nThe Logic and Metaphysics Workshop w
ill be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, un
less otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:\nSep 13. Ric
ki Bliss (Lehigh University)\nSep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion Un
iversity)\nSep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)\nOct 4. Yale W
eiss (CUNY GC)\nOct 11. NO MEETING\nOct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)\nOct 25
. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)\nNov 1. Thomas Macaulay
Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)\nNov 15
. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)\nNov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John
Jay)\nNov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of G
hent)\nDec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210913T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210913T181500
LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Metaphysical Overdetermination (Ricki Bliss) @ Logic & Metaphysics
Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/metaphysical-overdetermi
nation-ricki-bliss-logic-metaphysics-workshop/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\n
Abstract: It is widely recognized by prop
onents of the notion that grounding can be\, indeed is\, overdetermined.
Further to this\, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus h
as emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it\, ei
ther conceptually or metaphysically\, that we ought to find concerning. B
ut from a small sampling of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsi
bly be drawn. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obviou
s or straightforward about grounding overdetermination and that the topic
is deserving of much more serious philosophical attention.
\n
The Log
ic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (
NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedul
e is as follows:
\n
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
\n
S
ep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
\n
Sep 27. Rashe
d Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
\n
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
\n
Oct 11. NO MEETING
\n
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
\n
Oc
t 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
\n
Nov 1. Thom
as Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
\n
Nov 8. Roman Kossak
(CUNY GC)
\n
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
\n
Nov 2
2. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
\n
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münste
r)
\n
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
\n
Dec 13. Dolf R
ami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
\n
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7637@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f
rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted. The p
rovisional schedule is as follows:\nSep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University
)\nSep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)\nSep 27. Rashed A
hmad (University of Connecticut)\nOct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)\nOct 11. NO
MEETING\nOct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)\nOct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San
José State University)\nNov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Am
sterdam)\nNov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)\nNov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham Uni
versity)\nNov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)\nNov 29. Martin Pleitz
(Münster)\nDec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)\nDec 13. Dolf Rami (R
uhr-Universität Bochum)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210920T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210920T181500
LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20210920T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20210927T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211004T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211018T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211025T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211101T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211108T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211115T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211122T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211129T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211206T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20211213T161500
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-metaphysics-worksh
op-3/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\n
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mond
ays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online\, unless otherwise noted.
The provisional schedule is as follows:
\n
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehig
h University)
\n
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University
)
\n
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
\n
Oct 4.
Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
\n
Oct 11. NO MEETING
\n
Oct 18. Rohit Pari
kh (CUNY GC)
\n
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State Universi
ty)
\n
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
\n
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
\n
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham U
niversity)
\n
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
\n
Nov 2
9. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
\n
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent
)
\n
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
\n
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7653@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U
CONTACT:https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/events/robert-iliffe-thousan
d-fictions-cultism-and-delusional-metaphysics-newton-leibniz-disputes
DESCRIPTION:The rich philosophical and mathematical disputes that took plac
e between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteent
h century have received more historical attention than any other exchange
in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe
discusses a prominent but neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely
the mutual claim that their opponents’ conceptual foundations were fiction
al\, and were the product both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately
organized intellectual structures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly deb
ased metaphysics in various prominent places\, and mobilized allies such a
s Roger Cotes and John Keill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the mos
t sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched
against Newton by Leibniz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In th
e Fifth letter to Clarke\, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as
infantile\, vulgar\, and profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were
dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than t
he rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz
saved his most potent intellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\
, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton
’s work was no mere codicil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy
\, but instead lay at the heart of it. This famous debate\, while of cours
e somewhat sui generis\, is indicative of more general and dynamic feature
s of intellectual debate.\nEvent Speaker\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the
History of Science at the University of Oxford\nEvent Information\nThis e
vent is free and open to the public\; Registration required. Please contac
t scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.\nThis event is part o
f the New York History of Science Lecture Series.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210927T180000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210927T193000
LOCATION:ZOOM - see site for details
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Robert Iliffe – ‘A Thousand Fictions’: Cultism and Delusional Metap
hysics in the Newton-Leibniz Disputes
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/robert-iliffe-a-thousand
-fictions-cultism-anrobert-iliffe-a-thousand-fictions-cultism-and-delusion
al-metaphysics-in-the-newton-leibniz-disputesd-delusional-me/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThe rich phil
osophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton a
nd Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received
more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philos
ophy. Nevertheless\, in this talk\, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent bu
t neglected aspect of their disagreement\, namely the mutual claim that th
eir opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional\, and were the produc
t both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual s
tructures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in vari
ous prominent places\, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John K
eill to do the same. Nevertheless\, by far the most sophisticated critique
of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibn
iz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke
\, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile\, vulgar\, and
profoundly irreligious\, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that
were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of
writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent in
tellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke\, Robert Iliffe suggests
that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codi
cil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy\, but instead lay at th
e heart of it. This famous debate\, while of course somewhat sui generis\,
is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate
.
\nEvent Speaker
\nRobert Iliffe\, Professor of the History of Science at the Unive
rsity of Oxford
\nEvent Information
\nThis event is free and
open to the public\; Registration r
equired. Please contact sc
ienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
\nThis event is
part of the New York History of Science Lectu
re Series.
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics\,science
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7713@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2022/01/18/spring-2022-schedule/
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f
rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Speakers may present either virtually or in-pe
rson\; the details will be announced for each talk individually. Meetings
will convene at the Graduate Center\, Room 5382. You may attend any talk f
rom that location (even if the speaker is not physically present). At leas
t for any talk for which the speaker is not physically present\, you will
also be able to attend virtually from anywhere via Zoom. The provisional s
chedule is as follows:\nFeb 7. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)\nFeb 14. Ekate
rina Kubyshkina (Campinas)\nFeb 21. NO MEETING\nFeb 28. Michael Burton (Ya
le)\nMar 7. David Papineau (King’s)\nMar 14. Wilfrid Hodges (King’s)\nMar
21. Noson Yanofsky (CUNY)\nMar 28. Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)\nApr 4. Jenn McDonal
d (Columbia)\nApr 11. Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins)\nApr 18. NO MEETING\nA
pr 25. Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen)\nMay 2. Elia Zardini (Madrid)\nMay 9.
Friederike Moltmann (CNRS Nice)\nMay 16. Mircea Dumitru (Bucharest)\n
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220207T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220207T181500
GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098
LOCATION:Zoom & CUNY rm 5382 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220214T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220221T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220228T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220307T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220314T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220321T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220328T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220404T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220411T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220425T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220502T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220509T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220516T161500
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo
rkshop-16/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThe Logic and
Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY tim
e). Speakers may present either virtually or in-person\; the details will
be announced for each talk individually. Meetings will convene at the Grad
uate Center\, Room 5382. You may attend any talk from that location
(even if the speaker is not physically present). At least for any talk fo
r which the speaker is not physically present\, you will also be able to a
ttend virtually from anywhere via Zoom. The provisional schedule is as fol
lows:
\nFeb 7. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)
\nFeb 14. Ekaterin
a Kubyshkina (Campinas)
\nFeb 21. NO MEETING
\nFeb 28. Michael
Burton (Yale)
\nMar 7. David Papineau (King’s)
\nMar 14. Wilf
rid Hodges (King’s)
\nMar 21. Noson Yanofsky (CUNY)
\nMar 28.
Dongwoo Kim (CUNY)
\nApr 4. Jenn McDonald (Columbia)
\nApr 11.
Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins)
\nApr 18. NO MEETING
\nApr 25.
Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen)
\nMay 2. Elia Zardini (Madrid)
\nMay 9. Friederike Moltmann (CNRS Nice)
\nMay 16. Mircea Dumitru (Bu
charest)
\n
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7816@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/2022/08/19/fall-2022-schedule/
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f
rom 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-p
erson (at the Graduate Center\, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as
follows:\nSept 5. NO MEETING\nSep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)\nSep 19. Boka
i Yao (Notre Dame)\nSep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine)\, Louise Du
puis (Paris Dauphine)\, and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)\nOct 3. Yale Weis
s (CUNY)\nOct 10. NO MEETING\nOct 17. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)\nOct 24
. Friederika Moltmann (CNRS\, Côte d’Azur)\nOct 31. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)\nN
ov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)\nNov 14. Tommy Kivatinos (Auburn)\nNov 21. Ma
rko Malink (NYU)\nNov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)\nDec 5. Martin Pleit
z (Muenster)\nDec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220912T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220912T181500
GEO:+40.74809;-73.983098
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 7314 & Zoom @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\,
USA
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220919T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20220926T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221003T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221017T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221024T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221031T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221107T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221114T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221121T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221128T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20221205T161500
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo
rkshop-17/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThe Logic and
Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY tim
e). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-person (at the Graduate C
enter\, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as follows:
\nSept 5
. NO MEETING
\nSep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)
\nSep 19. Bokai Y
ao (Notre Dame)
\nSep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine)\, Louis
e Dupuis (Paris Dauphine)\, and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)
\nOct 3
. Yale Weiss (CUNY)
\nOct 10. NO MEETING
\nOct 17. Guillermo B
adia (Queensland)
\nOct 24. Friederika Moltmann (CNRS\, Côte d’Azur)
\nOct 31. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)
\nNov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)
\nNov 14. Tommy Kivatinos (Auburn)
\nNov 21. Marko Malink (NY
U)
\nNov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)
\nDec 5. Martin Pleit
z (Muenster)
\nDec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State)
\n
HTML>
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7870@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U
CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos
ophy/
DESCRIPTION:With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)\n
ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two diffe
