{"id":5269,"date":"2015-03-01T13:51:55","date_gmt":"2015-03-01T18:51:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/?p=5269"},"modified":"2015-03-01T13:51:55","modified_gmt":"2015-03-01T18:51:55","slug":"the-tortoise-and-the-hareloon","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/2015\/03\/01\/the-tortoise-and-the-hareloon\/","title":{"rendered":"The Tortoise and the HareLoon"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>[draft]<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/fair-use.org\/mind\/1895\/04\/what-the-tortoise-said-to-achilles\">Achilles glanced up from his writing atop the Tortoise<\/a>[1] and exclaimed, \u201cLook! The Hare has caught up.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cNo,\u201d said the Tortoise apprehensively, \u201cthat isn\u2019t the Hare, but the Hare\u2019s all too clever cousin, the HareLoon.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cA real HareLoon! I\u2019ve only ever seen them in pictures.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cDon\u2019t get so worked up. She is always in a hurry but I can never tell if she is coming or going.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAh, but you should know the HareLoon coming and the HareLoon going are one and the same,\u201d said the HareLoon. She then faced Achilles, \u201cI heard that Tortoise had you write many logical steps after starting with a mere three.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>With a wan smile Achilles murmured, \u201cWe\u2019ve moved on from that now\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cYes\u201d said the Tortoise firmly. \u201cHave you heard of Moore\u2019s Proof of the External World? It is just as short as the three lines of Euclid:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(A) Here is a Hand.<br \/>\n(B) Hands are external things.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(Z) The external world exists.<\/p>\n<p>Achilles said, &#8220;We are now in agreement that <em>Z<\/em> follows logically from <em>A<\/em> and <em>B<\/em>. But\u2026&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>\u201cBut <strong>only if<\/strong> we accept <em>A<\/em> and <em>B<\/em>, does <em>Z<\/em> follow,\u201d the Tortoise interjected. \u201cHowever, I\u2019m skeptical that hands are real at all.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhatever do you mean?\u201d asked the HareLoon, looking rather concerned for Achilles.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWell, I might just be dreaming that there is a Hand in front of me. Or I could have eaten something disagreeable that is making me imagine things. Or someone is playing a trick on me.\u201d The Tortoise continued, \u201cI need a further statement to guarantee <em>A<\/em>:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(C) I am not being fooled into thinking a Hand is here.<\/p>\n<p>Achilles cringed, palm to face.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cFair enough, and I think I know where you are going with this,\u201d said the HareLoon. \u201cBut before we worry about the External world, have you a proof of the Internal World?\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhat do you mean: Proof of the Internal World?\u201d asked Achilles.<\/p>\n<p>The HareLoon queried, \u201cLet me ask you first: Would you know a HareLoon if you saw one? If so, please tell me how.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In an official sounding voice the Tortoise recited: \u201cThe chief characteristic of a HareLoon is that it appears to be a Hare at some times, and appears to be a Loon at others.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cExcellent,\u201d replied the HareLoon. \u201cWould you agree that the HareLoon does not itself change when it takes on these different guises? That is: the appearance of the Loon and the appearance of the Hare are in the thoughts of the beholder.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI suppose\u2026 The change is in the onlooker,\u201d agreed the Tortoise.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThen,\u201d continued the HareLoon,<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(A\u2019) Here is a HareLoon.<br \/>\n(B\u2019) HareLoons are internal things.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(Z\u2019) The internal world exists.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI distinctly remember Moore talking about hands and not HareLoons,\u201d grumbled the Tortoise.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cPerhaps, but unlike hands you cannot be <strong><em>fooled<\/em><\/strong> into thinking HareLoons exist! We exist when, without change, we can appear to be a Hare or a Loon. Since we have agreed that this change is in your head, you can\u2019t be mistaken about us switching in appearance between Hare or Loon. Hence when <strong>you<\/strong> <strong><em>think<\/em><\/strong> you see a HareLoon, <strong>you<\/strong> <strong><em>do<\/em><\/strong> see a HareLoon!<\/p>\n<p>\u201cVery Clever!\u201d returned the Tortoise. \u201cBut what we want is the external \u2014 not internal \u2014 world. You\u2019ve just argued yourself into my head and out of external existence. If you are only in my thoughts, it is a <em>quick<\/em> matter of logic to say that you aren\u2019t anywhere eles.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhy Tortoise, that is the nicest thing you\u2019ve ever said to me! To think, you\u2019ve kept me in mind and maintained my existence, all these years. I should be flattered \u2014 or flattened, like you. I would take this paper thin existence (<a href=\"http:\/\/home.sandiego.edu\/~baber\/analytic\/Bouwsma1949.pdf\"><em>Cogito me papyrum esse, ergo sum<\/em><\/a>)[2] but I don\u2019t think I need to any longer.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Answer me this: Who lives in this internal world? I\u2019m here, and <strong>so are you<\/strong>! We have just agreed that I exist by you thinking, <em>Cogito Ergo Es<\/em>, and this is just the same as you existing by you thinking, <em>Cogito Ergo Sum<\/em>. So if I am a figment of your imagination, then so are you.