Apr
29
Mon
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center 7395
Apr 29 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisional schedule is as follows:

Feb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)

Feb 12. NO MEETING

Feb 19. NO MEETING

Feb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)

Mar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)

Mar 11. Otávio Bueno (Miami)

Mar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)

Mar 25. Dan Marshall (Lingnan)

Apr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)

Apr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)

Apr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)

Apr 22. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm)

May 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)

May
6
Mon
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center 7395
May 6 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 7395). The provisional schedule is as follows:

Feb 5. Roman Kossak (CUNY)

Feb 12. NO MEETING

Feb 19. NO MEETING

Feb 26. Matteo Plebani (Turin)

Mar 4. Elise Crull (CUNY)

Mar 11. Otávio Bueno (Miami)

Mar 18. Michał Godziszewski (Warsaw)

Mar 25. Dan Marshall (Lingnan)

Apr 1. Andrew Tedder (Vienna)

Apr 8. Asya Passinsky (CEU)

Apr 15. Jessica Collins (Columbia)

Apr 22. NO MEETING

Apr 29. Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm)

May 6. Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)

May
10
Fri
Modal definability and Kripke’s theory of truth. James Walsh (NYU) @ CUNY Grad Center 9207
May 10 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

The Saul Kripke Center is pleased to announce that James Walsh (Assistant Professor, Philosophy, NYU) will deliver a talk on Friday, May 10th, 2024, from 4:15 to 6:15 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 9207). The talk is free and open to all.

Title: Modal definability and Kripke’s theory of truth

Abstract: In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these–such as groundedness and paradoxicality–using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting Kripke’s informal definitions and characterize the modally definable sets. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality–which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally–is not.