Questioning the Evidence for Cosmic Expansion – Elise Crull (CCNY)

When:
April 10, 2018 @ 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm
2018-04-10T16:00:00-04:00
2018-04-10T18:00:00-04:00
Where:
CUNY Grad Center, rm 5307
365 5th Ave
New York, NY 10016
USA
Cost:
Free
Expansion is a key feature of the standard cosmological model, yet evidence for it is not as strong as often believed. The only direct evidence is galactic red-shifting, but reasoning from these data to expansion is not straightforward. I argue that the relationship is better understood as inference to the best explanation, and granting this, that expansion is not the obvious best explanation. This is demonstrated by investigating the fitness of the ΛCDM model as against static models under various indirect tests.In this talk I shall focus on time dilation studies: if expansion is happening, then general relativity suggests that clocks in substantially red-shifted galaxies ought to run slow with respect to the local frame. I briefly discuss the potential threat of selection bias in Type Ia supernovae time dilation tests, and evaluate the research methods employed by those assessing the mysterious lack of time dilation in gamma-ray bursts and quasars.

If expansion is not the best explanation for the relevant data, then one can motivate certain normative claims about methodological shifts in contemporary cosmology. To wit—more thought should be dedicated to alternate explanations for red-shifting phenomena, and to the development and careful analysis of indirect tests for expansion as against alternative cosmological models.

Elise Crull (CCNY).
4-6pm, Tuesday April 10, CUNY room 5307 (365 5th Ave, New York NY).
Title: TBD.

Abstract: TBD.

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UPCOMING:
J. Brian Pitts (Cambridge).
11am-12pm, Wednesday May 16, NYU philosophy department, room 302 (5 Washington Place, New York, NY).
Title: TBD.

Abstract: TBD.

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Jeremy Butterfield (Cambridge).
1:30-3:30pm, Wednesday May 16, NYU philosophy department, room 302 (5 Washington Place, New York, NY).
Title: On Dualities and Equivalences Between Physical Theories.

Abstract: My main aim is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities between theories, as `duality’ is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as `equivalence’ is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called `the same theory’, though we interpret them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly equivalent, as `equivalent’ is normally understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing—since often neglected.

My argument for this is based on the account of duality by De Haro and myself: which is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory. Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree in their claims about the world.

I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening of it.

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Chip Sebens (UCSD).
4-6pm, Wednesday May 16, NYU philosophy department, room 302 (5 Washington Place, New York, NY).
Title: TBD.

Abstract: TBD.

 

 

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