The full program can be viewed here.
The workshop will bring together philosophers working in ancient epistemology with those working in contemporary epistemology to discuss issues relevant to the debates in both fields.
It was assumed until recently that the distinction between doxa and epistêmê, key players in ancient epistemology, maps directly onto the contemporary distinction between knowledge and belief. Recent interpreters of Plato and Aristotle have challenged this assumption. Some argue that epistêmê is closer to understanding than to knowledge because (for example) it requires explanation rather than justification, cannot be transmitted by testimony, is hard to come by, and can only be had of a restricted range of objects. Others argue that doxa is narrower than belief, perhaps closer to opinion, because (for example) doxa is excluded by epistêmê while belief is entailed by knowledge, doxa is imprecise and unclear while these are not essential features of belief, and doxa too has a restricted range of objects.
Contemporary epistemology tackles issues that are related to the debates above. Is knowledge to be distinguished from understanding and if so, which one should be seen as the proper goal of inquiry? Does understanding have value over and above the value of knowledge? Much like Plato and Aristotle, epistemologists aim to elucidate the conceptual relations between knowledge, understanding, justification, explanation, epistemic authority, and testimony. In addition, contemporary epistemologists sometimes produce fictional genealogies of epistemic concepts to arrive at an improved understanding of our epistemic practices. If epistêmê and doxa are distinct from knowledge and belief in a way indicated above, then it seems appropriate to raise the question whether the actual history of epistemic concepts can help to improve these fictional genealogies.
The presentations are followed by a response and a general discussion.Papers by speakers who specialize in Ancient epistemology will be assigned to commentators who specialize in contemporary epistemology and vice versa.
Presenters: Gail Fine (Cornell), Richard Foley (NYU), Jane Friedman (NYU), Allison Hills (Oxford), Robert Pasnau (Colorado), Whitney Schwab (Baltimore/NYU), Katja Vogt (Columbia), Ralph Wedgwood (USC).
Respondents: John Bengson (Harvard), Hugh Benson (Oklahoma), Paul Boghossian (NYU), Toomas Lott (NYU/Tartu), Jessica Moss (NYU), James Pryor (NYU), Michael Strevens (NYU).
Organisers:
September 7, 2017, 7:00pm EST
email tl1972 at nyu
Jim Weatherall (University of California, Irvine)
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
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Metro Area Philosophy of Science group (MAPS) Presents:
Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Abstract: I argue that if we take the standard formulation of special relativity seriously, causation is frame-dependent. Thus, many ordinary causal claims require a parameter to specify the relevant frame of reference. This is in contrast to the widely-accepted belief that the causal structure of the world is objectively and absolutely determined by the light cone structure. Any event that can affect another (so the thought goes) must do so via light or matter, and the spacetime structure will tell us which of those came first, absolutely. For instance, according to Carl Hoefer (2009, 694, italics in original), if we assume that all signals travel slower than or equal to the speed of light, “we may take the light-cone structure of Minkowski spacetime as equally representing the causal structure of spacetime.” I argue that causation in relativistic spacetime is not so simple. Events can be extended in space and time, and events can be related to one another by distance and duration. Yet, according to special relativity, extension in space and time (i.e., distances and durations) are not invariant—they depend upon relative motion. Therefore, when ordinary events enter into causal relations, they do so relative to frames of reference, which can yield different causes and different effects. If you want to keep your promises, or bring about one outcome rather than another, you should take note of your reference frame.
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Abstract: Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics, sometimes known as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, was proposed as a solution to the quantum measurement problem. Both physicists and philosophers of physics have repeatedly claimed to be able to deduce the standard quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics alone. We will consider why this is impossible, then consider how Everett himself understood quantum probabilities. This will involve clearly distinguishing between typical and probable quantum worlds.
The 35th annual meeting of
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP)
October 21 – 22, 2017
Fordham University, Lincoln Center, New York
113 West 60th Street, New York, NY 10023
Corner of Columbus (9th) Avenue and West 60th Street
Sponsored by Fordham University
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP)
Conference Organizers
Tony Preus (apreus@binghamton.edu), Binghamton University
Daryl Tress (tress@fordham.edu), Fordham University
Registration for the Conference
There are some aspects of this conference that have changed from the way it has been done in the past:
· No Friday Plenary Session.
