There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ be.
Thus wrote Friedrich Nietzsche, and we at the Gotham Philosophical Society agree. We believe that to make sense of something, we need to see it from as many sides as possible.
That is why we are launching a new discussion series with the aim of contributing to the pursuit of New York’s objectivity. We will be taking on all manner of ideas, issues, and topics of significance to New Yorkers, and approaching them from legal, artistic, and philosophical perspectives. We believe that a philosophical understanding cut-off from our legal reality is irrelevant, and that laws uninspired by our poetic imagination are without soul.
With Dr. Joseph S. Biehl (Gotham Philosophical Society), Jane LeCroy, Shahabuddeen Ally
So please join us as we kick-off this series with a look at the concept of truth, the concept that is central to human discourse. What is truth? How can we know it? And what can it mean to say, as so many have, that we are now living in a ‘post-truth’ world? We’ll ask these questions and more, Monday, December 4, 2017, at Le Chélie NYC at 8pm.
The paper draws on the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on philosophical grounds. GG theorists tend to see their views as broadly speaking Aristotelian. And yet they address particular actions in isolation: agents, the thought goes, are motivated to perform a given action by seeing the action or its outcome as good. The paper argues that the GG is most compelling if we distinguish between three levels: the motivation of small-scale actions, the motivation of mid-scale actions or pursuits, and the desire to have one’s life go well. The paper analyzes the relation between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation in terms of Guidance, Substance, and Motivational Dependence. In its Aristotelian version, the argument continues, the GG belongs to the theory of the human good.
Katja Maria Vogt, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She specializes in ancient philosophy, ethics, and normative epistemology. In her books and papers, she focuses on questions that figure both in ancient and in contemporary discussions: What are values? What kind of values are knowledge and truth? What does it mean to want one’s life to go well?
Presented by The New School for Social Research (NSSR) Philosophy Department.
A Lawyer, A Poet, and A Philosopher Walk into a Bar to talk about Truth in the City…
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ be.
Thus wrote Friedrich Nietzsche, and we at the Gotham Philosophical Society agree. We believe that to make sense of something, we need to see it from as many sides as possible.
That is why we are launching a new discussion series with the aim of contributing to the pursuit of New York’s objectivity. We will be taking on all manner of ideas, issues, and topics of significance to New Yorkers, and approaching them from legal, artistic, and philosophical perspectives. We believe that a philosophical understanding cut-off from our legal reality is irrelevant, and that laws uninspired by our poetic imagination are without soul.
So please join us as we kick-off this series with a look at the concept of truth, the concept that is central to human discourse. What is truth? How can we know it? And what can it mean to say, as so many have, that we are now living in a ‘post-truth’ world? We’ll ask these questions and more.
Wednesday, January 17, 2018 at 8p.m. At Las Tapas Bar and Restaurant, 808 W 187th Street, New York, NY 10033. (Take the A Train) Admission is $15, which includes one complimentary tapa and drink. Reservations are recommended (646.590.0142)
Shahabuddeen Ally is a practicing lawyer specializing in the field of family law. He also teaches law at Long Island University. He was formerly Assistant Corporation Counsel at the New York City Law Department, as well as Staff Attorney for the City of New York, Administration for Children’s Services. Shah was recently reelected as Chairperson of Manhattan Community Board 12.
Jane LeCroy is a poet, performance artist and educator who fronts the band The Icebergs and was a part of Sister Spit, the famed west coast women’s poetry troupe. Since 1997 Jane has been publishing student work and teaching writing, literature and performance to all ages through artist-in-the-schools organizations such as Teachers & Writers Collaborative and DreamYard, and as adjunct faculty at the university level. Her poetry book, Names was published by Booklyn as part of the award winning ABC chapbook series, purchased by the Library of Congress along with her braid! Signature Play, her multimedia book from Three Rooms Press, features a poem that was nominated for a Pushcart Prize.
