Mar
6
Fri
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 7102
Mar 6 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

Mar
13
Fri
The Social and Individual Conference @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept.
Mar 13 – Mar 14 all-day

Contact  Professor Gooding-Williams for more info.

Mar
20
Fri
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 7102
Mar 20 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

Apr
3
Fri
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 7102
Apr 3 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

Apr
24
Fri
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 7102
Apr 24 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

May
8
Fri
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 7102
May 8 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

Mar
22
Tue
Jonardon Ganeri (Toronto) Can theater teach us about what it’s like to be someone else? @ Zoom
Mar 22 @ 7:00 pm – 8:30 pm

How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater, arguing that it’s not just a form of entertainment, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In this talk, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound, and that we can see why by turning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowledge and luck.

Jonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work draws on a variety of philosophical traditions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology. His books include Attention, Not Self (2017), a study of early Buddhist theories of attention; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012), an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self; Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves (2020), an analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self; and Inwardness: An Outsiders’ Guide (2021), a review of the concept of inwardness in literature, film, poetry, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowship of the British Academy in 2015, and won the Infosys Prize in the Humanities the same year, the only philosopher to do so.

This series is curated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers, aka Ian Olasov.

May
13
Fri
A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology. Allison Aitken, Columbia @ Faculty House, Columbia U
May 13 @ 5:30 pm – 7:30 pm

THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Welcomes you to an IN-PERSON meeting:

Allison Aitken (Columbia University)

« A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology »

With responses from Alexander Englert (Princeton University)

ABSTRACT: There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk, I will present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.

Sep
30
Fri
Buddhist Conventional Truth and Ontological Pluralism. Laura P. Guerrero (William & Mary) @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Sep 30 @ 5:30 pm – 7:30 pm

With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)

ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015, 2021, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. However, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019), a prominent defender of ontological pluralism, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventionally true.

 

Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. 

RSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu. 

Oct
14
Fri
How to nurture compassion? Some lessons from Asian philosophical traditions. Sin Yee Chan (U Vermont) @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Oct 14 @ 5:30 pm – 7:30 pm

With responses from Timothy Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)

ABSTRACT: Recent philosophical discussions on compassion focus on the value and the nature of compassion as an emotion. Ancient Asian philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism, however, emphasize compassion as a character trait that should be nurtured. This paper examines the insights drawn from these traditions to help inform the nurturing of compassion. For example, is empathy a necessary tool?  What is the role of love and care?  Does self-reflection contribute to the process?

 

Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. 

RSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.