Punny Logic

[draft]

It is hard to explain puns to kleptomaniacs because they take things literally.

On the surface, this statement is a statement of logic, with a premise and conclusion.

Given the premise:

Kleptomaniacs take things literally.

We may deduce the conclusion:

It is hard to explain puns to kleptomaniacs.

Now, whether the conclusion strictly follows from the premise is beside the point: it is a pun, and meant to be funny. However, as a pun, it still has to make some logical sense. If it didn’t make any sense, it wouldn’t, and couldn’t, be funny either. While nonsense can be amusing, it isn’t punny.

What is the sense in which the conclusion logically follows from the premise then, and how does this relate to the pun?

Puns play off ambiguity in the meaning of a word or phrase. In this case the ambiguity has to do with the meaning of to take things literally. It can mean to steal, or it can mean to only use the simplest, most common definitions of terms.

In the first meaning, by definition, kleptomaniacs steal, i.e. they literally take things.

So then “take things literally” is true.

In the second meaning, by deduction, since puns play off multiple meanings of things, it is hard to explain a pun to someone who only uses the single, most common definition of a term. That is, if they take things literally, they won’t recognize the multiple meanings required to understand a pun.

So if someone “takes things literally” it is true that it is hard to explain puns to them.

Therefore, between the two meanings, we can informally derive the statement: it is hard to explain puns to kleptomaniacs because they take things literally.

However, if we wanted to write this out in a formal logical language, then we would need a formal way to represent the two meanings of the single phrase.

Classically, there is no way to give a proposition multiple meanings. Whatever a proposition is defined as, it stays that way. A can’t be defined as B and then not defined as B: (A=B & A≠B) is a contradiction and to be avoided classically. But let’s start with a classical formulation:

Let:

TTL1 mean to Take Things Literally, in the 1st sense: to steal

TTL2 mean to Take Things Literally, in the 2nd sense: to use the most common definitions of terms.

Then

  1. ∀x [ Kx → TTL1x ]
    For anyone who is a Kleptomaniac, Then they take things literally (steal)
  2. ∀y[ TTL2y → Py ]
    For anyone who takes things literally (definitionally), Then it is hard to explain puns to them

What we want, however, is closer to:

  1. ∀z [[ Kz → TTLz] → Pz ]
    For anyone who is a Kleptomaniac, Then they take things literally, Then it is hard to explain puns to them

with only one sense of TTL, but two meanings.

Since TTL1 ≠ TTL2, we can’t derive (3) from (1) and (2), as is. And if TTL1 = TTL2, then we would have (1) A→B, and (2) B→C, while trying to prove (3) A→B→C, which logically follows. However, there would no longer be a pun if there was only one meaning of TTL.

What is needed is to be able to recompose our understanding of ‘to take things literally’ in a situation aware way. We need to be able to have the right meaning of TTL apply at the right time, specifically Meaning 1 in the first part, and the Meaning 2 in the latter.

Intuitively, we want something like this, with the scope corresponding to the situation:

  1. ∀z [ Kz → { TTLz ]1 → Pz }2

In this formula, let the square brackets [] have the first meaning of TTL apply, while the curly braces {} use the second meaning. Only the middle — TTL — does double duty with both meanings.

Achieving this customized scope can be done by using Independence Friendly logic. IF logic allows for fine-grained scope allocation.

So let:

S mean to steal.

D mean to take things definitionally.

Then:

  1. ∀x ∀y ∃u/∀x ∃v/∀y [ Kx → ( x=u & y=v & Su & Dv → TTLvu ) → Py ]
    If anyone is a kleptomaniac then there is someone who is identical to them who steals… and if there is someone who takes things definitionally then there is someone identical to them for whom it is hard to explain puns to… and the person who steals and the person who takes things definitionally then both Take Things Literally.