rent kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth
(paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand
this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two diffe
rent kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conv
entionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophi
cal discussions about ordinary objects\, Buddhist philosophers debate the
ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse
concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2021\, 2022) has influentially arg
ued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that in
terprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities
exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. How
ever\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019)\, a prominent defender of
ontological pluralism\, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidha
rma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be
“defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an e
ntity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that
Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself
well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of con
ventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from t
he models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s a
ccount of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist
ontology. That view will\, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits an
d McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventio
nally true.\n \nDinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University S
eminars. \nRSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating r
equirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T173000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220930T193000
GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136
LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100
27\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Gue
rrero (William & Mary)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/buddhist-conventional-tr
uth-and-ontological-pluralism-laura-p-guerrero-william-mary/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nWith responses from Mark Siderits (Illin
ois State University)
\nABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often dra
w a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth (
saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists
philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontologi
cal distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real e
ntities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). S
imilar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects\,
Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entiti
es and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015\, 2
021\, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he call
s “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one t
hat denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involvin
g apparent reference to them. However\, in a recent article Kris McDaniel
(2019)\, a prominent defender of ontological pluralism\, challenges that v
iew by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventi
onal truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinctio
n between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultima
tely. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional re
ality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will a
lso argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results
differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offeri
ng a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is deri
ved from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will\, unlike the vi
ews suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel\, allow for there to be ultima
te truths about what is conventionally true.
\n
\nDinner will be kindly offered by the C
olumbia University Seminars.
\nRSVP is req
uired for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:Buddhism\,metaphysics\,truth
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7888@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Independent
CONTACT:https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b0c618/
websitePage:9772d97b-6260-4e47-bbfb-cbb109517975
DESCRIPTION:Few words in our language appear to cover such a broad and flex
ible swath of ideas as “the mind.” But what\, actually\, is the human mind
? How does it relate to and differ from its seemingly inseparable companio
n\, the brain? Where does the mind begin or emerge from? Is it merely a by
-product of neural activities within the brain\, or does it connect with d
eeper and more fundamental features of physical reality that possibly span
across nature beyond the realm of living forms? Is there such a thing as
the proper locus of the mind? How independent is the mind from its biologi
cal foundations? It is generally believed that what distinguishes the huma
n mind is precisely its capacity to ask and probe these very questions. Bu
t is it actually equipped to answer them? How far does the scope of the mi
nd extend? And what role does reflection and conscious thought play in its
operation?\nPhilosopher of mind Ned Block\, philosopher Philip Goff\, and
philosopher Rebecca Newberger Goldstein dissect the connections between t
he human mind\, brain\, and consciousness.\nReception to follow.\n\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\nTickets: https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8
a4a73b0c618/websitePage:9772d97b-6260-4e47-bbfb-cbb109517975.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221117T190000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221117T203000
GEO:+40.791947;-73.952101
LOCATION:New York Academy of Medicine @ 1216 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10029\
, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Unraveling the Mind: The Mystery of Consciousness
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/unraveling-the-mind-the-
mystery-of-consciousness/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n
Few words in our language appear to cover such a broad and flexi
ble swath of ideas as “the mind.” But what\, actually\, is the human mind?
How does it relate to and differ from its seemingly inseparable companion
\, the brain? Where does the mind begin or emerge from? Is it merely a by-
product of neural activities within the brain\, or does it connect with de
eper and more fundamental features of physical reality that possibly span
across nature beyond the realm of living forms? Is there such a thing as t
he proper locus of the mind? How independent is the mind from its biologic
al foundations? It is generally believed that what distinguishes the human
mind is precisely its capacity to ask and probe these very questions. But
is it actually equipped to answer them? How far does the scope of the min
d extend? And what role does reflection and conscious thought play in its
operation?
\n
Philo
sopher of mind Ned Block\, philosopher Philip Goff\, and philosopher Rebec
ca Newberger Goldstein dissect the connections between the human mind\, br
ain\, and consciousness.
\n
Reception to follow.
