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NYC Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy: Freedom and Evil
NYC Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy: Freedom and Evil @ Fordham Lincoln Center
Mar 2 – Mar 3 all-day
The workshop, which is now in its 9th year, aims to foster exchange and collaboration among scholars, students, and anyone with an interest in Early Modern Philosophy. This year’s workshop will focus on the topic of “Freedom and Evil” in Early Modern Philosophy (roughly the period from 1600-1800). We welcome submissions on the conference topic, which may be broadly construed to include the problem of free will, theodicy, political and social liberty, and evil practices[...]
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CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Meeting Cancellation: The CUNY Graduate Center will be closed on Monday, March 4th. Therefore, the Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will not be meeting. There is no meeting I argue that racial injustice can make a subject’s news sources unreliable because of the effect of (1) racial prejudice and (2) society’s unjust structure on the news-gathering-and-disseminating processes a subject relies on.  I assume that societies with entrenched racial injustice have widespread racial prejudices and that these[...]
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows: Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU Apr 1. Elena[...]
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On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names, Dongwoo Kim (CUNY) 4:30 pm
On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names, Dongwoo Kim (CUNY) @ CUNY Grad Center, 6495
Mar 7 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm
I shall discuss some of the issues concerning a notorious doctrine of Frege that sentences are names of truth-values. I am interested in a problem raised by Kripke that the doctrine obscures the distinction between judgeable and unjudgeable contents. I shall present what I take to be Frege’s account of judgeable content. A proper expression of a judgeable content, for Frege, is susceptible to an analysis into a predicate and an argument-word, where a predicate[...]
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Gabriele Pulcini (New University of Lisbon): From Complementary Logic to Proof-Theoretic Semantics 12:00 pm
Gabriele Pulcini (New University of Lisbon): From Complementary Logic to Proof-Theoretic Semantics @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 716
Mar 8 @ 12:00 pm
Two proof-systems P and P* are said to be complementary when one proves exactly the non-theorems of the other. Complementary systems come as a particular kind of refutation calculi whose patterns of inference always work by inferring unprovable conclusions form unprovable premises. In the first part of my talk, I will focus on LK*, the sequent system complementing Gentzen’s system LK for classical logic. I will show, then, how to enrich LK* with two admissible[...]
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Jeremy Goodman (USC): Deep Structure. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Jeremy Goodman (USC): Deep Structure. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 11 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Russell proved over a century ago that a naive conception of structured propositions is inconsistent. Hodes (2015), Dorr (2016), and Goodman (2017) have recently reformulated Russell’s argument in the language of higher-order logic, and concluded from it that distinctions in reality cannot always reflect all the syntactic structure of the language in which we draw those distinctions. But they also float the idea that such distinctions might nevertheless have sentence-like structure, so long as this[...]
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Social and Political Philosophy Workshop 5:30 pm
Social and Political Philosophy Workshop @ Law School rm 8-01
Mar 12 @ 5:30 pm – 6:45 pm
Meetings are held on Tuesdays at Fordham’s Lincoln Center campus in Manhattan in the Plaza View Room, 12th Floor, Lowenstein Building (113 W. 60th St). We meet from 5:30 to 6:45 and papers are read in advance. If interested in attending, contact sahaddad@fordham.edu or jeflynn@fordham.edu. September 18 – Cristina Beltrán (NYU) October 9 – Jennifer Scuro (New Rochelle) – “Mapping Ableist Biases: Diagnoses and Prostheses” November 6 – Lillian Cicerchia (Fordham) March 12 – Rahel Jaeggi (Humboldt) April 9 – Ann Murphy (New Mexico),[...]
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Curved Spacetimes: Where Friedrich Nietzsche Meets Virginia Woolf 6:00 pm
Curved Spacetimes: Where Friedrich Nietzsche Meets Virginia Woolf @ The Tank, 1st flr.
Mar 17 @ 6:00 pm – 9:00 pm
Professor Barbara Gail Montero is the director of (and a performer in) the upcoming multimedia, interdisciplinary event Curved Spacetimes: Where Friedrich Nietzsche Meets Virginia Woolf. Prof. Nickolas Pappas will also perform (reading spoken word as Friedrich Nietzsche), and Prof. Jonathan Gilmore is a member of the team that brought the project to fruition. According to the American Society for Aesthetics (who partially funded this project with a $7,000 grant), Curved Spacetimes is “multisensory event focused on the Physics, Aesthetics,[...]
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Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 18 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Two ways of giving an epistemic justification of basic logical principles will be introduced, intuition-based accounts and concept or meaning constitution-based accounts. We will briefly consider different versions of these views and argue that they face parallel dilemmas. While ‘robust’ accounts are subject to what I call the ‘adoption problem,’ ‘weak’ accounts fail to ground our basic inferential dispositions. Either way, intuitions and meaning-constituting rules turn out to be irrelevant. A more general moral for[...]
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Kit Fine (NYU): A Theory of the Conditional. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Kit Fine (NYU): A Theory of the Conditional. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 25 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Abstract: I provide a truth-maker semantics for the conditional and consider the application to imperative and deontic conditionals. The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows: Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY[...]
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