The scope gymnastics are being performed by the slash operators at the start and the equality symbols in the middle part of the equation. What they are doing is specifying the correct meanings — the correct dependencies — to go with the correct senses: Stealing pairs with Kleptomania and taking things Definitionally pairs with being bad at Puns, while both pairs also meaning Taking Things Literally. With both pairs meaning TTL, and each pair being composed independently, Equation (5) therefore provides a formalization of the original pun.

Discussion

Finding new applications for existing logical systems provides a foundation for further research. As we expand the range of topics subject to logical analysis, cross-pollination between these subjects becomes possible.

For instance, using custom dependencies to associate multiple meanings to a single term is not only useful in describing puns. Scientific entities are often the subjects of competing hypotheses. The different hypotheses give different meanings — different properties, relations and dependencies — to the scientific objects under study. Logically parsing how the different hypotheses explain the world using the same terms can help us analyze the contradictions and incommeasureabilities between theories.

On the other hand, while this article may have forever ruined the above pun for you (and me), it does potentially give insight into what humans find funny. Classically, risibility, having the ability to laugh, has been associated with humans and rationality. Analyzing this philosophical tradition with the new logical techniques will hopefully provide existential insight into the human condition.

Posted in independence friendly logic, logic. Tagged with , , , .

Xmas post

Happy Holidays!

As is my Xmas tradition, I watched “Die Hard”. Surprisingly one of the characters reminded me of the current state of internet philosophy:

Posted in internet, news, philosophy. Tagged with .

xkcd on the Trolley Problem

https://xkcd.com/1455/

Posted in internet. Tagged with .

On the Dangers of Running the PGR

Something that caught my eye in the recent PGR debate was a compliment of the anti-PGR faction’s organizational skills that was stated right along side an insult to their actions. Specifically:

“I really do not understand what is going on. You [did x]…  The response has been a well-organized attempt to force you to [do y]. But [doing x] had exactly nothing to do with [doing y].”

This well-organization stands in contrast to:

“I would rather not have had to make the decision in the face of a sometimes irrational cyber-mob”

I think this contradiction in characterization — either the anti-PGR faction is well-organized or it is an irrational mob, but not both — reveals something interesting going on with the PGR and philosophy.

I’d like to focus on the compliment of the organizational skills as it is the more revealing.

Let’s assume that complimenting your opponent’s organizational skills was not done out of magnanimity. Instead, it works to shift the blame away from the pro-PGR arguments and moral standing: the opponents won because of reasons that were not pertinent to the discussion, not “legitimate” reasons. That is, no one is paying attention to the pro-PGR arguments because they are so blinded by the ‘organization’ of the anti-PGR faction.

There are two ways to understand this:

  1. They are accusing the anti-PGR faction of running a conspiracy. Being well organized implies that there wasn’t really a consensus against the PGR. Instead, only the appearance of a consensus exists through the efforts of the anti-PGR leaders. These masterminds have engineered the appearance of a consensus to gather popular support for their illegitimate cause. The masterminds have fooled the masses into doing their bidding.

       Besides implying that there is no consensus, this is a clever strategy because it puts the the anti-PGR faction into the position of proving a negative: proving that they were not so well organized and hence that there is no conspiracy.

  2. Though the pro-PGR folks understand what has happened, they do not understand HOW it happened. The claim of well-organization is being used as a catch-all in place of a better causal explanation.

I think the latter is the more likely of the two options. Firstly, because confusion is admitted directly in the quote, and secondly because the PGR debate itself is exactly about how to evaluate different philosophies.

The PGR has systematically been evaluating philosophy for years, and hence inherently creates confirmation bias with respect to those rankings. The confirmation bias will, over time, overvalue philosophy at the top of the rankings and undervalue philosophy at the bottom.

What, then, may have happened is that the success of the PGR infected the minds of those most involved with it. The confirmation bias caused them to undervalue and overlook the capabilities of low-ranked philosophies, to the point of atrophy. So when those philosophies became mobilized against them, they couldn’t see or understand what was happening. They became inevitable victims of their own success.

Posted in argumentation, news, philosophy. Tagged with , .

