Philosophy-in-Manhattan
Sunday, March 18 at 2:00 PM
CUNY philosophy PhD candidate Vincent Peluce will lead this discussion. What is law? In order for something to be correctly considered law, need onl…
Price: 12.00 USD
I study admissible multiple-conclusion rules of logics having the meta-disjunction expressible by a finite set of formulas. I show that in such logics the bases of admissible single- and multiple-conclusion rules can be converted into each other. Since these conversions are constructive and preserve cardinality, it is possible to obtain a simple way of constructing a base of admissible single-conclusion rules, by a given base of admissible multiple-conclusion rules and vice versa. Because the proofs are purely syntactical, these results can be applied to a broad class of logics.
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop
Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster
Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU
Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL
Mar 19 Alex Citkin, Private Researcher
Mar 26 Chris Scambler, NYU
Apr 2 SPRING RECESS. NO MEETING
Apr 9 Greg Restall, Melbourne
Apr 16 Daniel Nolan, Notre Dame
Apr 23 Mel Fitting, CUNY
Apr 30 Sungil Han, Seoul National
May 7 Andreas Ditter, NYU
May14 Rohit Parikh
Feb 26 Martin Pleitz, Muenster
Mar 5 Vera Flocke, NYU
Mar 12 Roy Sorensen, WUSTL
Mar 19 Alex Citkin, Private Researcher
Mar 26 Chris Scambler, NYU
Apr 2 SPRING RECESS. NO MEETING
Apr 9 Greg Restall, Melbourne
Apr 16 Daniel Nolan, Notre Dame
Apr 23 Mel Fitting, CUNY
Apr 30 Sungil Han, Seoul National
May 7 Andreas Ditter, NYU
May14 Rohit Parikh
Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo is a brilliant, suspenseful mystery exploring the often dangerous intimacy between love, compulsion, and death. It is also a profound meditation on the power of art. While it invites us to go on seeing art as a mimesis – a “representation,” or “imitation” of life – it also cryptically asks whether art objects might do more than merely represent life, even whether they might exercise power over death. James Stewart’s Scotty has been compared to Orpheus in quest of Eurydice; I suggest that he’s worth comparing to Admetus, who wished he could be Orpheus, and who imagines clinging to a statue to recapture his lost wife. The spell cast by Hitchcock in Vertigo shows us just how bewitching art can be when it has us under its sway.
Monday, March 19, 2018 at 6pm. This event is part of the Philosophy Series at The Cornelia Street Café, located at 29 Cornelia Street, New York, NY 10014 (near Sixth Avenue and West 4th St.). Admission is $10, which includes the price of one drink. Reservations are recommended (212. 989.9319)
Nickolas Pappas is Professor of Philosophy at City College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, where he has taught since 1993. He is the author of several books and around 40 articles, mostly on topics in ancient philosophy. His books include the Routledge Philosophical Guidebook to Plato’s Republic, now in its third edition; and most recently The Philosopher’s New Clothes (Routledge, 2016).
as our understanding of the universe and its basic building blocks extends to shorter and shorter distances, experiments capable of probing these scales are becoming increasingly difficult to construct. Fundamental particle physics faces a potential crisis: an absence of data at the shortest possible scales. Yet remarkably, even in the absence of experimental data, the requirement of theoretical consistency puts stringent constraints on viable models of fundamental particles and their interactions. In this talk I’ll present some of these constraints and discuss their applications for cosmology, string theory and more.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
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UPCOMING:
Abstract: conventional wisdom holds that since the advent of the first full theories of quantum mechanics in the mid-1920s, the Copenhagen interpretation has been the default interpretation of quantum mechanics, and has enjoyed the support of a majority of physicists ever since. This is not the case. While it is indeed true that a majority of physicists have long professed that they subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation, the plain fact of the matter is that there is no single coherent position known as the Copenhagen interpretation, nor has there ever been one. Moreover, none of the positions that go by the name “Copenhagen interpretation” do a good job of solving the measurement problem, the central interpretive problem at the heart of quantum foundations. Nor do they evade the nonlocality that is dictated by Bell’s theorem. In this talk, I will give an overview of the history of the Copenhagen interpretation from 1926 to the present, explain its multiple inconsistencies and failures, and attempt an answer at a persistent puzzle: why does the Copenhagen interpretation remain popular among physicists despite its manifest flaws and the existence of multiple superior alternatives
About the speaker: Adam Becker is the author of What is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics. He has a PhD in physics from the University of Michigan and he is the recipient of an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Book Grant. He is currently a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s Office for History of Science and Technology.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: My main aim is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities between theories, as `duality’ is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as `equivalence’ is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called `the same theory’, though we interpret them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly equivalent, as `equivalent’ is normally understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing—since often neglected.
