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Typicality of Worlds and the Metaphysics of Laws. Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL) 4:30 pm
Typicality of Worlds and the Metaphysics of Laws. Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL) @ NYU, room 110
Mar 5 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm
What are laws of nature? The predominant view in contemporary philosophy of science is the Humean `best system account’ which holds that the laws of nature are merely descriptive, an efficient summary of contingent regularities that we find in the world. Using the concept of typicality, I will spell out a common anti-Humean intuition into a precise argument: A typical Humean world wouldn’t have any law-like regularities to begin with. Thus (I will argue), Humean[...]
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Body and Mind in Early China: Embodied Cognition, Digital Humanities, and the Project of Comparative Philosophy- Edward Slingerland (University of British Columbia) 5:30 pm
Body and Mind in Early China: Embodied Cognition, Digital Humanities, and the Project of Comparative Philosophy- Edward Slingerland (University of British Columbia) @ Columbia University Religion Dept. 101
Mar 8 @ 5:30 pm – 7:30 pm
It is commonly claimed that mind-body dualism is entirely foreign to China—or “the East” more generally. This talk will explore how engaging with the cognitive sciences and digital humanities undermines claims such as this, and more broadly can help us to do our work as scholars of comparative philosophy. Embracing an embodied view of human cognition gets us beyond strong social constructivism and its accompanying cultural essentialism. In addition, new tools from the science and[...]
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“Why Care About What There Is” Daniel Korman (UCSB) 3:30 pm
“Why Care About What There Is” Daniel Korman (UCSB) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Mar 15 @ 3:30 pm – 5:30 pm
There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are ultimate (in one or another sense). I argue that this is a mistake.[...]
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