Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/GODWIA

Authors

G. C. Goddu

Abstract

Numerous informal logi- cians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put. Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens construction formels et théoriciens de l’argument- ation limitent leur non de théories à ce qu’ils appellent des arguments « authentiques ». Mais y-a- t’il une distinction claire entre des arguments« authentiques » et « inau- thentiques » ? Ici j’explore quatre descriptions possibles de cette préten- due distinction et je soutiens qu’- aucune ne répond aux besoins théori- ques auxquels elles sont censées ré- pondre

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nogre0:

Rating: 78

k_pars:

Rating: 78

GeePikeeAroh:

Rating: 75

Hubble_Truffle:

Rating: 75

Article Data

URL/PhilPapers Link:

https://philpapers.org/rec/WEBL-2

Authors

Jonathan Webber

Abstract

We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they believe to be false. We cannot trust the liar at all

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Reviewer Reports

nogre0:

Rating: 67

FrankBigTime:

Rating: 67

energydahamter:

Rating: 75

k_pars:

Rating: 75

RaDerpin:

Rating: 67

GeePikeeAroh:

Rating: 50

spuddyfranklin:

Rating: 75