Feb
12
Fri
Feb 12 @ 3:30 pm – 4:30 pm
The idea that people should stand in relationships of equal respect is almost a truism. But controversy begins the moment we try to specify what this means and what this requires. In this paper, I argue that a relatively modest assumption about respect for persons has some surprising implications for freedom of expression. If nothing else, respecting someone as a person requires recognizing her important interests as reasons for action in one’s practical deliberation. At least in a great many cases, the way we learn about other people’s interests is through their expression in behavior. So limitations on freedom of expression reduce a person’s opportunities to be recognized by others. And unequal freedom of expression generates unequal access to relationships of recognition. The link between expression and recognition reveals a category of limitations on freedom of expression that goes beyond the traditional First Amendment conception of a state-imposed restriction on people’s freedom to assert their beliefs. At the same time, it demonstrates by example that the relational view of equality does indeed have substantive normative implications.
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