Mar
18
Mon
Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 18 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

Two ways of giving an epistemic justification of basic logical principles will be introduced, intuition-based accounts and concept or meaning constitution-based accounts. We will briefly consider different versions of these views and argue that they face parallel dilemmas. While ‘robust’ accounts are subject to what I call the ‘adoption problem,’ ‘weak’ accounts fail to ground our basic inferential dispositions. Either way, intuitions and meaning-constituting rules turn out to be irrelevant. A more general moral for the epistemology of logic and its priorities will be drawn from the discussion.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Mar
25
Mon
Kit Fine (NYU): A Theory of the Conditional. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 25 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

Abstract: I provide a truth-maker semantics for the conditional and consider the application to imperative and deontic conditionals.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Apr
1
Mon
What does it mean that Contradiction is the Norm of Truth? Elena Ficara (Paderborn) Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Apr 1 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

In my talk I argue for the thesis CT: contradiction is the norm of truth, and ask about its relevance for contemporary philosophical logic. I first present three positions in the history of philosophy that have advocated some versions of CT, namely Plato’s idea of the “dialectical gymnastics” in the Parmenides (Plato, Parmenides 136 B-E), Aristotle’s notion of dialectics in the Topics (Aristotle, Topics I, 2-3) and Metaphysics (Aristotle, Met III 1, 995 a 24-29), and Hegel’s contradictio est regula veri (Hegel Werke 2, 533), then derive from them some answers to the questions:

What is meant by “contradiction” in CT?

What is meant by “truth” in CT?

What is meant by “norm” in CT?

I will show that to examine the meaning of CT in historical perspective is useful to understand the seeds of genuine glut theories.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Apr
5
Fri
Intersubjectivity and Interpretation: CUNY Grad Conference 2019 @ CUNY Grad Center, rm tba
Apr 5 all-day

In ethics, in epistemology, in philosophy of mind and even (Searlean protestations notwithstanding) in ontology interest has steadily been growing in the idea that intersubjectivity is a central concept for understanding various aspects of our world. Similarly, the concept of interpretation has come to attention in a new light as a key means by which the interactions between subjectivities is mediated. This line of research raises a number of philosophical questions:

– What is intersubjectivity? Can it be given ‘a clear explanation’? In what relation does it stand to objectivity? In what relation does it stand to the first-person and second-person perspectives?

– What is interpretation? What is it to interpret another person’s behaviour as that of a genuine subject of experience? Is this notion of interpretation the same as that which we employ when speaking of interpreting language, rules, art, or data?

– Does intersubjectivity require interpretation? Must we rely on interpretive practices in order to make sense of others as subjects? If so, what implications might this have for the concept of intersubjectivity, and those practices and entities that might depend upon it?

– Does interpretation require intersubjectivity? Is there a sense of interpretation for which one cannot genuinely interpret something without taking it to be the result of intentional action on the part of a subject, produced for other subjects? And if so, what implications might that have for our understanding of interpretive practices?

– How do these questions connect with issues in areas of philosophy such as epistemology, aesthetics, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, social philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, political theory?

The keynote speaker will be Jay Garfield, who will deliver a talk on “The Second Person: Reflexivity and Reflection”.

We are pleased to invite abstracts sufficiently in the spirit of the project theme of no more than 1,000 words. Abstracts should:

– Outline the paper’s principal argument(s).

– Give a good sense of the paper’s philosophical contribution(s).

– Be anonymized.

The deadline for abstracts is January 19th, 2019. Abstracts should be e-mailed to 2019cunygradconference@gmail.com. Please include with your submission a cover page that includes your name, affiliated institution, contact information, and title of paper.

We will accept submissions from any area of philosophy, and from any philosophical tradition. We strongly encourage participants from groups whose voices are disproportionately excluded from philosophical discourse to submit abstracts.

https://philevents.org/event/show/68066

Apr
8
Mon
Classical Logic and the Strict Tolerant Hierarchy (Chris Scambler) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Apr 8 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

In this talk I will do three things. First: I will present the central results from Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc’s recent paper “A hierarchy of classical and paraconsistent logics” (forthcoming in the JPL) along with some generalizations derived by observing certain symmetries; second, I will discuss the relation between the strict tolerant logics and classical logic, K3 and LP; third, I will try to convey the exact state of uncertainty about the philosophical significance of the foregoing I find myself in on the day.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Apr 8 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Apr
15
Mon
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Apr 15 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Structural Counterfactuals and the Importation Problem (Jenn McDonald). Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Apr 15 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

Structural causal models lend themselves to an analysis of counterfactuals – a structural semantics of counterfactuals. The basic idea is that a causal model allows for the clear and precise evaluation of any counterfactual encoded by it. Many argue that a structural semantics is superior to a more traditional similarity semantics, in part due to the latter’s independence from any notion of similarity(Galles & Pearl, 1998; Gallow, 2016; Hiddleston, 2005; Hitchcock, 2018; Pearl, 2000; Starr, 2019). I argue, though, that this is too quick. A similarity semantics employs the notion of similarity to answer what Priest (2018) calls the importation problem– the question of what information is to be held fixed in a counterfactual evaluation. I argue that where similarity semantics relies on an unarticulated notion of similarity, a structural semantics relies on an unarticulated notion of aptness. The superiority of structural semantics depends on its ability to deliver on a principled guide to determining which model(s) is apt. In this talk I go some way towards providing this guide.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY

Apr
29
Mon
Mapping the Moral Realm: The Philosophy of Stefan Bernard Baumrin @ CUNY Grad Center, C197
Apr 29 @ 1:30 pm – 4:30 pm

STEFAN BERNARD BAUMRIN was a husband, father, philosopher, lawyer, colleague, teacher, and friend. As a professional philosopher, Baumrin wrote sparingly, but incisively, on moral and political philosophy, medical ethics, the history of philosophy, and on matters of both theoretical and practical import. We, his students, colleagues, and most importantly friends, celebrate his memory with this symposium on his philosophy.

THE PROGRAM

Welcome

Professors David Rosenthal and Manfred Philipp

Session I

I. “Baumrin’s Hobbes”: Rosamond Rhodes

II. “A possibility for Moore’s Faulty Fallacy” Mark Sheehan

Discussion

Break (Light Refreshments)

Session II

I.“Baumrin on Autonomy” Katherine Mendis

II. “‘Physician, Stay Thy Hand!’ Revisited” Kyle Ferguson

III. “Our Immorality” Joseph S. Biehl

Discussion

Farewell

PARTICIPANTS

DAVID ROSENTHAL, PhD, is professor of philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center, and Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Concentration in Cognitive Science there. He taught at Lehman College from 1971 to 2009. He works mainly in philosophy of mind.

MANFRED PHILIPP, PhD, is professor emeritus at the CUNY Graduate Center and at Lehman College. He was Chair of CUNY’s University Faculty Senate, and member of the CUNY Board of Trustees and of the CUNY Research Foundation Board of Directors. He was President of the CUNY Academy for the Humanities & Sciences, Board President of the Fulbright Association in Washington, and President of the US Alumni Association for the German Academic Exchange Service. At Lehman College he was a Department Chair and Chapter Chair of the Professional Staff Congress of CUNY. He currently serves as a Trustee of the Belle Zeller Scholarship Fund for CUNY.

ROSAMOND RHODES, PhD, is Professor of Medical Education and Director of Bioethics Education at Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY, and Professor of Bioethics and Associate Director of the Clarkson-Mount Sinai Bioethics Program. She writes on a broad array of issues in bioethics and has published more than 200 papers and chapters. She is co-editor of The Human Microbiome: Ethical, Legal and Social Concerns (Oxford University Press, 2013), The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics (Blackwell, 2007), Medicine and Social Justice: Essays on the Distribution of Health Care (Oxford University Press, first edition 2002; second edition 2012), Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate (Routledge, 1998), and the author of the forthcoming monograph, The Trusted Doctor: Medical Ethics and Professionalism (Oxford University Press, 2019).  Professor Rhodes also serves on the editorial board of the journal Hobbes Studies and as Sovereign of the International Hobbes Association (2013-2018).

MARK SHEEHAN, PhD, leads the Oxford Biomedical Research Centre (BRC) Ethics Group and is Oxford BRC Ethics Fellow at the Ethox Centre in the Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford. He is Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Benet’s Hall and a Research Fellow at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics also in the University of Oxford. He is currently a member of the NICE’s Highly Specialised Technology Evaluation Committee, a member of the Health Research Authority’s National Research Ethics Advisors Panel, a member of the Thames Valley Healthcare Priorities Forum and Co-leader of the Ethical Analysis of Key Concepts GECiP sub-domain in the 100K Genome Project. He was a member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party on research in children, a member of the Royal College of General Practitioners Ethics Committee and an Associate Editor of the Journal of Medical Ethics.

KATHERINE MENDIS is a doctoral candidate in the philosophy program at the CUNY Graduate Center and a Clinical Professor of Bioethics at the CUNY School of Medicine, where she serves on the St. Barnabas Hospital Ethics Committee.  She has also been an Ethics Fellow at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai for several years.  She founded and for many years administered the CUNY Graduate Center Philosophy Program’s NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament pool, in which Stefan Baumrin was the only faculty participant.

KYLE FERGUSON is a PhD candidate in philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center.  He also teaches philosophy at Hunter College, CUNY, and medical ethics at Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.  He will soon defend his dissertation, “Metaethical Intentionalism and the Intersubjectivity of Morals,” a project he began with Stefan Baumrin and is completing under the supervision of Jesse Prinz.  This summer, he begins a postdoctoral fellowship at the Division of Medical Ethics at NYU School of Medicine.

JOSEPH S. BIEHL, PhD, is the founder and Executive Director of the Gotham Philosophical Society, Inc., a non-profit organization that uses philosophy to transform the civil, political, and educational institutions of New York City. Through its youth program, Young Philosophers of New York, it encourages elementary, middle, high school students to think critically, imaginatively, and normatively about their lives and the city they call home. Stefan Baumrin, who supervised Biehl’s dissertation, “The Ways of Wrongdoing: The Cognitivist’s Conundrum,” served on the Gotham Philosophical Society’s Board of Directors. Dr. Biehl is the co-editor of the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of the City (Routledge, 2019).

 

https://philevents.org/event/show/71574

A Mechanistic Conception of Metaphysical Grounding- Tommy Kivatinos. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Apr 29 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

A dominant theoretical framework in philosophy of science employs the notion of mechanistic dependence to elucidate how higher-level, less fundamental phenomena depend upon and arise out of lower-level, more fundamental phenomena. To elucidate the same thing, literature in metaphysics employs the notion of grounding. As I argue, regardless of whether the notion of mechanistic dependence or the notion of grounding is used to theoretically portray how higher-level phenomena arise out of lower-level phenomena, what is captured by such portrayals is the same. Thus, these notions pick out the same features of the world. With this as my basis, I identify the notion of grounding with the notion of mechanistic dependence, and thus, construct a mechanistic conception of grounding. Since mechanistic dependence is understood in terms of mechanisms, my conception frames grounding in terms of mechanisms. Moreover, the contemporary notion of mechanisms is shaped by how mechanisms are represented via the mechanistic models and mechanistic explanations provided by science. Thus, because my conception grounding identifies grounding with mechanistic dependence and thereby frames grounding in terms of mechanisms, this conception suggests that the notion of grounding is to be tailored to and constrained by the mechanistic models and mechanistic explanations provided by science. This leads the mechanistic conception of grounding to reject a wide variety of conventional claims about grounding, and thus, to offer a treatment of grounding that is highly revisionary. To reinforce the plausibility of the mechanistic conception of grounding, I discuss how grounding and mechanistic dependence are associated with explanation. Whereas mechanistic dependence is associated with mechanistic explanation, grounding is associated with grounding explanation. For each kind of explanation, some higher-level phenomenon P is explained by appeal to some low-level phenomenon that Parises out of. As I argue, these forms of explanation can be plausibly identified. This greatly supports the mechanistic conception of grounding. For if grounding explanations employ the notion of grounding and mechanistic explanations employ the notion of mechanistic explanation, and these forms of explanation can be identified, this suggests that these explanations employ the same notion. And, just as the notions of grounding and mechanistic dependence capture the same connection between higher-level and lower-level phenomena, grounding explanation and mechanistic explanation do so as well. Finally, to argue that the mechanistic conception is to be preferred to standard conceptions, I argue that my conception offers a powerful defense of grounding from recent criticisms.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:

Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY

Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva

Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia

Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY

Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC

Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY

Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU

Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn

Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU

Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY

Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY

May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal

May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia

May 20. Vincent Peluce, CUNY