Guidelines for Submitting to Philosophy Journals

Based on recent reviewers’ reports, I’ve come up with some quick guidelines to reference when submitting to philosophy journals:

1. Do not make an argument in your paper. If you do, it will be ignored, and hence is a waste of everyone’s time. Do not fear, though: The reviewer will tell you what argument should have been written and how you failed to provide sufficient supporting justifications for that argument.

2. Building and supporting the results of previous sections is likewise ill-advised. By having the sections relate to each other it ensures that they will be incompatible with the argument the reviewer is looking for.

3. Distinctions are dangerous! By associating two concepts together you will introduce complexity to your paper. The reviewer cannot be expected to remember which concept you are discussing, no matter how clearly you state which you are talking about.

4. Providing new definitions of traditional concepts should be avoided. As the old, contradictory, definition is so much more familiar, any new definition will inherently be too obscure to have any utility.

Conclusion: Basically assume the paper will be reviewed on a Friday night after heavy drinking.

OK. Done venting.

Posted in philosophy.

Site Update 2014

After running this site for 7 years, I have done a comprehensive update of the systems that run it, namely migrating it to a brand new database. This has increased the site speed, noticeable in page loading times especially on the calendar. The calendar is going strong, with many talks and events for the Fall of 2014. Please check it out if you are in the New York City metropolitan area.

Posted in internet, news. Tagged with .

On the defense of ‘Evolutionary and Newtonian Forces’

Dr. Ellen Clark, a.k.a. Philosomama, has written a good review of Velasco & Hitchcock’s Evolutionary and Newtonian Forces [no paywall], one of the first papers to appear in the new open access journal Ergo. She points out that although V&H are trying to show how evolutionary forces are well described by analogy to classical causal Newtonian forces, they very nearly prove their opponent’s — the statisticalist — position. However, she comes to their defense.

Briefly, the causalist position is that evolutionary forces are causal like the force of Newtonian gravity. Natural Selection is a causal force that acts on biological organisms. The statisticalist position claims evolutionary phenomena are just the statistical result of the underlying causal physical processes. Hence, for the statisticalist, evolutionary phenomena have no force of their own.

V&H want to argue that evolutionary forces are like friction or elasticity. Dr. Clark points out that these forces can be problematic for their view, as they too note:

As Velasco & Hitchcock acknowledge, friction and elasticity are usually thought of by physicists as emerging “from the aggregate statistical behaviour of more elementary forces in certain kinds of system.” … But this is grist to the statistical view’s mill, we might say. They argue that natural selection supervenes on more basic causal events, without adding any extra causal power of its own. So these critics might happily accept that evolutionary forces are analagous to non-fundamental Newtonian forces, whilst holding their ground on the claim that natural selection is not causal.

However, causalist vs. statistical isn’t what I would like to discuss here; see her review for more discussion. Instead I’d like to focus on her appeal to the unknown as a defense of V&H’s causalist position. She claims that it is OK to consider evolutionary forces causal, like Newtonian forces, because Newtonian forces are mysterious. Since Newtonian forces are mysterious, we shouldn’t privilege their causality and should grant that right to not well understood biological forces as well. She says:

If there is anything magical about thinking of natural selection as an overall force producing all the multifarious births and deaths that we actually observe, then it is in very good company lumped in with physical forces.

This is an example of my favorite fallacy, Ignotum Per Ignotius: explaining something unknown by appealing to something even less understood. Let me explain why this is really problematic for her defense and ultimately for V&H.

Imagine a statisticalist pointing to their analogies and explanations of evolutionary phenomena and saying, “Evolution isn’t mysterious at all, and we have a perfectly good statistical explanation right here. The only causality is in the underlying fundamental physics.” The evolutionary causalist is then in the uncomfortable luddite position of insisting, without reason, that we don’t understand evolution. Appealing to an analogy with physics that supports the causal position is question begging, if there is no deeper reason why this analogy holds other than it supports the claim that evolutionary phenomena are mysterious and hence causal. Therefore without some other reason to support the causal view of evolutionary phenomena, appealing to mysteriousness does not justify the causalist position.

