Apr
5
Fri
Intersubjectivity and Interpretation: CUNY Grad Conference 2019 @ CUNY Grad Center, rm tba
Apr 5 all-day

In ethics, in epistemology, in philosophy of mind and even (Searlean protestations notwithstanding) in ontology interest has steadily been growing in the idea that intersubjectivity is a central concept for understanding various aspects of our world. Similarly, the concept of interpretation has come to attention in a new light as a key means by which the interactions between subjectivities is mediated. This line of research raises a number of philosophical questions:

– What is intersubjectivity? Can it be given ‘a clear explanation’? In what relation does it stand to objectivity? In what relation does it stand to the first-person and second-person perspectives?

– What is interpretation? What is it to interpret another person’s behaviour as that of a genuine subject of experience? Is this notion of interpretation the same as that which we employ when speaking of interpreting language, rules, art, or data?

– Does intersubjectivity require interpretation? Must we rely on interpretive practices in order to make sense of others as subjects? If so, what implications might this have for the concept of intersubjectivity, and those practices and entities that might depend upon it?

– Does interpretation require intersubjectivity? Is there a sense of interpretation for which one cannot genuinely interpret something without taking it to be the result of intentional action on the part of a subject, produced for other subjects? And if so, what implications might that have for our understanding of interpretive practices?

– How do these questions connect with issues in areas of philosophy such as epistemology, aesthetics, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, social philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, political theory?

The keynote speaker will be Jay Garfield, who will deliver a talk on “The Second Person: Reflexivity and Reflection”.

We are pleased to invite abstracts sufficiently in the spirit of the project theme of no more than 1,000 words. Abstracts should:

– Outline the paper’s principal argument(s).

– Give a good sense of the paper’s philosophical contribution(s).

– Be anonymized.

The deadline for abstracts is January 19th, 2019. Abstracts should be e-mailed to 2019cunygradconference@gmail.com. Please include with your submission a cover page that includes your name, affiliated institution, contact information, and title of paper.

We will accept submissions from any area of philosophy, and from any philosophical tradition. We strongly encourage participants from groups whose voices are disproportionately excluded from philosophical discourse to submit abstracts.

https://philevents.org/event/show/68066

Apr
13
Sat
NYU-Columbia Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Keynote: Laurie Paul @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Apr 13 all-day

The graduate students and faculty of the Columbia and NYU Philosophy Departments invite graduate submissions in any area of philosophy for a conference to be held on Saturday, April 13th, 2019 at New York University.

Submission Guidelines

Please send submission as attachments in .doc or .pdf format to columbianyu.philgradconference@gmail.com by February 3rd, 2018 (Notification by February 17th, 2019).

Papers must meet the following requirements:

  • All papers must be between 3,000 and 5,000 words in length, suitable for a presentation of 30-40 minutes to a general philosophical audience.
  • Submit papers with a separate cover sheet in .doc or .pdf format that includes the following information: name, home institution, contact details, area of paper (e.g. metaphysics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, etc.) and an abstract of no longer than 300 words.
  • Papers must be submitted by email in blind-review format.
May
3
Fri
Workshop on Emotions @ CUNY Grad Center, rm 5307
May 3 all-day

This workshop will provide a forum for researchers doing work on emotions and related states. The goal is to share new ideas and lines of inquiry, to develop new reflections, and to foster communication between those of us who are investigating emotions in the New York area, and beyond.

*** The event is free but registration is required for those attending on Saturday. To register, send an email with your name by May 2, to Sarah Arnaud: sarnaud@gc.cuny.edu ***

Program (download printable flyer)

Friday, May 3

9:45-10:30

  • Introduction by Jesse Prinz

9:45-10:30

  • Sarah Arnaud
    “What are unconscious emotions?”

10:30-10:45: Break

10:45-11:30

  • Katherine Rickus
    “1st and 3rd person knowledge of emotions”

11:30-12:15

  • Hilla Jacobson
    “Pain and mere tastes”

12:15-1:45: Break – lunch

1:45-2:30

  • Kathryn Pendoley
    “Nagging Guilt, Tentative Fear: Uncertain Emotions and the Problem of Recalcitrance”

2:30-3:15

  • Alexandra Gustafson
    “Love Alters Not: A Study of Unrequited Love”

3:15-3:30: Break

3:30-4:15

  • Justin Leonard Clardy
    “A New Challenge for Romantic Love as Union”

4:15-5:00

  • Adam Lerner
    “Empathy is evidence”

5:00-6:00: Reception

 

Saturday, May 4

9:45-10:30

  • Federico Lauria
    “What does emotion teach us about self-deception?”

