Theorizing the Web 2015
April 15–16 in New York City
Venue: the Museum of the Moving Image, in Queens
Abstract submission deadline: 11:59 pm (EST), January 24, 2016
Theorizing the Web is an annual event featuring critical, conceptual discussions about technology and society. We began in 2011 to advance a different kind of conversation about the Web, one which recognizes that to theorize technology is also to theorize the self and the social world. Given that technology is inseparable from society, the ideas and approaches that have historically been used to describe social reality must not be abandoned. Instead, these historical approaches must be applied, reworked, and reassessed in light of the developing digitization of social life.
We are now seeking presentations for our sixth annual event, which will take place on April 15 and 16 at the Museum of the Moving Image in New York City. We invite submissions that engage with issues of social power, inequality, vulnerability, and justice from a diverse range of perspectives. Theorizing the Web is not an event just for academics or “tech” thinkers: activists, journalists, technologists, writers, artists, and folks who don’t identify as any of the above are all encouraged to submit a presentation abstract.
We are looking for abstracts that feature clear conceptual arguments and that avoid jargon in favor of more broadly accessible critical insight. Submissions on any topic are welcome, but some specific topics we’d like to address this year include:
- moving images, gifs, video, live streaming, copcams
- social photography, filters, selfies, posing
- race, racism, race posturing, ethnicity, #BlackLivesMatter
- sex, gender, feminism, queer and trans* politics
- sexuality, sexting, sex work, consent
- mental health, illness, neurodiversity
- (dis)ability and ableism
- non-Western Web(s), language barriers, hegemony, globalization
- social movements, protest, revolution, social control, censorship
- hate, harassment, intimidation, trolling, bullying, resistance
- pain, sickness, loss, death and dying
- parenting, birth, life course
- bodies, cyborgs, wearables, trans/post-humanism, bots
- the self, identity, subjectivity, (in)authenticity, impression management
- privacy, publicity, surveillance
- encryption, anonymity, pseudonymity
- presence, proximity, face-to-face, (dis)connection, loneliness
- capitalism, Silicon Valley, venture capital
- crowd funding, micro currencies, crypto currencies, blockchains
- work, labor, “gig” or “sharing” economy, “Uber for”, exploitation
- transportation, self-driving cars, drones, cities
- code, affordances, infrastructure, critical design
- knowledge, “big” data, data science, algorithms, positivism
- memes, virality, metrics, (micro-)celebrity, fame, attention, click-baiting
- underground markets, child porn, revenge porn, the extra-legal web
- fiction, literature, visual narratives, storytelling, self-publishing, fandoms
- time, (a)temporality, ephemerality, history, memory, right to forget
- games, gaming, gamification, free-to-play, fantasy sports, gambling
- elections, campaigns, presidential politics
Successful abstracts will address intersections of gender, race, class, age, sexual orientation, disability, and other forms of inequality as they pertain to any of the topics above.
Abstract submissions should be 300 to 500 words (only the first 500 words will be reviewed). Arguments should be scaled to fit 12-minute panel presentations, and titles should appeal to a general audience. Your submission should not only describe your topic and question but also summarize your thinking and your conclusions. Good abstracts will provide a specific, original argument with clear stakes. Please do not ask questions in your abstract without answering them, or state “I will make an argument about X” without making the argument.
Note that, because Theorizing the Web deeply values public engagement, we expect all TtW16 presentations to be both comprehensible and rewarding to people from outside the presenter’s specific areas of expertise.
Abstract submissions are due by 11:59 EST on January 24, 2016, and can be submitted through our form located at theorizingtheweb.org/submit. The TtW16 selection committee will blindly review all submissions. Space is limited, and selection is competitive. Our acceptance rate is typically 20% to 35%.
Please note that we have a separate submissions process for art and alternative-format presentations. If you would like to participate in some way that isn’t giving a spoken presentation (e.g., displaying a piece of art; giving a performance; doing something else entirely), please use this separate submission form.
Registration for Theorizing the Web remains “pay what you can,” and we ask that you donate whatever amount you deem fair or can afford (minimum $1). More information (including the registration form) can be found at theorizingtheweb.tumblr.com/2016/registration.
Stay tuned to theorizingtheweb.org for announcements about invited panels, and mail us at theorizingtheweb@gmail.com if you would like to help out with our all-volunteer event in any way.
The conference hashtag is #TtW16.
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Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume
delivered by
Mark Steiner
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
2-4 pm
Wednesday,
Nov 16, Nov 30, Dec 7
The CUNY Graduate Center,
Room 9205/6
Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume
delivered by
Mark Steiner
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
2-4 pm
Wednesday,
Nov 16, Nov 30, Dec 7
The CUNY Graduate Center,
Room 9205/6
Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume
delivered by
Mark Steiner
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
2-4 pm
Wednesday,
Nov 16, Nov 30, Dec 7
The CUNY Graduate Center,
Room 9205/6
April 25, Saray Alaya-Lopez (Cal. State, Sacramento), “Agency in Structural Explanations of Injustice.” 6:30-8:00pm, CUNY Graduate Center 5414.
