Mar
5
Thu
Overdoing Democracy: Robert B. Talisse in conversation with Oliver Burkeman @ CUNY Grad Center, Segal Theater
Mar 5 @ 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

The fate of democracy is increasingly in doubt, in America and around the world. But what if the greatest danger for democratic societies comes from within? In his insightful new book, philosopher Robert B. Talisse reports that he has seen the enemy and it is us: we are overdoing democracy, making every issue a political issue and every human engagement a political interaction. If we hope to save democracy, Talisse argues, we need to put politics in its place. Please join us for this essential discussion as Talisse is joined by The Guardian columnist Oliver Burkeman.

Presented by the Gotham Philosophical Society

Co-Sponsored by the CUNY Academy for the Humanities and Sciences

Robert B. Talisse is W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. His latest book, Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in its Place, argues that when citizen allow their political divides to infiltrate the entirely of the social worlds, they actually erode their capacities for competent democratic citizenship.

Oliver Burkeman is a New York based columnist for The Guardian and the author of The Antidote: Happiness for People Who Can’t Stand Positive Thinking.

The tragic irony of life. Renaudie Pierre Jean @ Wolff Conference Room, D1103
Mar 5 @ 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

According to a pervasive and widespread literature, we came, whether we want it or not, to surround our existences with all sorts of narratives: retrospective interpretations of what came before us and how we were born, anticipative stories about what is to come and what we should expect, and, most of all, restless attempts to describe what our present is made of so that we know how to make sense of it. First-person narratives occupy a central position amongst these varieties of narratives, as they give each of us a chance to provide meaning to our lives and achieve some kind of self-understanding.

Taking a resolutely opposite stance, Sartre (in)famously declared through the voice of the main character of his novel La Nausée that stories cannot but betray the lives they claim to describe, and necessarily fail to be faithful to the very experiencing of life that constitutes its specific grain and texture. In which sense is this failure a failure? In which sense must we consider it a failure, if narratives are the privileged device we use to make sense of existences in general, and ours in particular? Wouldn’t it be both tragic and ironical, from that perspective, that we live our lives in a way that remains impervious to our attempts to bring some meaning over our existence, and that first-person narratives should be regarded as fundamentally inadequate to account for life as we live it?

This paper will address these questions in light of the definition of ‘tragic irony’ that Richard Moran draws from his interpretation of Sartre, understanding tragedy as a clash between forms of significance displayed by incompatible perspectives. We will examine in particular the problem raised by first-person narratives, which conflate the seemingly incompatible perspectives of the narrator and of the character of the story. I will argue that Moran’s view fails to show in which sense the failure of first-person narratives are also, according to Sartre, the condition of their success, and that the irony of life might rely first and foremost on its ability to succeed even when and where it fails. After all, isn’t it the most ironical of it all that Sartre, notwithstanding his harsh critique of the fundamental inadequacy of life narratives, ended his literary career with the publication of his most acclaimed autobiography?

Bio:

Pierre-Jean Renaudie is Assistant Professor of philosophy (phenomenology and contemporary German philosophy) at the University of Lyon. He is the author of a book on Husserl’s theory of knowledge (Husserl et les categories. Langage, pensée et perception, Paris, Vrin, 2015), co-edited a book on phenomenology of matter (Phénoménologies de la matière, with C.V. Spaak, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2020) and published many articles, in French and in English, on the phenomenological tradition and its connection with contemporary issues in philosophy of mind. He is a member of the Institut de recherches philosophiques de Lyon (IRPHIL) and an associate member of the Husserl Archives in Paris.

Mar
6
Fri
1st Graduate Conference in Political Theory @ Politics Dept. New School
Mar 6 – Mar 7 all-day

The Politics department at the New School for Social Research will host its 1st Graduate Conference in Political Theory on March 6-7th, 2020.

We are launching this event to provide graduate students in the history of political thought, political theory and political philosophy an opportunity to present and receive feedback on their work. A total of six (6) papers will be accepted and each of them will receive substantial comments from a New School graduate student, to be followed by a general discussion. We welcome submissions from all traditions, but we are particularly interested in providing a venue for those students working on critical approaches. We would also like to encourage applications from under-represented groups in the field.

We are delighted to announce that Professor Robyn Marasco (Hunter College, City University of New York) will deliver the inaugural keynote address.