Joseph S. Biehl, earned earned a B.A. in philosophy from St. John’s University and a Ph.D. from the Graduate School and University Center, CUNY. He has written on ethics, meta-ethics, and politics. He has taught philosophy in New York and in Cork, Ireland, and is a member of the Governing Board and former co-director of the Felician Institute for Ethics and Public Affairs. He is the founder and executive director of the Gotham Philosophical Society and Young Philosophers of New York.
The Pratyabhijñā Śaiva tradition, as first systematized by Utpaladeva (10th century) and elaborated by Abhinavagupta (10th-11th century), follows a number of other classical Indian philosophical traditions in 1) fully acknowledging that Buddhist Vijñānavādins claim to account for the diversity manifest in the conventional world through an appeal to beginningless karmic imprints; and 2) utterly rejecting that this solution avoids circularity. To sum up the Śaiva critique: a Vijñānavādin cannot avoid the question of what causes the diversity of experiences in the conventional world by appealing to beginningless causal processes because these processes themselves require the existence of some kind of real stuff that has the capacity to manifest in diverse forms. These Śaivas hone their argument in relation to a Dharmakīrtian view of ultimate consciousness as utterly beyond causal relations—a view that Dharmakīrti (7th century) uses to brush aside any questions about the real relationship between conventional and ultimate reality as incoherent. These Śaivas argue that the question of how the variegation of a specific moment of awareness arises if no part of this variegation—including the variegation of the causes that produce it—is inherent to what is ultimately real is philosophically salient. Moreover, this question cannot be addressed simply by an appeal to beginningless ignorance. While an appeal to beginningless karmic imprints is perfectly sufficient to account for the differences between various karmic streams within the conventional world, it is not sufficient to account for the mere fact that there is differentiated stuff capable of entering into causal relations. The Pratyabhijñā Śaivas offer a complex and distinctive solution to this problem: while they affirm that ultimate reality is beginningless in the sense that it is beyond time, they also claim that time itself has a “beginning” in the expression of the nondual differentiation inherent to the ultimate itself. They further link the expression of time with the creation of the subject/object pairs that define conventional worlds—and use Dharmakīrti’s own apoha (exclusion) theory of concept formation to explain how this happens.
THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
Welcomes:
Catherine Prueitt (George Mason University)
With a response from:
Andrew Nicholson (Stony Brook University, SUNY)
Please save the following dates for our upcoming talks:
March 30: Kin Cheung (Moravian College)
April 13: Lara Braitstein (McGill University)
May 11: David Cummiskey (Bates College)
“Is Truth Dead?” asked Time Magazine last year. Since people clearly care about the truth, at least in mundane matters, truth is alive. If an airline agent tells you the flight to Dallas is leaving from Gate B16, you expect the flight to Dallas to be leaving from Gate B16, and complain sorely if it’s not.
But if the truth does still matter, why do we elect people who don’t seem to care what the truth is?
The answer to this question, argues philosopher Louise Antony, has partly to do with the structure of human knowledge, and partly to do with the structure of our society. We can’t do anything about the first matter, but we can do plenty about the second.
Louise Antony is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. She is the author of numerous essays on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and feminist theory. She is also a past president of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.
Contrary to Damien Keown (2001), who worries that metaphysical and epistemological inquiry may distract from ethical investigation, Bronwyn Finnigan and Koji Tanaka (2008) argue such questions may provide grounding for practical application of a Buddhist ethical path. I follow this line of inquiry into Buddhist theories of truth in order to better understand right speech as conceived in the Early Buddhist Suttas. I focus on what the Abhaya Sutta explicitly instructs and what it leaves out regarding the types of words the Tathagata does not say or has a sense of the proper time for saying them. K. N. Jayatilleke (1963) and Mark Siderits (1979) provide convincing evidence that contrary to popular characterizations of the
Buddhist theory of truth as pragmatic, Early Buddhist Suttas rest on some form of correspondence theory of truth. Siderits shows that at the very least, there is an uneasy tension between correspondence and pragmatic theories. I contrast their position with Francisca Cho and Richard K. Squier’s (2016) argument describing the Buddhist theory of truth as pragmatic based on the use of language and lies. I supplement Cho and Squier with Jonathan Silk’s (2008) work on truth and lies in Buddhist texts in order to argue that there may be an impasse on adjudicating Buddhist theories of truth.
