Calendar

2.15 Chaz Firestone
Assistant Professor, Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins
“What Do the Inattentionally Blind See? Evidence from 10,000 Subjects”

2.22 Robin Dembroff
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale
“Erecting Real Men”

3.1 Harvey Lederman
Professor of Philosophy, Princeton
TBD

3.8 Alison Jaggar
Professor Emerita and College Professor of Distinction, Philosophy and Women and Gender Studies, University of Colorado, Boulder
Marx Wartofsky Annual Lecture
TBD

3.15 Delia Baldassarri
Professor of Sociology, NYU
“How Does Prosocial Behavior Extend Beyond In–Group Boundaries in
Complex Societies?”

3.22 Myrto Mylopolous
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Carleton University
CUNY Alumni Lecture
“Skilled Action Guidance: A Problem for Intellectualism about Skill”

3.29 Josh Armstrong
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, UCLA
“The Social Origins of Language”

4.19 Denise Vigani
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Seton Hall
“Improvisation, Love, and Virtue”

4.26 Naomi Zack
Professor of Philosophy, Lehman College
“Metaphysical Racism and Racist Populism”

5.3 Sean Kelly
Teresa G. and Ferdinand F. Martignetti Professor of Philosophy, Harvard
TBD

This talk will develop the idea that racial identities are best understood as formed through large scale historical events, and that this genesis can only be obscured by disavowals of racial categories as conceptually mistaken and inevitably morally pernicious.  In this sense, races are formed not simply as ideas, or ideologies and policies, as many social constructivists about race argue, but as forms of life with associated patterns of subjectivity including, as a wealth of social psychology has shown, presumptive attitudes and behavioral dispositions (Jeffers 2019; Steele 2010; Sullivan 2005). Because they are historical formations, racial identities are thoroughly social, contextual, variegated internally, and dynamic. It is history that will alter them, not merely policy changes.

Talks hosted by Ryan McElhaney
To get Zoom links, email davidrosenthal1@gmail.com

Some—but not all—sessions are recorded for later access

2/3: Justin Sytsma
Philosophy, Victoria University of Wellington

2/10: Jonathan Birch
Philosophy, London School of Economics

2/17: No talk—one-week break

2/24: Miguel Ángel Sebastián
Philosophy, National Autonomous University of Mexico

3/3: Claudia Passos Ferreira
Philosophy, New York University
** HYBRID: Graduate Center Room 7102 **

3/10: Jonathan Morgan
Philosophy, Montclair State University
** HYBRID: Graduate Center Room 7102 **

3/17: Derek Brown
Philosophy, University of Glasgow

3/24: Robert Kentridge
Psychology and Centre for Vision and Visual Cognition, University of Durham
** HYBRID: Graduate Center Room 7102 **

3/31: Josh Weisberg
Philosophy, University of Houston
** HYBRID: Room TBA **

4/7, 4/14: Spring break—no talks

4/21: Michal Polák
Philosophy, University of West Bohemia

The CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker Series meets weekly at the CUNY Graduate Center,
Fridays, 1-3 pm—all on Zoom, some hybrid. This file is at: http://bit.ly/cs-talks
For additional information e-mail David Rosenthal <davidrosenthal1@gmail.com>

Well-being, also known as prudential value, refers to whatever makes a life non-instrumentally good for the person living it. Well-being is the object of immense practical, philosophical, and scientific concern. Assessments of well-being help to guide our decisions in everyday life, from relationships, to health decisions, to education and career choices. Well-being is increasingly the object of governmental and institutional policy, and even policies that are not aimed directly at promoting it can be evaluated in terms of their impacts on well-being. Colleges and universities routinely offer programs designed to help students maintain their well-being in the face of academic and personal stress. However, debates over the nature of well-being have raged since the beginning of philosophical inquiry, leaving us in a bad position when it comes to making headway on addressing those practical and scientific concerns. The goal of this talk is to show how the application of naturalistic methodology can help us to resolve the philosophical stalemate and thus to make progress in our practical and scientific projects relating to well-being. 

• Talk link — Email cruzdavis <at> umass.edu or jrc2266 <at> columbia.edu for the passcode

SWIP–NYC Sue Weinberg Lecture Series presents:
Grit & Imposter Syndrome
Joint Lectures by
Jennifer Morton (University of Pennsylvania)
Talk Title: Interpreting Obstacles
&
Leonie Smith (University of Manchester)
Talk Title: Class, Academia, and Imposter Syndrome
Friday, March 17
5–7 p.m.
CUNY Graduate Center
365 5th Avenue
Room 9207
QUESTIONS? EMAIL swipnyc@gmail.com

Conceptual misalignment is a pervasive phenomenon in the studies of Non-Western philosophy and the History of Philosophy (NW&HP). However, conceptual misalignment is often undetected, unsuspected, or seen as a hurdle that NW&HP materials need to overcome to contribute to contemporary discussions. Specifically, conceptual misalignment refers to the following: In the process of crystalizing NW&HP materials, a linguistic coordination of concepts is formed between the speaker, i.e., NW&HP, and its context of contemporary anglophone philosophy. However, in philosophically meaningful ways, the original NW&HP concept and its anglophone counterpart misalign. This misalignment is particularly intricate and hard to detect when it comes to emotion concepts, as they are thought to involve phenomenal and/or intentional features. Through investigating the concept of emotion in Chinese philosophy, I propose a refocusing on conceptual misalignment as a method of cross-cultural comparative and history of philosophy. Moreover, I argue that conceptual misalignment is an important resource for contemporary conceptual engineering and amelioration projects.

With responses from Andrew Lambert (College of Staten Island, CUNY)

RSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.

The sender-receiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackle the question of the conventionality of meaning. But many people who cared about the conventionality of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work, only a few attempts have been made to say anything about the nature of logic and inference from the perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the what’s been said in that regard, by Skyrms and others, and suggest a few general lessons.

—

Hi, All. Below is the provisional program for the Workshop this coming semester.  Meetings will be as usual: Mondays 16.15-18.15 at the GC. Room 9205. We are reverting to face to face meetings. (No more Zoom.)

Feb 27 Lionel Shapiro, UConn

Mar 6 Gary Ostertag, GC

Mar 13 Mel Fitting GC

Mar 20 Shawn Simpson

Mar 27 Brad Armour-Garb, SUNY Albany

Apr 3 Thomas Ferguson, Prague

Apr 10 Spring recess. No meeting

Apr 17 Branden Fitelson, Northeastern

Apr 24 Andrea Iacona, Turin

May 1 Samara Burns, Columbia

May 10 Special event. Note that this is a Wednesday and the  session will run all afternoon:

Marc Colyvan (Sydney) and Heinrich Wansing (Bochum), Daniel Skurt (Bochum)

May 15 Maciej Sendłak, Warsaw

For those interested, here is the schedule for the rest of the Fall 2022 semester and Spring 2023 semester. All the talks will happen between 4:30pm and 6:30pm EST unless stated otherwise.

Armin Schulz (University of Kansas)
Tuesday Jan 24 2023
TBA

Glenn Shafer (Rutgers University)
Tuesday Feb 14 2023 RESCHEDULE
TBA

Sean Carroll (Johns Hopkins)
Tuesday Feb 28 2023
TBA

Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College)
Tuesday Mar 21 2023
TBA

Any updates on the schedule, as well as information about the talks will be announced through the MAPS mailing list. To be added to the mailing list please message Diego Arana (da689@rutgers.edu) and Barry Loewer (loewer@philosophy.rutgers.edu).