(Information) Paradox Regained? Jim Weatherall, UC Irvine

Abstract: I will discuss some recent work by Tim Maudlin concerning Black Hole Information Loss. I will argue that there is a paradox, in the straightforward sense that there are propositions that appear true but which are incompatible with one another, and discuss its significance. I will also discuss Maudlin’s response to the paradox.

Jim Weatherall (University of California, Irvine)

 

There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.

 

===============================================================

Metro Area Philosophy of Science group (MAPS) Presents:

 

Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Title: It matters how you slice it: relativity and causation

Abstract: I argue that if we take the standard formulation of special relativity seriously, causation is frame-dependent. Thus, many ordinary causal claims require a parameter to specify the relevant frame of reference. This is in contrast to the widely-accepted belief that the causal structure of the world is objectively and absolutely determined by the light cone structure. Any event that can affect another (so the thought goes) must do so via light or matter, and the spacetime structure will tell us which of those came first, absolutely. For instance, according to Carl Hoefer (2009, 694, italics in original), if we assume that all signals travel slower than or equal to the speed of light, “we may take the light-cone structure of Minkowski spacetime as equally representing the causal structure of spacetime.” I argue that causation in relativistic spacetime is not so simple. Events can be extended in space and time, and events can be related to one another by distance and duration. Yet, according to special relativity, extension in space and time (i.e., distances and durations) are not invariant—they depend upon relative motion. Therefore, when ordinary events enter into causal relations, they do so relative to frames of reference, which can yield different causes and different effects. If you want to keep your promises, or bring about one outcome rather than another, you should take note of your reference frame.

===============================================================

Jeff Barrett (University of California, Irvine).

4:15 – 6:15pm, Tuesday November 7, Location TBD.

Title: Typical Quantum Worlds

Abstract: Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics, sometimes known as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, was proposed as a solution to the quantum measurement problem. Both physicists and philosophers of physics have repeatedly claimed to be able to deduce the standard quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics alone. We will consider why this is impossible, then consider how Everett himself understood quantum probabilities. This will involve clearly distinguishing between typical and probable quantum worlds.