With a response from:
Mark Siderits (Emeritus, Illinois State University)
The Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy (CSCP) is a University Seminar dedicated to the advancement of projects that draw on both western and non-western philosophy. The CSCP meets monthly on the campus of Columbia University and occasionally hosts conferences.
Please save the following dates for our upcoming talks:
March 30: Kin Cheung (Moravian College)
April 13: Lara Braitstein (McGill University)
May 11: David Cummiskey (Bates College)
Rutgers Workshop on Chinese Philosophy (RWCP) is designed to promote critical engagements and constructive dialogues between scholars of Chinese philosophy and Western analytic philosophy with the hope of bringing the study of Chinese philosophy into the mainstream of philosophical discourses within the Western academy. It is run every other April. The workshop is co-directed by Tao JIANG (Religion), Ruth Chang (Philosophy) and Stephen Angle (Wesleyan).
The theme and format of the fourth RWCP workshop is “Engagements with Western Philosophers.” Thirteen invited scholars will participate in the workshop, including seven experts on Chinese philosophy (one presentation will be jointly offered by two speakers) and six leading voices in the Western analytic philosophy.
Scholars of Chinese Philosophy:
Yong Huang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Sungmoon Kim (City University of Hong Kong)
Chenyang Li (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)
Li Kang (Vassar College)
JeeLoo Liu (California State University, Fullerton)
Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University) and Bradford Cokelet (University of Kansas)
Scholars of Western Philosophy:
Elizabeth Camp (Rutgers University)
Johann Frick (Princeton University)
Stephen Macedo (Princeton University)
Peter Railton (University of Michigan)
Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University)
Jennifer Whiting (University of Pittsburgh)
RSVP is required for attendance. Further information will be forthcoming in the spring of 2018.
The circa 9th century CE poet-saint Saraha enjoys a close association with spontaneity in both his reported actions and recorded works. This association leads him to be popularly read and remembered as a freewheeling antinomian sacred figure opposed to institutions, rituals, and even social norms. His appears to be a call to joyful chaos. But many of his verses invite readers towards a different kind of chaos, towards mental/perceptual chaos as the path towards correct conventional perception.
What does it mean to correctly perceive an object? Many Buddhist sources describe how perception functions, and theorize the differences between correct and incorrect perception. A related important distinction is made between conventional and ultimate truth in the discussion of the reality of phenomena even when correctly perceived. But this arguably epistemic distinction may also be understood as the difference between an ordinary person’s correct perception and a Buddha’s perception. I am not here exploring ultimate truth. I am interested in conventional truth, in what makes it true. Broadly, correct conventional perception is associated with the product of a rational mind processing sense perceptions fed to it by functioning sense organs, and conventional truth then is the experience of that reality. Correct conventional perception can be contrasted with incorrect conventional perception, which would be perception based on an irrational or deluded mind, or an experience based on damaged or non-functioning sense organs.
Saraha, however, sings a different tune. His work tells us that the very process of identifying and recognizing objects – what most of us would associate with the basic skills necessary to get around in the world – is itself deluded, its objects adventitious. He calls this kind of perception drenpa (dran pa; usually translated as mindfulness, memory, or recollection). In other words, he claims that our very perception of objects – no matter how carefully or clearly experienced – is evidence of our being deluded. In contrast, correct conventional perception is the undoing of that object-making, what he refers to as drenmé (dran med). Drenmé is an uncommon term the contexts of the two truths and meditation. Usually denoting a swoon or a coma, here it refers to a reversal or undoing of drenpa. What does it mean – if it means anything – to describe our perception of objects itself as evidence of our delusion? Can perception as object-making ever produce truth?
The Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy (CSCP) is a University Seminar dedicated to the advancement of projects that draw on both western and non-western philosophy. The CSCP meets monthly on the campus of Columbia University and occasionally hosts conferences.
Please save the following dates for our upcoming talks:
March 30: Kin Cheung (Moravian College)
April 13: Lara Braitstein (McGill University)
May 11: David Cummiskey (Bates College)
At the core of Kantian liberalism is a conception of the independent autonomous subject. On the other hand, the most central and distinguishing feature of Buddhist philosophy is the doctrine of no-self. It thus seems that Buddhists should reject Kantian liberalism. My larger project develops the connections between Buddhist perfectionism, liberalism, and principles of justice. In this paper, I focus on Buddhist and Kantian conceptions of self-constitution, but my ultimate concern is the significance of the doctrine of no-self to theories of justice.
Buddhists need some conception of a minimal self to account for the karmic-continuity of persons and also to provide an adequate account of the subjectivity of experience. I argue that we should reject the (Abhidharma) reductionist view of the self as a mere fiction that is reducible to its simpler and more basic parts. As is often noted, the Buddhist reductionist approach is similar to Derek Parfit’s view. Parfit also argues that there is no deep metaphysical self and that relations of personal identity are reducible to relations of psychological connectedness and causal continuity in a series of experiences. Christine Korsgaard has responded to Parfit’s reductionist view by developing a non-metaphysical account of Kantian agency and self-constitution. I argue that the Buddhist doctrine of no-self is consistent with a more minimal, non-substantial, emergent, view of the self. This approach, which is more fully developed by Evan Thomson, Matthew MacKenzie, Georges Dreyfus, and others, is surprisingly similar to Korsgaard’s practical conception of the self. As a result, the non-reductionist Buddhist approach is also not vulnerable to Korsgaard’s objection to reductionist views. In addition, I argue that the process of self-constitution is embedded in a recursive nexus of dependent origination, and reject Korsgaard’s conception of the independent autonomous subject, which she refers to as “over and above” its ends. In short, a Buddhist can accept Korsgaard’s basic account of self-constitution but nonetheless reject the Kantian idea of the independent autonomous subject. For Buddhists, the Kantian autonomous subject is instead part of the “primal confusion” that projects a reified subject-other division on experience. This confusion is the source of existential suffering, anxiety and stress, which characterizes too much of the human condition. The goal is to transcend the Kantian subject and internalize the pervasive interdependence of persons. Instead of the autonomous self, Buddhism embraces a perfectionist ideal, of a non-egocentric reorientation and re-constitution of the self.
Buddhists thus have reason to reject Kantian liberalism, if it is based on the autonomy and independence of persons. In his shift to Political Liberalism, John Rawls recasts the conception of the person, as “a self-originating source of valid claims,” and emphasizes that this conception is restricted to the political domain. It is part of a narrow conception of the “moral powers” of a free and equal citizen; it is not a metaphysical conception or comprehensive ideal. I conclude by exploring the contrast between Buddhist Perfectionism and Political Liberalism.
With a Response From:
Carol Rovane (Columbia University)
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Also, please visit our website:
http://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/
Co-Chairs
Professor Jonathan Gold
Associate Professor, Princeton University, Department of Religion
Professor Hagop Sarkissian
Associate Professor, The City University of New York, Baruch College | Graduate Center, Department of Philosophy
hagop.sarkissian@baruch.cuny.edu
Rapporteur
Jay Ramesh
A number of philosophers working on Buddhist traditions have recently explored similarities between the cultivated experience of not-self, and the clinical experience of depersonalization. In this talk, I will offer some reflections on this theme. But my primary aim will be to push a similar kind of exploratory project one step further. Drawing on tools from cognitive and computational neuroscience, as well as insights from Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy, I will explore some of the most significant similarities and differences between anomalous experiences evoked by meditation, and anomalous experiences that are commonly labeled as hallucinations. I will then argue that understanding how such experiences are produced offers a powerful framework for thinking about the socially and historically situated nature of everyday experience.