Submissions for the conference are due by December 10th, 2019. Papers should not exceed 8,000 words (excluding footnotes and bibliography) and should be sent in PDF format with the help of the electronic form provided below. Papers should be formatted for blind review with no identifying information. Abstracts will not be accepted. A Google account is needed in order to sign-in to the submission form; if you don’t have one, please email us. Papers will be reviewed over the winter break and notifications will be sent out early January 2020.

For any questions, please contact NSSRconferencepoliticaltheory@gmail.com
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfqJWRPS5DBI-zlmS4-3m-FpZA3suckmInHSIlvayKoibzQYg/viewform

https://philevents.org/event/show/77746

Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 7102
Mar 6 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University

2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine

2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University

3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University

3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire

4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University

4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford

5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto

Umrao Sethi (Brandeis) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Mar 6 @ 3:30 pm – 5:30 pm

Title and abstract forthcoming. Reception to follow.

New York German Idealism Workshop @ New School, tba
Mar 6 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm

Luca Corti (University of Padua) – March 6

Amy Allen (Penn State) – March 27

Andreja Novakovic (UC Berkeley) – April 3

Alberto Siani (University of Pisa) – May 8

Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 302
Mar 6 @ 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!

Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley

Mar
7
Sat
Munich/ NYC Workshop in Ethics @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 716
Mar 7 – Mar 8 all-day

Contact  Professor Katja Vogt for more info.

Mar
9
Mon
Is There an *Absolute* Modality? Antonella Mallozzi @ CUNY Grad Center, 7395
Mar 9 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

Modality seems distinctively pluralistic: there are many kinds of possibility and necessity (logical, physical, metaphysical, normative, etc.), which seem significantly different from one another. However, the various modalities also seem to have much in common–perhaps simply in virtue of being kinds of modality. Should we suppose that there is some fundamental modality, one to which all the other modalities can be somehow reducedModal Monism says yes. Particularly, monists may treat the different modalities as relative to some absolute modality. However, Monism, reductionism, and absolute modality need not be a package. Specifically, the claim that some modality is absolute can be understood in ways which are independent of Monism and reductionism. In this talk, I raise concerns for monistic and reductionist programs in modal metaphysics, while also arguing that the notion of absolute modality is ambiguous. Depending on the framework, it means different things and captures quite different desiderata. After exploring several ways of disambiguating  it, I suggest that while we possess and deploy a concept of absolute modality, that may be empty; or, otherwise put, no modal truth has the property of being “absolute”. I propose a pluralistic picture that still treats the different modalities as relative, while avoiding both absolute modality and reductionism. Importantly, the proposal won’t impact the philosophical significance of metaphysical modality.


Logic and Metaphysics Workshop

Feb 3 Hartry Field, NYU

Feb 10 Melissa Fusco, Columbia

Feb 17 GC CLOSED NO MEETING

Feb 24 Dongwoo Kim, GC

Mar 2 Alex Citikin, Metropolitan Telecommunications

Mar 9 Antonella Mallozzi, Providence

Mar 16 David Papineau, GC

Mar 23 Jenn McDonald, GC

Mar 30 Mircea Dimitru, Bucharest

Apr 6 ? Eoin Moore, GC

Apr 13 SPRING RECESS NO MEETING

Apr 20  Michał Godziszewski, Munich

Apr 27 Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

May 4 Matteo Zichetti, Bristol

May 11 Lisa Warenski,GC

May 18 PROBABLY NO MEETING

Philosophy of Language Workshop @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 302
Mar 9 @ 6:30 pm – 8:30 pm

We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language. Anyone with an interest in philosophy of language is welcome!

3 February
Paul Pietroski (Rutgers)

10 February
Brian Leahy (Harvard)

17 February
No Workshop

24 February
Elizabeth Coppock (Boston)

2 March
Maria Biezma (UMass)

9 March
Jenn McDonald (CUNY)

16 March
No Workshop

23 March
Liina Pylkannen (NYU)

30 March
Bob Beddor (NUS)

6 April
Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (Rutgers Newark)

13 April
Masha Esipova (Princeton)

20 April
Nate Charlow (Toronto)

27 April
Eric Tracy (City College)

4 May
Dilip Ninan (Tufts)

11 May
Jim Pryor (NYU)