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI am most certainly not a figment of my own imagination! You always were Loony, using Hairy reasoning.\u201d said the indignant Tortoise.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI don\u2019t want to deny my existence any more than you yours, but <a href=\"#philosophical-investigations-\u00a7398\">if, as a <em>quick<\/em> matter of logic, you exclude others from existing, it loses its sense to say that you exist, either<\/a>[3]. The only other thing that could have gone wrong is <em>B\u2019<\/em>, that HareLoons are internal things. So we now have:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(A\u2019) Here is a HareLoon.<br \/>\n(B\u2019\u2019) HareLoons are <strong>external<\/strong> things.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\">(Z) The external world exists.<\/p>\n<p>Achilles shook his head, \u201c<em>You<\/em> should have known, Tortoise\u2026 you can be <em>in<\/em> your house, but you\u2019re still <em>out<\/em>side. If only your cousin were here, the Mock-Turtle would say: that while Achilles skill kills and the Tortoise disorders us (what tsuris!), the HareLoon\u2019s Hume\u2019s heir.\u201d<\/p>\n<hr class=\"section\" \/>\n<p>[1] Carroll, Lewis. (1895) What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4, No. 14: 278-280.<br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/fair-use.org\/mind\/1895\/04\/what-the-tortoise-said-to-achilles\">http:\/\/fair-use.org\/mind\/1895\/04\/what-the-tortoise-said-to-achilles<\/a><\/p>\n<p>[2] Bouwsma, O. K. (1949). Descartes\u2019 evil genius. Philosophical Review 58 (2):141-151.<br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/home.sandiego.edu\/~baber\/analytic\/Bouwsma1949.pdf\">http:\/\/home.sandiego.edu\/~baber\/analytic\/Bouwsma1949.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n<p>[3] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953\/2003). Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation. Malden, Ma, Blackwell Pub.<br \/>\nRelevant section \u00a7398 quoted below.<br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/gormendizer.co.za\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/06\/Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.pdf\">http:\/\/gormendizer.co.za\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/06\/Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n<hr class=\"section\" \/>\n<h4 id=\"philosophical-investigations-\u00a7398\"><a href=\"#philosophical-investigations-\u00a7398\" name=\"philosophical-investigations-\u00a7398\"><\/a>Philosophical Investigations \u00a7398<\/h4>\n<p>(Bold Added)<\/p>\n<p>\u201cBut when I imagine something, or even actually <em>see<\/em> objects, I have <em>got<\/em> something which my neighbour has not.\u201d \u2014 I understand you. You want to look about you and say: \u201cAt any rate only I have got THIS.\u201d \u2014 What are these words for? They serve no purpose. \u2014 Can one not add: \u201cThere is here no question of a \u2018seeing\u2019 \u2014 and therefore none of a \u2018having\u2019 \u2014 nor of a subject, nor therefore of T either\u201d? Might I not ask: In what sense have you <em>got<\/em> what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even <em>see<\/em> it. Must you not really say that no one has got it? And this too is clear: <strong>if as a matter of logic you exclude other people\u2019s having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>But what is the thing you are speaking of? It is true I said that I knew within myself what you meant. But that meant that I knew how one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to make one\u2019s looking and pointing mean it. I know how one stares ahead and looks about one in this case \u2014 and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if, for example, you are sitting in a room) of the \u2018visual room\u2019. The \u2018visual room\u2019 is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it cannot be any one else\u2019s it is not mine either. In other words, it does not belong to me <em>because<\/em> I want to use the same form of expression about it as about the material room in which I sit. The description of the latter need not mention an owner, in fact it need not have any owner. But then the visual room<em> cannot<\/em> have any owner. \u201cFor\u201d \u2014 one might say \u2014 \u201cit has no master, outside or in.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. \u2014 Someone asks \u201cWhose house is that?\u201d \u2014 The answer, by the way, might be \u201cIt belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it\u201d. But then he cannot for example enter his house.<\/p>\n<hr class=\"section\" \/>\n<p>You\u2019ve tossed the grin out with the cat.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[draft] Achilles glanced up from his writing atop the Tortoise[1] and exclaimed, \u201cLook! The Hare has caught up.\u201d \u201cNo,\u201d said the Tortoise apprehensively, \u201cthat isn\u2019t the Hare, but the Hare\u2019s all too clever cousin, the HareLoon.\u201d \u201cA real HareLoon! I\u2019ve only ever seen them in pictures.\u201d \u201cDon\u2019t get so worked up. She is always in a hurry but I can never tell if she is coming or going.\u201d \u201cAh, but you should know the HareLoon [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19,20,26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5269","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-metaphysics","category-mind","category-philosophy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5269","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5269"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5269\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5276,"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5269\/revisions\/5276"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5269"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5269"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.noahgreenstein.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5269"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}