\n
\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n
\n
\n\nTickets: https://events.n
yas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b0c618/websitePage:9772d97b-62
60-4e47-bbfb-cbb109517975.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:consciousness\,mind
X-COST:$5-40
X-TICKETS-URL:https://events.nyas.org/event/aeb22abd-112e-4973-b86d-8a4a73b
0c618/websitePage:9772d97b-6260-4e47-bbfb-cbb109517975
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7921@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:NYU
CONTACT:https://as.nyu.edu/departments/philosophy/events/spring-2023/depart
ment-colloquium-katharina-kraus.html
DESCRIPTION:This talk explores the reflexive nature of consciousness\, whic
h consists primarily in the fact that a state of consciousness has a refle
xive relation to the subject who has that state\, so that the subject can
typically be aware of itself as having that state. Comparing Kant’s\, Fich
te’s\, and selected contemporary analytic theories of this reflexivity sho
ws that there is a crucial difference in the way the relation between form
(or mode) and content of a state of consciousness is conceived. The first
part examines Kant’s formal theory of consciousness: reflexivity is under
stood not in terms of a self-referential content resulting from a reflecti
on on the state of the subject\, but as the universal transcendental form
that any content must have in order to be representationally significant a
nd potentially conscious to the subject. The second part examines Fichte’s
departure from Kant in his theory of a self-positing consciousness: in th
e original act of self-positing\, the mere form of reflexivity is turned i
nto a self-referential content that determines the subject as an object fr
om the absolute standpoint of consciousness. The third part examines analy
tic theories that explain the reflexivity (or what is often called the sub
jective character) of consciousness on a model of mental indexicality. The
se theories tend to reduce reflexivity to an objective constituent of cont
ent that\, although often implicit\, can be read off from the subject’s co
ntextual situatedness in nature. In conclusion\, Kant’s theory can be unde
rstood as a moderate\, human-centered kind of perspectivism that navigates
between Fichtean absolute subjectivity and a naturalist absolute objectiv
ity.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nRegistration Information\n\n\n\nRegistration is free b
ut required. A registration link will be shared via email with our departm
ent mailing lists a few weeks before the event. Please contact Jack Mikusz
ewski at jhm378@nyu.edu if you did not receive a registration link.\n \n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\nDisability Accommodations\n\n\n\nThe Philosophy Department pro
vides reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities. Requests for
accommodations should be submitted to philosophy@nyu.edu at least two week
s before the event.\n\n\n\n\nTickets: https://as.nyu.edu/departments/philo
sophy/events/spring-2023/department-colloquium-katharina-kraus.html.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230217T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230217T173000
GEO:+40.729457;-73.994348
LOCATION:NYU Philosophy Dept. @ 5 Washington Pl\, New York\, NY 10003\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:The Reflexivity of Consciousness in Kant\, Fichte and Beyond. Katha
rina Kraus (Johns Hopkins)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/the-reflexivity-of-consc
iousness-in-kant-fichte-and-beyond-katharina-kraus-johns-hopkins/
X-COST-TYPE:external
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\n
\n\n
\n
This talk explores the reflexive nature of consciousness\, which cons
ists primarily in the fact that a state of consciousness has a reflexive r
elation to the subject who has that state\, so that the subject can typica
lly be aware of itself as having that state. Comparing Kant’s\, Fichte’s\,
and selected contemporary analytic theories of this reflexivity shows tha
t there is a crucial difference in the way the relation between form (or m
ode) and content of a state of consciousness is conceived. The first part
examines Kant’s formal theory of consciousness: reflexivity is understood
not in terms of a self-referential content resulting from a reflection on
the state of the subject\, but as the universal transcendental form that a
ny content must have in order to be representationally significant and pot
entially conscious to the subject. The second part examines Fichte’s depar
ture from Kant in his theory of a self-positing consciousness: in the orig
inal act of self-positing\, the mere form of reflexivity is turned into a
self-referential content that determines the subject as an object from the
absolute standpoint of consciousness. The third part examines analytic th
eories that explain the reflexivity (or what is often called the subjectiv
e character) of consciousness on a model of mental indexicality. These the
ories tend to reduce reflexivity to an objective constituent of content th
at\, although often implicit\, can be read off from the subject’s contextu
al situatedness in nature. In conclusion\, Kant’s theory can be understood
as a moderate\, human-centered kind of perspectivism that navigates betwe
en Fichtean absolute subjectivity and a naturalist absolute objectivity.
p>\n
\n
\n\n
\n\n
\n\n\n
\n
Registration is free but requir
ed. A registration link will be shared via email with our department m
ailing lists a few weeks before the event. Please contact Jack Mikuszewski
at jhm378@nyu.edu if you did not receive a registration link.
\n
p>\n
\n
\n\n \n\n
\n\n\n
\n
The Philosophy Department provide
s reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities. Requests for acco
mmodations should be submitted to philosophy@nyu.edu at least two weeks be
fore the event.
\n
\n
\n\n \nTickets: https
://as.nyu.edu/departments/philosophy/events/spring-2023/department-colloqu
ium-katharina-kraus.html.
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:consciousness\,German\,Kant\,mind\,modern
X-TICKETS-URL:https://as.nyu.edu/departments/philosophy/events/spring-2023/
department-colloquium-katharina-kraus.html
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7972@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:Neopragmatists seek to sidestep metaphysical puzzles by shiftin
g the target of philosophical explanation from the objects we think and ta
lk about to the functions of expressions and concepts in our cognitive eco
nomy. Logical vocabulary can serve as a target for neopragmatist inquiry\,
and it has also posed obstacles to neopragmatist accounts of other vocabu
lary. I will argue that the obstacles can be addressed by adopting a neopr
agmatist perspective toward logical relations\, such as logical consequenc
e\, and toward propositional content. Doing so calls into question two pur
ported constraints on explanations of the functions of logical connectives
. I will sketch an account made possible by rejecting those constraints\,
one according to which logical connectives serve to express dialectical at
titudes. The proposal is deflationary in two ways: it rests on an extensio
n of deflationism from truth to logical relations\, and it aims to deflate
some of neopragmatists’ theoretical ambitions.\nHi\, All. Below is the pr
ovisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be
as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to f
ace to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nM
ar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar
27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10
Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24
Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event
. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\n
Marc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum
)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230227T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230227T181500
GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 9205 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Neopragmatism and logic: A deflationary proposal. Lionel Shapiro (U
Conn)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/neopragmatism-and-logic-
a-deflationary-proposal-lionel-shapiro-uconn/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nNeopragmatist
s seek to sidestep metaphysical puzzles by shifting the target of philosop
hical explanation from the objects we think and talk about to the function
s of expressions and concepts in our cognitive economy. Logical vocabulary
can serve as a target for neopragmatist inquiry\, and it has also posed o
bstacles to neopragmatist accounts of other vocabulary. I will argue that
the obstacles can be addressed by adopting a neopragmatist perspective tow
ard logical relations\, such as logical consequence\, and toward propositi
onal content. Doing so calls into question two purported constraints on ex
planations of the functions of logical connectives. I will sketch an accou
nt made possible by rejecting those constraints\, one according to which l
ogical connectives serve to express dialectical attitudes. The proposal is
deflationary in two ways: it rests on an extension of deflationism from t
ruth to logical relations\, and it aims to deflate some of neopragmatists’
theoretical ambitions.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program
for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Monday
s 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meeti
ngs. (No more Zoom.)
\n
\nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\n
Mar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 S
hawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 T
homas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting<
/p>\n
Apr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacon
a\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Spe
cial event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all af
ternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Boch
um)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n
BODY>
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7920@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:Hi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop thi
s coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the
GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel F
itting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nAp
r 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Bra
nden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara B
urns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and t
he session will run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wa
nsing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T181500
EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500
EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500
EXDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500
GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001
6\, USA
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230306T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230403T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230417T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230424T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230501T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230510T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230515T161500
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo
rkshop-18/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nHi\, All. Bel
ow is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meet
ings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are re
verting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n
\nFeb 27
Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Me
l Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\
, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Sp
ring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeaster
n
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columb
ia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and
the session will run all afternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydne
y) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Ma
ciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7980@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:Saul Kripke announced his possible world semantics in 1959\, an
d published his proof of axiomatic completeness for the standard modal log
ics of the time in 1963. It is very unlike the standard completeness proo
f used today\, which involves a Lindenbaum/Henkin construction and produce
s canonical models. Kripke’s proof involved tableaus\, in a format that i
s difficult to follow\, and uses tableau construction algorithms that are
complex and somewhat error prone to describe. I will first discuss Kripke’
s proof\, then the historical origins of the modern version. Then I will
show that completeness\, proved Kripke style\, could actually have been do
ne in the Lindenbaum/Henkin way\, thus simplifying things considerably. N
one of this is new but\, with the parts collected together it is an intere
sting story. “In my end is my beginning”.\nHi\, All. Below is the provisio
nal program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as us
ual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to
face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 G
ary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Bra
d Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring
recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea
Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Note
that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\nMarc C
olyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay
15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230313T181500
GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001
6\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:On Kripke’s proof of Kripke completeness. Melvin Fitting (CUNY)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/on-kripkes-proof-of-krip
ke-completeness-melvin-fitting-cuny/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nSaul Kripke a
nnounced his possible world semantics in 1959\, and published his proof of
axiomatic completeness for the standard modal logics of the time in 1963.
It is very unlike the standard completeness proof used today\, which inv
olves a Lindenbaum/Henkin construction and produces canonical models. Kri
pke’s proof involved tableaus\, in a format that is difficult to follow\,
and uses tableau construction algorithms that are complex and somewhat err
or prone to describe. I will first discuss Kripke’s proof\, then the histo
rical origins of the modern version. Then I will show that completeness\,
proved Kripke style\, could actually have been done in the Lindenbaum/Hen
kin way\, thus simplifying things considerably. None of this is new but\,
with the parts collected together it is an interesting story. “In my end
is my beginning”.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for t
he Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.1
5-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (
No more Zoom.)
