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On the Notion of Diachronic Emergence. Jessica Wilson 4:15 pm
On the Notion of Diachronic Emergence. Jessica Wilson @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Dec 2 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Though most accounts of emergence take this to be a broadly synchronic phenomenon, it has been recently maintained that there are distinctively diachronic forms of emergence (see, e.g., O’Connor and Wong’s 2005 account of strong emergence, Mitchell’s 2012 dynamic self-organization account of emergence, and Humphreys’ and Sartenaer and Guay’s 2016 accounts of ‘transformational emergence’). Here I argue that there is no need for a distinctively diachronic notion of emergence, as purported cases of such emergence[...]
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Symposium on Brian Cantwell Smith’s The Promise of Artificial Intelligence: Reckoning and Judgment (MIT Press, 2019)
Symposium on Brian Cantwell Smith’s The Promise of Artificial Intelligence: Reckoning and Judgment (MIT Press, 2019) @ Kellen Auditorium, Room N101
Dec 6 all-day
Selected speakers: Zed Adams The New School Brian Cantwell Smith University of Toronto, St. George Mazviita Chirimuuta University of Pittsburgh
Cognitive Science Speaker Series 1:00 pm
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, 6493
Dec 6 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
September 20: Matthias Michel Philosophy and Laboratoire Sciences, Université Paris-Sorbonne and NYU “Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex” October 4: Ryan McElhaney Cognitive Science and Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center “Explanation and Consciousness” October 18: Sascha Benjamin Fink Philosophy-Neurosciences-Cognition, University of Magdeburg and NYU “Varieties of Phenomenal Structuralism” November 1: Jesse Atencio Cognitive Science and Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center Title TBA November 15: Frank Pupa Philosophy, Nassau Community College “Getting Between: Predicativism, Domain Restriction, and Binding” December[...]
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Logic in Fiction. Mark Colyvan 4:15 pm
Logic in Fiction. Mark Colyvan @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Dec 9 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
This paper will address the question of whether the logic of a fiction can be specified as part of the fiction. For example, can one tell a fictional story in which it is part of the story that the logic in question is, say, K3? It seems unproblematic that we can do this. After all, we can tell a story about a world with a different geometry from ours, different physical laws, and even different[...]
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