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Rebecca Comay, Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature, The University of Toronto discusses Hegel and Beckett followed by a response from Paul Kottman of The New School for Social Research.

The Vanishing Point of Existence: Kierkegaard and the Ethics of the Novel.

Presented by: Yi-Ping Ong, Associate Professor, Department of Comparative Thought and Literature, Johns Hopkins University.

Presented by Liberal Studies at The New School of Social Research

According to a pervasive and widespread literature, we came, whether we want it or not, to surround our existences with all sorts of narratives: retrospective interpretations of what came before us and how we were born, anticipative stories about what is to come and what we should expect, and, most of all, restless attempts to describe what our present is made of so that we know how to make sense of it. First-person narratives occupy a central position amongst these varieties of narratives, as they give each of us a chance to provide meaning to our lives and achieve some kind of self-understanding.

Taking a resolutely opposite stance, Sartre (in)famously declared through the voice of the main character of his novel La Nausée that stories cannot but betray the lives they claim to describe, and necessarily fail to be faithful to the very experiencing of life that constitutes its specific grain and texture. In which sense is this failure a failure? In which sense must we consider it a failure, if narratives are the privileged device we use to make sense of existences in general, and ours in particular? Wouldn’t it be both tragic and ironical, from that perspective, that we live our lives in a way that remains impervious to our attempts to bring some meaning over our existence, and that first-person narratives should be regarded as fundamentally inadequate to account for life as we live it?

This paper will address these questions in light of the definition of ‘tragic irony’ that Richard Moran draws from his interpretation of Sartre, understanding tragedy as a clash between forms of significance displayed by incompatible perspectives. We will examine in particular the problem raised by first-person narratives, which conflate the seemingly incompatible perspectives of the narrator and of the character of the story. I will argue that Moran’s view fails to show in which sense the failure of first-person narratives are also, according to Sartre, the condition of their success, and that the irony of life might rely first and foremost on its ability to succeed even when and where it fails. After all, isn’t it the most ironical of it all that Sartre, notwithstanding his harsh critique of the fundamental inadequacy of life narratives, ended his literary career with the publication of his most acclaimed autobiography?

Bio:

Pierre-Jean Renaudie is Assistant Professor of philosophy (phenomenology and contemporary German philosophy) at the University of Lyon. He is the author of a book on Husserl’s theory of knowledge (Husserl et les categories. Langage, pensée et perception, Paris, Vrin, 2015), co-edited a book on phenomenology of matter (Phénoménologies de la matière, with C.V. Spaak, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2020) and published many articles, in French and in English, on the phenomenological tradition and its connection with contemporary issues in philosophy of mind. He is a member of the Institut de recherches philosophiques de Lyon (IRPHIL) and an associate member of the Husserl Archives in Paris.

In better times, this talk may have been given as a detailed account of the practices and side stories that had been part of the just published anthology titled Tolstoy as Philosopher (2022), a result of a quarter-century work on Tolstoy’s manuscripts and research at international archives. The finished book can be abstracted as follows.

Beginning with Tolstoy’s first extant records of his written œuvre, the anthology assembles seventy-seven unabridged texts that cover more than seven decades of his life, from 1835 to 1910.  It constitutes the most complete single-volume edition to date of the rich variety of Tolstoy’s philosophical output: apothegmatic sayings, visions, intimate sketchbook and day notes, book reviews, open letters, dialogues, pedagogic talks, public lectures, programs and rules for personal behavior, fictions, and reminiscences.

It was the insolvable, the “scandalous,” problems of philosophy that never gave Tolstoy any rest: freedom of the will, religious tolerance, gender inequality, the tonal shape of music, the value of healthy life habits, the responsibilities of teaching, forms of social protest, cognitive development, science in society, the relation between body and mind, charity and labor, human dignity and public service, sexual psychology, national war doctrines, suicide, individual sacrifice, the purposes of making art.  And always: What are the sources of violence? Why should we engage in politics? Why do we need governments? How can one practice non-violence? What is the meaning of our irrepressible desire to seek and find meaning? Why can’t we live without loving? The typeset proofs of his final insights were brought to Tolstoy for approval when he was already on his deathbed. No matter their brevity or the occasion on which they were written, these works exemplify Tolstoy as an artistically inventive and intellectually absorbing thinker.

Most of the newly translated and thoroughly annotated texts have never been available in English.  Among the notable archival restorations is the text titled “Tolstoy on Venezuela,” an authentic first publication in English of “Patriotism, or Peace?” (1896) that had been personally checked by Tolstoy and deemed lost. In the inaugural piece, a seven-year-old Tolstoy describes violent but natural animal life in contrast with the lazy life of a peaceful barnyard in the countryside. The last entry in the anthology written by an eighty-year-old Tolstoy for his grandchildren provides a lesson on vegetarianism and non-violence that a hungry wolf teaches a hungry boy during their conversation when both are on their way to lunch.

The anthology was being copyedited when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. After having provided the necessary grounding for Tolstoy’s place within the Russian philosophical tradition and explaining his overall reception and standing, the speaker will comment on the implications of this unfolding historic tragedy for the current moment and the future, in order to then open the floor for general discussion.

About the speaker:

Inessa Medzhibovskaya has taught at The New School since 2004.  She is an intellectual historian, philologist, specialist in international education, and a literary scholar by training and is currently Professor of Liberal Studies and Literature at The New School for Social Research and Eugene Lang College. Her publications include numerous essays and chapters that focus on Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as nine previously published books: Tolstoy’s On Life (from the Archival History of Russian Philosophy), 2019 and Tolstoy and the Religious Culture of His Time (paperback 2009); and an online bibliography of Tolstoy’s publications and Tolstoy criticism in the Oxford University Press Bibliographies series (2021). She is the editor of the critical edition of Tolstoy’s On Life, co-translated with Michael Denner (2018), and editor of two more volumes: Tolstoy and His Problems: Views from the Twenty-First Century (2018), and A Critical Guide to Tolstoy’s On Life: Interpretive Essays (2019). She also served as the academic advisor for volumes 267 and 289AC of Short Story Criticism from Gale/Cengage (2019, 2020). Her Tolstoy as Philosopher was released on October 25, 2022.  She is currently completing a long book project solicited by Princeton University Press.

For further information, see this link.

In the final part of The Human Condition (1958) Hannah Arendt turns to the danger of ‘world- alienation’. Based on a variety of discoveries and evolutions that are constitutive of modernity (globalization, Protestantism, the invention of the telescope), modern man has adopted an Archimedean, external position vis-à-vis the world. According to Arendt, this ‘view from without’ has gradually jeopardized the experience of a shared world, endangering the foundation of all meaning-giving activities.

My talk can be considered as a reply to Arendt’s pessimistic account of modern ‘world-alienation’. It builds on the idea that some of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century (Ernst Jünger, Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Aby Warburg, Sigmund Freud) did not equate the loss of a shared world with the loss of meaning. Rather, the conceptual framework of a substantial part of early twentieth century German philosophy centers on the exploration of a productive opposition, negation or fragmentation of the world. From the perspective of these thinkers, the world’s ‘durability’ (Arendt) is not simply a source of shared meaning since it can be experienced as the mark of its indifference to change and renewal.

Bio:

Stéphane Symons is Full Professor of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Leuven, Belgium. His research is focused on interwar German thought (Frankfurt School) and postwar French philosophy (structuralism and post-structuralism).