10:30-10:45: Break

10:45-11:30

  • Hyunseop Kim
    “Meaningfulness as Correct Fulfillment”

11:30-12:15

  • Sergio Gallegos
    “Emilio Uranga’s analysis of zozobra (anguish)”

12:15-1:45: Break – lunch

1:45-2:30

  • Xiaoyu Ke
    “Virtue Responsibilism, Epistemic Emotions, and Epistemic Situationism”

2:30-3:15

  • Michael Zhao
    “Guilt without perceived wrongdoing”

3:15-3:30: Break

3:30-4:15

  • Shawn Tinghao Wang
    “Moral agency account of shame” 

4:15-5:00

  • Daniel Shargel
    “Lol: What we can learn from forced laughter”

5:00-6:00: Reception

Feb
15
Sat
After the Welfare State: Reconceiving Mutual Aid @ NYU
Feb 15 – Feb 16 all-day

The 2020 Annual Telos-Paul Piccone Institute Conference
Keynote Speaker: Catherine Malabou, Kingston University and University of California, Irvine.

Conference Description

Although the rise of populism has often been interpreted as the atavistic return of racism and nationalism, the underlying sources have more to do with the collapse of the welfare state model in advanced post-industrial countries, which has resulted in the search for new forms of solidarity that could replace welfare state structures. These structures were first developed in the early twentieth century when a new type of nation-state and industrial economy came into being along with the developing capitalist regime of accumulation. Such a regime brought about the destruction of the existing networks of solidarity—based primarily on family, religious community, and workplace ties—thereby leading the state to intervene in different social services, including health, employment, and senior care, as well as in labor policy regarding such issues as the minimum wage, the length of the working day, retirement, and accident insurance. However, these interventions by the state, whether they responded to labor union protests or arose from anti-socialist preemptive actions by conservative forces, have been accompanied by the growing bureaucratization of its practices, which have come to constitute, along with capitalist commodification, one of today’s fundamental sources of inequalities and conflicts.

The shifting line between the private and the public has had ambiguous effects. In the end, state intervention was carried out not in the form of a true democratization but through the imposition of new forms of subordination. The social result with greater globalization and deindustrialization in most of the advanced industrial countries has been a sense of abandonment, as well as a loss of empowerment and autonomy in all segments of the population. At the same time, with the emergence of post-Fordist capitalism in the late twentieth century, this subordination to the state has taken the opposite form—that of a reduction of state intervention and care, based on the idea that the endless expansion of state services cannot serve as a panacea for all problems. As a result, new distortions in the private/public divide recently have appeared. In turn, the private sphere has become increasingly contentious, first, because of growing privatization of previously public services and, second, because gaining access to those services is left to individual initiative.

The feeling that governments are incapable of dealing with social problems has regenerated the awareness that collective self-management is perhaps inevitable, at both micro- and macroscopic levels: from neighborhood collectives up to lending circles, non-profit societies, religious organizations, and solidarity economies. The contemporary interest in structures of mutual aid relates to the fact that we are living in an era that is clearly looking for new models of human flourishing and social development. Not only must we deal with multiple and recurring crises (finance, food, energy, and environment), but there is a growing recognition that today’s normative agenda has to be much more encompassing and holistic, including issues of gender equality, fair trade, environment, and cultural and religious diversity.

A need to reconceptualize the concepts of the “common good” and “collective interest” is developing out of this set of conditions, leading to new definitions of civic sense, responsibility, and autonomy. The need for intermediary structures between the private and public sphere frames the space of intervention for mutual aid as a new form of social coherence.

But the concept of mutual aid has a complex and contradictory history. According to Peter Kropotkin, there is an innate biological evolutionary tendency toward mutualism in all living beings, an immanent social rationality that orients humanity toward a self-regulated political organization and society. Against social Darwinism, Kropotkin argues that species not only compete but also, and mainly, collaborate. Such an evolutionary vision later formed the core of Edward Wilson’s sociobiology, marking the beginning of the altruism/selfishness debates within which the problematic of mutual help has remained enclosed for decades. Libertarianism, for example, presupposes that individuals’ social behavior is grounded in a natural principle of selfishness that should then become the basis of aid. This vision allows for a deterministic idea of the capitalist economy in which Robert Nozick argues for the principle of a “minimal state” grounded on the fact that no distributive justice can come from above. Similarly, Friedrich Hayek argues that the “true” nature of liberalism lies in the doctrine that seeks to reduce to the minimum the power of the state. Democracy is then only the means for collective decision-making or a utilitarian apparatus for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom. The capitalist free market, in turn, is said to be the only type of social organization that respects the principle of individual liberty.

If the theory of mutual aid can no longer be grounded in an opposition between the two poles of society and the state, but must be reconceptualized in terms of the mediation between both, the modes of its mediation become the key to the implementation of mutual aid practices. Ideas of family, nation, and religion thus take on new potential significance as the forms of mediation between individuals that can create the basis for networks of mutual aid. Are these the key categories that would embed mutual aid in broader affective, ethical, and metaphysical frameworks, or are there alternative possibilities that would establish new types of networks?