Moreover, without a supporting causalist argument, V&H have done the statisticalist’s work for them. As noted above, they have gone and shown exactly how evolutionary phenomena are like statistical results of underlying forces.

Posted in biology, evolution, philosophy, physics. Tagged with , , , , .

On Metaphysical Proficiency

Are you good at metaphysics? How good are you at metaphysics?

When I consider these questions, the only sure thing is that there is no objective measure of metaphysical proficiency. I can’t even imagine standards by which we could judge it. It would be at least as hard to estimate as intelligence, and anyway, I doubt smarts correlates with metaphysical skill. Lots of smart people have said a lot of ridiculous things. I like to think that I’m better than the next guy, because, well, I like to think that. This reminded me of the old highway driving razor:

Have you ever noticed that anybody driving slower than you is an idiot, and anyone going faster than you is a maniac? — George Carlin

I’d amend it to say:

Everyone who is more dogmatic than you is an idiot and everyone who is less dogmatic than you is a maniac.

Perhaps we are the metaphysicians we think we are, but it wouldn’t hurt to be a bit more metaphysically charitable.

Posted in metaphysics, philosophy. Tagged with , .

Shaking the Tree

Life often results in situations such that no strategy suggests any further moves. We just don’t know what to do next. In a game of perfect information, where each player knows all the previous moves, this can signal stalemate. Take chess: given both sides know everything that has transpired and have no reason to believe that the opponent will make a mistake, there can come a time when both sides will realize that there are no winning strategies for either player. A draw is then agreed upon.

The situation is not as simple in games of incomplete information. Let’s assume some information is private, that some moves in the game are only known to a limited number of players. For instance, imagine you take over a game of chess in the middle of a match. The previous moves would be known to your opponent and the absent player, but not to you. Hence you do not know the strategies used to arrive at that point in the game, and **your opponent knows that you do not know**.

Assume we are in a some such situation where we do not know all the previous moves and have no further strategic moves to make. This is to say we are waiting, idling, or otherwise biding our time until something of significance happens. Formally we are at an equilibrium.

A strategy to get out of this equilibrium is to “shake the tree” to see what “falls out”. This involves making information public that was thought to be private. For instance, say you knew a damaging secret to someone in power and that person thought they had successfully hidden said secret. By making that person believe that the secret was public knowledge, this could cause them to act in a way they would not otherwise, breaking the equilibrium.

How, though, to represent this formally? The move made in shaking the tree is to make information public that was believed to be private. To represent this in logic we need a mechanism that represents public and private information. I will use the forward slash notation of Independence Friendly Logic, /, to mean ‘depends upon’ and the back slash, , to mean ‘independent of.’

To represent private strategy Q, based on secret S, and not public to party Z we can say:

Secret Strategy) If, and only if, no one other than Y depends upon the Secret, then use Strategy Q
(∀YS) (∃z/S) ~(Y = z) ⇔ Q

To initial ‘shaking the tree’ would be to introduce a new dependency:

Tree Shaking) there is someone other than Y that depends on S
(∃zS) ~(Y = z)

Tree Shaking causes party Y’s to change away from Strategy Q since Strategy Q was predicated upon no one other than Y knowing the secret, S. The change in strategy means that the players are no longer idling in equilibrium, which is the goal of shaking the tree.

Posted in game theory, independence friendly logic, logic, philosophy. Tagged with , , .

NYC Area Philosophy Calendar Spring 2014 update

I’ve updated the NYC Area Philosophy Calendar for Spring 2014. As per usual, there are some great talks and conferences to check out.

I’d love feedback about the calendar, so please get in touch if you have any comments or suggestions.

From my website statistics Brooklyn, NY has the heaviest calendar users. Hello Brooklyn.

Posted in internet, news, NYC, philosophy.
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