· No Food. Those who have been attending will remember that food is available in the snack bar just off the Atrium where we have held the Friday Evening sessions several times. In addition, there are several restaurants and a Starbucks close by.
· No Registration Fee as such. In order to cover the minimum expenses of putting on the program – badges, printed programs, paying some students to help with registration – we require that everyone who participates or attends be a member of SAGP for 2017/18. We’ll try to cover everything out of SAGP dues, and that will work only if we’re serious about all attendees being current dues-paying members of the Society. Membership forms and information about current membership status available from apreus@binghamton.edu.
· Fordham University security requires all visitors to the Lincoln Center Campus to register for the conference and receive a guest badge. Members of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy who are on the program will have a badge waiting for them when they arrive (we hope). Other current members who expect to attend, but are not on the program, should alert Preus (apreus@binghamton.edu) of their intention, in order to assure that a badge will be prepared for them. Current members who plan to attend are encouraged to volunteer to chair a session: a DRAFT program is included below to assist in planning for that!
· We hope to make it possible for persons who are not current members to join the Society for 2017/18 at the registration desk and get a badge, at least on Saturday morning.
Conference Location
All conference events take place at Fordham University, Lincoln Center campus, 60th St. & Columbus Ave, New York. This is on the western side of Manhattan, about two blocks from Columbus Circle and the southwestern border of Central Park. The closest subway stop for Fordham is the 59 Street/Columbus Circle stop, which is serviced by the blue lines (the A and C trains), the red line (the #1 train) and the orange line (the B and D trains).
Accommodations
The hotel closest to Fordham’s Lincoln Center campus is the Hudson Hotel (www.hudsonhotel.com), which provides a business rate (pending availability) if you identify yourself as affiliated with Fordham University.
Lodging can be found on a number of search vehicles like www.expedia.com, www.nyc.com/hotels/, hotels.com, or, www.nycgo.com/hotels (which is the site to which the Mayor’s office links). A number of sites allow you to search by regions within Manhattan. The three regions closest to Fordham are Central Park West (north of the campus), Clinton (“Hell’s Kitchen,” west and south of the campus), and Midtown West (south of the campus). Some sites allow you to search by landmarks: the closest one to Fordham is the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts (across the street from Fordham). The Lincoln Center area is one of the more expensive places to stay in the city, but around Bryant Park and the Empire State building (three stops from Columbus Circle on the red line), lodging is more reasonably priced.
Other useful links:
· Fordham University, Lincoln Center Information Page (http://www.fordham.edu/info/21454/lincoln_center_campus)
· Subway map (http://www.mta.info/nyct/maps/submap.htm)
· Bus map (www.mta.info/nyct/maps/busman.pdf)
The paper draws on the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on philosophical grounds. GG theorists tend to see their views as broadly speaking Aristotelian. And yet they address particular actions in isolation: agents, the thought goes, are motivated to perform a given action by seeing the action or its outcome as good. The paper argues that the GG is most compelling if we distinguish between three levels: the motivation of small-scale actions, the motivation of mid-scale actions or pursuits, and the desire to have one’s life go well. The paper analyzes the relation between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation in terms of Guidance, Substance, and Motivational Dependence. In its Aristotelian version, the argument continues, the GG belongs to the theory of the human good.
Katja Maria Vogt, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She specializes in ancient philosophy, ethics, and normative epistemology. In her books and papers, she focuses on questions that figure both in ancient and in contemporary discussions: What are values? What kind of values are knowledge and truth? What does it mean to want one’s life to go well?
Presented by The New School for Social Research (NSSR) Philosophy Department.