\n
\nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar
6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn S
impson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas
Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\n<
p>Apr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Tu
rin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special e
vent. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoo
n:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\,
Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n<
/HTML>
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7987@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:The sender-receiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackl
e the question of the conventionality of meaning. But many people who care
d about the conventionality of meaning did so because they thought it was
intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work\,
only a few attempts have been made to say anything about the nature of lo
gic and inference from the perspective of the sender-receiver model. This
talk will look at the what’s been said in that regard\, by Skyrms and othe
rs\, and suggest a few general lessons.\n—\nHi\, All. Below is the provisi
onal program for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as u
sual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face t
o face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6
Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Br
ad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague\nApr 10 Sprin
g recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern\nApr 24 Andre
a Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia\nMay 10 Special event. Not
e that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:\nMarc
Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMa
y 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230320T181500
GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001
6\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic and inference in the sender-receiver model. Shawn Simpson (Pi
tt)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-inference-in-t
he-sender-receiver-model-shawn-simpson-pitt/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThe sender-re
ceiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackle the question of the co
nventionality of meaning. But many people who cared about the conventional
ity of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to
the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work\, only a few attempts hav
e been made to say anything about the nature of logic and inference from t
he perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the wh
at’s been said in that regard\, by Skyrms and others\, and suggest a few g
eneral lessons.
\n—
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional progr
am for the Workshop this coming semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mond
ays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face mee
tings. (No more Zoom.)
\n
\nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20
Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3
Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iac
ona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 S
pecial event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session will run all
afternoon:
\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bo
chum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7990@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:What we call first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated\
, in a certain guise\, by Peirce around 1885 and championed\, albeit in id
iosyncratic form\, by Zermelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterize s
uch logics model- and proof-theoretically and argue that they constitute e
xploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain-dependent gener
ality. Whereas a logic\, or family of such\, can be of interest for any o
f a variety of reasons\, we suggest that one of those reasons might be tha
t said logic fosters some clarification regarding just what qualifies as a
logical concept\, a logical operation\, or a logical law.\n \nNote: The p
ublished paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.\nHi\
, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semes
ter. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205.
We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)\n \nFeb 27 Lio
nel Shapiro\, UConn\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC\nMar
20 Shawn Simpson\nMar 27 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nApr 3 Thomas Ferg
uson\, Prague\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting\nApr 17 Branden Fitelson\,
Northeastern\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin\nMay 1 Samara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the session wil
l run all afternoon:\nMarc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\
, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230327T181500
GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center Room 9205/9206 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 1001
6\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:First-order logics over fixed domain. Gregory Taylor (CUNY)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/first-order-logics-over-
fixed-domain-gregory-taylor-cuny/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nWhat we call
first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated\, in a certain guise\, b
y Peirce around 1885 and championed\, albeit in idiosyncratic form\, by Ze
rmelo in papers from the 1930s. We characterize such logics model- and pr
oof-theoretically and argue that they constitute exploration of a clearly
circumscribed conception of domain-dependent generality. Whereas a logic\
, or family of such\, can be of interest for any of a variety of reasons\,
we suggest that one of those reasons might be that said logic fosters som
e clarification regarding just what qualifies as a logical concept\, a log
ical operation\, or a logical law.
\n
\nNote: Th
e published paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.
\nHi\, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this comi
ng semester. Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Ro
om 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)
\n<
p> \nFeb 27 Lionel Shapiro\, UConn
\nMar 6 Gary Ostertag\, GC
\nMar 13 Mel Fitting GC
\nMar 20 Shawn Simpson
\nMar 27
Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nApr 3 Thomas Ferguson\, Prague
\nApr 10 Spring recess. No meeting
\nApr 17 Branden Fite
lson\, Northeastern
\nApr 24 Andrea Iacona\, Turin
\nMay 1 Sam
ara Burns\, Columbia
\nMay 10 Special event. Note that this
is a Wednesday and the session will run all afternoon:
\nM
arc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)\, Daniel Skurt (Bochum)
\nMay 15 Maciej Sendłak\, Warsaw
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-7941@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:New School for Social Research
CONTACT:https://event.newschool.edu/jocelynbenoist
DESCRIPTION:Western metaphysics is based on the opposition between reality
and appearance. This construction essentially rests on a visual model\, or
more exactly on some staging of what visual experience is.\nI am going to
question the basis of this metaphysics\, by taking into account the reali
ty of appearances and reflecting on their various uses\, in particular art
istic ones. This path will be taken in the first place by shifting the foc
us of philosophical analysis from visual to acoustic models. Thus\, I will
envisage a realism of echoes\, as opposed to the metaphysics of shadows.
