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On Being Abstract – Pete Mandik (William Patterson) 5:30 pm
On Being Abstract – Pete Mandik (William Patterson) @ Philosophy Dept. Schmitt 104
May 2 @ 5:30 pm
In this session, Mandik will expand on his idea that persons are abstract things. To do this, he will discuss recent philosophical issues about personal identity, mind-uploading, and whether you could upload your mind to a piece of technology and survive.   https://philevents.org/event/show/72442
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No Metaphysical Disagreement Without Logical Incompatibility- Daniel Durante. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
No Metaphysical Disagreement Without Logical Incompatibility- Daniel Durante. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
May 6 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
The purpose of this talk is to defend the logical incompatibility of the opposing views as a criterion for characterizing disagreements as genuinely metaphysical. That is, I intend to argue that a specific dispute is a metaphysical disagreement only when the conflicting views are governed by different logics. If correct, this criterion would not only help to separate merely verbal from genuine metaphysical debates, but it also would ground an argument against deflationism, guaranteeing the[...]
“Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” 7:30 pm
“Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ Dweck Center, Brooklyn Public Library
May 6 @ 7:30 pm – 9:00 pm
5/6 – Philosophy in the Library: Rivka Weinberg, “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ the Dweck Center // 7:30 P.M.-9:00 P.M.
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Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schurmann Annual Symposium in Political Philosophy “Varieties of Intentionality”
Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schurmann Annual Symposium in Political Philosophy “Varieties of Intentionality” @ Theresa Lang Center, I202, New School
May 10 – May 11 all-day
Conference Schedule Friday May 10 1pm: Rachel Goodman (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) Introductory Overview 1:30pm: Jake Quilty-Dunn (University of Oxford) On Elisabeth Camp’s “Putting Thoughts to Work” 4:30pm: John Kulvicki (Darmouth College) On Jacob Beck’s “Perception is Analog” Saturday May 11 1pm: Jacob Beck (York University) On Jake Quilty-Dunn’s “Perceptual Pluralism” 4pm: Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University) On John Kulvicki’s “Modeling the Meanings of Pictures” The Five Essential Readings for the Conference The conference is predicated on[...]
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Composition as Identity: A New Approach- Martina Botti. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Composition as Identity: A New Approach- Martina Botti. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
May 13 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
I argue that the debate on composition as identity – the thesis that any composite object is identical to its parts – is deadlocked because both the defenders and the detractors of the claim have so far defended and criticized respectively something that is not composition as identity. After having made clear how composition as identity should properly be understood, I will set forth a new strategy to defend it.  The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop[...]
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The Perception of Time in Intuitionistic Arithmetic (Vincent Peluce) Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
The Perception of Time in Intuitionistic Arithmetic (Vincent Peluce) Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
May 20 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
In L.E.J. Brouwer’s first act of intuitionism, the subject’s perception of time is put forth as the foundation on which arithmetic will be built. According to Brouwer, proper intuitionistic arithmetic, as with the rest of intuitionistic mathematics, is not tied to any particular formal system. When we try to axiomatically approximate an intuitionistic arithmetical system, we are faced with the problem of incorporating the subject and their perception into the axiom system itself. We discuss some unsatisfactory responses[...]
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