May 23, Karen Jones (U. Melbourne), “Radical Consciousness and Epistemic Privilege.” 6:30-8:00pm, CUNY Graduate Center 5414.
Jim Weatherall (University of California, Irvine)
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
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Metro Area Philosophy of Science group (MAPS) Presents:
Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Abstract: I argue that if we take the standard formulation of special relativity seriously, causation is frame-dependent. Thus, many ordinary causal claims require a parameter to specify the relevant frame of reference. This is in contrast to the widely-accepted belief that the causal structure of the world is objectively and absolutely determined by the light cone structure. Any event that can affect another (so the thought goes) must do so via light or matter, and the spacetime structure will tell us which of those came first, absolutely. For instance, according to Carl Hoefer (2009, 694, italics in original), if we assume that all signals travel slower than or equal to the speed of light, “we may take the light-cone structure of Minkowski spacetime as equally representing the causal structure of spacetime.” I argue that causation in relativistic spacetime is not so simple. Events can be extended in space and time, and events can be related to one another by distance and duration. Yet, according to special relativity, extension in space and time (i.e., distances and durations) are not invariant—they depend upon relative motion. Therefore, when ordinary events enter into causal relations, they do so relative to frames of reference, which can yield different causes and different effects. If you want to keep your promises, or bring about one outcome rather than another, you should take note of your reference frame.
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Abstract: Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics, sometimes known as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, was proposed as a solution to the quantum measurement problem. Both physicists and philosophers of physics have repeatedly claimed to be able to deduce the standard quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics alone. We will consider why this is impossible, then consider how Everett himself understood quantum probabilities. This will involve clearly distinguishing between typical and probable quantum worlds.
The paper draws on the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics I, but goes beyond interpretation in putting forward a new version of the Guise of the Good (GG). This proposal is Aristotelian in spirit, but defended on philosophical grounds. GG theorists tend to see their views as broadly speaking Aristotelian. And yet they address particular actions in isolation: agents, the thought goes, are motivated to perform a given action by seeing the action or its outcome as good. The paper argues that the GG is most compelling if we distinguish between three levels: the motivation of small-scale actions, the motivation of mid-scale actions or pursuits, and the desire to have one’s life go well. The paper analyzes the relation between small-, mid-, and large-scale motivation in terms of Guidance, Substance, and Motivational Dependence. In its Aristotelian version, the argument continues, the GG belongs to the theory of the human good.
Katja Maria Vogt, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She specializes in ancient philosophy, ethics, and normative epistemology. In her books and papers, she focuses on questions that figure both in ancient and in contemporary discussions: What are values? What kind of values are knowledge and truth? What does it mean to want one’s life to go well?
Presented by The New School for Social Research (NSSR) Philosophy Department.
The CUNY Graduate Center Advanced Research Collaborative (ARC) and the Philosophy Program present a talk and book panel on:
RACIAL JUSTICE
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3 (Rooms 9204-5)
4:15-5:00 PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM LECTURE:
“Racial Justice”: Charles W. Mills, Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
5:00-5:05 Break
5:05-5:45 BOOK PANEL on Charles W. Mills’s 2017 book, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism
Frank M. Kirkland (CUNY Hunter College & the Grad Center)
John Pittman (CUNY John Jay College)
5:45-6:30 Q & A
6:30-7:30 BOOK PARTY—Philosophy common room, 7113 (food and drink)
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates argues that justice is good not only for its consequences but also in and of itself. Challenged by Glaucon and Adeimantus, who suggest that all human interactions are inherently competitive and that being unjust could help you get the better in these conflicts, Socrates establishes that justice is good because it is harmony in the city and in the soul. If justice is a kind of health of the soul, then surely it is better to be just than unjust. This claim might ameliorate the concerns of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but I will argue that Plato does more than address the vision of justice brought forth by Socrates’ interlocutors. Particularly through the contrasts among the different kinds of lives that are either described or depicted in the Republic, Plato points his readers toward a conception of justice that reveals it as the ground of mutuality, reciprocity, dialogue and friendship. In fact, the Republic reveals justice to be necessary to the philosophical life and, hence, to the best kind of life.
There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. However, it is disputed which role matter fulfills in substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter persists while taking on or losing a substantial form. According to a rival interpretation, matter does not persist in substantial change; instead, it is an entity from which a new substance can emerge and which ceases to exist in this process. In my view, both interpretations are problematic in the light of Aristotle’s broader ontological project and are at odds with the way Aristotle describes the substantial generation of living beings. On the basis of Aristotle’s biological theory, I will suggest that Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial generation, but does not satisfy the common criteria for persistence that apply to individual substances.
Anna Schriefl
Anna Schriefl is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (assistant professor) at the University of Bonn, and currently a visiting scholar at the New School. She has published a book about Plato’s criticism of money and wealth, and most recently an introduction into Stoicism (both in German).