Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/HALTCO-38

Authors

Jan Halák

Abstract

In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of body schema. According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic unity of the body, i.e. the fact there are various possibilities how the practical diagram of body schema could be de-differentiated (in pathology) or further refined (via cognitive and cultural superstructures, symbolic systems). This chapter summarises Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the notion, while contrasting it to the more traditional understanding of the body in phenomenology and recent philosophical texts dealing with body schema.

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nogre0:

Rating: 89

LuminanceBloom:

Rating: 83

energydahamter:

Rating: 95

ItAllCostsMoney:

Rating: 50

byrdbanes:

Rating: 67

LatvianJesus:

Rating: 38

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/GAREDA-12

Authors

Jan Mark Garcia

Abstract

Deepfake technology, powered by artificial intelligence and deep learning, has rapidly advanced, enabling the creation of highly realistic synthetic media. While it presents opportunities in entertainment and creative applications, deepfakes pose significant risks, including misinformation, identity fraud, and threats to privacy and national security. This study explores the evolution of deepfake technology, its implications, and current detection techniques. Existing methods for deepfake detection, such as convolutional neural networks (CNNs), recurrent neural networks (RNNs), and generative adversarial networks (GANs), are examined, highlighting their effectiveness and limitations. The study also reviews state-of-the-art approaches in image forensics, phoneme-viseme mismatch detection, and adversarial training to counter deepfake threats. Moreover, the ethical and legal challenges surrounding deepfakes are discussed, emphasizing the need for policy regulations and collaborative efforts between governments, tech companies, and researchers. As deepfake technology continues to evolve, so must detection strategies, integrating multimodal analysis and real-time verification systems. This research underscores the importance of developing robust detection frameworks and public awareness initiatives to mitigate the risks associated with deepfakes. Future directions include enhancing detection algorithms through explainable AI, improving dataset quality, and integrating blockchain for digital content authentication. By providing a comprehensive analysis of deepfake creation, detection, and countermeasures, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on synthetic media and its societal impact. Addressing these challenges requires interdisciplinary collaboration and continuous innovation to safeguard digital integrity and trust in the information ecosystem.

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nogre0:

Rating: 33

vipersgratitude:

Rating: 38

energydahamter:

Rating: 75

RaDerpin:

Rating: 67

byrdbanes:

Rating: 50

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/QUIOWT-2

Authors

Willard Van Orman Quine

Abstract

Suppose now that two philosophers, McX and I, differ over ontology. Suppose McX maintains there is something which I maintain there is not. McX can, quite consistently with his own point of view, describe our difference of opinion by saying that I refuse to recognize certain entities. I should protest of course that he is wrong in his formulation of our disagreement, for I maintain that there are no entities, of the kind which he alleges, for me to recognize; but my finding him wrong in his formulation of our disagreement is unimportant, for I am committed to considering him wrong in his ontology anyway. When I try to formulate our difference of opinion, on the other hand, I seem to be in a predicament. I cannot admit that there are some things which McX countenances and I do not, for in admitting that there are such things I should be contradicting my own rejection of them.

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nogre0:

Rating: 67

unrealbrian:

Rating: 83

energydahamter:

Rating: 75

byrdbanes:

Rating: 83

zerouxel:

Rating: 75

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIMOL

Authors

Cord Friebe

Abstract

At first glance, every metaphysics of laws can be combined with every ontology of time. In contrast, the paper intends to show that Humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical view of temporal existence, i.e. growing block or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-productive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.

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nogre0:

Rating: 78

ItAllCostsMoney:

Rating: 38

energydahamter:

Rating: 75

k_pars:

Rating: 42

socnow:

Rating: 17

byrdbanes:

Rating: 67

rockophile:

Rating: 67

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/THAMWO

Authors

Koshy Tharakan

Abstract

Recent discussions on the explanation of action are permeated with two divergent models of explanation, namely causal model and non- causal model. For causalists the notion of explanation is intimately related to that of causation. As Davidson contends, any rudimentary explanation of an event gives its cause. More sophisticated explanations may cite a relevant law in support of a singular causal claim. The non-causalists, on the other hand, hold that when we explain an action we do not ask for the cause, rather we try to understand the action in terms of its meaning. Moreover, they argue that the causal model fails to account for the conceptual priority of human agency. The aim of this paper is to show how Max Weber attempted a synthesis of the two divergent models of explanation in the realm of human actions. The first section of this paper gives an expository account of Weber’s theory of explanation. In the second section an attempt is made to interpret Weber’s thesis so as to assimilate the two divergent models of explanation.

