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Temporal ‘de re’ Attitudes (Yael Sharvit) 4:15 pm
Temporal ‘de re’ Attitudes (Yael Sharvit) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 9 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
A sensible approach to the semantics of tense says that present tense and past tense “refer” to the evaluation time and to some pre-evaluation time, respectively. Indeed, this seems to be the case in unembedded sentences (e.g., Mary is thirty-five, Mary was thirty-five). But embedded tenses seem to misbehave: (1) does not express the proposition that two months prior to s* (= the speech time) Joseph was sure about the truth of [Mary is currently thirty-five]; this proposition is expressed by (2). Assuming[...]
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Balzan Conference: Dworkin’s Late Work
Balzan Conference: Dworkin’s Late Work @ Lester Pollack Colloquium Room, 9th Flr Furman Hall
Sep 13 – Sep 14 all-day
Ronald Dworkin’s work always spanned a wide array of topics, from the most abstract jurisprudence through the details of American constitutional law all the way over to political philosophy and theories of justice and equality. In the last decades of his life, however, Dworkin’s work flowered in ways that went beyond even this prodigious range. Though he continued his central work in the philosophy of law and constitutional theory, he also addressed issues in international[...]
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Anti-Exceptionalism and Explanations in Logic (Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin) 4:15 pm
Anti-Exceptionalism and Explanations in Logic (Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 16 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
According to logical anti-exceptionalism we come to be justified in believing logical theories by similar means to scientific theories. This is often explained by saying that theory choice in logic proceeds via abductive arguments (Priest, Russell, Williamson, Hjortland). Thus, the success of classical and non-classical theories of validity are compared by their ability to explain the relevant data. However, as of yet there is no agreed upon account of which data logical theories must explain,[...]
Legal Interpretation and Natural Law. Mark Greenberg (UCLA) 6:00 pm
Legal Interpretation and Natural Law. Mark Greenberg (UCLA) @ Fordham Law School, Bateman 2-01B
Sep 16 @ 6:00 pm – 7:50 pm
Fordham Natural Law Colloquium 5:30-6:00 check in, 6:00-7:50 program Location: Fordham Law School, Bateman 2-01B Contact Michael Baur and Ben Zipursky for more information.
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Existence, Verbal Disputes and Equivocation (Alessandro Rossi) 4:15 pm
Existence, Verbal Disputes and Equivocation (Alessandro Rossi) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 23 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Noneism is the theory according to which some things do not exist. Following an established convention, I will call allism the negation of noneism (every thing exists). Lewis [1990] and, more recently, Woodward [2013] argued that the allism/noneism dispute turns on an equivocation about the meaning of ‘exists’ and would thereby be merely verbal. These arguments have been attacked by Priest [2005, 2011, 2013], who took the dispute to be genuine. In this paper, I will present[...]
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