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Temporal ‘de re’ Attitudes (Yael Sharvit) 4:15 pm
Temporal ‘de re’ Attitudes (Yael Sharvit) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 9 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
A sensible approach to the semantics of tense says that present tense and past tense “refer” to the evaluation time and to some pre-evaluation time, respectively. Indeed, this seems to be the case in unembedded sentences (e.g., Mary is thirty-five, Mary was thirty-five). But embedded tenses seem to misbehave: (1) does not express the proposition that two months prior to s* (= the speech time) Joseph was sure about the truth of [Mary is currently thirty-five]; this proposition is expressed by (2). Assuming[...]
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International Merleau-Ponty Circle: Affect / Emotion / Feeling
International Merleau-Ponty Circle: Affect / Emotion / Feeling @ 12th Floor Lounge
Sep 12 – Sep 14 all-day
Thursday, September 12 Schedule 8:30 – 9 a.m. Registration and coffee 9 – 9:15 a.m. Opening remarks: Shiloh Whitney, Conference Director Session 1 – Organic Affectivity and Animality Moderator: Emilia Angelova, Concordia University 9:15 – 10 a.m. Hermanni Yli-Tepsa, University of Jyväskylä: “How to feel like our eyes: tracing the theme of instinctive affectivity in Phenomenology of Perception” 10 – 10:45 a.m. Sarah DiMaggio, Vanderbilt University: “Flesh and Blood: Reimagining Kinship” 10:45 – 11 a.m.[...]
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Anti-Exceptionalism and Explanations in Logic (Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin) 4:15 pm
Anti-Exceptionalism and Explanations in Logic (Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 16 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
According to logical anti-exceptionalism we come to be justified in believing logical theories by similar means to scientific theories. This is often explained by saying that theory choice in logic proceeds via abductive arguments (Priest, Russell, Williamson, Hjortland). Thus, the success of classical and non-classical theories of validity are compared by their ability to explain the relevant data. However, as of yet there is no agreed upon account of which data logical theories must explain,[...]
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Cognitive Science Speaker Series 1:00 pm
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 6493
Sep 20 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
September 20: Matthias Michel Philosophy and Laboratoire Sciences, Université Paris-Sorbonne and NYU “Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex” October 4: Ryan McElhaney Cognitive Science and Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center “Explanation and Consciousness” October 18: Sascha Benjamin Fink Philosophy-Neurosciences-Cognition, University of Magdeburg and NYU “Varieties of Phenomenal Structuralism” November 1: Jesse Atencio Cognitive Science and Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center Title TBA November 15: Frank Pupa Philosophy, Nassau Community College “Getting Between: Predicativism, Domain Restriction, and Binding” December[...]
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Existence, Verbal Disputes and Equivocation (Alessandro Rossi) 4:15 pm
Existence, Verbal Disputes and Equivocation (Alessandro Rossi) @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 23 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Noneism is the theory according to which some things do not exist. Following an established convention, I will call allism the negation of noneism (every thing exists). Lewis [1990] and, more recently, Woodward [2013] argued that the allism/noneism dispute turns on an equivocation about the meaning of ‘exists’ and would thereby be merely verbal. These arguments have been attacked by Priest [2005, 2011, 2013], who took the dispute to be genuine. In this paper, I will present[...]
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