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nogre0:

Rating: 15

energydahamter:

Rating: 78

socnow:

Rating: 17

byrdbanes:

Rating: 25

AntiSnowman:

Rating: 58

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/NAGMLO

Authors

Thomas Nagel

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

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nogre0:

Rating: 78

unrealbrian:

Rating: 75

vipersgratitude:

Rating: 50

Tyndereos:

Rating: 83

LuminanceBloom:

Rating: 89

energydahamter:

Rating: 83

RaDerpin:

Rating: 89

ItAllCostsMoney:

Rating: 78

socnow:

Rating: 42

byrdbanes:

Rating: 75

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/MOYBIP

Authors

Ignacio L. Moya

Abstract

I argue that the nineteenth-century German pessimist philosopher Philipp Mainländer is unique in that he views boredom as the driving force behind the creation of the universe and at the same time the driving force behind our inevitable extinction. In order to show this, I explain why he claims that God was at one point bored with His existence and why humanity should strive for the construction of an advanced just and egalitarian society as a way to hasten our demise. Along the way, I contrast Mainländer’s views on boredom with those of Leopardi and, crucially, with the views of his philosophical inspiration, Schopenhauer.

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nogre0:

Rating: 78

LuminanceBloom:

Rating: 75

ArisTHOTtle:

Rating: 83

energydahamter:

Rating: 83

ItAllCostsMoney:

Rating: 67

RaDerpin:

Rating: 67

socnow:

Rating: 17

byrdbanes:

Rating: 38

Adam_tuned_in:

Rating: 33

broken_ph_meeper:

Rating: 25

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBDDC

Authors

Adam F. Gibbons

Abstract

Standards of democratic competence are implicit in many areas of democratic theory, playing a role in debates about the responsibilities of citizens, civic education, and more. The importance of establishing minimal requirements for democratic competence that all those committed to democracy can endorse is thus clear. In recent work, Alexandra Oprea and Daniel J. Stephens argue that a democratically competent voter is one who both knows how to and intends to vote in such a way that, if the relevant candidates or policies were chosen, the predictable end of electoral democracy would not follow. In this paper I outline and discuss two complications for their account. First, I argue that in some cases a democratically competent voter may vote for an option that, if chosen, would bring about the predictable end of democracy. Second, I challenge their claim that democracy must involve the use of free and fair elections, urging instead that sortition—that is, the selection of public officials by lottery—can be legitimately democratic. Consequently, a democratically competent voter can intend to vote for an option that ends electoral democracy without intending the end of democracy entirely, provided that they intend to vote for a suitably democratic alternative based on the use of sortition.

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nogre0:

Rating: 78

unrealbrian:

Rating: 67

vipersgratitude:

Rating: 50

k_pars:

Rating: 62

socnow:

Rating: 17

byrdbanes:

Rating: 50

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/PIRTPW

Authors

Paulo Pirozelli

Abstract

The aim of the article is to explore Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “scientific crisis” and indicate some difficulties with it. First, Kuhn defines “crisis” through the notion of “anomaly” but distinguishes these concepts in two different ways: categorically and quantitatively. Both of these alternatives face considerable problems. The categorical definition relies on a distinction between “discoveries” and “inventions” that, as Kuhn himself admits, is artificial. The quantitative definition states that crises are a deeper, more profound type of anomaly. Kuhn, however, does not offer any criteria for objectively defining this “severity” of the crises. The second kind of problem is related to the application of the concept of “crisis.” Apparently, Kuhn attributes crises to individuals as much as to communities. Lastly, there is the problem of the function of crises. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, they are presented as a precondition to scientific revolutions. In later articles, however, Kuhn seems to see them only as a common antecedent to revolutions.

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nogre0:

Rating: 67

unrealbrian:

Rating: 50

energydahamter:

Rating: 83

ItAllCostsMoney:

Rating: 50

byrdbanes:

Rating: 67

rockophile:

Rating: 75

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19690039220

Authors

T. M. FRASER

Video Review

Reviewer Reports

nogre0:

Rating: 75

unrealbrian:

Rating: 83

Tyndereos:

Rating: 81

cinesemiotics:

Rating: 75

energydahamter:

Rating: 83

RaDerpin:

Rating: 75

k_pars:

Rating: 83

byrdbanes:

Rating: 75

rockophile:

Rating: 75