\nBiography:\nJocelyn Benoist\, born in 1968\, is Professor at the univers
ity Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne\, where he teaches Contemporary Philosophy\,
and currently a member of the ‘Institut Universitaire de France’. He has
dedicated his early work to phenomenology and the bridges between phenomen
ology and early Analytic philosophy. For some time he was the Director of
the Husserl Archive of Paris at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Then\, he de
veloped a personal investigation into the meaning of realism in philosophy
. He has published many books\, including recently: Toward a Contextual Re
alism\, H.U.P.\, 2021\, and Von der Phänomenologie zum Realismus\, Mohr Si
ebeck\, 2022.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230330T180000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230330T200000
GEO:+40.73702;-73.992243
LOCATION:Wolff Conference Room/D1103 @ 6 E 16th St\, New York\, NY 10003\,
USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Echoes. Beyond the opposition between appearance and reality. Jocel
yn Benoist
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/echoes-beyond-the-opposi
tion-between-appearance-and-reality-jocelyn-benoist/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nWestern metap
hysics is based on the opposition between reality and appearance. This con
struction essentially rests on a visual model\, or more exactly on some st
aging of what visual experience is.
\nI am going to question the basi
s of this metaphysics\, by taking into account the reality of appearances
and reflecting on their various uses\, in particular artistic ones. This p
ath will be taken in the first place by shifting the focus of philosophica
l analysis from visual to acoustic models. Thus\, I will envisage a realis
m of echoes\, as opposed to the metaphysics of shadows.
\nBiography:
\nJocelyn Benoist\, born in 1968\, is Pro
fessor at the university Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne\, where he teaches Cont
emporary Philosophy\, and currently a member of the ‘Institut Universitair
e de France’. He has dedicated his early work to phenomenology and the bri
dges between phenomenology and early Analytic philosophy. For some time he
was the Director of the Husserl Archive of Paris at the Ecole Normale Sup
érieure. Then\, he developed a personal investigation into the meaning of
realism in philosophy. He has published many books\, including recently: <
em>Toward a Contextual Realism\, H.U.P.\, 2021\, and Von der Phänomen
ologie zum Realismus\, Mohr Siebeck\, 2022.
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8003@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U
CONTACT:https://universityseminars.columbia.edu/seminars/comparative-philos
ophy/
DESCRIPTION:When someone is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of th
at state? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to an
swering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a con
straint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusion
s it might be used to establish. Here I examine different candidate direc
tions of explanation between consciousness and inner awareness. I interpr
et the metaphor of consciousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use th
e metaphor to distinguish between his view and contemporary higher-order t
heories of consciousness. I then turn to explain why the memory argument
fails. The first main problem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contemporar
y defenders\, there is no good way to use the argument to reach a conclusi
on about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the propos
ed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic\, in tension both
with ancient objections as well as current psychology.\nWith responses fro
m Lu Teng (NYU Shanghai)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T173000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230505T193000
GEO:+40.806753;-73.959136
LOCATION:Faculty House\, Columbia U @ 64 Morningside Dr\, New York\, NY 100
27\, USA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Speak\, Memory: Dignāga\, Consciousness\, and Awareness. Nicholas S
ilins (Cornell)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/speak-memory-dignaga-con
sciousness-and-awareness-nicholas-silins-cornell/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nWhen someone
is in a conscious state\, must they be aware of that state? The Buddhist
philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by
leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I be
gin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to es
tablish. Here I examine different candidate directions of explanation bet
ween consciousness and inner awareness. I interpret the metaphor of consc
iousness as a lamp that lights itself\, and use the metaphor to distinguis
h between his view and contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness
. I then turn to explain why the memory argument fails. The first main p
roblem is that\, contrary to Dignāga’s contemporary defenders\, there is n
o good way to use the argument to reach a conclusion about all conscious s
tates. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint
on memory is highly problematic\, in tension both with ancient objections
as well as current psychology.
\nWith responses from Lu Teng (NYU Sh
anghai)
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:comparative\,consciousness\,mind
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8019@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:This semester\, we will meet as usual on Mondays\, 4.15-6.15\,
followed by a trip to the pub for all those who would like to go. The roo
m is yet to be determined. Meetings will be face to face only. Below is th
e provisional program for the semester. Details of each meeting will be an
nounced on a weekly basis\, as usual.\nNote that the first meeting will be
on September 11. Unfortunately we lose several Mondays towards the start
of the semester because of CUNY holidays. There is nothing currently sche
duled for Nov 20 or Dec 11. Whether we fill those slots is a decision yet
to be made\; but if you would like one of them\, let us know.\n \nSept 4.
