Calendar

Jun
10
Mon
Rutgers-Bristol Workshop on the Metaphysical Unity of Science @ Rutgers U, Newark. Conklin Hall 455
Jun 10 – Jun 11 all-day

Schedule – June 10th 

(Talks are aprox. 45 minutes with 30 minutes for Q&A)

9:00    Mazviita Chirimuuta, Emergence in Science & the Unity of Science

10:15  Joyce Havstad, TBA

12:00  Lunch, Marcus P&B.  Part of RUN and Newark’s Community Development.

2:00    Ricki Bliss, Fundamentality: From Epistemology to Metaphysics

3:15    Tuomas Tahko, Laws of Metaphysics for Essentialists

 

Schedule – June 11th 

9:00    Kelly Trodgon, Grounding and Explanatory Gaps

10:15  Stuart Glennan, Rethinking Mechanistic Constitution 

12:00  Lunch, Mercato Tomato Pie.

2:00    Alex Franklin,  How Do Levels Emerge?

3:15    Ken Aizawa, New Directions in Compositional Explanation: Two Cases Studies

Abstracts


Mazviita Chirimuuta – Emergence in Science & the Unity of Science

This paper considers the implications of recent accounts of emergent phenomena for the question of the unity of the sciences. I first offer a historical account of physicalism in its different guises since the mid 19th century. Two threads connecting these otherwise quite different views have been the rejection of emergent phenomena and the commitment to the unity of science. In section two I provide an exposition of emergence as presented in recent philosophy of science, where the key claim is that “parts behave differently in wholes”, based on the empirical finding of what Gillett (2016) calls “differential powers.” Gillett argues that the empirical evidence does not yet support the strong emergentist claim that there is downward causation or any other form of influence from the whole system to its constituent parts, but that such evidence might be obtained. In section 3 I propose instead that the question of whether or not the finding of differential powers is taken to provide overwhelming evidence for strong emergence depends on the further interpretation of differential powers, and ultimately on very broad metaphysical commitments. The interpretation of differential powers that is most resistant to objections from opponents of strong emergence involves a rejection of substance ontology, and hence the rejection of physicalism. Thus, as I conclude in section 4, philosophers should not wait in expectation for empirical results that will settle the question of whether or not there is strong emergence.  I offer a preliminary costs/benefits analysis of the different ontologies of differential powers, intended to aid the reader in their decision over the status of strong emergence. On the most radical interpretation, the usual physicalist conception of the unity of science must be rejected, while a different kind of metaphysical wholism stands in its place.

Joyce Havstad, TBC

Ricki Bliss – Fundamentality: from Epistemology to Metaphysics

In this talk, I explore what might follow for the metaphysics of fundamentality if we take seriously certain reasons to believe there is anything fundamental in the first place.

Tuomas Tahko – Laws of Metaphysics for Essentialists

There is a line of thought gathering momentum which suggests that just like causal laws govern causation, there needs to be something in metaphysics that governs metaphysical relations. Such laws of metaphysics would be counterfactual-supporting general principles that are responsible for the explanatory force of metaphysical explanations. There are various suggestions about how such principles could be understood. They could be based on what Kelly Trogdon calls grounding-mechanical explanations, where the role that grounding mechanisms play in certain metaphysical explanations mirrors the role that causal mechanisms play in certain scientific explanations. Another approach, by Jonathan Schaffer, claims to be neutral regarding grounding or essences (although he does commit to the idea that metaphysical explanation is ‘backed’ by grounding relations). In this paper I will assess these suggestions and argue that for those willing to invoke essences, there is a more promising route available: the unificatory role of metaphysical explanation may be accounted for in terms of natural kind essences.

Kelly Trogdon – Grounding and Explanatory Gaps

 Physicalism is the thesis that all mental facts are ultimately grounded by physical facts. There is an explanatory gap between the mental and physical, and many see this as posing a challenge to physicalism. Jonathan Schaffer (2017) disagrees, arguing that standard grounding connections involve explanatory gaps as a matter of course. I begin by arguing that Schaffer and others mischaracterize the explanatory gap between the mental and physical—it chiefly concerns what I call cognitive significance rather than priori implication or related notions. The upshot is that standard grounding connections normally don’t involve explanatory gaps. Then I consider two grounding-theoretic proposals about how to close explanatory gaps in the relevant sense, one involving structural equations (Schaffer 2017) and the other mechanisms (Trogdon 2018). While each of these proposals seeks to illuminate grounding connections, I argue that neither is helpful in closing the explanatory gap between the mental and physical.  

Stuart Glennan – Rethinking Mechanistic Constitution

  

The relationship between a mechanisms and its working parts is known as mechanistic constitution.   In this paper we review the history of the mechanistic constitution debate, starting with Salmon’s original account, and we  explain what we take to be the proper lessons to be drawn from the extensive literature surrounding Craver’s mutual manipulability account.  Based on our analysis, we argue that much of the difficulty in understanding the mechanistic constitution relation arises from a failure to recognize two different forms of mechanistic constitution — corresponding to two different kinds of relationships between a mechanism and the phenomenon for which it is  responsible.  First, when mechanisms produce phenomena, the mechanism’s parts are diachronic stages of the process by which entities act to produce the phenomenon.  Second, when mechanisms underlie some phenomenon, the phenomenon is a activity of a whole system, and the mechanism’s parts are those of the working entities that synchronically give rise to the phenomenon.  Attending to these different kinds of constitutive  relations will clarify the circumstances under which mechanistic phenomena can be said to occur at different levels.

Alex Franklin – How Do Levels Emerge?

 Levels terminology is employed throughout scientific discourse, and is crucial to the formulation of various debates in the philosophy of science. In this talk, I argue that all levels are, to some degree, autonomous. Building on this, I claim that higher levels may be understood as both emergent from and reducible to lower levels. I cash out this account of levels with a case study. Nerve signals are on a higher level than the individual ionic motions across the neuronal membrane; this is (at least in part) because the nerve signals are autonomous from such motions. In order to understand the instantiation of these levels we ought to identify the mechanisms at the lower level which give rise to such autonomy. In this case we can do so: the gated ion channels and pumps underwrite the autonomy of the higher level.

Ken Aizawa – New Directions in Compositional Explanation: Two Cases Studies

The most familiar approach to scientific compositional explanations is that adopted by the so-called “New Mechanists”. This approach focuses on compositional explanations of processes of wholes in terms of processes of their parts. In addition, the approach focuses on the use of so-called “interlevel interventions” as the means by which compositional relations are investigated. By contrast, on the approach I adopt, we see that there are compositional explanations of individuals in terms of their parts and properties of individuals in terms of the properties of their parts. In addition, I draw attention to the use of abductive methods in investigations of compositional relations. I illustrate my approach by use of Robert Hooke’s microscopic investigations of the cork and the development of the theory of the action potential.

Jun
13
Thu
Kant (Introduction to Ethics series) @ Justine's apartment
Jun 13 @ 6:30 pm – 7:30 pm

Philosophy-in-Manhattan
Thursday, June 13 at 6:30 PM

Justine Borer, adjunct professor of philosophy at John Jay College, will lead this meeting. We’ll continue our discussion of Kant from last week, this…

Price: 18.00 USD

Kant (Introduction to Ethics series)

Thursday, Jun 13, 2019, 6:30 PM

Justine’s apartment
47 East 88th Street New York, NY

1 Members Attending

Justine Borer, adjunct professor of philosophy at John Jay College, will lead this meeting. We’ll continue our discussion of Kant from last week, this time focusing on the intersection between his theory and the role of criminal punishment. The reading is Chapter 10 in “The Elements of Moral Philosophy,” 8th edition, by Rachels (available to buy, o…

Check out this Meetup →

Jun
20
Thu
Virtue ethics (Introduction to Ethics series) @ Justine's apartment
Jun 20 @ 6:30 pm – 7:30 pm

Philosophy-in-Manhattan
Thursday, June 20 at 6:30 PM

Justine Borer, adjunct philosophy professor at John Jay College, will lead this meeting. We’ll discuss virtue ethics (the theory that moral goodness i…

Price: 18.00 USD

Virtue ethics (Introduction to Philosophy series)

Thursday, Jun 20, 2019, 6:30 PM

Justine’s apartment
47 East 88th Street New York, NY

1 Members Attending

Justine Borer, adjunct philosophy professor at John Jay College, will lead this meeting. We’ll discuss virtue ethics (the theory that moral goodness is based on certain personality traits). The reading is Chapter 12 in “The Elements of Moral Philosophy,” 8th edition, by Rachels (available to buy, or to rent for approximately $20, on Amazon).

Check out this Meetup →

Jun
21
Fri
Public Philosophy and Theology in a Digital Context @ Public Square Larini Room
Jun 21 all-day

This conference will discuss the role of digital spaces such as social media in being a public philosopher or theologian. The conference will choose papers that explore different digital platforms, how these platforms can aid in being a public philosopher or theologian, as well as the specific challenges these spaces pose. Sessions will explore how digital spaces have become arenas for philosophers and theologians to discuss ideas with other scholars and with the public, and how the discussion of concepts in this format affects the delivery and reception of the ideas. We will solicit papers that specifically discuss how digital spaces can positively facilitate the goals of public philosophy. Internet spaces are an important tool for the contemporary public philosopher and the full implications of their usage has not yet been fully explored.

Main speakers: Barry Lam, Vassar College

Contact Information

Katherine G. Schmidt, Ph.D.
Theology and Religious Studies
1000 Hempstead Avenue
Rockville Centre, NY 11571-5002
516.323.3362
Kimberly S. Engles, Ph.D.
Theology and Religious Studies
1000 Hempstead Avenue
Rockville Centre, NY 11571-5002
516.323.3341

http://connect.molloy.edu/s/869/alumni/index.aspx?sid=869&pgid=2173&gid=1&cid=3727&ecid=3727&post_id=0

Jun
26
Wed
Workshop on German Aesthetics @ Lowenstein, Plaza View Room (12th Floor)
Jun 26 all-day

Session I – Chair: Michael Begun (Fordham)

10:00 – Samantha Matherne (Harvard University)

“Rethinking Kantian Aesthetic Normativity”

11:30 – Wiebke Deimling (Clark University)

“Kant’s Theory of Tragedy”

1:00 – Lunch Break

Session II – Chair: Daryl Tress (Fordham)

2:30 – Melissa Zinkin (SUNY Binghamton)

“Aesthetic Judgment, the Generation of Concepts, and Cognitive Mastery in Kant”

4:00 – Jay Bernstein (New School for Social Research)

“Kant and Adorno on Mind and World: From Wild Beauties to Spiral Jetty

 

Sponsored by the Fordham Philosophy Department’s German Philosophy Group

Contact: Reed Winegar (bwinegar@fordham.edu)

Jun
27
Thu
What is the ideal ethical theory? (Introduction to Ethics series) @ Justine's apartment
Jun 27 @ 6:30 pm – 7:30 pm

Philosophy-in-Manhattan
Thursday, June 27 at 6:30 PM

Justine Borer, adjunct philosophy professor at John Jay College, will lead this meeting. We’ll review the ethical theories discussed throughout the In…

Price: 18.00 USD

What is the ideal ethical theory? (Introduction to Ethics series)

Thursday, Jun 27, 2019, 6:30 PM

Justine’s apartment
47 East 88th Street New York, NY

1 Members Attending

Justine Borer, adjunct philosophy professor at John Jay College, will lead this meeting. We’ll review the ethical theories discussed throughout the Introduction to Ethics series, and try to decide what an ideal ethical theory would look like. There is no reading for this meeting.

Check out this Meetup →

Jul
5
Fri
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 201b
Jul 5 @ 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm
Poprock’s summer’s schedule is below — we’ll be meeting on Thursdays, from 3-5pm, at a Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right) at Columbia.
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”
July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)
July 18 — Kathryn Pendoley
July 25 — Andrew Lee
Aug 1 — Simon Brown
Aug 8 — tbd
Aug 12ish— Henry Shevlin
Aug 22 — Andrew Richmond
Jul
11
Thu
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 201b
Jul 11 @ 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm
Poprock’s summer’s schedule is below — we’ll be meeting on Thursdays, from 3-5pm, at a Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right) at Columbia.
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”
July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)
July 18 — Kathryn Pendoley
July 25 — Andrew Lee
Aug 1 — Simon Brown
Aug 8 — tbd
Aug 12ish— Henry Shevlin
Aug 22 — Andrew Richmond
Jul
18
Thu
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 201b
Jul 18 @ 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm
Poprock’s summer’s schedule is below — we’ll be meeting on Thursdays, from 3-5pm, at a Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right) at Columbia.
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”
July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)
July 18 — Kathryn Pendoley
July 25 — Andrew Lee
Aug 1 — Simon Brown
Aug 8 — tbd
Aug 12ish— Henry Shevlin
Aug 22 — Andrew Richmond
Jul
25
Thu
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 201b
Jul 25 @ 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm
Poprock’s summer’s schedule is below — we’ll be meeting on Thursdays, from 3-5pm, at a Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right) at Columbia.
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”
July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)
July 18 — Kathryn Pendoley
July 25 — Andrew Lee
Aug 1 — Simon Brown
Aug 8 — tbd
Aug 12ish— Henry Shevlin
Aug 22 — Andrew Richmond