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CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Meeting Cancellation: The CUNY Graduate Center will be closed on Monday, March 4th. Therefore, the Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will not be meeting. There is no meeting I argue that racial injustice can make a subject’s news sources unreliable because of the effect of (1) racial prejudice and (2) society’s unjust structure on the news-gathering-and-disseminating processes a subject relies on. I assume that societies with entrenched racial injustice have widespread racial prejudices and that these[...]
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows: Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU Apr 1. Elena[...]
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Typicality of Worlds and the Metaphysics of Laws. Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL)
4:30 pm
Typicality of Worlds and the Metaphysics of Laws. Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL)
@ NYU, room 110
Mar 5 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm
What are laws of nature? The predominant view in contemporary philosophy of science is the Humean `best system account’ which holds that the laws of nature are merely descriptive, an efficient summary of contingent regularities that we find in the world. Using the concept of typicality, I will spell out a common anti-Humean intuition into a precise argument: A typical Humean world wouldn’t have any law-like regularities to begin with. Thus (I will argue), Humean[...]
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Jeremy Goodman (USC): Deep Structure. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Jeremy Goodman (USC): Deep Structure. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 11 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Russell proved over a century ago that a naive conception of structured propositions is inconsistent. Hodes (2015), Dorr (2016), and Goodman (2017) have recently reformulated Russell’s argument in the language of higher-order logic, and concluded from it that distinctions in reality cannot always reflect all the syntactic structure of the language in which we draw those distinctions. But they also float the idea that such distinctions might nevertheless have sentence-like structure, so long as this[...]
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Black Women Philosophers Conference
Black Women Philosophers Conference
@ Elebash Recital Hall, CUNY Grad Center
Mar 15 – Mar 16 all-day
What does a philosopher look like? Inevitably, our mental pictures are shaped by the dominant imagery of the white male marble busts of Greco-Roman antiquity—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca—and their modern European heirs—Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Mill. Even today Western philosophy is largely male and overwhelmingly white—about 97 percent in the U.S., close to 100 percent in Europe. Diversifying the field requires expanding our corporeal imaginary of its practitioners. This conference, timed to honor[...]
“Why Care About What There Is” Daniel Korman (UCSB)
3:30 pm
“Why Care About What There Is” Daniel Korman (UCSB)
@ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Mar 15 @ 3:30 pm – 5:30 pm
There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are ultimate (in one or another sense). I argue that this is a mistake.[...]
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Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 18 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Two ways of giving an epistemic justification of basic logical principles will be introduced, intuition-based accounts and concept or meaning constitution-based accounts. We will briefly consider different versions of these views and argue that they face parallel dilemmas. While ‘robust’ accounts are subject to what I call the ‘adoption problem,’ ‘weak’ accounts fail to ground our basic inferential dispositions. Either way, intuitions and meaning-constituting rules turn out to be irrelevant. A more general moral for[...]
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Kit Fine (NYU): A Theory of the Conditional. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
4:15 pm
Kit Fine (NYU): A Theory of the Conditional. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 25 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Abstract: I provide a truth-maker semantics for the conditional and consider the application to imperative and deontic conditionals. The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows: Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY[...]
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