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Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schurmann Annual Symposium in Political Philosophy “Varieties of Intentionality” @ Theresa Lang Center, I202, New School
Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schurmann Annual Symposium in Political Philosophy “Varieties of Intentionality” @ Theresa Lang Center, I202, New School
May 10 all-day
Conference Schedule Friday May 10 1pm: Rachel Goodman (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) Introductory Overview 1:30pm: Jake Quilty-Dunn (University of Oxford) On Elisabeth Camp’s “Putting Thoughts to Work” 4:30pm: John Kulvicki (Darmouth College) On Jacob Beck’s “Perception is Analog” Saturday May 11 1pm: Jacob Beck (York University) On Jake Quilty-Dunn’s “Perceptual Pluralism” 4pm: Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University) On John Kulvicki’s “Modeling the Meanings of Pictures” The Five Essential Readings for the Conference The conference is predicated on[...]
Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schurmann Annual Symposium in Political Philosophy “Varieties of Intentionality” @ Theresa Lang Center, I202, New School
Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schurmann Annual Symposium in Political Philosophy “Varieties of Intentionality” @ Theresa Lang Center, I202, New School
May 11 all-day
Conference Schedule Friday May 10 1pm: Rachel Goodman (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) Introductory Overview 1:30pm: Jake Quilty-Dunn (University of Oxford) On Elisabeth Camp’s “Putting Thoughts to Work” 4:30pm: John Kulvicki (Darmouth College) On Jacob Beck’s “Perception is Analog” Saturday May 11 1pm: Jacob Beck (York University) On Jake Quilty-Dunn’s “Perceptual Pluralism” 4pm: Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University) On John Kulvicki’s “Modeling the Meanings of Pictures” The Five Essential Readings for the Conference The conference is predicated on[...]
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4:15 pm No Metaphysical Disagreement Without Logical Incompatibility- Daniel Durante. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
No Metaphysical Disagreement Without Logical Incompatibility- Daniel Durante. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
May 6 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
The purpose of this talk is to defend the logical incompatibility of the opposing views as a criterion for characterizing disagreements as genuinely metaphysical. That is, I intend to argue that a specific dispute is a metaphysical disagreement only when the conflicting views are governed by different logics. If correct, this criterion would not only help to separate merely verbal from genuine metaphysical debates, but it also would ground an argument against deflationism, guaranteeing the[...]
7:30 pm “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ Dweck Center, Brooklyn Public Library
“Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ Dweck Center, Brooklyn Public Library
May 6 @ 7:30 pm – 9:00 pm
5/6 – Philosophy in the Library: Rivka Weinberg, “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have it, We Can’t Get it, and We Should be Very, Very Sad” @ the Dweck Center // 7:30 P.M.-9:00 P.M.