My argument for this is based on the account of duality by De Haro and myself: which is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory. Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree in their claims about the world.
I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening of it.
Abstract: TBD.
Our topic for Spring 2018 will be Formal Frameworks for Semantics and Pragmatics. We’ll be investigating a range of questions in semantics and/or pragmatics which involve or are relevant to the choice between different kinds of overall structure for theories in these areas.
In most sessions, the members of the seminar will receive a week in advance, copies of recent work, or work in progress from a thinker at another university. After reading this work, students discuss it with one of the instructors on the day before the colloquium. Then at the Tuesday colloquium, the instructors give a summary review and raise criticisms or questions about the work. The author responds to these, and also to questions from the audience.
Meetings
The main seminar meetings are on Tuesday from 4-7, in the second floor seminar room of the Philosophy Department. Additionally, there will be a supplementary meeting open to all students participating in the seminar (whether enrolled or not) on Mondays from 4-5, in the same location in the fifth-floor seminar room.
This seminar is open to all interested parties.
There is a googlegroups mailing list for the class. If you want to receive announcements, please add yourself to that list. (To be able to access the mailing list’s web interface, you’ll need to log into Google’s systems using an identity Google recognizes, like a Gmail address, or a NYU email address because of how NYU’s authentication systems are connected to Google. But there’s no real need to see the mailing list’s web interface. You just need some email address to be added to list, then any messages we send to the list will get forwarded to all the email addresses then registered on the list. If you want us to add an address to the list that you can’t log into Google’s systems with, just send us a message with the address you want registered.)
Schedule and Papers
Papers will be posted here as they become available. Some may be password-protected; the password will be distributed in class.
- 23 Jan
- Introductory session (no meeting on Monday 22 Jan), Jim’s handoutSome people asked for more background reading. Here are two useful textbooks: Heim & Kratzer, then von Fintel & Heim. Here is a survey article about different treatments of pronoun anaphora. Here is a course page with links to more reading.
- 30 Jan
- Jim Pryor (NYU, web, mail), “De Jure Codesignation“
- 6 Feb
- Mandy Simons (CMU, web, mail), “Convention, Intention, and the Conversational Record” and (with Kevin Zollman) “Natural Conventions and the Semantics/Pragmatics Divide“(Mandy is also speaking in the NYPL on Monday 5 Feb at 6:30.)
- 13 Feb
- Paul Pietroski (Rutgers, mail), “Semantic Typology and Composition“
- 20 Feb
- Karen Lewis (Columbia/Barnard, web, mail)
- 27 Feb
- Daniel Rothschild (UCL, web, mail)(Daniel is also speaking in the NYPL on Monday 26 Feb at 6:30.)
- 6 Mar
- John Hawthorne (USC, mail)
- 13 Mar
- Spring Break
- 20 Mar
- Lucas Champollion (NYU, web, mail)
- 27 Mar
- Matthew Mandelkern (Oxford, web, mail)
- 3 Apr
- Paolo Santorio (UC-San Diego, web, mail)
- 10 Apr
- Una Stojnić (Columbia, web, mail)
- 17 Apr
- Seth Yalcin (UC-Berkeley, web, mail)
- 24 Apr
- Stephen Schiffer (NYU, web, mail)
- 1 May
- Maria Aloni (ILLC and Philosophy/Amsterdam, web, mail)(Maria is also speaking in the NYPL on Monday 30 Apr at 6:30.)
The Epistemology and Ethics group is composed of faculty and graduate students at Fordham and other nearby universities. Papers are read in advance, so the majority of the time is devoted to questions and discussion. If interested in attending, email dheney[at]fordham[dot]edu.
September 19th Kate Manne (Cornell)
October 17th Sandy Goldberg (Northwestern)
November 14th Eden Lin (Ohio State)
February 27th Nathan Ballantyne (Fordham)
March 20th Sophie Horowitz (UMass, Amherst)
April 24th Nomy Arpaly (Brown)
Each colloquium is held on Wednesday at 4:15 P.M. All colloquia will take place at the Graduate Center in rooms 9204/9205 except as otherwise noted. Please call (212) 817-8615 for further information.
February 7th • Jerrold Katz Memorial Lecture
David Papineau (CUNY Graduate Center | King’s College London)
“Kinds and Essences: Taming Metaphysical Modality”
February 14th
Jane Friedman (NYU)
“The Epistemic and the Zetetic”
February 21st
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (York U)
“Are Sexes Natural Kinds?”
February 28th
Laurie Paul (UNC)
“De Se Truth and Epistemic Revolution”
March 7th • Marx Wartofsky Memorial Lecture
Steven Lukes (NYU)
Title TBD
March 14th
Collin O’Neill (CUNY Lehman College)
“Consent and Third-Party Coercion in Medicine and Research”
March 21st
Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh)
TBD
March 28th
Greg Restall (Melbourne)
“Accommodation, Inference, Generics and Pejoratives”
April 4th: No Colloquium (Spring Recess)
April 11th: No Colloquium (CUNY Friday Schedule)
April 18th
Shaun Nichols (Arizona)
“The Wrong and the Bad: On the Rational Acquisition of Moral Rules”
April 25th
Quayshawn Spencer (UPenn)
“A Radical Solution to the Race Problem”
May 2nd
Tim Crane (CEU)
“Putnam’s Ant: On the Reduction of Meaning and Intentionality”
May 9
Kathryn Tabb (Columbia)
“Locke on the Complexity of Ideas and the Ethics of Belief”
Download an interactive PDF version of the schedule here.
Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present. I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy and science by Mach, Poincaré, and Einstein. I then consider the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer and (yes) Thomas Kuhn, which finally leads to my own attempt to develop a post-Kuhnian approach to the philosophy of science in the light of this history.
The Department’s colloquium series typically meets on Thursdays in the Seminar Room at Gateway Bldg, 106 Somerset Street, 5th Floor.
- 2/27/18 Goldman Lecture, 4pm
- 3/1/18 Mesthene Lecture, Prof. Miranda Fricker (GC-CUNY), 3:00-6:30 pm
- 3/22/18 RU Climate Lecture, Prof. Sally Haslanger (MIT) 3:00-5:00 pm
- 4/8/18 Karen Bennett (Cornell University)
- 4/12/18 Sanders Lecture, Prof. Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma)
- 4/13/18 Rutgers Chinese Philosophy Conference, 9:30 am-6:30 pm
- 4/13-4/14/18 Marilyn McCord Adams Memorial Conference
- 4/14-4/15/18 Rutgers-Columbia Undergraduate Philosophy Conference (held at Columbia University)
- 4/17/18 Class of 1970’s Lecture, Prof. Jeremy Waldron (NYU), Alexander Teleconference Lecture Hall, 4:30-7:30 pm
- 5/21-5/25/18 Metaphysical Mayhem
- 6/8-6/9/18 Pantheism Workshop
- 7/8-7/15/18 Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy (held at the Rutgers University Inn and Conference Center)