GC closed. No meeting\nSept 11 Francesco Paoli\, Cagliari\nSept 18 Will Na
va\, NYU\nSept 25 GC closed. No meeting\nOct 2 Brett Topey\, Saltzburg\nOc
t 9 GC closed. No meeting.\nOct 16 Yale Weiss\, GC\nOct 23 Melissa Fusco\,
Columbia\nOct 30 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany\nNov 6 Alex Citkin\, Priv
ate Researcher\nNov 13 Alex Skiles\, Rutgers\nNov 20 [GP in Germany]\nNov
27 Mircea Dumitru\, Bucharest\nDec 4 James Walsh\, NYU\nDec 11
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230911T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230911T181500
GEO:+40.748789;-73.984092
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 4419 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20230918T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231002T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231016T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231023T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231030T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231106T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231113T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231127T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231204T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20231211T161500
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic and Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-and-metaphysics-wo
rkshop-19/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThis semester
\, we will meet as usual on Mondays\, 4.15-6.15\, followed by a trip to th
e pub for all those who would like to go. The room is yet to be determine
d. Meetings will be face to face only. Below is the provisional program fo
r the semester. Details of each meeting will be announced on a weekly basi
s\, as usual.
\nNote that the first meeting will be on September 11.
Unfortunately we lose several Mondays towards the start of the semester b
ecause of CUNY holidays. There is nothing currently scheduled for Nov 20
or Dec 11. Whether we fill those slots is a decision yet to be made\; but
if you would like one of them\, let us know.
\n
\nSept 4. GC closed. No meeting
\nSept 11 Francesco Paoli\, Cagliari
\nSept 18 Will Nava\, NYU
\nSept 25 GC closed. No meeting
\nOct 2 Brett Topey\, Saltzburg
\nOct 9 GC closed. No me
eting.
\nOct 16 Yale Weiss\, GC
\nOct 23 Melissa Fusco\,
Columbia
\nOct 30 Brad Armour-Garb\, SUNY Albany
\nNov 6 Alex
Citkin\, Private Researcher
\nNov 13 Alex Skiles\, Rutgers
\nN
ov 20 [GP in Germany]
\nNov 27 Mircea Dumitru\, Bucharest
p>\n
Dec 4 James Walsh\, NYU
\nDec 11
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8136@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:CUNY
CONTACT:https://logic.commons.gc.cuny.edu/
DESCRIPTION:The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays f
rom 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only
at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisional schedule is as fo
llows:\nFeb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)\nFeb 12. NO MEETING\nFeb 19. NO MEETING
\nFeb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)\nMar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)\nMar 11. Otávi
o Bueno (Miami)\nMar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)\nMar 25. Dan Marshal
l (Lingnan)\nApr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)\nApr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)\nA
pr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)\nApr 22. NO MEETING\nApr 29. Anandi Hatt
iangadi (Stockholm)\nMay 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240205T161500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240205T181500
GEO:+40.748815;-73.984102
LOCATION:CUNY Grad Center 7395 @ 365 5th Ave\, New York\, NY 10016\, USA
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240226T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240304T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240311T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240318T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240325T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240401T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240408T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240415T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240429T161500
RDATE;TZID=America/New_York:20240506T161500
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/logic-metaphysics-worksh
op-4/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\n
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mond
ays from 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in
-person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisi
onal schedule is as follows:
\n
Feb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)
\n
Fe
b 12. NO MEETING
\n
Feb 19. NO MEETING
\n
Feb 26. Matteo Plebani
(Turin)
\n
Mar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)
\n
Mar 11. Otávio Bueno (M
iami)
\n
Mar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)
\n
Mar 25. Dan Mar
shall (Lingnan)
\n
Apr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)
\n
Apr 8. Asya
Passinsky (CEU)
\n
Apr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)
\n
Apr 22.
NO MEETING
\n
Apr 29. Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm)
\n
May 6.
Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)
\n
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:logic\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ai1ec-8032@www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress
DTSTAMP:20240329T090305Z
CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Columbia U
CONTACT:https://philosophy.columbia.edu/content/colloquia-lectures-2023-202
4
DESCRIPTION:Verity Harte is a specialist in ancient philosophy\, with parti
cular research interests in ancient metaphysics\, epistemology and psychol
ogy\, especially of Plato and Aristotle. She is the author of Plato on Par
ts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure\, and is the editor of several
important books on ancient philosophy.
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240215T161000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240215T180000
GEO:+40.807536;-73.962573
LOCATION:716 Philosophy Hall @ 116th and Broadway\, New York\, NY 10027\, U
SA
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Verity Harte (Yale)
URL:https://www.noahgreenstein.com/wordpress/event/verity-harte-yale/
X-COST-TYPE:free
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nVerity Harte
is a specialist in ancient philosophy\, with particular research interests
in ancient metaphysics\, epistemology and psychology\, especially of Plat
o and Aristotle. She is the author of Plato on Parts and Wholes: The M
etaphysics of Structure\, and is the editor of several important book
s on ancient philosophy.
\n
X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:ancient\,metaphysics
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR