Calendar

The notion of an occurrence of a proposition in discourse is the subject of the following observation:

(O) A proposition may occur in discourse, now asserted, now unasserted, and yetbe recognizably the same proposition.

I shall argue that the true significance of this observation is utterly distorted by Geach’s manner of construing of it — a construal widely known today as “the Frege-Geach point”. Though it serves as a basis for a contemporary understanding of logical form, strictly thought through, this way of construing (O) can be shown to lead to absurdity.  I will further argue that a straightforward, undistorted, acceptance of (O) is the key to a genuine philosophical logic.

— Irad Kimhi (The Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago)

Reception to follow.

While non-classical theories of truth that take truth to be transparent have some obvious advantages over any classical theory that evidently must take it as non-transparent, several authors have recently argued that there’s also a big disadvantage of non-classical theories as compared to their “external” classical counterparts: proof-theoretic strength. Some of them have concluded that this gives a decisive advantage to classical logic theories. Williamson has argued this too. While conceding the relevance of proof-theoretic strength to the choice of logic, I will argue that there is a natural way to beef up extant internal theories so as to remove their proof-theoretic disadvantage. Given this, the resulting internal theories should seem preferable to their external counterparts.

Logic and Metaphysics Workshop Spring 2020

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 David Papineau, GC

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

I explore the implications of the Tense Phrase deletion operation known as sluicing (Ross 1969) for the semantic and pragmatic literature on the Free Choice effect (Kamp 1973, von Wright 1969). I argue that the time-honored ‘I don’t know which’-riders on Free Choice sentences, traditionally taken to show that the effect is pragmatic, are sensitive to scope. Careful attention to such riders suggests that these sluices do not show cancellation on Free Choice antecedents in which disjunction scopes narrower than the modal.

Logic and Metaphysics Workshop Spring 2020

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 David Papineau, GC

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

This paper attempts to provide an exact truthmaker semantics for a family of normal modal propositional logic. The new semantics can be regarded as an “exactification” of the Kripke semantics in the sense of Fine (2014). For it offers an account of the accessibility relation on worlds in terms of the banning and allowing relations on states. The main idea is that an exact truthmaker for “Necessarily P” is a state that bans the exact falsifiers of P from obtaining, and an exact truthmaker for “Possibly P” is a state that allows the exact verifiers of P to obtain.

Logic and Metaphysics Workshop

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 David Papineau, GC

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 David Papineau, GC

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

Some people fight for the rights of animals, I am fighting for the rights of rejected propositions. Following the approach suggested by Brentano and accepted and developed by Lukasiewicz, I study the deductive systems that treat asserted and rejected propositions equally, in the same way. By “statement,” we understand the expressions of form +A – “A being asserted”, and -A$ – “A being rejected”, where A is a proposition. Accordingly, by a “unified logic,” we understand a consequence relation between sets of statements and statements. We introduce the unified deductive systems which can be used to define the unified logics. Unified deductive system consists of axioms, anti-axioms, and the multiple conclusion inference rules which premises and conclusions are the statements rather than the propositions. In particular, we study the deductive systems that contain the coherency rule, which means that one cannot assert and reject the same proposition at the same time, and the fullness rule, which means that each proposition is either asserted or rejected. Inclusion of these rules though does not enforce the law of excluded middle, or the law of non-contradiction on the propositional level.

Logic and Metaphysics Workshop

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 David Papineau, GC

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

Modality seems distinctively pluralistic: there are many kinds of possibility and necessity (logical, physical, metaphysical, normative, etc.), which seem significantly different from one another. However, the various modalities also seem to have much in common–perhaps simply in virtue of being kinds of modality. Should we suppose that there is some fundamental modality, one to which all the other modalities can be somehow reduced? Modal Monism says yes. Particularly, monists may treat the different modalities as relative to some absolute modality. However, Monism, reductionism, and absolute modality need not be a package. Specifically, the claim that some modality is absolute can be understood in ways which are independent of Monism and reductionism. In this talk, I raise concerns for monistic and reductionist programs in modal metaphysics, while also arguing that the notion of absolute modality is ambiguous. Depending on the framework, it means different things and captures quite different desiderata. After exploring several ways of disambiguating  it, I suggest that while we possess and deploy a concept of absolute modality, that may be empty; or, otherwise put, no modal truth has the property of being “absolute”. I propose a pluralistic picture that still treats the different modalities as relative, while avoiding both absolute modality and reductionism. Importantly, the proposal won’t impact the philosophical significance of metaphysical modality.

Logic and Metaphysics Workshop

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 David Papineau, GC

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

For over a hundred years econometricians, epidemiologists, educational sociologists and other non-experimental scientists have used asymmetric correlational patterns to infer directed causal structures. It is odd, to say the least, that no philosophical theories of causation cast any light on why these techniques work. Why do the directed causal structures line up with the asymmetric correlational patterns? Judea Pearl says that the correspondence is a “gift from the gods”. Metaphysics owes us a better answer. I shall attempt to sketch the outline of one.

Logic and Metaphysics Workshop

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 David Papineau, GC

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 David Papineau, GC

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING