Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/SMUTEO-4

Authors

Aaron Smuts

Abstract

I distill three somewhat interrelated approaches to the ethical criticism of humor: (1) attitude-based theories, (2) merited-response theories, and (3) emotional responsibility theories. I direct the brunt of my effort at showing the limitations of the attitudinal endorsement theory by presenting new criticisms of Ronald de Sousa’s position. Then, I turn to assess the strengths of the other two approaches, showing that that their major formulations implicitly require the problematic attitudinal endorsement theory. I argue for an effects-mediated responsibility theory , holding that the strongest ethical criticism that can be made of our sense of humor is that it might indicate some omission on our part. This omission could only be culpable in so far as a particular joke could do harm to oneself or others. In response to Ted Cohen’s doubts that such a mechanism of harm is forthcoming, I argue that the primary vehicle of the harmful effects of humor is laughter.

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Reviewer Reports

nogre0:

Rating: 78

energydahamter:

Rating: 83

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Rating: 78

RaDerpin:

Rating: 83

Wyllt42:

Rating: 50

banana_bunnyy:

Rating: 38

reclusey_:

Rating: 75

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/MYETER

Authors

Joshua Myers

Abstract

      The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. 

Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery, and phenomenal consciousness.

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nogre0:

Rating: 33

ItAllCostsMoney:

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ZeNemonic:

Rating: 38

banana_bunnyy:

Rating: 75

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/PISPPA

Authors

Arina Pismenny

Abstract

      Chronic pain patients frequently encounter not only physical 

suffering but also emotional dismissal and misrecognition in clinical settings. This paper argues that such experiences reflect a pervasive form of structural harm: emotional injustice. Chronic pain sufferers, especially women and members of marginalized groups, are often subject to emotion policing—the unjust regulation of emotional expression that distorts, suppresses, or discredits their feelings of frustration, sadness, and anger. Stereotypes like “women are emotional” or “boys don’t cry” shape how patients’ pain is interpreted and whether their emotional expressions are seen as credible, appropriate, or pathological. As a result, patients’ emotions are routinely misread, their reports of pain discounted, and their treatment delayed or denied. Through the lens of emotion stereotyping, display suppression, and emotion hegemonizing, I show how dominant emotional norms constrain how chronic pain patients can express distress and advocate for themselves. These practices compromise emotional autonomy— their ability to experience and express fitting emotions in ways that reflect their circumstances, values, and lived reality—and reinforce systemic inequities in healthcare. While these harms intersect with forms of epistemic injustice, I argue that emotional injustice captures a distinct and deeper wrong: the denial of patients’ ability to make sense of and communicate their emotional suffering on their own terms. Recognizing emotional injustice in the treatment of chronic pain is crucial for promoting more equitable, respectful, and compassionate care—care that honors the emotional realities of patients’ lives.

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Reviewer Reports

nogre0:

Rating: 62

unrealbrian:

Rating: 75

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Rating: 33

Adam_tuned_in:

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LatvianJesus:

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chocolate_mintz:

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banana_bunnyy:

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stevethejohn:

Rating: 67