The CUNY Graduate Center Advanced Research Collaborative (ARC) and the Philosophy Program present a talk and book panel on:
RACIAL JUSTICE
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3 (Rooms 9204-5)
4:15-5:00 PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM LECTURE:
“Racial Justice”: Charles W. Mills, Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
5:00-5:05 Break
5:05-5:45 BOOK PANEL on Charles W. Mills’s 2017 book, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism
Frank M. Kirkland (CUNY Hunter College & the Grad Center)
John Pittman (CUNY John Jay College)
5:45-6:30 Q & A
6:30-7:30 BOOK PARTY—Philosophy common room, 7113 (food and drink)
How is the ancient exhortation to “know thyself” related to consolation, virtue, and the study of nature? How did the commitment to self-knowledge shift over the centuries in writings by Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and early modern natural philosophers? How did medieval women contribute to modern notions of self, self-knowledge, and knowledge of nature? This conference explores the meditative “reflective methodology” from its ancient roots, through medieval Christian, Muslim, and Jewish traditions to the so-called “new” methodologies of early modern science. Speakers include Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Pierre Force, Clémence Boulouque, Christia Mercer, and Pamela Smith.
Points of focus will be: (1) the relation between the ancient imperative to “know thyself” and medieval concerns to reflect on one’s self as a means to find ultimate truths; (2) the meditative genre as it developed from Augustine’s Confessions through Christian and Islamic spiritual exercises to late medieval Christian meditations and early modern kabbalist writings; (3) the continuity between medieval meditations and the reflective methodology of early modern science; and (4) the meditative genre’s afterlife in Freud, Foucault, Arendt, and contemporary science.
Conference co-sponsored by the Center for New Narratives in Philosophy, the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy, the Departments of Philosophy, French, English and Comparative Literature and the Maison Française
To download a PDF about this event click here.
Søren Kierkegaard’s most famous work, Fear and Trembling, has the distinction of drawing near-universal derision from scholars of political theory and ethics. Dr. Dinan suggests that Kierkegaard’s readers haven’t accounted for his return to Socratic political philosophy as a direct riposte to the politics of G.W.F. Hegel and his successors. He considers the implications of Kierkegaard’s use of the ‘questionable stratagem’ of Socratic irony in relation to politics, ethics, Christian faith, and philosophy. Kierkegaard is concerned not with destroying political philosophy, but with restoring its attentiveness to paradox.
Dr. Matt Dinan, Assistant Professor, St. Thomas University
The New York City Wittgenstein Workshop has the following workshops scheduled for this semester and more planned workshops to be announced soon.
All workshops are on Fridays from 4 to 6 pm in room D1106.
2/22 — Zed Adams (the New School) — History of the digital/analogue distinction in philosophy
4/19 — Nickolas Pappas (CUNY) — “Plato on the Opposite of Philosophy”
4/26 — Larry Jackson
5/03 — Nuno Venturinha (Nova University of Lisbon) — “Autobiographical Writing, Self-knowledge, and the Religious Point of View.”
5/10 — Pierre-Jean Renaudi (Lyon)
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates argues that justice is good not only for its consequences but also in and of itself. Challenged by Glaucon and Adeimantus, who suggest that all human interactions are inherently competitive and that being unjust could help you get the better in these conflicts, Socrates establishes that justice is good because it is harmony in the city and in the soul. If justice is a kind of health of the soul, then surely it is better to be just than unjust. This claim might ameliorate the concerns of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but I will argue that Plato does more than address the vision of justice brought forth by Socrates’ interlocutors. Particularly through the contrasts among the different kinds of lives that are either described or depicted in the Republic, Plato points his readers toward a conception of justice that reveals it as the ground of mutuality, reciprocity, dialogue and friendship. In fact, the Republic reveals justice to be necessary to the philosophical life and, hence, to the best kind of life.
There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. However, it is disputed which role matter fulfills in substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter persists while taking on or losing a substantial form. According to a rival interpretation, matter does not persist in substantial change; instead, it is an entity from which a new substance can emerge and which ceases to exist in this process. In my view, both interpretations are problematic in the light of Aristotle’s broader ontological project and are at odds with the way Aristotle describes the substantial generation of living beings. On the basis of Aristotle’s biological theory, I will suggest that Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial generation, but does not satisfy the common criteria for persistence that apply to individual substances.
Anna Schriefl
Anna Schriefl is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (assistant professor) at the University of Bonn, and currently a visiting scholar at the New School. She has published a book about Plato’s criticism of money and wealth, and most recently an introduction into Stoicism (both in German).