This conference seeks to develop new concepts of mutual aid that are not predetermined by conceptions of biological, economic, or political certainties. Key questions include:

  • Why is mutual aid not linked with theories of social contract, and how do we determine its degrees of separation from the state?
  • How can mutual aid be reconceptualized by renewing intellectual traditions?
  • What are the moral implications and requisites of the concept of mutual aid today?
  • What are the privileged domains of application for mutual aid and what are the organizational principles underlying them?
  • Does mutual aid imply a reorganization of the economy, or is it compatible with or even essential to a capitalist organization of economic life?
  • Does the concept of mutual aid offer tools for reimagining socialism in a way that avoids an overreliance on state power?
  • Does mutual aid require a reconstitution of subjectivity that moves it away from the autonomous individual of liberal theory?
  • What are the prospects and problems of religious frameworks, such as Pentecostalism, that function as the basis for mutual aid?
  • Can the rise of populism be understood as part of a search for new networks for mutual aid? Does mutual aid imply the restriction of its networks to limited groups, implying a relationship to political identity?
  • How does the concept of mutual aid relate to state power and the sovereignty of the state?

Abstract Submissions

Please note: Abstracts for this conference will only be accepted from current Telos-Paul Piccone Institute members. In order to become a member, please visit our membership enrollment page. Telos-Paul Piccone Institute memberships are valid until the end of the annual New York City conference.

We invite scholars from all disciplines to submit 250-word abstracts along with a short c.v. to telosnyc2020@telosinstitute.net by September 30, 2019. Please place “The 2020 Telos Conference” in the email’s subject line.

https://philevents.org/event/show/73818

Apr
2
Thu
Analytic/Continental What? Dissolving the Philosophical Divide @ CUNY Grad Center
Apr 2 all-day

The 23rd Annual CUNY Graduate Student Philosophy Conference invites graduate students to submit their work engaging with philosophical topics and traditions that consider or bridge the analytic/continental divide. The analytic/continental division typically assumes contrasting notions of what philosophy ‘is’ and what it ought to be. The divide also describes the varying methodologies employed when we practice philosophy. Whether it refers to meta-philosophical commitments or strategies used, the divide can do exactly that – divide. When concerned with the nature of philosophy and how one ought to conceive of the practice the stakes can be high; when we ask, “What counts as philosophy?” we implicitly ask, “What doesn’t ‘count’ as philosophy?” This conference aims to explore issues that need to be explored by the philosophical community at large, especially when the legitimacy of certain practices are under scrutiny. The conference also aims to create a space where we can learn to ask better questions concerning the nature of our academic practices, the traditions we draw from, the methodologies we employ, and the topics we consider.

Keynote speaker: Talia Mae Bettcher (California State University, Los Angeles)

We are particularly interested in papers from all areas of philosophy that:

  • explore the meta-philosophical or sociological questions concerning the analytical/continental divide without exclusionary border-policing. Is such a divide legitimate? What has motivated this divide? What are the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining the divide? How can we bridge or dismantle the divide? Etc.
  • broadly engage with the question of “what can philosophy be?” How can philosophy establish fewer borders and more bridges?
  • engage with philosophers (i.e. Rorty, Badiou, Williams, etc.), philosophical topics (i.e. race, gender, coloniality, etc.), and/or traditions (i.e. critical race theory, feminist philosophy, queer theory, postcolonial/decolonial theory, etc.) that have always or currently do bridge the analytic/continental divide, again without exclusionary border-policing.
  • explore the analytic/continental divide in an interdisciplinary manner drawing from sociology, critical psychology, gender studies, race studies, literature, history, the arts, etc.

The conference is committed to providing a platform for marginalized persons and topics in the discipline. In answering some of the questions presented we highly encourage papers regarding, among other topics: critical race theory, feminist philosophy, queer theory, trans philosophy, and disabilities studies. Speakers from marginalized groups in the discipline are strongly encouraged to submit. Any abstracts that aim to discredit already marginalized philosophers or philosophies are strongly discouraged.

Apr
3
Fri
1st Annual NYU Philosophical Bioethics Workshop @ Center for Bioethics, NYU
Apr 3 all-day

The NYU Center for Bioethics is pleased to welcome submissions of abstracts for its 1st Annual Philosophical Bioethics Workshop, to be held at NYU on Friday, April 3, 2020.

We are seeking to showcase new work in philosophical bioethics, including (but not limited to) neuroethics, environmental ethics, animal ethics, reproductive ethics, research ethics, ethics of AI, data ethics, and clinical ethics.

Our distinguished keynote speaker will be Frances Kamm.

There will be four additional slots for papers chosen from among the submitted abstracts, including one slot set aside for a graduate student speaker. The most promising graduate student submission will be awarded a Graduate Prize, which includes coverage of travel expenses (up to $500, plus accommodation for two nights) as well as an award of $500. Please indicate in your submission email whether you would like to be considered for the Graduate Prize.

Please submit extended abstracts of between 750 and 1,000 words to philosophicalbioethics@gmail.com by 11:59 pm EST on Friday, January 24, 2020. Abstracts should be formatted for blind review and should be suitable for presentation in 30-35 minutes. Notification of acceptance will take place via email by Friday, February 14, 2020.

When submitting your abstract, please also indicate whether you would be interested in serving as a commentator in the event that your abstract is not selected for presentation. We will be inviting four additional participants to serve as commentators.